(1) Assuming the signif icates of non-complex terms, in this treatise I intend to investigate certain properties of terms, [properties] that are applicable to them only insofar as they are parts of propositions.

(2) Now I divide this tract into three parts. The first is about the supposition of terms, the second about appellation, and the third about copulation. Supposition belongs to the subject, appellation to the predicate. Copulation belongs to the verb that couples the predicate with the subject. For these three are the integral parts of the categorical proposition, to which we turn before [treating] hypotheticals. ¹ Hence in this tract I want to talk about the suppositions of terms in categoricals.

[Part One: On Supposition]

(3) The first part will contain six chapters. The first chapter is about the division of supposition in general. The second chapter is about material supposition. The third chapter is about simple supposition. The fourth chapter is about the division of personal supposition in general. The fifth chapter is about various difficulties that arise concerning personal supposition. The sixth chapter is about improper supposition.

¹ Hypothetical propositions are propositions composed of two or more categoricals. A categorical proposition is, in modern logical terminology, either an atomic proposition or else the negation of an atomic proposition. Hence the notion of a hypothetical proposition is not exactly the same as the modern notion of a “molecular” proposition, since the negations of atomic propositions are molecular but not hypothetical. Note that hypothetical propositions, in this sense, are not restricted to if-then conditionals.
[Chapter 1: On the Division of Supposition in General]

(4) As for the first chapter, you have to know that ‘supposition’ is taken in two senses, namely, broadly and properly. Supposition taken broadly is a property of a term relative to another term in a proposition. In this sense, supposition belongs to the subject as well as to the predicate, and even to the verb or the consignificates of the verb. We shall use ‘supposition’ in this sense in many places in this first part. Taken in this sense, supposition belongs to more than appellation does, because supposition belongs to the subject as well as to the predicate, while appellation belongs only to the predicate.

(5) Supposition properly so called is a property of the subject term relative to the predicate. Now ‘term’ here is taken indifferently for anything that can be an extreme of a proposition, whether it is a simple term, whether it is an aggregate of an adjective and a substantive, or [an aggregate] of adjectives, or is even put together by means of conjunction or disjunction.

(6) Speaking generally, supposition is the taking of a term for something, namely, for a thing or for an utterance or for a concept.

(7) I recall that in my youth I wrote about a great many divisions of supposition. But in the present work I do not want to maintain so many branches, because fewer suffice for my present purpose.

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2 In mediaeval logical writings, to say that something is said in a “proper” sense is not to imply that there is something incorrect or wrong about other senses. The contrast here between the “broad” and the “proper” senses is simply one of extension.

3 The “consignificates” of a verb are things like the time implied by the verb’s tense. It is at first hard to see how such consignificates can be said to have supposition in the general sense Burley defines, if supposition belongs only to terms in propositions. The time implied by a proposition’s verb would not seem to be part of the proposition, but instead part of its semantic correlate. In order to make sense of Burley’s claim, you have to realize that he has a doctrine of something called a “real proposition” in addition to the normal spoken, written and mental propositions. A “real proposition” is not so much a piece of language as a piece of the world. The details of this doctrine are obscure, but it is perhaps only in such “real propositions” that the consignificates of the verb can be said to have supposition.

4 That is, a subject or predicate.

5 Note that the conjunctions and disjunctions referred to here are of terms, not of propositions. Thus, ‘Socrates and Plato’, ‘Socrates or Plato’.

6 ‘utterance’ = vox. There is no really satisfactory translation for this term. It refers to any block of speech, not necessarily consisting of meaningful words or meaningful combinations of words. ‘Utterance’ is probably accurate enough, and I have adopted it throughout; but it sometimes results in pretty lumpy English.

7 It is not clear what earlier work of his Burley is referring to. He wrote an earlier treatise De suppositionibus, but the division of supposition there is not markedly different
By its first division, supposition is divided into proper and improper supposition. Supposition is proper when a term supposits for something for which it is permitted to supposit literally. Supposition is improper when a term supposits for something by transumption or from its usage in speech.

Proper supposition is divided. For one kind is formal and another kind is material. Supposition is material when an utterance supposits for itself or for another utterance that is not inferior to it. As an example of the first kind: ‘Man is monosyllabic’, ‘Man is a noun’, ‘Cato’s is in the possessive case’, and so on. As an example of the second kind: ‘That a man is an animal is a true proposition’. Here the utterance ‘that a man is an animal’ supposits for the utterance ‘A man is an animal’, and the utterance ‘that a man is an animal’ is neither inferior nor superior to the utterance ‘A man is an animal’.

Now I said that supposition is material when an utterance supposits for itself or for another utterance “that is not inferior to it”. For an utterance sometimes does supposit for something inferior to it, and in that case it supposits personally, whether what is inferior is an utterance or whether it


‘Transumption’ is the name given by the mediaevals to the second of the three “modes” of equivocation described by Aristotle at Sophistic Refutations 4, 166a4ff. It amounts to equivocation by analogy. For example, the term ‘man’ may be used to describe both human beings and the images or statues of human beings.

Note that mediaeval Latin did not have quotation marks. In effect, the theory of material supposition is designed in part to do what we do with quotation marks. But there are important differences. According to the modern convention, a quotation-mark name is a distinct name from the name quoted. But a term in material supposition is not regarded as distinct from the same term in some other kind of supposition; it is just used with a different semantic role. Note also that Latin has no indefinite article, so that the ‘a’ in the second example is supplied only because English requires it. It does not translate a Latin quantifier.

‘That a man is an animal is a true proposition’ = Hominem esse animal est propositione vera. Latin frequently uses such an accusative + infinitive construction (hominem esse animal) where English would prefix a ‘for’ or use a ‘that’-clause. Thus Impossibile est hominem esse asinum = ‘It is impossible for a man to be an ass’, ‘It is impossible that a man be an ass’. The original Latin construction is sometimes retained in English, however, and is visible in the cases of some pronouns, where the accusative is distinguished from the nominative. Thus, ‘They thought him to be mad’, ‘I would prefer him to keep quiet’. The accusative + infinitive construction in Latin is called a “dictum”.

Inferiority and superiority here are matters of predication. ‘Man’ is said to be “inferior” to ‘animal’, and ‘animal’ superior to ‘man’ because ‘animal’ is predicated of everything ‘man’ is predicated of, and of more besides. The expressions ‘A man is an animal’ and ‘that a man is an animal’ are not related in this way.
is a thing or a concept. Thus, when one says ‘Every name is an utterance’, the term ‘name’ supposit for utterances only. But because those utterances are contained under the utterance ‘name’, therefore it does not supposit materially but rather personally.

(11) Formal supposition is of two kinds. For a term sometimes supposit for its significate, sometimes for its suppositum\textsuperscript{12} or for some singular of which it is truly predicated.\textsuperscript{13} And so formal supposition is divided into personal supposition and simple supposition.

(12) Supposition is personal when a term supposit for its suppositum or supposita or for some singular of which the term is accidentally predicated. I include [the last clause] on account of singular\textsuperscript{14} aggregated or concrete terms.\textsuperscript{15} Such terms can supposit personally or simply, as is clear. For each of the following is true: ‘White Socrates is a being by accident’, ‘White Socrates is a substance’, according to the one [kind of] supposition or the other. According as ‘white Socrates’ supposit for its significate, namely, for the whole aggregate,\textsuperscript{16} it has simple supposition, and ‘White Socrates is a being by accident’ is true. But according as ‘white Socrates’ supposit for Socrates, of whom it is accidentally predicated, it has personal supposition. In that sense the proposition ‘White Socrates is a substance’ is true.

(13) Therefore, I say that formal supposition is divided into personal supposition and simple supposition. Supposition is personal when a common term supposit for its inferiors, whether those inferiors are singulars or common [things],\textsuperscript{17} whether they are things or utterances, or when a concrete\textsuperscript{18} accidental term or a compound term supposit for what it is accidentally predici-

\textsuperscript{12} The noun term ‘suppositum’ has a logical usage, according to which it refers to whatever a term supposit for. That is not the sense here, since it would be tautologous to say that a term supposit for its suppositum in that sense. There is also a metaphysical sense of the term, according to which the supposita of a term are the individuals that fall under it. (‘Supponere’ = literally, “to place under.”) In this metaphysical sense, Socrates and Plato are supposita of the term ‘man’.

\textsuperscript{13} The phrase ‘for some singular of which it is truly predicated’ is an explication of the notion of “suppositing for its suppositum”, not an alternative to it.

\textsuperscript{14} “Singular”, not as opposed to “plural”, but as opposed to “general”.

\textsuperscript{15} “Concrete terms” does not here mean concrete as opposed to abstract (although that usage is also common in the Middle Ages). It means literally “grown together”. Here the phrase appears to be an explication of the preceding term “aggregated”, not an additional alternative. In the examples, ‘white Socrates’ is an aggregated or concrete singular term, because it is the result of the coming together of the two words ‘white’ and ‘Socrates’.

\textsuperscript{16} That is, the accidental combination of Socrates and his whiteness.

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Common things’. That is, universals or common natures.

\textsuperscript{18} See n. 15, above.
cated of. But supposition is simple when a common term or an aggregated singular [term] supposits for what it signifies.

[Chapter 2: On Material Supposition]

(14) Now that we have looked at the general division of supposition, we must look at [each] branch in particular, and first at material supposition. In this regard, you have to understand first that supposition is material when (a) a spoken utterance supposits for itself spoken or (b) for itself written, or also (c) for another utterance that is not inferior to the former utterance taken in such a way, or also (d) when an utterance taken under one [kind of] supposition supposits for itself taken under another [kind of] supposition, or (e) when an utterance taken in one way supposits for itself taken in such a way that it cannot supposit or have supposition [at all]. In all these ways a term can have material supposition.19

(15) As an example of the first case, suppose that someone is talking and pronounces the utterance ‘man’. In that case the spoken utterance ‘Man is spoken’ or ‘Man is a spoken utterance’ is true. And insofar as [the proposition] is true, the utterance ‘man’ supposits for itself spoken and has material supposition.

(16) As an example of the second case, keep the same situation [as before].20 If ‘Man is a spoken utterance’ or ‘Man is spoken’ is written down, then this written expression has a true sense, namely, insofar as the written word ‘man’ supposits for itself spoken.21 Or suppose that the utterance ‘man’ is written down on this page, and someone says ‘Man is written on this page’. This has a true sense, namely, insofar as the spoken utterance ‘man’ supposits for itself written. And the supposition [in that case] is material.

(17) As an example of the third case, if someone says ‘That a man is an animal is a declarative expression’,22 it has a true sense, namely, insofar as the utterance ‘that a man is an animal’ supposits for the utterance ‘A man is an animal’. And the supposition [in this case] is material.

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19 All these will be illustrated in the following paragraphs.

20 That is, suppose that someone is talking and pronounces the utterance ‘man’.

21 Note the implicit assumption that the term ‘man’ is the same whether it is spoken or written. You might think for a moment about the metaphysics behind this. Note also that the example does not fit case (b) as described in para. 14. For a fuller and more careful statement of the modes of material supposition, see para. 22, below.

22 ‘That a man is an animal is a declarative expression’ = Hominem esse animal est oratio enuntiativa. Here is another one of those dicta or accusative + infinitive expressions discussed in n. 10 above.
(18) Nevertheless, ‘That a man is an animal is a declarative expression’, according as the subject has material supposition, can be distinguished insofar as the utterance ‘that a man is an animal’ can supposit for itself or for ‘A man is an animal’. In the first sense [the proposition] is false and ‘That a man is an animal is a noun clause’\(^{23}\) is true. In the second sense [the proposition] is true, namely, insofar as ‘that a man is an animal’ supposts for ‘A man is an animal’.

(19) And so we have a clear example of the third case, namely, that sometimes supposition is material when one utterance supposts for another that is not inferior to it. Here is another example: ‘The utterance “animal” is truly predicated of man’. This is true insofar as the utterance ‘of man’\(^{24}\) supposts for the utterance ‘man’. For ‘animal’ is truly predicated of the utterance ‘man’, not of the utterance ‘of man’ in its own right. For ‘A man is an animal’ is true, while ‘Of man is an animal’\(^{25}\) is false or ill-formed.

(20) Here is an example of the fourth case: In the proposition ‘Every man runs’, the term ‘man’ has personal supposition. And if someone should say “Man supposits personally in A” — let A be the proposition ‘Every man runs’ — [then] ‘Man supposits personally in A’ is true. And in ‘Man supposits personally in A’, the utterance ‘man’ does not have personal supposition, insofar as [the proposition] is true. For if it had personal supposition, [the proposition] would be false because each of its singulars\(^{26}\) is false. Therefore, ‘Man supposits personally in A’ is true insofar as the term ‘man’ supposits materially for itself standing personally in ‘[Every]\(^{27}\) man runs’. Likewise, ‘Man is distributed in A’ is true in the same way.

(21) There is an example of the fifth case where one says ‘White cannot supposit’.\(^{28}\) This is true insofar as the utterance ‘white’ is taken substan-
tively (or after the manner of a substantive, even though it is not a substantive) and supposit for itself taken adjectivally and insofar as it cannot supposit. Thus, of what cannot supposit, insofar as it is such, no predicate can be verified. Yet of something suppositing for what cannot supposit something can be verified.\(^{29}\)

(22) So it appears that a term can supposit materially in five ways. If other ways are found, they will be like these or reducible to these. The first way [arises] when a term spoken supposit for itself spoken, taken in the same way, or [a term] written [supposit] for itself written; the second way, when a term spoken supposit for itself written, or conversely; the third way, when a term or utterance supposit for another utterance that is not inferior to it. (I say ‘that is not inferior’, because if it supposit for its inferior, it would not supposit materially but rather personally.) The fourth way occurs when a term taken under one [kind of] supposition supposit for itself taken under another [kind of] supposition. The fifth way occurs when a term taken under one [kind of] supposition supposit for itself [taken as] not able to supposit [at all].

(23) But there is a doubt about this last case. For in ‘White cannot supposit’, if [the proposition] is true, [the term ‘white’] has to have a suppositum able to supposit. Therefore, it is true to say of what supposit here that it is able to supposit. And consequently ‘White cannot supposit’ is false.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) This obscure passage can perhaps be explained as follows. ‘White’ = albus is the masculine form of the adjective. As an adjective, it needs a noun (= substantive) to modify. Hence the adjective can never function by itself in subject or predicate position. Thus, it cannot have supposition. (On the other hand, the composite of adjective + noun can have supposition, since it can function as a subject or predicate.) In the proposition ‘White cannot supposit’, taken in the sense that makes it true, the term ‘white’ is not being used in this adjectival way. On the contrary, it is being used “after the manner of a substantive, even though it is not a substantive”. That is, it is being used as a kind of “quasi-noun” to refer to itself in its adjectival role. The example is perhaps needlessly obscure because it appeals to details of theory that are not really necessary to make the point. Easier examples might have been: ‘If is a conjunction’, ‘Of is a preposition’ ‘Of cannot have supposition’, etc.

\(^{30}\) The argument in this paragraph is not persuasive as it stands. Why does the subject have to have a suppositum that is itself able to supposit? I suspect the text is corrupt here. The reply to this argument, given two paragraphs below, seems to be instead a reply to an argument like the following: If ‘White cannot supposit’ is true, then the subject term ‘white’ must supposit for something. That is, there must be something that it is being said cannot supposit. But what could that something be except the term ‘white’ itself? On the other hand, that very term, we just said, is the subject of ‘White cannot supposit’ and does indeed have supposition there. Thus the claim that it cannot have supposition is false. (In this form, the argument amounts to a reductio.) A few minor emendations of the Latin text would enable it to yield this argument.
(24) In the same way, there is a doubt about such cases as ‘Every is a syncategoremata taken syncategorematically’.

This is true. Therefore, ‘every’ is taken here either categorically or syncategorematically. If categorically, then [the proposition] is false because ‘every’, as taken categorically, is not a syncategoremata taken syncategorematically. But if ‘every’ is a syncategoremata taken syncategorematically, then the proposition is ill-formed and unintelligible. For ‘every’ taken syncategorematically cannot supposit [for anything] or signify anything by itself.

(25) To the first [objection] I reply, in accordance with the last branch [of material supposition], that ‘White cannot supposit’ is true insofar as ‘white’ is taken materially and after the manner of a substantive. For in that sense it supposits for itself taken adjectivally, and [taken] in this [adjectival] way it cannot supposit. When it is argued “White, as it supposits here when one says ‘White cannot supposit’, is a suppositum and is able to supposit”, I say [in reply] that what supposits here, as it supposits here, is able to supposit. Nevertheless, ‘White cannot supposit’ is true, because ‘white’ here supposits for something that cannot supposit in the way in which ‘white’ here supposits for it. Thus a negative proposition can very well be true, even though the predicate belongs to the subject, or to that for which [the subject] supposits, provided that it does not belong to that for which [the subject] supposits according as it supposits for it. It is like this in the case at hand. For ‘white’ taken substantively and after the manner of a substantive supposits for itself taken adjectivally and after the manner of [something] dependent. As so taken, the ability to supposit does not belong to it. Therefore, ‘White cannot supposit’ is true insofar as ‘white’ taken substantively supposits for itself taken adjectivally.

(26) The same thing must be said to the second [objection]. When it is said [there] that ‘Every is a syncategoremata taken syncategorematically’ is
true, [we must reply] that it is true insofar as ‘every’ is taken materially and after the manner of a categorema. Yet it supposits for itself taken syncategorematically. Therefore it is true, even though the predicate does not belong to what supposits just exactly as it supposits here. For it suffices for the truth of this affirmative that the predicate belong to that for which it supposits. And this is true, because it is certain that in some proposition ‘every’ is a syncategorema taken syncategorematically.

[Chapter 3: On Simple Supposition in Particular]

(27) Having looked at material supposition, it remains to speak about simple supposition. First we must see what sort of supposition simple supposition is [and], second, in what ways it occurs.

(28) As for the first point, I say that supposition is simple when a common term supposits for its first significate or for everything contained under its first significate, or else when a singular concrete term or a singular compound term supposits for its whole significate. This was said, after a fashion, above.

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36 In para. 47, below, Burley speaks of the “first and adequate” significate. The notion seems to be derived from the Aristotelian “first subject” of an attribute or of a “commensurately universal” attribute (Posterior Analytics I, 4, 73b25 –74a3). Ockham, for instance, says: “And I call the ‘first subject’ that to which [the attribute] belongs setting everything else aside, but to nothing when it is said aside. For instance, the intellective soul is the first subject with respect to ‘able to acquire learning’. For, setting everything else aside, still the soul is able to acquire learning, and nothing can acquire learning once the intellective soul is set aside. On the other hand, man is a subject of this attribute, although not the first but rather a secondary [subject], because if man is destroyed, the soul can still acquire learning. It is like this [too] for other accidents that belong to a whole by means of some part.” (William of Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum: Ordinatio, Prol. q. 4, Gedeon Gál and Stephen F. Brown, eds.; “Opera theologica”, vol. 1; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1967, p. 144.17 –145.5. See also Ockham, Summa logicae I, 66.) The “first significate” is thus also “adequate” in the sense of being “made equal” in extent. Note that the notion of a “first significate” in this sense has nothing directly to do with the notion of primary, as opposed to secondary, significiation found in Ockham’s Summa logicae I, 10.

37 This is a reference to “special compared simple supposition”, described in para. 47 below. There a term supposits for a species contained under a most general genus (= category). The phrase ‘everything contained under its first significate’ thus refers here to the all the species contained under the first significate, not to the individuals contained under it.

38 ‘Singular concrete term’ and ‘singular compound term’ mean the same thing here. See para. 12 and n. 12, above, and para. 41, below.

39 See para. 12, above.
(29) But some people reject this statement, namely, that “supposition is simple when a term supposits for its signif i cate”. Rejecting the older views, they say that [the statement] is false and impossible. Indeed, they say that supposition is personal when a term supposits for its signif i cate or for its significates, and supposition is simple when a term supposits for an intention or [for] intentions of the soul. Thus they say that in ‘Man is a species’ the term ‘man’ has simple supposition and [yet] does not supposit for its signif i cate, because the signif i cates of the term are this and that man. Instead, in ‘Man is a species’ the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention of the soul, which [intention] is truly the species of Socrates and Plato.

(30) But that is no doubt a very unreasonable thing to say. For in ‘Man is a species’, in the sense in which it is true, the term ‘man’ supposits for its signif i cate. I prove this as follows: For it is certain that, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, ‘man’ is the name of a second substance; therefore, the term ‘man’ signifies a second substance. And it does not signify a second substance that is a genus. Therefore, it signifies a species. Therefore, taking ‘man’ to supposit for what it signifies, ‘Man is a species’ will be true, because the name ‘man’ is the name of a species and signifies a species.

(31) Also, Priscian says the name ‘man’ is the name of a species.

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41 Burley is referring to Ockham. See William of Ockham, Summa logicae I, 64. Ockham’s definition of simple supposition adds the proviso that the intention not be a signif i cate of the term. This disarms Burley’s argument in para. 40, below, at least as an objection against Ockham.

42 Ockham, loc. cit.

43 Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a11 –19.

44 Ockham, on the other hand, takes the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substances to be a distinction between kinds of names, not kinds of things. See Ockham, Summa logicae I, 42 (Gál & Brown, eds.), lines 50 –55: “And therefore, it must be said that this division is nothing but a division of one common name into less common names, so that it is equivalent to the following division: Among names conveying or signifying substances outside the soul, some are names proper to one substance, and those names are here called ‘first substance’. On the other hand, some names are common to many substances, and those names are called ‘second substances’.”

45 Priscian (fl. c. 500 a.d.) was a famous grammarian. See his Institutiones grammaticae II, 5 (“De nomine”), H. Keil, ed., (Grammatici latini II, p. 58 lines 14 –18): “Now
(32) Again, Aristotle says in the *Categories* that second substance—
that is, a *name* of second substance—signifies a *kind* of something and not a *this* something. But a thing’s kind is the common [entity] given in response to the question “What is it?” asked about an individual. Therefore, the name ‘man’ signifies a common [entity], and no other common [entity] than [one] common by a community of species. Therefore, it signifies a species. Therefore, taking ‘man’ to supposit for what it signifies, ‘Man is a species’ will be true, because the name ‘man’ is the name of a species and signifies a species.

(33) Again, the name ‘man’ signifies something first. And it does not first signify Socrates or Plato, because in that case one who heard the utterance and knew what was signified by the utterance would determinately and distinctly understand Socrates, which is false. Therefore, the name ‘man’ does not first signify something singular. Therefore, it first signifies a common [entity]. And that common [entity] is a species. Therefore, what is first signified by the name ‘man’ is a species.

(34) I do not care for the present whether that common [entity] is a thing outside the soul or a concept in the soul. Rather it suffices merely that what the name first signifies is a species. Thus ‘Man is a species’ will be true insofar as ‘man’ is taken for its significate. This is confirmed, because a name is not imposed except on the known, according to the Commentator,
Metaphysics VII,\textsuperscript{49} and also according to Boethius,\textsuperscript{50} who says, “One imposes names on the things one sees.” But he who imposed the name ‘man’ to signify did not know me or John who is now present. Therefore, the name ‘man’ does not signify me or John who is now present. Consequently, the name ‘man’ does not signify me or John, etc., and yet supposits for me and for John when it supposits personally. Therefore, it is not true that a term supposits for its significate or significates whenever it supposits personally.

(35) As for what they say — that ‘man’ signifies an intention in the soul, and that that intention is a species\textsuperscript{51} — I say that whether the intention is maintained as the species or not, one must say that the name ‘man’ supposits for its significate when it supposits simply. For if the intention is a species, then since names and verbs first signify passions of the soul, that is, intentions in the soul, according to the Philosopher in De interpretatione I,\textsuperscript{52} it follows that the term ‘man’ in ‘Man is a species’, in the sense in which it is true, supposits for what it first signifies.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{49} The “Commentator” on Aristotle is Averroes. See his In Metaphysicorum VII, tx. c. 54 (Venice: Juntas, 1574), fol. 202M (on Metaphysics VII, 15, 1040a10, against the Platonic Ideas: “And the formula must consist of words; and he who defines must not invent a word (for it would be unknown).” (Oxford translation)). Averroes says: “That is, it is necessary that definitions be composed of names. And he who does not know a thing does not put a name on it. For no one puts a name on what he does not know.”

\textsuperscript{50} I was unable to find this reference. In general, however, Boethius discusses such questions in his two commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. See C. Meiser, ed., Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias, (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877 –1880).

\textsuperscript{51} This is not Ockham’s doctrine, according to which (a) species and genera are concepts or intentions in the soul (Summa logicae I, 64), and (b) terms are subordinated to concepts or intentions in the soul but (c) do not in general signify them (Summa logicae I, 1).

\textsuperscript{52} Aristotle, De interpretatione 1, 16a3 –5: “Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.” (Oxford translation.) The mediaeval Latin translation has “passions of the soul” for the Oxford version’s “mental experience”. Burley comments on this passage as follows (Burlei super artem veterem Porphirii et Aristotelis, Venice: Otinus (de Luna) Papiensis, 11 May 1497, no folio numbers): “One must know that the name’s and the verb’s signifying passions of the soul can be understood in two senses. In one sense, in such a way that the name and the verb signify passions of the soul as the things which they are first imposed to signify. In the other sense, it can be understood in such a way that they signify passions of the soul as the things by means of which they are imposed to signify .... I say it is in the second sense that names and verbs signify passions of the soul. For a passion of the soul is that by means of which a name signifies an external thing, because a name is not imposed except on a known thing, and a thing is not known except by a likeness of it existing in the soul.”

\textsuperscript{53} The force of this argument is very obscure. I offer the following analysis. The conclusion to be established is that the term ‘man’ supposits for its (first) significate when it has simple supposition. The argument seems implicitly to presuppose that a term in simple
(36) Again, ‘Man is a second substance’ is true insofar as the subject has simple supposition. Yet if the subject supposited for an intention in the soul, [the proposition] would be false, because an intention in the soul is an accident, and an accident is neither a first substance or a second [one].

(37) Again, I prove that when a term supposits personally it does not supposit for what it signifies. For ‘Every white [thing] is a substance’ is true, and in [that proposition] the subject supposits personally. Yet it does not supposit for what it signifies, because if it supposited for what it signifies, then [the proposition] would be false. For ‘white’ signifies an accident alone or else it signifies an aggregate of subject and accident, and neither of these is a substance.

(38) If it is said that ‘white’ signifies the subject of whiteness — for instance Socrates or Plato, for whom whiteness is an accident — I argue to

supposition will supposit for a species. Burley claims it makes no difference for his conclusion whether that species is identified with the intention in the soul or not. Indeed, given the implicit presupposition just mentioned, the conclusion already follows from para. 33, regardless where the species is located. Burley nevertheless adds a further argument addressed to those who identify the species with the intention: The term ‘man’ in simple supposition supposits for the species (implicit presupposition); the species in this case is the intention or concept “man” in the soul (hypothesis); but the intention is the first significate of the term ‘man’ (according to Aristotle); therefore, the term ‘man’ in simple supposition supposits for its first significate. The difficulty with this formally valid argument lies in the reference to Aristotle. If the Philosopher’s authority can be invoked here, it seems it can also be invoked in the following argument: The first significate of ‘man’ is the species (established in para. 33); but the first significate of ‘man’ is the intention (Aristotle); therefore, the intention “man” is the species; hence the term ‘man’ in simple supposition supposits for the intention (by the implicit presupposition). The term ‘man’ is clearly only an example; the argument applies generally. But this violates para. 36, which establishes that not every case of simple supposition is for an intention. It is not clear why Burley should take the Aristotelian text in a sense that allows either argument to run.

For Ockham, concepts or intentions are indeed (accidental) forms inhering in the soul (Summa logicae I, 15). His interpretation of the Aristotelian distinction between first and second substance (see n. 44, above) as a distinction between two kinds of names allows him to sidestep Burley’s argument in this paragraph.

This and the following paragraph are an attack on Ockham’s view of signification as outlined in Summa logicae I, 1. The main point of the attack is that, on such a view, terms would continually change their signification. This is a problem because the signficate of a term was taken to be, roughly, what the term makes us think of (ibid.). Ockham recognizes these difficulties, and proposes a second, broader notion of signification in Summa logicae I, 33, one that avoids these problems. Note that Burley’s De puritate was probably written after Ockham’s Summa logicae, so that Ockham’s discussion in Summa logicae I, 33, is not a response to the De puritate.

That is, the substance in which the accidental quality whiteness inheres.

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the contrary: If this were true, then assuming that Socrates is first white and afterwards black, the name ‘white’ would first signify Socrates, and afterwards the name ‘black’ would signify Socrates. So, assuming that everything that today is white should become black tomorrow, then everything that ‘white’ signifies today ‘black’ would signify tomorrow. And so utterances would continually be falling away from their significates. Neither could anyone move his finger without an utterance’s by that fact falling away from its significate. For when the finger is still, the utterance ‘still’ signifies the finger, and when the finger is moved, that utterance would not signify the finger, which seems absurd.

(39) Again, according to this way of speaking, the name ‘man’ signifies Socrates when Socrates exists, and when Socrates dies it does not signify Socrates, because in that case Socrates is not a man. Therefore, whenever anyone dies, the name ‘man’ would fall away from its significate. And so it follows that anyone who destroys some real thing would make an utterance fall away from its significate, which is absurd.

(40) Again, it is apparent that a term does not always have simple supposition when it supposits for an intention in the soul. For ‘Every intention in the soul is in the soul’ is true, and the subject here supposits for an intention in the soul. Nevertheless, it does not supposit simply.

(41) Therefore I say, just as I used to say, that when a common term or a concrete singular term or an aggregated singular [term] supposits for what it signifies, it has simple supposition, and when a common term sup-

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58 See Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 5 & 10. Ockham holds that the term ‘white’ signifies the same things as does its nominal definition ‘something having a whiteness’. The latter signifies white things “primarily” — that is, in such a way that it can also supposit (personally) for them. But it also signifies whitenesses “secondarily”, in virtue of the term ‘whiteness’ in its nominal definition. The term cannot, however, supposit personally for whitenesses. Thus, if Burley’s use of ‘signify’ here is taken as Ockham’s “primary signification”, the argument is an attack on Ockham’s theory of signification. Note that “primary signification” must not be confused with “first signification” in the sense discussed in n. 36, above.

59 That is, Ockham’s. See para. 29 above.

60 Perhaps a reference to Burley’s *De suppositionibus*. (See the reference in n. 7, above.)

61 See nn. 15 & 36, above.
posits for its supposita, or when an aggregated term supposit for a simple
term of which it is predicated accidentally, it has personal supposition.

(42) You must understand that a term that can have different supposi-
tions can have personal supposition literally with respect to any predicate
whatever, because this is the term’s primary way of being taken or suppos-
ting. Yet it cannot have material or simple supposition except with respect to
a term that goes with it according to simple or material supposition. Thus, if
‘A man runs’ is said, or ‘A man is white’, the term ‘man’ determinately has
personal supposition. But if ‘Man is a species’ is said, or ‘Man is a mono-
syllable’, the term ‘man’ can supposit indifferently either personally or sim-
ply or materially.

(43) Thus, just as an analogous [term] put by itself and not matched
with anything participating in it according to the second significate, stands
for the more familiar manner, so a term that is able to have different suppo-
sitions, and [is] not matched with anything participating in it according to
secondary supposition, supposits personally only. And just as an analogous
term matched with something participating in it according to the secondary
significate is equivocal in the second mode of equivocation in virtue of the

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62 ‘a simple term ... accidentally’. It is not clear what this means. See para. 12,
where the corresponding phrase is ‘some singular of which the term is accidentally predi-
cated’. I suspect the text is corrupt here, and should read as in para. 12.

63 ‘determinately has personal supposition’. That is, it has personal supposition and
not material or simple supposition. The word ‘determinately’ should not here be taken as
referring to determinate personal supposition in the sense defined in para. 82 below.

64 That is, either personally or simply in the first example, and either personally or
materially in the second.

65 This is awkwardly put, but the idea is plain enough. Consider, for instance, the
term ‘man’. Primarily it refers to human beings, but in a secondary sense (“according to the
second significate”) it may also refer to statues or images of men (“That’s a man over on the
left in the picture, by the tree”). Burley’s point is merely that cases of this second kind arise
only where something special about the context allows it. The term ‘man’, taken all by itself
without any such special context, refers only to human beings, not to their statues or images.
The phrase ‘stands for the more familiar manner’ (= stat pro modo famosiori) is odd. One
might perhaps have expected ‘in’ instead of ‘for’.

66 The three modes of equivocation are given by Aristotle at Sophistic Refutations 4,
166a14 –21. In the second mode, a word is taken in more than one sense by analogy (by
“custom” in the Oxford translation). Aristotle gives no examples, but William of Sherwood
does: “Whatever runs has feet, the Seine runs; therefore the Seine has feet.” (Kretzmann, tr.,
p. 136.) The mediaevals called this equivocation by “transumption”. (See also para. 8,
above.) Ockham (Summa logicae I, 65) takes the propositions Burley is talking about here as
equivocal in the third mode of equivocation: ‘When words that have a simple sense taken
alone have more than one meaning in combination; e.g., ‘knowing letters’. For each word,
both ‘knowing’ and ‘letters’, possibly has a single meaning: but both together have more
fact that it can be taken for its primary or secondary significate,\(^{67}\) so a term that can have different suppositions, matched with something participating in it according to secondary supposition, is multiple\(^{68}\) in virtue of the fact that it can have the one supposition or the other, namely, the first or the second.

(44) Thus ‘A man runs’ is not multiple, and neither [is] ‘A man is an animal’, because in these [propositions] the subject suppositis personally [only]. But propositions like ‘Man is a species’ and ‘Man is a monosyllable’ are multiples in the second mode of equivocation in virtue of the fact that the term ‘man’ can have personal or simple or material supposition [in them]. For the sentence ‘Man is a species’ is multiple by the fact that the term ‘man’ can have personal or simple supposition [in it]. And ‘Man is a monosyllable’ [likewise] has to be distinguished in the second mode of equivocation by the fact that the term ‘man’ can have personal or material supposition [in it]. Thus a term that can have these [kinds of] supposition can also have personal supposition with respect to any [term] whatever, but [it can have] simple or material supposition only on the basis of an adjunct, that is, by the fact that it is matched with some [term] that goes with it according to such supposition (namely, simple or material).

[On the Division of Simple Supposition]

(45) Now that we have seen when a term has simple supposition, we must see how simple supposition is divided. According to the old logicians,\(^{69}\)
simple supposition is divided into *absolute* supposition and *compared* simple supposition. Simple supposition is *absolute* when a common term supposits absolutely for its significate insofar as it *is in* its supposita. Simple supposition is *compared* when a common term supposits for its significate insofar as it *is predicated of* its supposita. For a universal or a common term has two conditions, according to the Philosopher, because it *is in* many and *is said of* many. Absolute simple supposition belongs to the universal insofar as it has *being* in many, and compared or respective simple supposition belongs to it insofar as it is *said of* many. Thus, ‘Man is a species’ is verified according to the one supposition, and ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is verified according to the other supposition. For ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is verified insofar as the term ‘man’ has absolute simple supposition. But ‘Man is a species’ is verified insofar as ‘man’ has compared simple supposition. Nevertheless, one could [also] say that simple supposition is *absolute* when a term supposits for its significate absolutely, not in comparison to its supposita, either as far as *being in* is concerned or as far as *being said of* is concerned, but simple supposition is *compared* when a common term supposits for its significate in comparison to its supposita, or for some of its inferiors having supposita.

(46) Compared simple supposition is divided into *general* and *special* supposition. This distinction applies in a special case of a general term having species and individuals under it, namely, in the case of the most general genera. When such a general term has *general* simple supposition, it supposits for its significate absolutely, and not for any of its inferiors. In this sense, ‘Substance is a most general genus’ is true. But when it has *special* simple supposition, it supposits for the species and not for individuals.

(47) In this [second] sense propositions like the following are true: ‘Substance is second substance’, ‘Substance is a species of the genus sub-

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70 This is a common slogan attributed to Aristotle, although he does not say it all in one place. At *De interpretatione* 7, 17b39 –40, he says that a universal is what is apt to be *predicated of many* (= “said of many”). For the other half of the slogan, see *Metaphysics* 7, 13, 1038b11: “that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing” (Oxford translation). In the Latin translation, ‘belong’ = *inesse* = be in.
71 ‘worthiest creature among creatures’. This odd locution is just a fancy way of saying, roughly, “worthiest creature of them all”.
72 See n. 37, above. These two ways of drawing the distinction are based on different grounds. It is not clear which, if either, Burley favors.
73 That is, the ten Aristotelian categories.
74 ‘Absolutely’ is here explained by the clause ‘not for any of its inferiors’ — that is, not for the species. General supposition is a kind of *compared* supposition, however, and so it not *absolute* in the sense of para. 45.
75 See n. 37, above.
stance’, ‘Substance is properly defined’. For if ‘substance’ were taken for its first and adequate significate, then ‘Substance is properly defined’ would be false, whether ‘substance’ signified a singular external thing, or a thing common to all substances, or whether it signified a concept in the soul. For a singular thing is not properly defined. Neither is a concept in the soul, since it is an accident. Nor is a thing common to all substances — that is, a most general genus — since it does not have a genus and difference, and every definition is given by genus and difference. Therefore, if ‘Substance is defined’ is true, then since neither an individual nor substance in general is defined, ‘substance’ must supposit for the species contained under substance.

(48) Those who maintain that species and genera are things outside the soul have to say this, as well as those also who maintain that species and genera are concepts or intentions in the soul. For if the most general genus in the genus substance is a real thing, then clearly it is not defined, whether it is common or singular. And therefore, if ‘Substance is defined’ is true in any sense, and also ‘Substance is a species of substance’, the term ‘substance’ must supposit [there] neither for the most general genus, whatever it may be, nor for individuals either. Therefore, it must supposit for the species of substance, whether those species are external things or concepts in the soul.

[Objections]

(49) But a doubt arises here. For it does not seem that ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is true insofar as the subject has simple supposition. For insofar as the term ‘man’ has simple supposition, it supposits for its significate, according to you. But its significate, whether it is a thing or a concept in the soul, is not the worthiest creature among creatures. As for the concept in the soul, certainly it is not the worthiest creature among creatures.

(50) Likewise, if the term ‘man’ signifies an external thing, still it is certain that [the proposition] is false. For if a species is a thing outside the soul, [then] since an individual in a species adds some perfection onto the species, ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ will still be false.

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76 That is, the category “substance” itself, which is common to all substances.
77 That is, according to Burley. The objection is put in the mouth of an interlocutor.
78 ‘among creatures’. Reading ‘creaturarum’ instead of the edition’s ‘creaturam’ (p. 12 line 30).
79 That is, an individual is made up of the species plus something else (the notorious “principle of individuation”). That additional something is here assumed to add to the perfection or value of the result.
because an individual in the species is a worthier creature than the species itself [is].

(51) Again, if someone promises you a horse, [then] ‘A horse is promised to you’ is true, and certainly not insofar as ‘horse’ supposits materially. Neither [is it true] insofar as ‘horse’ has personal supposition, because neither this [horse] nor that one is promised to you. Therefore, since [the proposition] is true, it must be true insofar as ‘horse’ has simple supposition. And yet, taking ‘horse’ for its signifcate, whether it signifies a common thing or a concept in the soul, ‘A horse is promised to you’ is always false. For neither a concept in the soul nor a common thing is promised to you. Therefore, a term suppositing simply does not supposit for its signifcate, which is contrary to what was [just] said. Therefore, one has to grant [yet] other ways of suppositing.

(52) Again, ‘Color is the first object of sight’ is true. And yet it is true neither insofar as the subject has simple supposition nor insofar as it has personal or material supposition. For if the subject has simple supposition, it supposits for a universal thing or a concept, and neither of these is the first object of sight. If it supposits materially, then [the proposition] is false, as is clear enough. If it supposits personally, then it supposits only for the individuals in [the species] color — that is, for this color and that. And none of those is the first object of sight. Therefore, one has to grant [yet] other ways of suppositing.

(53) Again, ‘Man is the first risible’ is true. And yet [this is so] neither insofar as the subject supposits materially, as is clear enough, nor insofar as the subject supposits simply. For neither a common nature nor a concept in the soul is the first risible. Neither is [the proposition] true insofar as the subject supposits personally, because neither Socrates nor Plato is the first risible. Therefore, one has to grant [yet] other kinds of supposition.

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80 Note that species (and genera too) are regarded as creatures. They are not Platonic eternal entities.

81 The point is that, although it is true that I promised you a horse, there is no individual horse such that it is true that I promised you that horse.

82 ‘first object’. On this notion, see n. 36, above.

83 That is, this instance of a particular shade of red, and that instance of a particular shade of blue. If the particular shades were meant here, rather than their instances, then the contrast with universals in the preceding sentence would fail.

84 Again, on the notion of “first” here, see n. 36, above. “Risibility” is the aptitude for laughter. It was regarded as a peculiar feature of all and only human beings.
(54) Again, ‘Something is the first corruptible’\(^\text{85}\) is true. Yet it is not true according to any of these [three] kinds of supposition. Therefore, the above division of the kinds of supposition is not enough.

[Replies to the Objections]

(55) To (a) the first of these, it is usually said that ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is true insofar as the subject has absolute simple supposition and [the proposition] is understood as follows: ‘Among corruptible creatures, man is the worthiest creature’.\(^\text{86}\)

(56) When it is stated that Socrates is a worthier creature than man in general,\(^\text{87}\) it is usually said that this is not true. For although Socrates includes the perfection of man, yet he does not include it necessarily but rather contingently, because when Socrates dies, Socrates is not a man. So it is clear that the inference ‘Socrates includes the whole perfection of man, and also some superadded perfection; therefore, Socrates is more perfect than human nature’ is not valid. Rather, one has to add that Socrates would include the perfection of the human species necessarily, or that he would include the perfection of the human species as a part of himself. And neither of these is true.

(57) So ‘Man is the worthiest, etc.’ can be true insofar as the subject has simple supposition. And ‘The ox is the animal most useful for the plow’ is true according to the same [kind of] supposition, and likewise ‘He is deprived of sight’ or ‘Of sight he is deprived’,\(^\text{88}\) and the like.

(58) Yet others, who say there is no real unity outside the soul besides numerical unity, have to say that ‘Man is the worthiest creature, etc.’ is literally false, and [that] the term ‘man’ in it has personal supposition. Nevertheless, the understanding [of it] by those who grant [the proposition] can be true. They understand it in the sense that among bodily creatures man is nobler than any bodily creature that is not a man. And this is true, taking the subject personally.\(^\text{89}\)

\(^{85}\) Once again, for this notion see n. 36, above.

\(^{86}\) Compare Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 66. The addition of ‘corruptible’ is inserted to rule out angels.

\(^{87}\) That is, than the universal human nature. This was said in the statement of the objection. See above, para. 50.

\(^{88}\) ‘He is deprived of sight’ = *Ille privatur visu*. ‘Of sight he is deprived’ = *Visu privatur ille*. Mediaeval logicians generally regarded scope as extending to the right, not to the left, so that the second formulation means something like ‘Sight is such that he is deprived of it’. By giving both formulations, Burley suggests that the difference doesn’t matter for present purposes.

\(^{89}\) This is Ockham’s view. See Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 66.
(59) To (b) the other [objection], when it is asked which [kind of] supposition [it is] according to which ‘A horse is promised to you’ is true, assuming that someone promises you a horse, [I reply that for someone] maintaining that there is some [kind of] unity other than numerical unity outside the soul, it would have to be said that ‘A horse is promised to you’ is true insofar as the subject has simple absolute supposition. For I do not promise you this horse or that one, but rather simply a horse. And because a universal cannot exist by itself, and consequently cannot be delivered [in fulfillment of the promise] except [as found] in some singular, therefore he who promises you a horse is bound to deliver to you some horse. Otherwise he cannot deliver to you what was promised.

(60) But those who say there is nothing outside the soul except the singular have to say that ‘A horse is promised to you’ is true insofar as [‘horse’] has personal supposition. Hence, he who promises you a horse by saying generally ‘I shall give you a horse’ promises you every horse, existing and [only] possibly existing, but under a disjunction. For whichever horse he delivers to you, he makes satisfaction to you, as is plainly clear.

(61) When it is said,90 “He does not promise you that horse, because in that case you could by law demand that horse of him, and by the same reasoning neither does he promise you that [other] horse”, I say that promising is of two kinds, namely, determinate and indeterminate. [A promise is] determinate when some singular determinate thing is promised. A promise is indeterminate when some thing is promised under a disjunction. Thus I say that, in the assumed case, that horse is [indeed] promised to you, but indeterminately and under a disjunction. Because of this one cannot by law demand that horse or that [other] one determinately, but [only] under a disjunction.

(62) To (c) the other [objection], when it is said that ‘Color is the first object of sight’ etc. is true,91 maintaining [first] that the universal has being outside the soul,92 I say that there are two kinds of object of sight, namely, the contentive object and the motive object. The contentive object is what is common to everything that, by itself and under its own notion, is perceived by the power [of sight]. The motive object is what moves and impresses the species93 or act on the power [of sight]. I say, then, that ‘Color is the first ob-

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90 This was not explicitly said in the statement of the objection (para. 51). But it reflects the reasoning there.
91 See para. 52 –54, above.
92 For a reply directed to those who deny this, see para. 64 below.
93 ‘Species’ here is the “sensible species” or sense-impression, and does not mean species as opposed to genus. We retain traces of this sense of ‘species’ in our word ‘specious’, meaning “apparent”.

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ject of sight’ is true, speaking about the contentive object, insofar as the subject has simple supposition. For the common nature signified by the name ‘color’ is common to everything visible by itself and properly. Thus the universal is the object of sense. This [is so] when speaking of the contentive object. But if we speak of the motive object, then ‘Color is the first object of sight’ is true insofar as [its subject] supposits personally.

(63) If it should be said [in objection] that [in that case] *this* color would be the first object of sight, [and] thus whatever is seen would be seen under the aspect of *this* color, I say [in reply] that this does not follow, speaking about the motive object. For the motive object is not first in the positive sense, in such a way that it is before any other. Instead it is first only in the negative sense, in such a way that nothing is before it in the way of a motive. The common [saying], “What is said by superabundance belongs to one [thing] only”, should be understood in [the former] way, by analyzing ‘superabundance’ (or ‘superlative’) in the positive sense. But analyzing it in the negative sense, what is said by superabundance is quite able to belong to several [things].

(64) Yet those who maintain there is nothing outside the soul except the singular have to say that ‘Color is the first object of sight’ is simply false. Likewise, ‘Man is the first risible’ is false literally, and ‘Something is the first corruptible’ is likewise false. Nevertheless, the senses in which they are made are true. In the above propositions, insofar as philosophers and speakers in general grant them, the exercised act is taken for the signified act. Thus, you have to know that the verb ‘is’ *exercises* predicition, and the verb ‘to be predicated’ *signifies* predicition. Sometimes ‘to be’ is taken for ‘to be predicated’, sometimes the other way around. Thus when philosophers grant ‘Color is the first object of sight’, ‘to be’ is taken for ‘to be predicated’, according to their [way of] understanding [the proposition]. So, by the exercised act there is understood a signified act as follows, namely, that of color ‘to be visible’ or ‘to be apprehensible by sight’ is predicated first. By ‘Man is the first risible’ there is understood a signified act like ‘Of man “to be risible” is predicated first’. By [the proposition] ‘Something is the first corruptible’ there is understood [a proposition] like ‘Of something “to be corruptible” is predicated first’.

(65) Hence all these propositions formed about the exercised act are literally false. Thus they are false in the sense *which* they make; yet they are true in the sense *in which* they are made. For the senses in which the propositions formed about the signified acts are made are true.

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94 This is Ockham’s doctrine. See Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 66.
95 On the notion of being predicated “first”, see n. 36, above.
(66) But perhaps someone will contradict this, because the same difficulties return as before. For if ‘Of color “to be visible” is predicated first’ is true, then [it will be true] either by taking ‘color’ according to simple supposition or according to personal supposition. Neither one can be granted. For neither of the intention in the soul nor of the external singular is ‘to be visible’ predicated first. Likewise, when it is said that of man ‘to be risible’ is predicated first, this cannot be true insofar as ‘man’ has simple supposition, or even insofar as it has personal supposition. For neither of the concept in the soul is ‘to be risible’ predicated first nor of any singular man is ‘to be risible’ predicated first.

(67) It must be said [in reply] that propositions like this are true insofar as such terms supposit simply. For of the common [entity] man ‘to be risible’ is predicated first, and of the common [entity] that is color ‘to be visible’ is predicated first, and of the common [entity] that is composite of contraries or having matter ‘to be corruptible’ is predicated first. Nevertheless, in the propositions in which the predications are exercised that are signified in these [other propositions], the terms have personal supposition. For ‘Every color is visible’ is true first, and the subject supposit personally in it. Likewise ‘Every man is risible’ is true first, and the subject supposit personally in it. Also ‘Everything composed of contraries, or everything having matter, is corruptible’ is true first, and the subject has personal supposition in it.

(68) Thus a term need not supposit in the same way with respect to the signified act and with respect to the exercised act corresponding to [the signified act]. For example, ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’ is true insofar as ‘man’ has simple supposition. Yet in the exercised acts corresponding to this signified act, ‘man’ supposits personally, as is clear in ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘Plato is a man’. Likewise, in ‘Man is distributed for every man’, the term ‘man’ supposits simply. But in ‘Every man is an animal’, in which the distribution is exercised, the term ‘man’ supposits personally. And so it is in other cases [too] that a term having one [kind of] supposition sometimes sup-

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96 Burley is supposed to be arguing here from the nominalist point of view that there is nothing outside the soul except singulars. (See para. 64.) Hence the “common entity” here appears to be the common concept in the soul, which is the only sort of common entity the nominalist allows. (There are also common spoken and written terms, but they are common only in a secondary sense derivative from the community of concepts, and are not common at all in the way realists talk about common things.) It is possible to construe Burley’s talk about universal or common entities in this and the following paragraphs in this nominalist way, although that is certainly not the more natural reading. Perhaps the best interpretation is to view Burley’s discussion in these paragraphs as strictly neutral between his own realist notion of universal or common entities and Ockham’s nominalist theory.
posits for itself having another [kind of] supposition, just as in ‘Man is predicated of several [things]’, the term ‘man’ supposing simply supposit for itself suppositing personally.

(69) If someone argues to the contrary as follows: “If of man ‘to be risible’ is predicated first, then man is the first risible, and if of the composite of contraries ‘to be corruptible’ is predicated first, therefore the composite of contraries is the first corruptible”, I say [in reply] that inferences like that are not valid. For such predications should not be exercised that way, but rather like this: “Because ‘Of man “risible” is predicated first’ is true, therefore ‘Man is risible’ is first true,” and “Because of the composite of contraries ‘to be corruptible’ is predicated first, therefore ‘The composite of contraries is corruptible’ is first true.”

(70) If it is said that ‘The composite of contraries is corruptible’ does not appear to be first true, because a common [entity] or universal is here put in subject position, and being corruptible does not belong first to any universal, but more to the singular, I reply that being corruptible does belong first to a universal or common [entity], but not for itself but rather for singulars. Thus it is one thing of which [being corruptible] is predicated first, and another thing or things for which it is predicated. For that of which being corruptible is first verified is a universal suppositing personally, and so the things for which it is verified are singulars.

(71) If it is asked “Which is the first corruptible, the singular or the universal?” I say that ‘first’, like any superlative, can be analyzed in two senses — that is, either positively or negatively. If it is taken positively, then it is analyzed by the fact that it is “before any other”. Analyzing [it] in this sense, I say that nothing is the first corruptible, because neither this [is] nor that, and so on. But if [‘first’] is taken or analyzed negatively, then I say that it is analyzed by “nothing before it”. In this sense, I say that Socrates is first corruptible, and [so is] Plato, and so on, and in general every composite of contraries is first corruptible. For, indicating any composite of contraries

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97 The point of these inferences is to move from propositions in which the signified act is expressed to the propositions in which the corresponding exercised act is expressed. In the latter, according to the view being attacked here, the subjects have personal supposition, so that there must be an individual man who is the first risible and an individual composite of contraries that is the first corruptible. But these conclusions are false, for the reasons given in para. 66.

98 ‘universal suppositing personally’. This could either refer to a universal concept, which is a term in mental language and so able to have supposition, or it could refer to a metaphysical universal in the realist’s sense, in which case it could be said to have supposition only in one of Burley’s “real propositions”. On this notion, see note 3, above.

99 Reading ‘verificatur’ for the edition’s ‘verificantur’ (p. 18 line 7).
whatever, it is true to say that this is corruptible and nothing is corruptible prior [to it].

(72) If it is asked, “What is being corruptible predicated of first?”, I say it is [predicated] of an [entity] common to all corruptibles and suppositing personally for them. And it does not follow from this that a common [entity] is the first corruptible. Neither does it follow that “being corruptible inheres in a common [entity] for its supposita, therefore, being corruptible inheres first in the supposita”. Indeed, being corruptible inheres first in a common [entity] suppositing personally, as was said.

(73) One could say something else about the propositions ‘Man is the first risible’, [and] ‘The composite of contraries, or what has matter, is the first corruptible’, [namely,] that expressions like this have to be distinguished because ‘first’ or firstness can be referred to the composition or can be the predicate. If it is referred to the composition, then any [proposition] like ‘Man is the first risible’, ‘The composite of contraries is the first corruptible’ is false. For if the subject is taken simply, it is clear that [the proposition] is false. Even if the subject is taken personally, [the proposition] is certainly false, because each singular is false. But if firstness is the predicate, then propositions like this are true because the whole dictum is the subject, and ‘first’ or firstness is the predicate. Thus, the sense is: “‘Man is risible’ is first”. And in that sense it is true. In the first sense, [the proposition] is false, as was said, because if nothing is the subject but the term ‘man’, then however the term ‘man’ supposits, [the proposition] is always false. In the second sense, [the proposition] is true because the whole [phrase] — namely, ‘for a man to be risible’ or ‘A man is risible’ — is the subject, and it is denoted that firstness inheres in the whole proposition. And that is true.

(74) If it is asked which supposition the term ‘man’ has in this [proposition], insofar as [the proposition] is true, I say that it does not have any supposition. For supposition is a property of an extreme, and it does not belong to a part of an extreme, but rather to the whole extreme. Because the term ‘man’ is not an extreme in “‘Man is risible’ is first, or is first true”, but is rather a part of an extreme, therefore it does not have any supposition

\[\text{100} \text{ Rather, part of the predicate. See the further discussion below.}\]
\[\text{101} \text{ See n. 10, above.}\]
\[\text{102} \text{ In mediaeval logic, one should not always take ‘inhere’ in too metaphysical a sense. Frequently the word simply means “is predicated of”. Thus, the predicate is often said to “inhere” in the subject. Here, firstness is said to “inhere” in the proposition, not as some kind of metaphysical accident, but simply in the sense that the proposition is a “first” one. Such “inherence” terminology obviously has its roots in a metaphysically realist doctrine that regards predication as not just a matter of language but also as a matter of ontology. But the terminology is used freely also by people who do not share those metaphysical views.}\]
[there]. In the same way, propositions in which [the phrase] ‘by itself’ is included, or some other mode signifying the quality of the sentence, are to be distinguished.

[Chapter 4: On Personal Supposition]

(75) After talking about simple and material supposition, it remains to talk about personal supposition. Personal supposition is divided into discrete and common supposition. There is discrete supposition when a proper name supposits, or a demonstrative pronoun indicating the same as what a proper name signifies. For example, ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘This is a man’.

(76) But there is an objection against this. For in ‘Socrates is an individual’, a singular term is put in subject position, and yet the subject has simple supposition. For it supposits with respect to a name of second intention. Consequently, the subject supposits simply.

(77) Again, ‘This herb grows here and in my garden’ is true. Yet if the subject had discrete supposition, it would be false.

(78) To the first [objection, I reply] that in ‘Socrates is an individual’ the subject has personal supposition. For it supposits for a simple singular thing for which it is inconsistent to be found in several [instances]. (By ‘person’ in a proposition I mean such a simple singular for which being found

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103 Names of first intention were generally taken to include names like ‘animal’, ‘man’, ‘rational’, ‘Socrates’, ‘redness’. Names of second intention included names like ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘difference’, ‘individual’, ‘accident’. They are the names that, when found in predicate position, allow the subject to have simple supposition. (See the discussion in para. 42 –44 above.) Burley does not give us a general theory of such names (at least not in any passage I know). But the point of the objection seems to be as follows: The second-intention name ‘species’ is not truly predicable of a man, but is truly predicable of his general human nature, so that in the proposition ‘Man is a species’, the predicate allows the subject to have simple supposition for the general human nature (for humanity). So too, the second-intention name ‘individual’ is not truly predicable of Socrates, but is truly predicable of his individual nature, so that in the proposition ‘Socrates is an individual’, the predicate allows the subject to have simple supposition for Socrates’ individual nature (his “Socrateity”). Burley’s reply, in para. 78 –80, denies that the subject in ‘Socrates is an individual’ has simple supposition. The fact that he does not allow non-compound singular terms to have simple supposition (see para. 12 & 28 above and para. 80 below) suggests that he does not accept the notion of individual natures. On the other hand, the fact that he does allow compound singular terms to have simple supposition (ibid.) complicates this picture in ways that I have not sorted out.

104 Discrete supposition is a branch of personal supposition only, so that if the subject had discrete supposition, the sense would be not “This kind of herb grows here and in my garden” but rather “This individual specimen of it grows here and in my garden”, which is false (provided, I suppose, that you are not standing in your garden at the time).
in several [instances] is inconsistent. Thus supposition is called personal when a common or singular term supposits for some [one] simple singular or for [several] such singulars. In that case it supposits personally. But not the other way around. For a term suppositing personally does not have to supposit for [several] singular things or for [one] singular thing. For in saying ‘Every species is under a genus’, the subject supposits personally. Yet it does not supposit for singular things. Rather, it supposits for its inferiors.

(79) I say therefore that supposition is personal when a simple singular term or a common term supposits for [one] singular or for [several] singulars, or a common term [supposits] for all its inferiors, [either] copulatively or disjunctively, whether those inferiors are singulars or not.

(80) If someone asks whether supposition is always personal when a singular term supposits, it must be said that whenever a singular term supposits for a singular simple thing or a thing [that is] one all by itself, then it supposits personally. But when a singular composite or aggregated term that signifies things of different genera supposits for what it signifies, in that case such a term has simple supposition, as is clear in the case of ‘White Socrates is a being by accident’, in the sense in which it is true. But when such an aggregated term supposits for the singular simple thing of which it is accidentally predicated, in that case it has personal supposition, as is clear in the case of ‘White Socrates is a man’, in the sense in which it is true. The preceding chapter talked about this.

(81) To the other [objection], I say that ‘This herb grows here and in my garden’ is literally false. But a true proposition can be understood by means of it, namely, ‘Such an herb grows here and in my garden’.

(82) Common supposition is divided. For one kind is determinate and another kind confused. Supposition [is] determinate when a common term supposits disjunctively for its supposita in such a way that one can descend to all its supposita under a disjunction, as is clear in the case of ‘Some man runs’. For it follows: “Some man runs; therefore, Socrates runs or Plato runs, Burley is here trying to give some motivation for the fact that this kind of supposition is called “personal”, even though it does not necessarily have anything at all to do with “persons” in the usual sense. Historically, the terminology appears to have arisen in the context of speculations about the Trinity, where there is a crucial distinction between the divine nature (which is individual since there is and can be only one God) and the three divine “persons” that share that nature. But the history of this terminology has not been traced in detail.

This is a reference to the various subdivisions of personal supposition, described below beginning at para. 82. Despite what Burley says here, not all cases of personal supposition involve this “copulative or disjunctive” reference. See para. 85 –86 below.

The reference is to para. 28. But a fuller discussion is in Ch. 1, para. 12.

See n. 12, above.
and so on.” The supposition is called “determinate”, not because a term supposing determinately in this way supposits for one [of its supposita] and not for another. Rather the supposition is called “determinate” because for the truth of a proposition in which a common term supposits determinately it is required that [the proposition] be verified for some determinate supposition.\footnote{That is, taking Burley’s example ‘Some man runs’, it is required that there be some determinate man such that he runs, although any such man will do.}

(83) But there is a doubt here. For ‘Pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is true, and the subject has determinate supposition here. Yet the sentence is not verified for any one determinate singular.\footnote{That is, there is no one pepper that is sold both here and at Rome. Note that, since we are dealing here with personal supposition, we are talking about individual peppers, and not kinds of pepper.}

(84) It has to be said [in reply] to this that ‘Pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is multiple\footnote{See n. 68, above.} according to composition and division. In the sense of composition, [the proposition] is false, because it is an indefinite [proposition] each singular of which is false.\footnote{An indefinite proposition is one without any explicit quantifier. For example, ‘Man runs’, as opposed to ‘Some man runs’ or ‘Every man runs’. Such indefinite propositions were generally taken as equivalent to particular propositions — that is, to existentially quantified one (‘Some man runs’). In “the sense of composition”, the proposition ‘Pepper is sold here and at Rome’ is taken to mean “Some (individual) pepper is such that it is sold both here and at Rome”. In that sense the proposition is false, because “each singular is false”. That is, ‘This pepper is such that it is sold both here and at Rome’ is false, and ‘That pepper is such that it is sold both here and at Rome’ is false, and so on for all (individual) peppers.} In the sense of division, [the proposition] is true, and in that case it is denoted [by the proposition] that pepper is sold here and pepper is sold at Rome.\footnote{In “the sense of division”, then, the proposition is taken not as one indefinite proposition with a conjoined predicate, but as an implicit conjunctive (= “copulative”) proposition.} In that sense it is a copulative [proposition], and [the conjuncts] are two indefinite propositions one of which is verified for one singular and the other for another [singular]. For the truth of [the proposition] it is not required that [the whole proposition] be verified for some one singular. Rather, it suffices that one part be verified for one singular and the other [part] for another [singular].

(85) Confused supposition is divided. For one kind is merely confused, and another kind is confused and distributive. Supposition is merely confused when a common term supposits for several [things] in such a way that [the proposition] is inferred from any [one] of them and one cannot descend to
any of them either copulatively or disjunctively. The predicate supposits in this way in ‘Every man is an animal’, because the term ‘animal’ supposits [there] for several [things]. For if it supposited for some determinate one, [the proposition] would be false.\(^{114}\) [The proposition] is inferred from any [one] of its singulurs. For it follows: “Every man is this animal; therefore, every man is an animal.”\(^{115}\) And one cannot descend under ‘animal’ [either] disjunctively or copulatively. For it does not follow: “Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal or every man is that animal.” Neither does it follow: “Every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal and every man is that animal,” and so on.

\((86)\) Therefore, these three conditions belong to the notion of merely confused supposition. First, that a term having that [kind of] supposition supposits for several [things]. Second, that it could be inferred from anything for which [the term] supposits. The third [condition] is that under a term suppositing in this way one cannot descend either copulatively or disjunctively.

\((87)\) Now in order to recognize when a common term has merely confused supposition, you have to know that every syncategorematic word that does not include a negation and that remains syncategorematic and conveys a multitude [of things] has the power of confusing a mediate following term\(^{116}\) merely confusedly. I said ‘that does not include [a negation]’, because if it did include a negation, it would make the mediate following term supposit confusedly and distributively. This is clear with universal signs conveying negation,\(^{117}\) such as ‘no’, ‘neither’, and the like.

\((88)\) I said ‘that remains syncategorematic’, because if a syncategorematic word were to become part of an extreme (which happens when it affects\(^{118}\) part of an extreme), then such a word is not taken syncategorematically and does not remain as a syncategorema. In that case it does not have the power of confusing the mediate following term merely confusedly. For instance, in saying ‘He who sees every man is an animal’. In this proposition, the term ‘animal’ does not supposit merely confusedly, but

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\(^{114}\) That is, ‘Every man is this (individual) animal’ is false (because there is more than one man, and each one is a distinct animal).

\(^{115}\) If it were true that every man is this (individual) animal (that is, if there were only one man and he is the one indicated by the phrase ‘this animal’), then of course a fortiori it would be true that every man is an animal.

\(^{116}\) As the phrase implies, a “mediately following term” is a term that follows the syncategorema, but is not the first such term. For example, in ‘No man is an island’, the predicate ‘island’ medately follows the syncategorema ‘no’. The immediately following term is of course ‘man’.

\(^{117}\) ‘universal signs conveying negation’. That is, universal negative quantifiers.

\(^{118}\) ‘affects’ = disponit. I am not sure of the difference between becoming part of an extreme and affecting part of an extreme.
rather determinately. For it follows: “He who sees every man is an animal; therefore, an animal is he who sees every man,” and conversely. And in the latter

‘animal’ supposit determinately. Therefore, it supposit determinately in the other [proposition]. The reason for this is that in ‘He who sees every man is an animal’ the whole ‘he who sees every man’ is the subject. So the universal sign here is part of an extreme, and consequently is not taken syncategorematically.

(89) I said ‘that conveys a multitude [of things]’, because syncategoremata that do not convey a multitude — like ‘someone’, ‘the one’, and the like — do not have the power of confusing a term. But syncategoremata like ‘every’, ‘each’ and the numerical adverbs like ‘twice’, ‘thrice’ and such, have the power of confusing the mediately following common term merely confusedly.

(90) I said ‘mediately following’, because a syncategoremata that follows has no power over a preceding term. For this reason, it is clear that ‘An animal is every man’ is false, because the term ‘animal’ has determinate supposition, since it is not confused by any [syncategorema]. For the [universal] sign that follows [it] does not have [any] power over it, and therefore it supposit determinately and disjunctively for its supposita. For this reason [the proposition] is false, just as ‘This animal is every man or that animal is every man, and so on’ [is false].

(91) Nevertheless, you have to know that even though a syncategorematic word that conveys a multitude [of things] has the power of confusing a mediately following term in the same categorical proposition, yet such a syncategorematic word conveying a multitude [of things and] occurring in one categorical does not have the power of confusing a term occurring in another categorical. Thus the copulative ‘Every man is an animal and some man is he’ is false on account of its second part. For the term ‘man’ occurring in the second categorical is not confused by the preceding [universal] sign. Therefore, it supposit determinately, and it is denoted [by the proposition] that every man is an animal and Socrates is he or every man is an animal and Plato is he, and so on. And each of these [disjuncts] is false. Therefore, the whole copulative [proposition] is false on account of its second part.

(92) Likewise, a universal negative sign occurring in one categorical does not have the power of confusing a term occurring in another categorical.

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119 That is, in ‘An animal is he who sees every man’.
120 Note the implicit criterion here: If $p$ implies $q$ and conversely, and if a certain term $x$ occurs in both $p$ and $q$, then $x$ has the same kind of supposition in $p$ and $q$.
121 That is, “the one” as opposed to “the other”.

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For example, in saying ‘No man is an ass and some animal runs’, the term ‘animal’ occurring in the second categorical has determinate supposition.  

(93) From what has been said above, it is apparent that propositions like ‘Twice you ate a loaf of bread’, ‘Thrice you drank wine’ are true, and yet no loaf of bread did you eat twice, and likewise no wine did you drink thrice. The reason for this is that the numerical adverbs ‘twice’, ‘thrice’, and so on, convey a multitude [of things], and therefore have the power of confusing the [mediately following] term merely confusedly. Therefore, in ‘Twice you ate a loaf of bread’, the term ‘loaf of bread’ does not stand determinately for this loaf or that, under a disjunction. For in that sense [the proposition] would be false, because ‘Twice you ate this loaf of bread’ is false, and likewise ‘Twice you ate that loaf of bread’ is false, and so on. Instead, ‘At one time you ate one loaf of bread, and at another time you ate another loaf of bread’ is true. Neither does it follow: “Twice you ate a loaf of bread; therefore, a loaf of bread you ate twice.” Rather, that is a fallacy of figure of speech.  

(94) Thus, whenever there is an argument from a term suppositing merely confusedly to a term suppositing determinately with respect to the same multitude, there is a fallacy of figure of speech. Thus it does not follow: “Every man is an animal; therefore, an animal is every man.” Rather it is a fallacy of figure of speech.

(95) If it is said that, according to this [view], there would be a fallacy of figure of speech in “Every man is an animal; therefore, some animal is a man,” because in the antecedent the term ‘animal’ supposits merely confusedly and in the consequent [it supposits] determinately, it has to be said [in reply to this] that there is not always a fallacy of figure of speech when there is an argument from a term suppositing merely confusedly to the same term suppositing determinately. Instead, when there is an argument from a term suppositing merely confusedly with respect to a syncategorematic word that conveys a multitude [of things] to the same term suppositing determinately with respect to the same syncategoremata conveying a multitude [of things], in that case there is a fallacy of figure of speech.

\[\text{And not merely confused supposition, as it would have if it were within the scope of the universal negative quantifier in the first conjunct.}\]

\[\text{122 On the Aristotelian fallacy of “figure of speech”, see Aristotle, Sophistic Refutations 4, 166b10 –21, and 22, 178a5 –179a10.}\]

\[\text{123 A kind of thing} = \text{qua ile quid. The claim is perhaps odd, since it suggests that the term supposits in simple supposition, not in personal supposition at all.}\]

\[\text{124 this something} = \text{hoc aliquid.}\]
(96) From all this, it is clear that, assuming the world is eternal with respect to [both] the past and the future, ‘Always some man was’ is true, and likewise ‘Always some man will be’. But ‘Some man always was’ [and ‘Some man always will be’] are false. For in ‘Always some man was’ [and] ‘Always some man will be’, the term ‘man’ supposits merely confusedly. But in ‘Some man always was’ [and] ‘Some man always will be’, it supposits determinately.

(97) Suppose someone says [as an objection] perhaps that in ‘Always a man was’, the term ‘man’ does not mediately follow the term conveying a multitude, but rather immediately, because when one says ‘Always a man will be’ there is nothing between the ‘always’ and the term ‘man’, [and] therefore [the term] does not supposit merely confusedly. For it was said above that a syncategorematic word conveying a multitude confuses the mediately following term merely confusedly. It has to be said [in reply] that, although the term ‘man’ does not mediately follow the syncategorematic ‘always’ verbally, nevertheless according to the sense in which [the proposition] is understood it does follow mediately. For to say ‘Always a man was’ is the same as saying ‘In every time a man was’, and in ‘In every time a man way’ the term ‘man’ follows a distributive sign mediately. It is the same way for other syncategorematic words that convey a multitude — that is, such words convey in themselves their distributables which, according to the sense in which they are understood, immediately follow them. Thus, to say ‘Twice you were a man’ is the same as to say ‘Two times you were a man’, so that the distributable [term] or what is numbered by these numerical adverbs is ‘times’. For to say ‘Thrice you drank wine’ is the same as saying ‘Three times you drank wine’.

(98) It is also clear from what has been said above that, assuming that continuously throughout the whole day there is some man in this house, but continually one after another in succession, ‘All day some man is here indoors’ is true, and ‘Some man all day is here indoors’ is false. For the first [proposition] is true because each singular is true. For in any part of the day there is some man here indoors. But the second [proposition] is false, because it is a particular [proposition] of which each singular is false.

(99) Confused and distributive supposition is divided. For one kind is mobile and another kind immobile. Each kind is twofold, one [subdivision]
absolute and the other respective. First we must talk about absolute supposition.

(100) Confused and distributive supposition is mobile and absolute when under the term that has supposition one can descend absolutely to any suppositum of that term by virtue of the distribution. This is clear. For the subject of the proposition ‘Every man runs’ supposits confusedly and distributively [and mobile], because by virtue of the distribution one can descend to any suppositum of ‘man’.

(101) But confused and distributive supposition is immobile when a common term is distributed for its supposita and one cannot descend to those supposita with respect to that with respect to which the distribution is made. For instance, in ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’, the term ‘man’ is distributed with respect to an exception, and one cannot descend with respect to the same exception. For it does not follow: “Every man besides Socrates runs; therefore, Plato besides Socrates runs.”

(102) Thus, you have to know that when one cannot descend to the supposita under a common term, and the common term cannot be inferred from the supposita, so that it neither implies its supposita nor is inferred from its supposita, in that case the term supposits confusedly and distributively immobile. This is clear in the example already given. It is also clear in ‘No man besides some of these is an animal’, indicating all the men who now exist. The term ‘animal’ [here] supposits confusedly and distributively immobile, because it neither implies its supposita nor is inferred from its supposita. For it does not follow: “No man besides some of these is an animal; therefore, no man besides some of these is an ass.” For the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Also, it does not follow: “No man besides some of these is an ass; therefore, no man besides some of these is an animal.” For if this inference were a formal one, then it would [also] follow: “No animal besides some of these is a man; therefore, no animal besides some of these is a substance,” because the argument is the same in both cases, from an infe-

130 This is just as ill-formed in Latin as it is in English.
131 That is, ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’.
132 This is analyzed as “Some of these is an animal and no other man is not an animal.” See Burley’s De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, Part 3, Ch. 2, (ed. cit., p. 165 lines 23 –28): “It also has to be noted that every exceptive [proposition] has two exponents [that is, two parts to its analysis], namely, an affirmative one and a negative one. For example, ‘Every man besides Socrates runs’ is analyzed as follows: ‘Every man other than Socrates runs and Socrates does not run.’ And ‘No man except Socrates runs’ is analyzed as follows: ‘No man other than Socrates runs and Socrates runs.’”
133 The consequent is false because its second “exponent” (see the preceding note) is false: ‘Some of these is an ass.’
134 Indicating, as before, all existing men.
rior to a superior on the part of the predicate in a negative exceptive [proposition]. But this [latter] inference is not valid, because the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.

(103) With respect to confused and distributive mobile supposition, it has to be understood that confused and distributive supposition is mobile when by virtue of the distribution one can descend under a common term to its supposita. But if sometimes one can make a descent, even under a common term, but not by virtue of a distribution, [in that case] the term under which one can descend does not supposit confusedly and distributively. For instance, it follows: “Some proposition is true; therefore, this proposition is true”, indicating ‘Some proposition is true’. Yet the subject in ‘Some proposition is true’ does not supposit confusedly and distributively, because the inference referred to does not hold by virtue of the distribution. Instead, it holds through the fact that any proposition asserts itself to be true.

(104) Thus, it must be seen which words have the power of distributing a term confusedly and distributively. For this, you have to know that the universal affirmative sign has the power of confusing the immediately following term confusedly and distributively. But a universal negative sign and negating negation have the power of confusing a mediate as well as an immediate term confusedly and distributively. Thus in ‘No man is an animal’ the subject as well as the predicate supposit confusedly and distributively. Likewise, [in] ‘Not: man is an animal’, insofar as the negation ‘not’ is merely negating, the negation confuses the subject as well as the predicate confusedly and distributively.

(105) Likewise, relative words that include an exercised negation, such as ‘differing’, ‘other’, and the like, have the power of confusedly and distributively confusing a common term that immediately follows and terminates their dependence. For it follows: “Socrates differs from a man; therefore, Socrates differs from Socrates.” Likewise, it follows: “Socrates is

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135 The point is that the proposition is to be read in the sense “It is not the case that man is an animal”, not in the sense of “Non-man is an animal”.

136 That is, their grammatical dependence. See the explanation in para. 106.

137 The inference sounds fallacious, but it isn’t. Propositions of the form ‘x differs from y’ were analyzed as: “x and y exist, and x is not y.” This was done even where the ‘x’ and the ‘y’ were replaced by quantified terms. Thus ‘Socrates differs from Plato’ = ‘Socrates and Plato exist, and Socrates is not Plato’. Similarly, ‘Socrates differs from a man’ = ‘Socrates and a man exist, and Socrates is not a man’, which is false in virtue of the second conjunct. On the other hand, ‘Socrates differs from every man’ = ‘Socrates exists and every man exists, and Socrates is not every man’, which is true if there are any men besides Socrates.
other than an animal; therefore, Socrates is other than this animal.”\textsuperscript{138} Now it is clear that such inferences are good ones, because if Socrates differs from a man, [then] Socrates is not the same as\textsuperscript{139} a man. And if Socrates is not the same as a man, it follows that he is not the same as Socrates. For a negation negates the following term confusedly and distributively. And it follows [further]: “He is not the same as Socrates; therefore, he differs from Socrates.” Thus [putting it all together] from beginning to end: “Socrates differs from a man; therefore, Socrates differs from Socrates.” Similarly, it follows: “Socrates is other than an animal; therefore, he is not the same as an animal. And further: Therefore he is not the same as this animal; therefore, he is other than this animal.” Thus [putting it all together] from beginning to end, it follows: “Socrates is other than an animal; therefore, he is other than this animal.”

\textsuperscript{(106)} I said that such a term “that includes an exercised negation” (the negation ‘not’ is like this) has the power of confusedly and determinately confusing the term that immediately follows and terminates its dependence. For if it did not terminate the dependence of the relation conveyed by such a term, [the immediately following term] would not be confused by it. For example if someone says ‘Another man, or a differing man, runs’, the term ‘man’ here is not confused. But when someone says ‘Another than a man runs, or what is different from a man runs’, the term ‘man’ is confused confusedly and distributively.

\textsuperscript{(107)} I also said that such a relative word that includes an exercised negation can confuse a common term that \textit{immediately} follows, etc., because it cannot confuse a term that mediately follows. For “What differs from a risible is an animal; therefore, what differs from a risible is a man” does not follow, because the antecedent is true and the consequent false. The reason for this is that the negation included in such a term is referred only to the term that terminates its dependence. Therefore, it neither negates nor confuses any other term. Yet, if a common term terminating the dependence of such a relative [word] that conveys a negation precedes [the relative word], it is not confused in virtue of the negation conveyed by the relative [word]. For instance, in saying ‘From a man Socrates differs’ or ‘Socrates from a man differs’, the term ‘man’ supposits determinately and is not confused. For the negation does not govern what precedes [it].

\textsuperscript{138} The analysis of ‘other’ follows the same pattern as ‘differ’. See the preceding note.

\textsuperscript{139} The analysis of ‘not the same as’ (\textit{=} \textit{non idem}) follows the pattern of ‘differ’ and ‘other’. See the two preceding notes. Burley’s reason for introducing ‘not the same as’ here is that it makes explicit the negation implicit in the other two locutions.
So, therefore, it is apparent what confused and distributive absolute supposition is.

[Two Objections and Replies]

But a doubt arises. For it was said that in a universal affirmative [proposition] the subject supposit confusely and distributively. But this does not seem [to be] true. For, assuming that no man is white, ‘Every white man is white’ is a universal affirmative, and yet the subject does not supposit confusedly and distributively, because it supposit for nothing [at all].

Again, the proposition ‘Either man runs’ is a universal [proposition], and yet the subject does not supposit confusedly and distributively. For in that case it would supposit for any man, which is false since the sign[superscript 5] ‘either’ only distributes for two.

To the first [objection], it must be said that, assuming that no man is white, the subject in ‘Every white man is white’ does supposit confusedly and distributively. Nevertheless, it does not supposit for anything because the subject does not have any suppositum. Yet it is denoted to have supposita by the fact that the universal affirmative sign is added to it. Therefore, I say that confused supposition is distributive when a common term supposit for all its supposita or is denoted to supposit for all its supposita by the addition of a universal sign. Thus, if the common term does not have supposita and a universal affirmative sign is added to it, it supposit confusedly and distributively, because it is denoted to supposit for all its supposita.

To the second [objection], I say that ‘Either man runs’ is not properly formulated. For [what is] distributable by the sign ‘either’ ought to have two supposita only, and they ought to be indicated by a demonstrative pronoun [occurring] in the distributable [phrase], as here: ‘Either of these runs’, indicating Socrates and Plato, or any other two whatever.

[On the Supposition of Relative Terms]

Having talked about absolute supposition, we must talk briefly about relative supposition. Relative supposition belongs to a relative term, taking ‘relative’ in the sense of “recollective of a thing referred to previously”. (For that is how we intend to talk about relatives in the present context.)

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[i] I.e., quantifier.

[ii] This was a well known definition. Note that we are not talking here about “relatives” in the sense of terms like ‘to the right of’, ‘larger than’.
(114) To make [the matter] plain, you have to know that among such relatives, some are *relatives of substance*, like ‘he’, ‘the same’, ‘another’, and ‘the rest’. Some are *relatives of accidents*, like ‘such’, ‘such as’, ‘so much’, ‘so many’. Among relatives of substance, some are *relatives of identity*, like ‘he’, ‘the same’, and some are *relatives of diversity*, like ‘another’, ‘the rest’. A relative of identity supposit for the same [thing] as its antecedent is verified of. But a relative of diversity supposit for [something] other than what its antecedent supposit for. Among relatives of identity, some are *reciprocals*, like ‘of himself’, ‘to himself’, ‘himself’, ‘by himself’, together with its possessive [forms] ‘his’, ‘hers’, ‘its’.

(115) With respect to relatives of substance, and first with respect to relatives of identity, you have to know that a non-reciprocal relative of identity supposit for the same [thing] as what its antecedent supposit for. Thus, if its antecedent supposit for supposita, the relative supposit for supposita. And if the antecedent of the relative supposit for the significate or for the utterance, the relative of identity supposit for the same [thing]. For example: ‘If a man runs, he is moved.’ Because the term ‘man’ in the antecedent supposit for supposita, therefore the relative [term] in the consequent supposit for supposita. Likewise, in saying ‘Man is a species, and he is predicated of several [things]’. Because ‘man’, which is the antecedent, supposit for its significate in the first part, therefore the relative in the second part supposit for the same [thing].

(116) Yet you have to understand that even though the relative supposit for the same [thing] as its antecedent supposit for, nevertheless the relative does not always have the same supposition as its antecedent has. This is clear in saying ‘Animal is a trisyllable and it is not a monosyllable’. ‘Animal’ in the first part supposit materially. But ‘it’ in the second part does not supposit materially. For in that case it would supposit for the utterance ‘it’, and so ‘Animal is a trisyllable and it is not a monosyllable’ would be true. Therefore, it must be granted that a relative of identity always supposit for the same [thing] as what its antecedent supposit for. But it does not always have the same [kind of] supposition as its antecedent has.

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142 ‘such’, ‘such as’, ‘so much’, ‘so many’ = *talis, qualis, tantus, quantus*.
143 That is, reflexive.
145 ‘Supposita’ in the metaphysical sense. See n. 12 above. A term supposita for its “supposita”, in this sense, when it is in personal supposition.
146 In the previous example, the ‘antecedent’ was used in the sense of the antecedent of an inference. Here it is used in the sense of the grammatical antecedent of a relative term.
(117) You have to know that it is not always permissible to put the antecedent in place of the relative. For to say ‘A man runs and he argues’ is not the same as to say ‘A man runs and a man argues’, because for the truth of ‘A man runs and a man argues’ it suffices that one man runs and another one argues. Instead, the rule ‘It is permissible to put the antecedent in place of the relative’ is to be understood [as holding] when the antecedent is singular and not common to [several] supposita. For to say ‘Socrates runs and he argues’ is the same as to say ‘Socrates runs and Socrates argues’.

(118) You have to know that a non-reciprocal relative of identity never refers to something occurring in the same categorical. For to say ‘Every man is he’ is [to say] nothing [at all], unless ‘he’ is taken demonstratively. For ‘he’ cannot refer to ‘man’ occurring in the same categorical. But a relative of identity occurring in one categorical can refer to a term occurring in another categorical. In order for the categoricals to be true in which there occurs a relative [term] and the antecedent of the relative, the propositions have to verified for the same suppositum. For in order that ‘A man runs and he argues’ be true, it has to be the case that ‘A man runs’ is verified for some suppositum of ‘man’ and that the second part is verified for the same suppositum. It follows from this that a non-reciprocal relative of identity is not inferred from its suppositum unless, together with this, its antecedent is inferred from the same suppositum. Thus it does not follow: “A man runs and Socrates argues; therefore, a man runs and he argues.”

(119) You must know that neither negation nor distribution has the power of confusing a relative of identity. Instead, a relative of identity always supposits for the same [thing] as what its antecedent supposits for, and in the same way. Thus, assuming that Socrates runs and Plato does not, ‘Some man runs and Plato is not he’ is true. But it does not follow from this that some man runs and Plato is not Plato. For even though the negation precedes the relative ‘he’, nevertheless it does not confuse it. Rather, ‘he’, like its antecedent, supposits particularly, despite the fact that the negation precedes. From this, it is clear that the second parts of these copulatives are true: ‘Some man is risible and Socrates is he’ and ‘Some man is risible and Socrates is not he’. Neither do the second parts of these copulatives contradict [one another]. In such cases, no contradictory can be given for the proposition in which the

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147 That is, have as its antecedent. We are talking here about reference in the syntactical, not the semantical sense.
148 And so not relatively.
149 As it would follow if the ‘not’ had the power of confusing the relative ‘he’.
150 We have not seen this as a division of supposition before. Apparently it means “determinately”.

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relative occurs, except with respect to the contradictory of the proposition in which the antecedent of the relative occurs.\footnote{An example would have been in order here. For some help, see para. 130 –132 below. (But there are problems there too.)}

\textbf{(120)} A doubt arises here. If a relative of identity has the same supposition as its antecedent has, then ‘Every man is an animal and every risible is it’ would be true. For in the second part, ‘it’ would supposit merely confusedly, and so it is not denoted by this part that some animal inheres in every risible.\footnote{Reading ‘risibili’ for the edition’s ‘animali’ (see p. 30.10). On inherence, see n. 102 above.}

\textbf{(121)} It has to be said [in reply] that ‘Every man is an animal and every risible is it’ is false, despite the fact that the relative in the second part supposits merely confusedly. For there follows from this [the conclusion] ‘Socrates is an animal and every risible is he’, which is false.

\textbf{(122)} You have to know that a non-reciprocal relative of identity related to a common term that stands confusedly and distributively has the power of confusing a mediately adjoined term merely confusedly. For when someone says ‘Every man is an animal and he is some man’, ‘man’ in the second part is confused merely confusedly.

\textbf{(123)} With respect to the supposition of reciprocal relatives, you have to know that a reciprocal relative can indifferently refer to a term occurring in the same categorical and to a term occurring in another categorical.\footnote{In other words, both ‘Socrates saw himself’ and ‘Socrates looked in the mirror and he saw himself’ are perfectly acceptable constructions.} In this respect, a reciprocal relative of identity differs from a non-reciprocal relative of identity.

\textbf{(124)} You have to know that a reciprocal relative referring to a term in another categorical is either (a) an extreme all by itself. And in that case it supposits for the same [thing] as does its antecedent. There are the same rules about a [reciprocal] relative suppositing like this as there about a non-reciprocal relative of identity. But when a reciprocal relative referring to a term in another categorical is (b) not an extreme but a part of an extreme, in that case the extreme does not have to supposit for the same [thing] that the antecedent of the relative supposits for. For example, when someone says ‘A man argues and his ass runs’, ‘his ass’ in the second part does not supposit for what the term ‘man’ supposits for in the first part.

\textbf{(125)} You have to know that a reciprocal relative referring to a term in the same categorical has the same supposition as its antecedent [has]. But onto the supposition that its antecedent has, the relative adds “singulation”, so that if its antecedent supposits confusedly and distributively, the relative
Confused and distributive singulated supposition is, as it were, an intermediary supposition between confused and distributive supposition and merely confused supposition absolutely so called.\textsuperscript{155} For it agrees with confused and distributive supposition absolutely so called insofar as a term suppositing confusedly and distributively singly actually supposit for a suppositum. It differs from absolute confused and distributive supposition, because under a term that supposit absolutely confusedly and distributively one can descend to anything for which the distribution is made. But under a term that supposit absolutely confusedly and distributively singly one cannot descend absolutely to any suppositum. Rather, to any suppositum one can descend \textit{with respect to itself}.\textsuperscript{156} Therefore, it is called “singulated” supposition because it assigns singulars to singulars. For it does not follow: “Every man sees himself; therefore, every man sees Socrates.” But it quite well follows: “Every man sees himself; therefore, Socrates sees Socrates.”\textsuperscript{157} 

\textbf{(127)} [Confused and distributive singulated] supposition agrees with merely confused supposition insofar as under a term suppositing singly one cannot descend absolutely to supposita. It also differs from merely confused supposition because a term that supposit merely confusedly can be inferred from its suppositum. For it follows: “Every man is this animal; therefore, every man is an animal.”\textsuperscript{158} But a term that supposit confusedly and distribut-

\textsuperscript{154} Many mediaeval authors said this, but few seem to have taken the restriction very seriously. Burley’s attitude here is typical. Even though only whole extremes and not their parts properly have supposition, he goes ahead and talks about the supposition of parts of extremes anyway. See the further explanation in para. 192 –194. See also para. 74 & 125, above.

\textsuperscript{155} There has been no talk up to now about “absolute” merely confused supposition. But confused and distributive supposition, whether mobile or immobile, can be either absolute or respective. See para. 99 above. Perhaps the phrase ‘absolutely so called’ is simply misplaced in the text. But see the following note.

\textsuperscript{156} This last phrase is a clue to the sense of ‘absolute’ in these passages. The contrast appears to be between ‘absolute’ and ‘with respect to something’. The examples make the point clear enough.

\textsuperscript{157} In short, with singulated supposition the descent to singulars must take place under two terms at once, the reciprocal relative of identity and its antecedent.

\textsuperscript{158} See para. 85, above.
tively singly is not inferred from its suppositum. For it does not follow:
“Every man sees Socrates; therefore, every man sees himself.”

(128) There is a doubt about one thing said above. For it seems that
a non-reciprocal relative of identity can refer to something occurring in the
same categorical, as it clear here: ‘Every man having an ass sees it.’

(129) It must be said [in reply] that a non-reciprocal relative of identity
cannot refer to any extreme of the proposition in which the relative oc-
curs. Nevertheless it can refer to a part of an extreme, as happens in the case
at hand. For when someone says ‘That man having an ass sees it’, the rela-
tive ‘it’ refers to ‘ass’, and so refers to a part of the extreme.

(130) You have to know that such a relative takes its supposition from
the antecedent. Therefore, to give the contradictory in the case of relatives,
the antecedents of the relatives in the contradictories have to have opposite
suppositions, or else the relatives do not have suppositions [at all].

(131) The reason such propositions do not contradict [one another] is
that in contradictories the terms have opposite modes of suppositing. Thus,
since the antecedent of the relative in ‘Some man having a son does not love
him’ supposits particularly, [so] likewise the relative supposits particularly too — insofar as we can say that a part of an extreme supposit.

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It does not seem to me that this is the correct way to formulate the inference. In
virtue of the preceding paragraph, it would appear that the correct way would be: “Socrates
sees Socrates; therefore, every man sees himself.” But of course that inference fails too, so
that Burley’s point stands.

160 See para. 118.

161 The original proposition had ‘every’. But the point is the same.

162 I can make no sense out of this last clause. The verb is in the indicative, so that it
is not governed by the ‘have to’. I suspect there is a corruption of the text here.

163 This will only be so if the proposition is read in the sense “Every man who has an
ass is such that he has an ass that he sees”.

164 See para. 125 and n. 154, above. As it stands, the argument is incomplete. We
need to be also told what kind of supposition ‘son’ and ‘him’ have in ‘Every man having a
son loves him’, and how this kind of supposition is not “opposite” to the determinate
(= particular) supposition the same terms have in ‘Some man having a son does not love
him’. It is clear why the terms have determinate supposition in the latter proposition. For
From what was said above, it is clear that this inference is not valid: “Every man having an ass sees it; some man having an ass does not see it; therefore, some man having an ass is not a man having an ass.”

With respect to a relative [term] of diversity, you have to know that it is not called a relative of diversity because it supposit for another [thing] than what its antecedent supposit for, but rather because a proposition in which a relative of diversity occurs is not verified for the same [thing] as is the proposition in which the antecedent of the relative occurs. For example, when someone says ‘The one of these is true and the other of these is false’, indicating two contradictory opposites, ‘the other’ is a relative of diversity and supposit for the one of these. What I [just] said, ‘the one of these’, supposit indifferently for either of these. Therefore, ‘the one’ and ‘the other’ supposit for the same [things].

Nevertheless, the proposition ‘The one of these is true’ and ‘The other of these is true’ cannot be verified together for the same [thing]. Thus because ‘The one of these is true’ is only verified for that (among these) which is true, therefore if ‘The other of these is true’ were true, the first one would have to be false.

For this reason, it is clear that the second part of the following copulative is false and impossible: ‘The one of these is true and the other of these is true’, despite the fact that the subject of the second part supposit for a contingent proposition, because for the truth of the second part it is required that the predicate inheres\(^\text{165}\) in the subject on the false side. Thus, it is impossible, just as ‘A false contingent is true’ is impossible, despite the fact that its subject supposit for something that can be true.

With respect to relatives of accident, you have to know that a relative of identity of accidents does not refer to its antecedent for numerically the same [thing]. For it is impossible for the same accident to inhere in numerically diverse things. Rather it refers to its antecedent for something that specifically the same quality belongs to. For example, when someone says ‘Socrates is white and such is Plato’, ‘such’ is a relative of identity and

\(^{165}\) On inherence, see n. 102, above.
refers to [what is] white, [but] not for numerically the same thing. Rather it supposes for something to which a whiteness belongs that is specifically the same as the whiteness in Plato. Thus, the sense in which ‘Socrates is white and such is Plato’ is understood is ‘Socrates is white and Plato is [someone] having a whiteness’.

(137) In this there lies a difference between a relative of identity of substance and a relative of identity of accidents. For a relative of identity of substance refers [to its antecedent] for numerically the same [thing], because for the truth of ‘A man runs and he argues’ it is required that Socrates runs and numerically the same one argues. But a relative of identity of accidents does not refer [to its antecedent] for numerically the same [thing]. This is clear in the earlier example, and also here: ‘Socrates is two cubits tall and Plato is as much’. For it is not denoted by this that Socrates has numerically the same quantity that Plato has.

[Chapter 5: In which Doubts are Resolved by Means of What Was Said Above]

(138) On the basis of what has been said above, [certain] difficulties are solved that arise in natural science and in the other sciences from an ignorance of what has been said above.

(139) For it is usually proven sometimes that a magnitude is not divisible into ever further divisibles, but that one arrives [instead] at indivisible magnitudes. This [is proven] as follows: Than every magnitude one can assign a lesser magnitude. (This has to be so if magnitude were divided into ever further divisibles.) And since the magnitude that is less than every magnitude is indivisible, it follows than an indivisible magnitude can be assigned. And since, as a result of the division, one arrived at indivisibles, the division stops. It would follow that magnitude is not divisible into ever further divisibles. From this it follows that magnitude is not divisible to infinity. Now it is clear that the magnitude that is less than every magnitude is indivisible. For if it were divisible, [then] since it is not divisible except into magnitudes, and a part is less than its whole, it follows that the magnitude that is put as less than every magnitude is not less than every magnitude [after all], because it is not less than its part.

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166 That is not required. Rather, it is required that Socrates runs and numerically the same one argues, or Plato runs and numerically the same one argues, and so on. Burley is being a little over-compressed here.
167 In ‘Socrates is white and such is Plato’.
168 The juxtaposition of ‘usually’ and ‘sometimes’ is just as odd in the Latin.

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(140) It is also usually proven [by such arguments] that a multitude cannot grow to infinity. For if it could, then beyond every given finite multitude one could assign a greater finite multitude. But a multitude greater than every finite multitude is an infinite multitude. Therefore, if beyond every given finite multitude one could assign a greater finite multitude, it would follow that some finite multitude would be an infinite multitude, which is impossible. Now it is clear that if a multitude could grow to infinity, [then] beyond every given finite multitude one could assign a greater finite multitude, because each singular of this universal [proposition] would be true. For beyond this given finite multitude one could assign a greater finite multitude, and beyond that one, and so on to infinity.

(141) It is usually proven by similar arguments that time is not eternal and could not by any power have been [made to exist]. For if it were [eternal], then any past instant some instant would have preceded. Since, therefore, the whole of time neither is current\textsuperscript{169} nor exists in the nature of things except through an instant, it follows that the whole of past time some instant would have preceded. But what is preceded by an instant is not eternal, but rather beings to be. Therefore, the whole of past time begins to be.

(142) Again, it is proven by a similar argument that an instant is immediately next to [another] instant. This [is proven] as follows: If it is given that an instant is \textit{not} immediately next to [another] instant, then some time intervenes between this instant and any instant other than this instant. Since, therefore, there are many instants in that [intervening] time, those instants will be immediately next to this instant. Otherwise it would follow that that time would intervene between this instant and any instant that is in [that time], which is impossible.

(143) Again, it is usually proven that the generation of man is not perpetual. For, assuming the eternity of the world, ‘Any man the sun precedes in time’ is true, because each singular is true.\textsuperscript{170} Therefore, at some time the sun existed when no man existed. Consequently, at some time no man existed. Consequently, at that time the human species did not exist, and so the generation of man is not eternal.

(144) Again, it is proven that there can be motion in an instant. For motion can be speeded up to infinity, according to the Commentator on

\textsuperscript{169}‘is current’ = \textit{instat}. I am not happy with my translation here, although English does have an adjectival usage of ‘instant’ in this sense. (Think of the old letter-writing style: ‘Yours of the 10th instant received, etc.’) There is an etymological word-play going on. Time does not ‘stand-in’ (= \textit{instat}, be current) except through a ‘stand-in’ (= \textit{instans}, an instant). See also para. 155 below.

\textsuperscript{170}That is, ‘This man the sun precedes in time’ is true, and so is ‘That man the sun precedes in time’, and so on. ‘Sun’ is the subject here.
Therefore, for every finite velocity one can assign a greater. But a velocity greater than every finite velocity is an infinite velocity. Therefore, some motion can be of infinite velocity. But a motion of infinite velocity necessarily occurs in an instant. Therefore, there can be motion in an instant.

[Replies to These Difficulties]

(145) All these and similar difficulties are solved by means of a rule that was given in the preceding chapter, as follows: “Whenever there is an argument from some common term suppositing confusedly with respect to some multitude to the same term suppositing determinately with respect to the same multitude, a fallacy of figure of speech is committed, because a kind of something is turned into a this something.” For example, “Every man is an animal; therefore, an animal is every man.” For the term suppositing merely confusedly indicates a kind of something, and the term suppositing determinately indicates a this something. And when one proceeds from a kind of something to a this something with respect to the same thing, a fallacy of figure of speech is committed.

(146) On this basis, [the reply] to the preceding difficulties is clear:

(147) To (a) the first one, I grant that than every given magnitude one can assign a lesser. For in this [proposition] the term ‘lesser magnitude’ supposits merely confusedly by virtue of the preceding distribution. Yet ‘Some magnitude is less than every magnitude’ is false, because in this [proposition] the subject supposits determinately. And therefore it does not follow: “Than every magnitude there is some magnitude less; therefore, there is some magnitude less than every magnitude.” Instead, it is a fallacy of figure of speech. Therefore, when someone says, “If than every magnitude there is some magnitude less; and what is less than every magnitude is indivisible, etc.,” I say [in reply] that there is no magnitude less than every magnitude. Neither does it follow from ‘Than every magnitude there is a magnitude less’ that there is some magnitude less than every magnitude.

(148) Suppose someone says, “I do not want to make that inference. Instead, I am arguing as follows: ‘Than every magnitude there is some magnitude less; but a magnitude less than every magnitude is indivisible; therefore, some magnitude is indivisible.’ It must be said [in reply] that the mi-

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171 Averroes, In Physicorum VI, tx. c. 15 (Venice: Junctas, 1562), fol. 117B.
172 See para. 93, above. The rule was never explicitly stated there.
173 See para. 139, above.
174 The point of this is to maintain that ‘A magnitude less than every magnitude is indivisible’ is not meant to follow somehow from ‘Than every magnitude there is some
nor [premise] of this reasoning is false. For it implies that some magnitude is less than every magnitude. And that is false.

(149) If it is said that some magnitude is less than *this* magnitude, and some magnitude is less than *that* magnitude, and so on to infinity, [and] therefore some magnitude is less than every magnitude, it has to be said [in reply] that this does not follow. Instead, it is a fallacy of figure of speech, arguing from several determinates with respect to parts of a multitude to one determinate with respect to the whole of the multitude. For in each of ‘Some magnitude is less than this magnitude’ and ‘Some magnitude is less than that magnitude’, and so on — in each one, the subject supposit for some determinate magnitude. Each of them is verified for one or another singular. [But] in the conclusion, when it is said that some magnitude is less than every magnitude, the subject supposit for some determinate, in the singular. So [the argument] proceeds from several determinates to one determinate, and so a *kind* of something is changed into a *this* something. For the several determinates indicate a kind of thing, and the one determinate indicates a this something.

(150) Suppose someone speaks against [this view] as follows: If ‘Than every magnitude there is some magnitude less’ is true, [then] let that magnitude be assigned — let it be *A*. Then the argument is as follows: Than every magnitude, *A* is a lesser magnitude; therefore, *A* is less than every magnitude. Consequently, some magnitude is less than every magnitude.

(151) It must be said [in reply] that a common term suppositing merely confusedly should not be instantiated to any suppositum, because it does not supposit determinately for any suppositum. Thus, in place of a common term suppositing determinately, it is legitimate to put some suppositum of [the term] by instantiating the common term to a suppositum. But in place of a common term suppositing merely confusedly, it is not legitimate to put some suppositum of [the term]. This is clear in ‘Every man is some animal’. It is not legitimate to instantiate ‘some animal’ to any suppositum.

magnitude less’, as suggested at the end of para. 147. Rather it is intended as a separate premise which, together with ‘Than every magnitude there is some magnitude less’, yields the conclusion ‘Some magnitude is indivisible’. Burley’s reply is that it doesn’t make any difference, since the premise is false anyway.

175 I am repunctuating the edition, which in my opinion distorts the argument here by including ‘in the conclusion’ as part of the preceding sentence.

176 ‘assigned’ = *signetur*. See also the following note.

177 ‘instantiated’ = *signari*. See the preceding note. The variation in translation should cause no confusion.

179 That is, one cannot say: Every man is some animal; therefore, every man is *this* animal — no matter which animal is indicated.
(152) If you say, “If every man is some animal, [then] let it be assigned — let it be \( A \)”, I say [in reply] that when you say ‘it’ you are assuming something false, namely, that ‘animal’ supposits for something determinate. In the same way, when it is said that every man is some animal, if someone asks “Which animal?” or “Which animal is it?”, I say that this question assumes something false, namely, that ‘animal’ supposits for something determinate in ‘Every man is some animal’.

(153) We have to reply in the same way to the other difficulty, (b), the one about multitude. When it is said, “If than every given finite multitude one can assign a greater finite multitude, and a finite multitude that is greater than every finite multitude is infinite, therefore some finite multitude is infinite,”\(^1\) it must be said that there is a fallacy of figure of speech here. For in the major the term ‘finite multitude’ in the predicate of the first proposition supposits merely confusedly and indicates a kind of something. [But] when in the minor [premise] it is said that a finite multitude is greater than every, etc., the same term supposits determinately with respect to the same multitude conveyed by the universal sign. Thus a kind of something is changed into a this something.

(154) Also, ‘A finite multitude greater than every finite multitude is infinite’\(^1\) is false on account of a false implication. For it implies that there is some finite multitude greater than every finite multitude.\(^2\) Hence the categorical ‘A finite multitude greater etc.’ is false; it is false because of a false implication on the part of the subject. Nevertheless, the conditional ‘If some finite multitude is greater than every finite multitude, [then] it is infinite’ is true. But the antecedent [of that] is impossible.

(155) To the other form [of argument, (c)], at the difficulty where it is said that any past instant some instant precedes, I grant that. [But] when it is said that the whole of time some instant precedes, I say that [that] does not follow. For in the antecedent the term ‘instant’ supposits merely confusedly, and in the consequent it supposits determinately. And when it is said that time is not current\(^3\) except through an instant, I grant that [too]. But it does not follow from this that the whole of time some instant precedes. For whether the sign ‘whole’ is taken categorically or syncategorically, the antecedent is true and the consequent false. It also does not follow: “Any

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\(^{1}\) See para. 140 above. As usual, Burley is quoting only loosely.

\(^{2}\) The minor premise of the inference in para. 153.

\(^{3}\) It implies this because it is an “indeterminate” affirmative proposition — that is, one without an explicit quantifier. Such propositions were analyzed as equivalent to existentially quantified propositions. Thus the proposition amounts to ‘Some finite multitude greater than every finite multitude is infinite’, and is false for the reason Burley gives.

\(^{4}\) ‘is not current’ = \(\text{non instat}\). See n. 169 above.
past instant some instant precedes; therefore, some instant precedes any past instant.” Rather, that is a fallacy of figure of speech, because a kind of something is changed into a this something.

(156) To the other [difficulty, (d)], when it is proven that an instant is immediately next to [another] instant, because otherwise it is true that some time would intervene between this instant and any instant other than this one, I say [in reply] that that does not follow. For in ‘Some time intervenes, etc.’ the term ‘time’ supposits determinately, and [yet] one cannot assign any determinate time that intervenes between this instant and any instant other than this instant.184 Nevertheless, ‘Between this instant any instant other than this one there is some intervening time’ is true, because the term ‘intervening time’ in it supposits merely confusedly by virtue of the preceding distribution. Thus, you have to be most careful to consider whether a universal sign or other syncategorematic word that conveys a multitude precedes the common term or follows it.

(157) To the other argument, (e), by which it is proven that the generation of man is not eternal because [if it were], then any man the sun preceded in time, I say that this [latter proposition] is true, because each singular is true.185 I say that in this [proposition] the time consignified by the verb ‘preceded’ supposits merely confusedly186 by virtue of the preceding distribution. Thus it does not supposit for some determinate time. Neither does it follow: “Every man the sun preceded in time; therefore, the sun preceded every man in time.” For [the inference] proceeds from confused supposition to determinate supposition with respect to the same multitude. In the antecedent the time consignified by the verb supposits merely confusedly by virtue of the preceding distribution, and in the consequent, when it says ‘The sun preceded, etc.’, the time consignified by the verb ‘preceded’ supposits determinately, because nothing preceded [it]187 that could confuse it. And so in the inference mentioned a fallacy of figure of speech is committed, because a kind of something is changed into a this something.

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184 This is not good enough. All Burley’s argument shows as it stands is that the proposition is false. But the argument in para. 142 agreed that it was false; indeed, it was because it was false that the argument concluded by reductio that one instant is immediately next to another. What Burley needs to show is not that the proposition is false, but that it does not follow from the claim that one instant is not immediately next to another. Such an argument is perhaps implicit in the remainder of the paragraph.

185 That is, ‘This man the sun preceded in time’ is true, and ‘That man the sun preceded in time’ is true, and so on. Again, the subject is ‘sun’.

186 See n. 3 above.

187 That is, preceded it in the proposition, not preceded it in time.
(158) On the basis of what has [just] been said, it is apparent that, assuming the world existed from eternity and completed species, like man, ass, and the like, existed from eternity, ‘Every man some ass preceded in time’ is true, because each singular is true. Similarly, ‘Every ass some man preceded in time’ is true, because each singular is likewise true. Yet ‘Some ass preceded every man in time’ is false, and similarly ‘Some man preceded every ass in time’ [is false].

(159) To the other difficulty, (f), where it is said that motion can be speeded up to infinity, it must be said that, granting it is not inconsistent for a motion to be speeded up to infinity, [it follows that] ‘Than every finite velocity one can assign a greater’ can be granted. And when it is said that the velocity that is greater than every velocity is infinite, I say [in reply] that this categorical is false because of a false implication. For it implies that there is some velocity greater than every finite velocity. But that is not denoted by ‘Than every finite velocity one can assign a greater velocity’. For in this [proposition] ‘greater velocity’ supposits merely confusedly, and in the other [proposition] it supposits determinately. And when it is said that a velocity that is greater than every finite velocity is infinite, it must be said [in reply] that this categorical is false because of a false implication. For it implies that there is some velocity greater than every finite velocity, which is false. Nevertheless, the conditional ‘If there is some velocity greater than every finite velocity, that velocity is infinite’ is true. But the antecedent is false.

(160) On the basis of what has been said above, it is also clear that certain people’s reasonings who want to prove that God is of infinite perfection are inconclusive. They argue like this: “For [what is] most eminent it is inconsistent that something be more eminent; for nothing finite is it inconsistent for there to be something more eminent; therefore, nothing finite is the most eminent. Consequently, what is most eminent is infinite.

(161) This reasoning is inconclusive. For, taking the major [premise] insofar as it is a particular [proposition], in that sense it is false. For to that which is the most eminent, it is not a formal contradiction in terms that there

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188 'completed' = perfectae. I am not sure of the sense here.
189 That is, ‘This man some ass preceded in time’ is true, and so is ‘That man some ass preceded in time’, and so on. The subject is ‘ass’.
190 See para. 144, above.
191 See n. 182 above.
192 These last two sentences plainly just repeat what went before. They are probably the result of some textual corruption, and can be deleted with impunity.
193 That is, existentially quantified. The ‘something’ in ‘something is more eminent’ is regarded as the subject.
be something more eminent than it. But taking the major [premise] in the
sense of composition, in that sense it is true. The sense [in that case] is that
there is an inconsistency here: that something is more eminent than the most
eminent. And that is true.\footnote{The difference then is the difference between saying “It is inconsistent for there
to be anything more eminent than \(x\)”, where \(x\) is the most eminent thing, and saying “It is
inconsistent for there to be anything more eminent than the most eminent thing”, which is
true. In short, it is the difference between \textit{de re} and \textit{de dicto} modality.} But taking the major in the latter sense, no con-
clusion follows from the premises, because the premises do not share any
term.

(162) Take an example. Suppose someone argues like this: “For the
sitting it is inconsistent that he be standing; Socrates is sitting; therefore, for
Socrates it is inconsistent that he be standing.” If the major [premise] of this
reasoning is taken in the sense of division, in that sense it is false. For to \textit{him}
who is sitting it is not inconsistent that he be standing. But in the sense of
composition the major [premise] is true, and [in that sense] no conclusion
follows from the premises. For the premises do not share any term, as is clear
if the propositions are resolved.\footnote{That is, analyzed.} For the following propositions do not share
their terms, and neither is anything inferred from them if you argue: “Here is
an inconsistency: ‘The sitting is standing’; Socrates is sitting; therefore, here
is an inconsistency: ‘Socrates is standing’.” Plainly, there is no connection
here.

(163) From what was said above, the solution of sophisms like these is
clear: Suppose Socrates says that God exists, Plato says that man is an ani-
mal, and both of them say ‘A man is an ass’. Assuming this situation, ‘[What
is] by both of these [men] stated is true’ is true. For each singular is true.
From this, we argue further as follows: ‘[What is] by both of these [men]
stated is true; but nothing is stated by both of these [men] except that a man
is an ass; therefore, that a man is an ass is true.’

(164) The solution is clear from what was said. For ‘[What is] by both
of these [men] stated is true’ is true, because the term ‘stated’ supposits
merely confusedly by virtue of the preceding distribution. But in the minor
[premise], where it says ‘[What is] stated by both of these [men] is that a man
is an ass’, or where it says that nothing is stated by both of these [men] except
that a man is an ass,\footnote{The difference between these two formulations is that the one is affirmative and
the other negative. That is why Burley goes on to say that ‘stated’ there supposits determinately or
confusedly and distributively. Negative terms, remember, have the ability to con-
fuse the supposition of a following term.} the term ‘stated’ supposits determinately, or confus-
edly and distributively,\textsuperscript{197} with respect to the same multitude. Thus, the inference does not hold. Instead, there is a fallacy of figure of speech by changing one [kind of] supposition into another. It also does not follow: “[What is] by both of these [men] stated is true; therefore, [what is] stated by both of these [men] is true.” For [there] we go from merely confused supposition to determine supposition with respect to the same multitude. Therefore, a kind of something is changed into a this something.

[Difficulties over Confused and Distributive Supposition]

\textbf{(165)} With respect to confused and distributive supposition, difficulties arise in the case of absolute [terms] as well as in the case of relative [terms]. For (a) it was said above\textsuperscript{198} that in a universal affirmative [proposition] a common term supposits for its supposita,\textsuperscript{199} and that a universal affirmative proposition is true only when the predicate inheres\textsuperscript{200} in whatever is contained under the subject. But this does not seem true. For ‘Any singular of some universal [proposition] is true’. Yet the predicate does not inhere in whatever is contained under the subject. For the proposition ‘Socrates is an ass’ is a singular of some universal [proposition], and yet it is not true.

\textbf{(166)} Furthermore, (b) ‘Every man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ is true. Yet the predicate does not inhere in whatever is contained under the subject, because Plato is contained under the subject. For ‘Plato is a man, if he is Socrates’ is true. Yet the predicate ‘differs from Plato’ does not inhere in Plato.

\textbf{(167)} To (a) the first of these [difficulties], it must be said that ‘Any singular of some universal [proposition] is true’ is false. For in this [proposition] the whole [subject] — that is, ‘singular of some universal’ — is distributed. And it is denoted [by the proposition] that the predicate — namely, ‘true’ — inhere in anything of which the term ‘singular of some universal’ is truly said, which is false.

\textbf{(168)} If someone says, “Any singular of this universal ‘Every man is an animal’ is true; therefore, any singular of some universal is true,” I say [in reply] that [this] does not follow. Rather it is a fallacy of the consequent,\textsuperscript{201} because one is arguing from an inferior to a superior with distribution.

\textsuperscript{197} See the preceding note.
\textsuperscript{198} See para. 79. The claim about when a universal affirmative is true was not explicitly made above. The closest perhaps is in para. 120.
\textsuperscript{199} See n. 12 above.
\textsuperscript{200} On inherence, see n. 102, above.
\textsuperscript{201} That is, the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
‘singular of this universal’ is inferior to ‘singular of some universal’. But, even though ‘Any singular of some universal is true’ is false, nevertheless ‘Of some universal any singular of it is true’ is true. For in this [proposition] the whole — that is, ‘singular of some universal’ — is not distributed. Rather, only the term ‘singular of it’ is distributed. The term in the oblique case, namely, ‘of some universal’, supposits particularly, since it precedes the universal sign.

(169) Thus, you have to know that whenever a [term in the] nominative and a [term in an] oblique case precede the composition joining the predicate with the subject, you have to consider whether the nominative precedes the oblique case or the other way around. If the nominative does precede the oblique case, the whole aggregate of nominative and oblique case is the subject. This is clear in ‘Any ass of a man runs’. Here the whole ‘ass of a man’ is in subject position. In the same way, in ‘Any singular of some universal is true’, the whole — namely, ‘singular of some universal’ — is the subject, because in this [proposition] the nominative term precedes the oblique term. But if the oblique term precedes the nominative term, then nothing but the oblique term is the subject, speaking of the “subject” as far as the logician is concerned. The oblique term, and the whole of what remains goes on the side of the predicate. This is clear in ‘Any man’s ass runs’, and the like. Here nothing but ‘man’s’ is the subject, and the rest goes on the side of the predicate.

(170) Now you must know that in such cases it used to be the custom to distinguish a twofold subject, namely, the subject of the proposition and the subject of the locution. The subject of the proposition is what is the subject for the logician, and it is that under which an application should be made in a perfect syllogism. But the subject of the locution is the subject for the grammarian, and it is what “renders a suppositum to the verb”. Thus in

202 The Latin of course does not use the preposition here. The whole thing is in the genitive case.
203 That is, it is the “logical subject”, even though the grammarian might find a different “grammatical subject”. See para. 169.
204 ‘application’ = sumptio, I am not very happy with this translation. Generally, in mediæval discussions of the syllogism, the word ‘assumptio’ or ‘assumptum’ means the minor premise. I conjecture that the idea here is that in a perfect syllogism the major term has to be of wider extension than the minor (Posterior Analytics I, 11, 77a18), so that in passing from the major to the minor, the major term is “applied”. Burley’s point in the present context is that it is the subject of the proposition, not the subject of the locution, that one looks at to decide whether this done correctly. See also para. 171.
205 A not infrequent grammatical expression, meaning simply: to give the verb a subject. ‘Suppositum’ in this grammatical usage carries its etymological sense; the subject is what is “put under” the predicate.
‘Any man’s ass runs’, ‘man’s’ is the subject of the proposition and of the distribution, but the term ‘ass’ is the subject of the locution. Nevertheless, [the term ‘ass’] goes on the side of the predicate, speaking of the *predicate of the proposition*.

(171) On the basis of what has been said above, the solution of certain sophisms is clear. For any proposition can be proven by an argument like this: “Of any contradiction the one part is true; the proposition ‘You are an ass’ (or whichever one you want to prove) is of a contradiction the one part; therefore, this proposition is true.” Thus it can be proven that you are an ass and that God does not exist, and so on, by means of a paralogism like this, namely, “Of any contradiction the one part is true; this proposition is, of a contradiction, the one part; therefore, this proposition is true.”

(172) The solution of this is clear on the basis of what has already been said. For it was said that when the oblique [term] precedes the nominative before the composition, nothing but the oblique term is the subject for the logician. Therefore, in ‘Of any contradiction the one part is true’, nothing but the oblique term is the subject — that is, ‘of a contradiction’. And, because in a perfect syllogism an application should be made only under the subject, therefore the syllogism must be formed like this: “Of any contradiction the one part is true; this contradiction is a contradiction; therefore, of this contradiction the one part is true.” Thus, when someone argues, “Of any contradiction the one part is true; this proposition is, of a contradiction, the one part; therefore, etc.,” I say that [this] does not follow. Instead there are four terms here. For in the major nothing but the term ‘of a contradiction’ is in subject position, and in the minor the whole ‘of a contradiction the one part’ is predicated. So the middle [term] is changed.

(173) To (b) the other difficulty, when it says “‘Every man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ is true”, I say [in reply] that this [proposition] is multiple according to composition and division. In the sense of composition, the whole ‘man, if he is Socrates’ is the subject, and it is denoted [by the proposition] that everything [like] that (of which the whole ‘man, if he is Socrates’ is predicated) differs from Plato. In this sense, it is a categorical

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206 There is an awkwardness in translating this, because I have to include the ‘of’ in order to reflect the Latin genitive. The translation perhaps makes it look at first as if Burley has inadvertently slipped from ‘of any contradiction’ to ‘of a contradiction’. But he hasn’t. In Latin, the two phrases are ‘cujuslibet contradictionis’ and simply ‘contradictionis’, respectively. Burley is merely counting only the noun as the subject, not the noun + its quantifier.

207 See n. 204, above.

208 A valid syllogism has to have only three (perhaps not distinct) terms.

209 See n. 68, above.
and false proposition, because the subject is said of something of which the predicate is not said. For the subject is said of Plato, because Plato is a man, if he is Socrates. But the predicate, which is ‘to differ’ or ‘different from Plato’, is not truly said of Plato.

(174) But in the sense of division, [the proposition] is a conditional hypothetical and is true. For [in that sense] it is denoted [by the proposition] that if every man is Socrates, every man differs from Plato. And, in that sense, nothing but the term ‘man’ is the subject in the antecedent. Therefore, if an application\(^{210}\) should be made under the subject only, [then] an application should be made [in the present case] under ‘man’, like this: ‘Every man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato; Plato is a man; therefore, Plato, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato.’ And this conclusion is true. (Nevertheless, I am not saying that an application\(^{211}\) or descent should be made under the subject of a universal proposition [that is] the antecedent in a conditional. This will be clear in the second tract.\(^{212}\)

(175) Perhaps someone will say that ‘Every man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ does seem to be true in the sense of composition. For each singular seems to be true, namely, ‘This man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ and ‘That man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’, and so on.

(176) It must be said [to this] that in the singulars of a universal [proposition] the whole subject should be instantiated to the things it is distributed for. Thus, each singular depends [for its truth] on two things, namely, on the attribution of the principal predicate to the singular to which the subject is instantiated, and on the attribution of the subject to that to which it is instantiated. For example, the singulars of the universal [proposition] ‘Every man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ are ‘This man, if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’ [and] ‘That man, if he is Socrates differs from Plato’. The sense is: ‘This, of whom the term “man, if he is Socrates” is said, differs from Plato’, and in that sense it is a false singular. For, pointing to Plato, ‘This man, if he is Socrates, etc.’ is false, because the sense is ‘This, who is a man if he is Socrates, differs from Plato’, and that is false.

(177) You must reply in the same way to sophisms like these: ‘Every proposition or its contradictory is true’, ‘Every good or non-good is to be chosen’, ‘Whatever is or is not, is’. For all propositions like this are false in the sense of composition. In their singulars the whole subject should be instantiated to the things it is truly said of. Thus each of these has many false

\(^{210}\) See n. 204, above.

\(^{211}\) Ditto.

\(^{212}\) The second tract of Burley’s Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic, is “On Propositions and Hypothetical Syllogisms”. I have not translated this part.

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singles. [For example,] pointing to [the proposition] ‘You are an ass’, ‘This proposition or its contradictory is true’ is false in the sense of composition insofar as the whole subject is instantiated. For the sense is: ‘This, which is a proposition or its contradictory, is true’. Thus, the truth of this [singular] depends on these two things, namely, that this\textsuperscript{213} is true and that this is a sentence or its contradictory. It is the same way for the others.

(178) There is still a doubt. For it does not seem that a universal affirmative [proposition] is true when the predicate inheres in whatever is contained under the subject. For in that case ‘Every man is an individual’ would be true, because the predicate is in whatever is contained under the subject. But there is a proof that this [proposition] is false. For an affirmative proposition is false when the predicate does not inhere in the subject. And that is so in the present case, because in this [proposition] the species is in subject position, and being an individual does not inhere in that.\textsuperscript{214}

(179) I reply that you have to say ‘Every man is an individual’ is true, because each singular is true. When it is said that the predicate does not inhere in the subject, I say that the predicate does inhere in the subject supposing personally — that is, the predicate inhere in the subject [when the subject is taken] for the things the subject supposits for. But it does not inhere in the subject [taken] for the subject itself. Thus, for the truth of an affirmative proposition it is not required that the predicate inhere in the subject for itself. Instead, it is required that the predicate inhere in the thing or things for which thing or things the subject supposits. And it does not suffice for the truth of an affirmative that the predicate inhere in the subject. For ‘Some man is a species’ is false insofar as it is a particular [proposition].\textsuperscript{215} Nevertheless, the predicate inhere in the subject. But, because the predicate does not inhere in what the subject supposits for, therefore [the proposition] is false. Thus, you have to look for the truth of an affirmative proposition more in the inherence of the things the extremes supposit for than in the inherence of the extremes [themselves] in one another.

(180) It is clear from this that an affirmative proposition in which a superior [term] is predicated of its inferior can be false. This [is so] when the inferior supposits for something the superior does not inhere in. For example, ‘Some man is a common term’ is false. Yet the predicate is superior to the subject, because the predicate is common to any common term. Thus, even

\textsuperscript{213} Indicating ‘You are an ass’.

\textsuperscript{214} With this objection, compare pars. 76 & 78 –80.

\textsuperscript{215} That is, an existentially quantified one. The quantifier limits the subject to personal supposition. I don’t know of very many authors who actually stated this as a rule, but it is often — as here — appealed to implicitly.
though the predicate inheres in the subject, nevertheless because it does not inhere in what the subject supposit for, [the proposition] is therefore false.

(181) It is also clear that an affirmative proposition in which one contradictory is predicated of the other can be true. For ‘Non-common is common’ is true, because the term ‘non-common’ is predicated of Socrates, and of Plato, and of any individual. For no individual is common, talking about “common” in the sense of predication. Therefore, the term ‘non-common’ is a common thing. And so ‘Non-common is common’ is true.

(182) There is no incongruity [in the fact] that one contradictory, taken under one [kind of] supposition, is truly affirmed of the other [contradictory], taken under another [kind of] supposition. Thus ‘Non-common is common’ is true insofar as the subject supposit simply or materially and the predicate supposit personally. Nevertheless, one contradictory is never truly affirmed of the other under the same [kind of] supposition.

[Difficulties over Relative Terms]

(183) Difficulties arise also over relative [terms]. For if it sufficed for the truth of a universal affirmative that the predicate inhered in each thing the subject supposit for, then ‘The one of these is a man and either of these is he’ would be true, pointing to Socrates and Plato. For the first part is true, certainly, and the second part would be true since there is no exception in the case of any singular. For ‘The one of these is a man and Socrates is he’ is true, and similarly ‘The one of these is a man and Plato is he’ is true. But [the original proposition] seems to be false, because ‘Socrates is a man and either of these is he’ is false, and similarly ‘Plato is a man and either of those is he’ is false.

(184) One must say that in such cases, where the first part of a copulative or disjunctive [proposition] is a particular [proposition] and the second [part] is a universal [proposition] in which there occurs a relative [term] referring to some term occurring in the first part, the singulars of the second part should not be given except in comparison to the singulars of the first part. Thus, I say it does not follow: “The one of these is a man and Socrates is he; the one of these is a man and Plato is he; therefore, the one of these is a man and either of these is he.” For one is going from several determinates with respect to the parts of a multitude to one determinate with respect to the whole of the multitude.

216 It can also, of course, mean the kind of metaphysical “community” universals have. There are also various non-technical senses, like “public”. All of these are irrelevant here.
(185) I say that, by giving the singulars of the second part of this [copulative proposition] in comparison to the singulars of the first part, in that sense both singulars are false — but [only] with respect to different singulars of the first part. Thus, if I take the singulars of the first part as follows:

‘Socrates is a man and either of these is he’, \(217\) [then] one singular of the second part is false, namely ‘Plato is he’. And if I take this singular of the first part: ‘Plato is a man and either of these is he’, [then] another singular of the second part is false, namely, ‘Socrates is he’.

(186) Suppose someone says that, with respect to one singular of the
first part one singular [of the second part] is true, and with respect to another singular of the first part another singular [of the second part] is true Therefore, both singulars are true. And since it has only two singulars, it follows that each singular of the second part is true. Consequently, the whole second part is true.

(187) As it seems to me at present, one must say [in response] that the second part of this copulative [proposition] has four singulars, two with respect to one singular of the first part and the other two with respect to the other singular of the first part. For with respect to this singular of the first part ‘Socrates is a man’, [the second] part has two singulars, one true and the other false. And with respect to ‘Plato is a man’, it has two other singulars, one true and the other false. And so it has four singulars. This happens because of the variation of the relative [term] in comparison to the singulars of the first part.

(Chapter 6: On Improper Supposition)

(188) Having talked about proper supposition, we must talk about improper supposition. Supposition is improper whenever a term supposits precisely for something for which it is not permitted to supposit precisely literally. Improper supposition is divided. For one kind is antonomastic, one kind synecdochical, and one kind metonymical.\(218\)

(189) Supposition is antonomastic when a term supposits precisely for that to which the name belongs the most. For example, when one says ‘The Apostle says this. It is understood by this that Paul says this, and yet the term ‘apostle’ literally supposits no more for Paul than for Andrew. For otherwise, if Paul said something, it would be true that every apostle said it, because the term ‘apostle’ would only supposit for Paul. But this is false. For it does not follow: “Paul says this; therefore, every apostle says this.” Therefore, in ‘The

\(217\) Of course, that is only one singular. The other one is ‘Plato is a man and either of these is he’. It is treated below.

\(218\) The terminology is taken from the terminology of rhetorical figures.
Apostle says this’, the term ‘apostle’ does not supposit properly for Paul precisely, but improperly for Paul.

(190) Supposition is synecdochical when a part supposit for the whole, as in ‘The prow is in the sea’ — that is, the ship is in the sea. And so the prow, which is a part of the ship, supposit for the ship, which is its whole.

(191) Supposition is metonymical when a container supposit for what is contained. Now this [kind of supposition] is improper, because literally a cup does not supposit for the contents of the cup. Rather [this happens] only according to the speaker’s usage.

(192) Thus, when a term is taken for one thing according to the speaker’s usage, and for another literally, the supposition is improper.

(193) You have to know that a part of an extreme does not properly supposit, but [only] improperly. Therefore, when one argues from an inferior to a superior, and the inferior and superior are parts of extremes, the inference need not be valid unless, together with the fact that there is an order [of inferiority to superiority] between the parts of the extremes, there is also an order [of inferiority to superiority] between the extremes themselves. Many sophisms are solved on this basis.

(194) For it is commonly proven that if you go to Rome, you are existing at Rome. For everything that goes exists; therefore, if you are going to Rome, it follows that you are existing at Rome. Or [alternatively put], if you are going to Rome, you are being at Rome.

(195) The solution to this is clear. For although ‘going’ is inferior to ‘existing’, nevertheless ‘going to Rome’ is not inferior to ‘existing at Rome’. Therefore, it does not follow: “You are going to Rome; therefore, you are existing at Rome.” For although there is an order [of inferiority to superiority] between the parts of the extremes, nevertheless between the extremes [themselves] there is no order [of inferiority to superiority]. Yet it quite well follows: “You are seeing a man; therefore, you are seeing an animal.” For, together with the fact that there is an order [of inferiority to superiority] between the parts of the extremes, there is also an order [of inferiority to superiority] between the extremes themselves. For ‘seeing a man’ is inferior to ‘seeing an animal’. Thus, in brief, a part of an extreme does not supposit.

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219 In this and the following paragraph, it sounds very much as if Burley is talking not about the term ‘prow’, but about the actual physical thing. So too for ‘cup’ in the next paragraph. On this, see n. 3, above.

220 ‘To Rome’ and ‘at Rome’ both translate the locative ‘Romae’. Thus the shift from ‘to’ to ‘at’ does not reflect any variation in the Latin. The problem with the inference, of course, is that you can hardly exist at Rome — that is, already be there — if you are only going to Rome and so have not yet arrived.

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properly. Rather proper supposition belongs solely to the whole extreme, as has been said.\footnote{See para. 74 & 125, above.}

\[\text{Part Two: On Appellation}\]

(196) Now that we have looked at the supposition of terms, we must look at appellation. Appellation is a property of a common term predicable of its inferiors. Thus, just as supposition taken strictly is a property of the subject insofar as it is matched with the predicate, so appellation is a property of the predicate matched with the subject or with an inferior.

(197) You must understand that there is a difference between appellation and significati on. For a common univocal term appellates its inferiors but does not signify its inferiors. But an equivocal term signifies its signifies and does not appellate them. Thus, appelling some things is the same as being common to them. Because of this, a common name is said to be an “appellative” name. For if signifying were the same as appelling, every name would be an appellative name. For every name signifies something.

(198) Suppose someone objects, as in general it is customarily said, that the predicate appellates its form.\footnote{See, for example, William of Sherwood, \textit{Introduction to Logic}, Kretzmann, tr., Ch. 5, pp. 112 –113. (But Sherwood does not use the term ‘appellation’ here.) The rule is also cited by Ockham, \textit{Summa logicæ} I, 66, and II, 7.} But the form of the predicate is not something inferior to the predicate. Therefore, the predicate does not appellate its inferiors.

(199) It must be said [in response to this] that a predicate is said to appellate its form because under the same form and under the same pronunciation\footnote{‘under the same form and under the same pronunciation’. That is, the same \textit{syntactical} form. The predicate is not varied with respect to tense, voice, etc.} under which it is predicated in a proposition about the past or about the future or about the possible, it was predicated or will be predicated or can be predicated in a proposition about the present of that for which the subject supposits.\footnote{The rule is not as complicated as it sounds. The examples in the following paragraphs should make it clear.} Thus, if ‘Socrates \textit{was} white’ \textit{is} true, [then] this [same] predicate, under the same form and under the same pronunciation and formal signification, must at one time \textit{have been} predicated of Socrates. For if Socrates \textit{was} white, [then] ‘Socrates \textit{is} white’ must have been true at one time. But this is not so for the subject. For if the predicate inhered in the subject, so that a proposition about the past is true, the same predicate need not on that account have been at one time truly predicated of the subject, under \textit{the same form of}
the subject, by means of a verb about the present. Rather, it is required that
the same predicate at one time was truly affirmed by means a verb about the
present of what the subject supposits for.

(200) One has to speak the same way about a proposition about the
future and about the possible or the contingent. Thus, for the truth of an af-
firmative proposition about the past, it is required that the predicate, under
the same form, was affirmed at one time, by means of a verb about the pres-
ent, of what the subject supposits for. And for the truth of an affirmative
proposition about the future, it is required that the predicate, under the same
form, will be affirmed at one time, by means of a verb about the present, of
what the subject supposits for. And for the truth of an affirmative
[proposition] about the possible or the contingent, it is required that the
predicate, under the same form, be able to inhere, by means of the verb ‘is’,
in what the subject supposits for. But it is not required that the predicate be
able to inhere in the subject under the same form of the subject.

(201) For example, ‘The white can be black’ is true in the sense of
division. For the same thing that is now white can be black. Nevertheless, this
predicate can never inhere in the subject under the same form. For ‘The white
is black’ will always be impossible. But ‘The white can be black’ is true, be-
cause the predicate ‘black’, under this same form, can, by means of the verb
‘is’, inhere in what the subject supposits for. For ‘Socrates is black’ is possi-
ble (let it be the case that Socrates is now white).

(202) It is the same way with propositions about the past and about
the future, insofar as the predicate, under the same form, inhere or will in-
here in what the subject supposits for. But it is not required that the predicate
inhered or will inhere in the subject under the same form. For example, as-
suming that Socrates now for the first time is white, I say that ‘A white was
Socrates’ is true. For what is white was Socrates. Yet ‘A white is Socrates’
was never true. ‘A white was black’ is also true now, because what is now
white was black before. Yet ‘A white is black’ was never true.

(203) I say, therefore, that the old and common saying, “The predicate
appellates its form.” should be understood in this sense, namely, that the
predicate predicates its form in such a way that, under the same form, it in-
heres in the subject or [in] what the subject supposits for, if it is an asser-

225 On inherence in this sense, see n. 102 above.
226 ‘The white’ = album = a white thing. It does not mean whiteness, and it does not
mean the Platonic Form of “The White”. Any white thing will do.
227 Presumably we are implicitly to assume that Socrates, who is now white for the
first time, had previously been black.
228 Either the first alternative here is to be taken as a shorthand version of the sec-
ond, or the first alternative is just a mistake. It goes contrary to the whole discussion here.
toric\textsuperscript{229} proposition about the present, or if it is about the past, under the same form it inhered in what the subject supposit for.

(204) Thus, to appellate is in one sense the same as to predicate. It is taken in this sense when it is said that the predicate “appellates its form”. In another sense, to appellate is the same as to be common, and in that sense it is true that a common term appellates its inferiors.

(205) You have to understand that three rules are usually given concerning a common term in comparison with its appellata or inferiors.

(206) The first rule is that a common term suppositing with respect to a non-ampliative verb about the present supposits for present \textsuperscript{230} only.

(207) The second rule is that a common term suppositing with respect to a verb about the past can indifferently supposit for present \textsuperscript{230} and past \textsuperscript{230}.

(208) This third rule is that a common term suppositing with respect to a verb about the future can indifferently supposit for present \textsuperscript{230} and future \textsuperscript{230}.

(209) In these rules, by ‘present \textsuperscript{230}’ I mean not only those that presently exist. Rather, by ‘present supposita’ I mean those supposita of which the subject is truly predicated by means of the verb ‘is’, whether they exist or not. And by ‘past supposita’ I mean those of which the subject is predicated by means of a verb about the past, whether they ever existed or not. And by ‘future supposita’ I mean those supposita of which the subject is said by means of a verb about the future. Thus, a proposition about the past in which a common term supposit has two causes of \textsuperscript{231} its truth, or two senses of multiplicity.\textsuperscript{232} For instance, ‘A man was white’ can be verified in two ways: either (a) what \textit{is} a man was white, or (b) what \textit{was} a man was white.

The ‘or’ in the text may signal two alternative textual readings. That is, for example, one manuscript may have read ‘in the subject’. Someone who read the manuscript and realized that this was not correct, or perhaps someone who had a correct copy of the manuscript to compare it with, might then have written the correction in the margin, ‘or what the subject supposit for’. A later copyist, copying from our (now corrected) manuscript, may then have seen the marginal note, and thinking that it was meant to insert something that had been left out rather than to correct an error, included \textit{both} in his copy, resulting in what we find: ‘in the subject or \textit{in} what the subject supposit for’. Although this story is purely conjectural, you should realize that this sort of thing is not at all uncommon in mediaeval manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{229} As distinguished from a modal proposition.

\textsuperscript{230} I take the insertion from para. 208.

\textsuperscript{231} That is, two alternative truth conditions, either one of which is sufficient.

\textsuperscript{232} ‘Two senses of multiplicity’. This means only that it is equivocal (“multiple”), and has two senses. For the difference between “causes of truth” and “senses of multiplicity”, see para. 220 & 222, below.
Thus, those [two] senses or causes [of truth] should be expressed like this: ‘What is a man was white’ or ‘What was a man was white’, and not like this: ‘A man who is was white’ or ‘A man who was was white’. It is the same way for propositions about the future.

(210) From these [observations], it can be [made] clear how one must syllogize in the first figure with propositions about the past or about the future. Once that is seen, it will be easily apparent how one must syllogize in the second figure and in the third. You have to know, therefore, that a uniform syllogism about the past is good in the first figure if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what was it. However the subject of the minor [premise] is taken, that does not matter. For as long as the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what was it, the syllogism is always a good one when both of the premises are about the past. But if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what is it, and the minor [premise] is about the past, the syllogism is invalid. I say the same thing for [syllogisms] about the future, [that is,] that if both premises are about the future in the first figure, and the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what will be it, the syllogism is a good one, and is ruled by the dici de omni vel de nullo. But if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what is it, the syllogism is invalid.

(211) To make this clear, you must know that the major [premise] in the first figure virtually contains the whole syllogism. For in the major proposition there are three relations, one explicit and two implicit. There is one relation between [the predicate] and the subject, and that is expressed by the major [premise]. There is another relation of the subject to what is contained under the subject, and that [relation] is implicit in the major [premise] and explicit in the minor [premise]. There is a third relation, of the predicate to what is contained under the subject, and that is implicit in the major [premise] and explicit in the conclusion.

(212) For example, when one says ‘Every man is an animal’, there is one relation in [this proposition] between animal and man, and this is an explicit [relation]. There is another relation between animal and man and what is con-

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233 That is, a syllogism in which all the premises are about the past.
234 That is, valid.
235 For example, taking ‘man’ for what was a man.
236 This refers to a passage in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (I, 1, 24b26 –30): “That one term should be included in another as in a whole is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. And we say that one term is predicated of all of another, whenever no instance of the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted: ‘to be predicated of none’ must be understood in the same way.” On the dici de omni et nullo, see I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, Ivo Thomas, tr., (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), sections 14.23, 33.05 & 33.20.
tained under man. For ‘animal’ in this [proposition] is predicated of ‘man’ taken universally for everything contained under it. There is a third relation, between man and its contents, because ‘man’ here is distributed for the [things] contained under it. For by means of the [phrase] ‘every man’ that I say, there is a relation had between man and its contents. Thus, I say in general that whenever the minor [premise] expresses the relation that held between the middle [term] (or the subject of the major [premise]) and its contents in the major [premise], the syllogism is a good one in the first figure, and is governed by the * dici de omni vel de nullo*. But if the minor [premise] does not express that relation, the syllogism is not so ruled, and is not a perfect [syllogism].

(213) On this basis, I say in the case at hand that if someone argues “Every white was black; Socrates was white; therefore, Socrates was black”, if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what was white, then [the argument] is a good syllogism and is ruled by the * dici de omni*. For the minor [premise] explicated the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term]. For the major [premise] says that everything that was white was black. So the relation between ‘white’ and its contents in the major [premise] comes about by means of a verb about the past. And the minor [premise] expresses that relation when it says ‘Socrates was white’. Thus, the syllogism “Everything that was white was black; Socrates was white; therefore, Socrates was black” is governed [by the * dici de omni vel de nullo*] and perfect.

(214) But if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what is it, and the minor [premise] is about the past, [then] the syllogism is invalid. For in the minor [premise] the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of major [term] is not expressed. For the relation between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term] comes about by means of a verb about the present. But in the minor [premise] the relation between the middle [term] and the content or contents [of the major term] is expressed by means of a verb about the past. Thus, it is plain that the syllogism “Everything that is white was black; Socrates was white; therefore, etc.” is invalid.

(215) So, therefore, it is clear that a uniform syllogism about the past in the first figure is not valid unless the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what was it. If it is so taken, the syllogism is always a good one. It is the same way for [syllogisms] about the future, [namely,] that for a uni-

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237 This is the definition of the middle term.
238 ‘black’. Reading ‘nigrum’ for the edition’s ‘homo’, which doesn’t fit at all here (p. 51 line 11).
form syllogism about the future to be valid in the first figure, the subject of the major [premise] has to be taken for what will be it. For in that case, the minor [premise] about the future expresses the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term]. But if the subject of the major [premise] is taken for what is it, and the minor is about the future, the syllogism is not valid. For the minor [premise] does not express the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term].

(216) You have to know, further, how a mixture of one premise about the present and another about the past or about the future is valid. You must know that when one premise is about the past and the other about the future, the syllogism is never valid in the first figure. For the minor [premise] does not express the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term]. Also, if the major [premise] is about the present and the minor [premise] about the past or future, the syllogism is not valid, because the minor [premise] does not express the relation between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term]. For if the major [premise] is about the present, the relation between [its] subject and its contents comes about by means of a verb about the present. But the minor [premise] about the past or about the future does not express that relation.

(217) If the major [premise] is about the past or about the future and [its] subject is taken for what is it, and the minor [premise] is about the present, then the syllogism is a good one. For the minor expresses the relation that held between the middle [term] and the contents of the major [term]. Thus, the following syllogism is a good one: “Everything that is white was black; Socrates is white; therefore, Socrates was black.” Likewise, the following syllogism is a good one: “Everything that is white will be black; Socrates is white; therefore, Socrates will be black.”

(218) I say that in this [kind of] mixture [of premises], the conclusion should follow the character of the major [premise], so that if the major [premise] is about the past, the conclusion will be about the past, and if the major [premise] is about the future, the conclusion will be about the future. For such is the relation between the major extremity and the contents under the middle [term] in the major [premise], and that is the way it ought to be expressed in the conclusion. Therefore, if the relation between the major extremity and the contents under the middle [term] comes about by means of a verb about the past, the conclusion will be about the past. And if the relation between the major extremity and the contents under the middle [term] in the major [premise] comes about by means of a verb about the future, the conclusion will be about the future.

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239 That is, the major term.
(219) As for the rules, “A common term suppositing with respect to a non-ampliative verb about the present supposits only for present [supposita], and with respect to a verb about the past [it supposit] for present [supposita] and past [supposita], and with respect to a verb about the future for present [supposita] and future [supposita],” you must understand that there is the same verdict for a term suppositing with respect to a verb as there is for a term suppositing with respect to a participle of the same tense and the same signification. Therefore, despite the fact that the verb is about the present, as long as the predicate is a participle in the past tense or the future tense a common term suppositing with respect to such a verb can supposit for past [supposita] or future [supposita]. Thus, ‘Some man is to be created’ is true, and similarly ‘Some man is about to be born’. For [in each case] the subject supposits indifferently for present and for future [supposita]. Thus, such participles have the power of ampliating, just as [do] the modes ‘possible’, ‘contingent’ and the like.

(220) Now there is a doubt [about] whether the predicate in such propositions about (a) the past or about (b) the future can be taken in these ways, so that it can be taken indifferently for (a) what is it or for what was it in the proposition about the past, and in a proposition about the future for (b) what is it or for what will be it.

(221) Again, there is another doubt, [about] whether these ways of taking a term in one sense or another are causes of truth or senses of multiplicity.

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240 See para. 205–207, above.
241 ‘Some man is to be created’ = Aliquis homo est creandus. ‘Creandus’ is a future passive participle. Such participles — in Latin as in English — can convey not only futurity but also a sense of obligation or duty. Compare the English ‘What is to be done?’ . In the present context, it is plainly the sense of futurity that is meant to be dominant.
242 ‘Some man is about to be born’ = Aliquis homo est nasciturus’. ‘Nasciturus’ is the participle.
243 ‘ampliating’. That is, extending the range of supposita of a term beyond the present.
244 That is, modal terms.
245 The earlier rules were about the subject, not about the predicate. The present question is whether the same things apply to the predicate.
246 See para. 208, above. If they are “causes of truth”, then the proposition is a univocal proposition with a disjunctive set of truth conditions. If they are “senses of multiplicity”, then the proposition is an ambiguous proposition with multiple senses. These are not the same notions. For instance, ‘pen’ can mean either a writing instrument or a corral or enclosure for animals. If I bought the latter but not the former, is ‘I bought a pen’ true without qualification (on the grounds that buying either one is sufficient), or do we rather say that in such a situation ‘I bought a pen’ is true in one sense (with respect to the one meaning of ‘pen’) but not in the other?
(222) As for the first doubt, I say these ways of taking [a term] go
with the subject, and not with the predicate. For the predicate apppellates its
form, as was said.\textsuperscript{247} Thus, if Socrates is now white for the first time, ‘Socrates
was white’ is false in every sense.\textsuperscript{248} It cannot be verified for ‘Socrates was
what now is white’.\textsuperscript{249} For, assuming the [above] case, ‘Socrates was what
now is white’ is false. For ‘Socrates is what now is white’ was never true.

(223) It is clear that [this view] is true. For ‘Antichrist can be what is
a man’ is now true, which it would not be if the term ‘man’ on the part of the
predicate were taken for what is now a man. For Antichrist certainly cannot
be Socrates, and he cannot be Plato, and so on for [all] the others who are
now men.\textsuperscript{250} Therefore, ‘Antichrist can be what is now a man’ is true because
‘Antichrist is what is now a man’ can be true. But ‘A man can be Antichrist’
is false when the subject is taken for what is a man. For each singular is false.

(224) But that ‘Antichrist can be what is a man’ is true is proven as
follows: “Every man is what is a man; Antichrist can be a man; therefore,
Antichrist can be what is a man.”\textsuperscript{251} The premises are true; therefore, the con-

\textsuperscript{247} See para. 197, above.
\textsuperscript{248} It is false both in the sense of “What is Socrates was white”, by the hypothesis of
the case. It is also false in the sense of “What was Socrates was white”, by the same hy-
pothesis. (Socrates is the same individual all along, so that ‘what is Socrates’ and ‘what was
Socrates’ supposit for the same individual in each proposition. Some authors put this by
saying that “singular terms cannot be amplified”.
\textsuperscript{249} If the distinction of senses goes with the predicate as well as with the subject,
then we could distinguish two senses for ‘Socrates was white’: (a) ‘Socrates was what \emph{is}
white’, and (b) ‘Socrates was what \emph{was} white’. Burley does not discuss (b), since it is plainly
false in the assumed case. He also wants to maintain that (a) is false. The reason is that “the
predicate apppellates its form”. Thus, the analysis of (a) is not “For some \(x\) such that \(x\) is (or
was — it makes no difference in virtue of n. 248 above) Socrates and for some \(y\) such that \(y\)
is what is white, \(x\) was \(y\)” That would be true, since the same individual who has been Soc-
rates all along \emph{was} identical (and still is) with an individual who is now white. Instead, be-
cause “the predicate apppellates its form”, the analysis of (a) has to be given in such a way
that the very same predicate ‘what \emph{is} white’ \emph{was} predicated of Socrates. Thus, the sense is
“For some \(x\) such that \(x\) is (or was) Socrates, it \emph{was} the case that ‘\(x\) is what is white’ \emph{is} true.”
And that is not so under the assumed case.
\textsuperscript{250} The implicit assumption, of course, is that Antichrist does not yet exist. The term
‘Antichrist’ is here taken as a proper name, not as a “job description”. Thus, the fact that
Antichrist does not yet exist means that he will be \emph{new} individual when he does arrive. No
presently existing man will somehow change his identity and “become” Antichrist.
\textsuperscript{251} The Latin text switches from ‘can’ = \textit{contingit} in the second premise to ‘can’
= \textit{potest} in the conclusion. Technically, these are not the same notions. The former applies
only to what both can be the case \emph{and} can be not the case (it is “contingent”). The latter ap-
plies also to what is necessary (necessity implies possibility). Plainly, Burley does not in-
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clusion is true. And the syllogism is plain, from the Philosopher, *Prior Analytics* I,\(^{252}\) where he says that when the major [premise] is simply assertoric and the minor [is] about the contingent, there follows a conclusion about the possible. So it is clear that ‘Antichrist can be what is a man’ is true. This would not be so if a term on the part of the predicate could be taken in these various ways.

(225) To the second doubt,\(^{253}\) I believe these ways of taking a term in one sense and another are senses of multiplicity.\(^{254}\) This multiplicity is with respect to the third mode equivocation.\(^{255}\) For a term taken by itself is taken literally for present [things] only. But because of the fact that it is matched with such a verb — that is, one about the past or about the future — it can be taken for other [things] than present ones. Now the third mode of equivocation arises from the fact that a term by itself is taken for one thing, and by its being matched with [something] else it can be taken for another [thing]. This is clear in ‘The suffering one was cured’.\(^{256}\)

[Part Three: On Copulation]

(226) Now that we have talked about appellation, we have to talk about copulation. Copulation, in the sense in which we mean it at present, is the union or putting together of the predicate with the subject. Copulation is conveyed by the verb ‘is’ and by oblique verbs derived from ‘is’, like ‘was’, ‘will be’, and the like.

(227) You have to know that the verb ‘is’ can be taken in two ways. In one way, it is predicated *secundum adjacens*; in the other way, it is predicated *tertium adjacens*.\(^{257}\) ‘Man is’ is an example of the first kind; ‘A man is

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\(^{253}\) See para. 220, above.

\(^{254}\) And not “causes of truth”. See note 246, above.

\(^{255}\) See n. 66, above.

\(^{256}\) ‘The suffering one was cured’ = Laborans sanabatur, ‘Laborans’ is a present active participle. The equivocation here is of exactly the kind Burley is talking about. In one sense, the proposition is false, because if the poor man is still suffering now, he obviously wasn’t really cured. In the other sense it is true (or at least might be), because it means only that someone of whom the present participle was truly predicable (and so, who was suffering) was cured.

\(^{257}\) I have left these phrases in Latin, because one frequently finds them that way in the secondary literature. ‘Is’ is predicated *secundum adjacens* in existence-claims. It is used *tertium adjacens* when it serves as a copula. The examples below illustrate these usages. I
an animal’ is an example of the second kind. The same judgment holds for its oblique forms — that is, for ‘was’ and ‘will be’.

(228) When the verb ‘is’ is predicated secundum adjacens, it indicates what exists in itself, that is, actual being or the being of existence. But when it is predicated tertium adjacens, it indicates the kind of being conveyed by the predicate. For when the verb ‘is’ is predicated secundum adjacens, it is a categoremata, because in that case it is the predicate, or includes the predicate in itself, and indicates a determinate nature, namely, the being of existence. But when it is predicated tertium adjacens, it is a syncategoremata, and in that case it indicates what is conveyed by the predicate, and does not indicate what exists in itself.

Aristotle, in De interpretatione, I, says about the verb ‘is’, insofar as it is predicated tertium adjacens, that the verb ‘is’ signifies a certain composition that cannot be understood without its components. Now every word that does not by itself establish an understanding is a syncategoremata. And therefore the verb ‘is’, insofar as it is predicated tertium adjacens, is a syncategoremata. As such, it is not the predicate or a part of the predicate, and it does not include the predicate.

have sometimes translated ‘is’ secundum adjacens as ‘exists’, for the sake of the English. But I have avoided this in cases where it matters.

That is, not what exists in the verb ‘is’, but what is “self-existent”.

‘actual being’ = esse in effectu. ‘being of existence’ = esse existere. The phrase ‘esse in effectu’ = literally, “being in effect” is an Arabism.

Sometimes ‘is’ taken secundum adjacens was analyzed as ‘is a being’, where in the latter the ‘is’ is taken tertium adjacens with the participle ‘being’ serving as the predicate. On that analysis, ‘is’ secundum adjacens implicitly includes the predicate ‘being’ in itself.

See n. 258, above.

Aristotle, De interpretatione 3, 16b22 –25: “For neither are ‘to be’ and ‘not to be’ and the participle ‘being’ significant of any fact [better: any thing], unless something is added; for they do not themselves indicate anything, but imply a copulation, of which we cannot form a conception apart from the things coupled.” (Oxford translation, with my own comment.) Note that Burley does not accept the claim about the participle ‘being’; it is categoremata.

‘establish an understanding’. This is the classical definition of signifying. See Aristotle, De interpretatione 3, 16b19 –21: “Indeed verbs, when uttered by themselves, are names and signify something. For he who says [a verb] establishes an understanding, and he who hears it rests [his mind].” I am translating from Boethius’ Latin translation, which is the source of this vocabulary in the Latin Middle Ages. See Boethius, In librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias, C. Meiser, ed., 2 vols., (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877 –1880), I, p. 5 lines 5 –7.

In general, syncategoremata can be parts of predicates. For example, in ‘Socrates bought butter and cheese’, the ‘and’ is a syncategorematic part of the whole predicate ‘bought butter and cheese’. The point here is only that the verb ‘is’ tertium adjacens is not to be regarded as part of the predicate.

See n. 260, above.

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Rather, it is the mere putting together of the predicate with the subject. But the verb ‘is’, insofar as it is predicated secundum adjacens, does include the predicate, because its participle of the same tense and the same signification is the predicate when the verb ‘is’ is predicated secundum adjacens.

(229) But there is a doubt [that arises] here. For it does not seem true that the verb ‘is’ predicated secundum adjacens is a categoremata, and predicated tertium adjacens is a syncategoremata. If that were so, the syllogism “Every man is; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is” would not be valid, but would be a fallacy of equivocation. For the verb ‘is’ in the major would be categorematically, and in the minor syncategorematically.

(230) Again, it seems the verb ‘is’ is a predicate when it is predicated tertium adjacens. For what is predicated is the predicate; but the term ‘is’ is predicated tertium adjacens; therefore, it is the predicate.

(231) To the first [of these], it must be said that the difference in the way of taking the verb ‘is’, insofar as it is predicated secundum adjacens or tertium [adjacens], does not cause a fallacy of equivocation. For it is not taken in a different way in comparison to the same thing, but rather in comparison to different things. Although the verb ‘is’ in the major [premise], when it says ‘Every man is’, is predicated secundum adjacens with respect to the subject, nevertheless in the relation the subject has to its contents, [‘is’] is taken insomuch as it is predicated tertium adjacens. For the sense [of the major premise] is as follows: ‘Everything that is a man is’, where the verb ‘is’ occurring in the first position (that is, in the embedded clause266) is taken as tertium adjacens. In the minor [premise], likewise, [the verb ‘is’] is predicated tertium adjacens. So in the same relation, namely, in the relation according to which the middle [term] is matched with its contents, the verb ‘is’ is taken in the same way, although it is not taken in the same way in the relation of predicate to subject in the major [premise] and in the relation of subject or middle [term] to its contents in the minor [premise]. Thus, because the verb ‘is’ is not the middle [term], and also is not an extreme,267 but rather is a mode,268 therefore its variation does not cause any fallacy or defect [in the syllogism]. This is clear in the case of useful269 mixed [syllogisms], where there is one mode taken in the major and another in the minor. [It is clear] too in assertoric syllogisms when one premise is universal and the other particu-

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266 Embedded clause = implicatione. Here, the relative clause ‘that is a man’.

267 That is, the subject or predicate. Understand: the subject or predicate of the conclusion. In short, the minor or major term of the syllogism, respectively.

268 That is, a modal word, like ‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’. It is, so to speak, a “degenerate case” of a modal word, in the sense in which mathematicians speak of “degenerate cases”.

269 I don’t know what exactly Burley has in mind here.
lar. In these [syllogisms], the mode is varied\(^{270}\) and yet the syllogism is a good one.

(232) To the second [doubt], I say that ‘predicate’ is taken in two senses, either for what is the one extreme of a proposition, or for that by which the one extreme is united to the other. In the first sense, the verb ‘is’ is not a predicate, but in the second sense it is a predicate. Thus, it is a predicate “by which”, but it is not a predicate “which”. Nevertheless, literally, it should not be granted that the verb ‘is’ is predicated.

(233) Or [alternatively,] it could be said that ‘to be predicated’ can be taken in two senses, namely, actively and passively. If it is taken actively, [then] in that sense it is called a “predicating predicate”, and in that sense the predicate is not some extreme of the proposition but is rather that by means of which [one] extreme is predicated of the [other] extreme. In this sense, the verb ‘is’ is the predicate, namely, “actively” [and] “by which”. But when [‘to be predicated’] is taken passively, it is taken for what is stated about [something] else. In that sense, the verb ‘is’ is not a predicate. Thus, when it is said that the verb ‘is’ is predicated secundum adjacens or tertium [adjacens],\(^ {271}\) ‘predicate’ is taken actively, not passively.

(234) You must understand that in every proposition the verb ‘is’ or some oblique form of it is the copula, whether an adjectival verb or a substantival one\(^ {272}\) is expressed in that proposition, or whether the proposition is about the present or about the past or about the future. Thus, in ‘Socrates walks’ the verb ‘is’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walks’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates is walking’. And in ‘Socrates walked’ the verb ‘was’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walked’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates was walking’.

(235) From what has been said above, it is plain that because the verb joining the predicate with the subject is not a predicate, therefore, the “modes of composition”, like ‘necessary’, ‘possible’, etc., are not predicates [either] but are [indeed] modes of composition. It can be proven that in modal [propositions] the mode is not predicated, because if it were, [then] a modal proposition would be assertoric. For if it were [predicated], then in a modal proposition the mode would be denoted to inhere simply in the dictum itself\(^ {273}\); and when the predicate is denoted to inhere simply in the subject, the

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\(^{270}\) It is not clear to me how the “mode” is varied in these cases.

\(^{271}\) In para. 229. Note that ‘is’ was not there said to be taken secundum adjacens. Here we almost certainly have one of those textual “funny cases” of the kind described in n. 228 above.

\(^{272}\) ‘To be’ and its forms were said to be “substantival verbs”. All others were said to be “adjectival verbs”.

\(^{273}\) See n. 10, above.
proposition is assertoric; therefore, if the mode were predicated in modal
[propositions], every modal proposition would be an assertoric proposition.
Thus, just as ‘Socrates is contingent’ is assertoric, ‘That Socrates runs is con-
tingent’ is assertoric in the same way, insofar as ‘contingent’ is predicated.
For the inference is alike in both cases.

(236) Again, if the mode were predicated in modal [propositions], it
would follow that, from an assertoric major [premise] and a minor [premise
that is] about the contingent, there would be a perfect syllogism in the first
figure, ruled by the *dici de omni vel de nullo*. This goes against the Philoso-
pher, *Prior Analytics I*. That this does [indeed] follow is proven like this:
The syllogism “Every contingent is possible; that every man runs is contin-
tent; therefore, that every man runs is possible” is a good one and is ruled by
the *dici de omni*. Yet the major [premise] is assertoric and the minor [premise
is] about the contingent, assuming that in modal [propositions] the mode is
predicated. But I prove that the minor [premise] is [really] assertoric. For if
the converting [form of a proposition] is assertoric, [then] the [form] that was
converted will be assertoric [too], as is clear from *Prior Analytics I*. But
‘Some possible is that a man runs’ is assertoric; therefore, the proposition
into which it is converted will be assertoric [too]; therefore, ‘That a man runs
is possible’ is assertoric, insofar as ‘possible’ is a predicate. And this is to
be granted. Thus in ‘That a man runs is possible’, insofar as ‘possible’ is
predicated, the predicate is denoted simply to inhere in the subject, just as in
‘A man is an animal’. Therefore, just as ‘A man is an animal’ is assertoric, so
[too] ‘That a man runs is possible’ is assertoric, insofar as ‘possible’ is predi-
cated.

(237) Because of this, I say that in modal [propositions] the mode is
not predicated. Rather the mode is a determination of the composition, just as
the universal and particular signs are determinations of the subject. But [as
for] what Aristotle says in *De interpretatione II* namely, that modes are

275 And not modal, as the theory being rejected here says.
277 Things are going wrong here. First of all, the minor premise said ‘contingent’,
not ‘possible’. Again, the minor premise was about its being contingent that every man runs,
not just some man or a man. Either Burley has lost track of his example, or the text has suf-
f ered some corruption here.
278 That is, quantifiers.
279 Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 12, 21b22. Burley is reading the passage pretty
freely.
“additions”,\(^\text{280}\) he does not mean *predicates* by ‘additions’. Rather, by ‘additions’ he means the determinations that are added to the composition.

(238) From what has been said above, it can be made clear that an inference need not in general be valid from a proposition in which the verb ‘is’ is predicated *tertium adjacens* to a proposition in which the verb ‘is’ is predicated *secundum adjacens*. For the verb ‘is’, when it is predicated *secundum adjacens*, indicates being simply, that is, actual being\(^\text{281}\) or the being of existence. But when it is predicated *tertium adjacens* it does not indicate being simply, but being-such, that is, the kind of determinate being that is conveyed by the predicate. Now an inference from being-such to being absolutely need not hold.

(239) To make this clear, you have to understand that there are certain predicates that determinately include non-being, like ‘to be dead’, ‘to be decomposed’, and so on. When someone argues from a proposition in which such a predicate is predicated to being simply, there is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*.\(^\text{282}\) Therefore, it does not follow: “Caesar is dead; therefore, Caesar is.”

(240) But there are certain [other] predicates that presuppose being simply — for example, predicates that denominate accidents and signify an act or a form in act, like ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘hot’, ‘cold’. In such cases the inference does hold from [‘is’] *tertium adjacens* to [‘is’] *secundum adjacens*. For it follows: “Socrates is white; therefore, Socrates is.”

(241) But there are [still] other predicates [that are] indifferent to actual being and to actual non-being, like the transcendental predicates such as ‘being’, ‘good’, ‘intelligible’, etc. In such cases, the inference does not hold from [‘is’] *tertium adjacens* to [‘is’] *secundum adjacens*. Rather, it is a fallacy of the consequent, because it follows the other way around and not this way. Or [alternatively,] it is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, because it goes from ‘to be’, taken with a determination that permits diminished being\(^\text{283}\) or [that is] predicative of diminished being, to ‘to be’ simply. And so there is a fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. Therefore, it does not follow: “Caesar is intelligible; therefore, Caesar is.” Neither does it follow: “Caesar is a being;

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\(^{280}\) ‘additions’ = *appositiones*. Aristotle’s Greek has *prostithemenae*. See the previous note. The word ‘*appositum*’ was sometimes used in Latin to mean the predicate of a proposition.

\(^{281}\) See n. 259, above.

\(^{282}\) That is, a fallacy of confusing what is said absolutely with what is said only in a certain respect. On the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*, see Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations* 5, 166b38 –167a21, and 25, 180a23 –b40.

\(^{283}\) ‘diminished being’ = *esse diminutum*. This is a kind of lesser grade of being possessed, for instance, by thought objects. Compare the modern notion of “intentional being”.
therefore, Caesar is”, taking ‘being’ in the antecedent insofar as it is a trans-
scendental [term]. Neither does it follow: “Antichrist is producible; therefore, Antichrist is.” In all these cases there is a fallacy secundum quid et simplic-
ter by going from “such in a certain respect” to “such simply”.

(242) But there are doubts here. The first doubt arises because it does
not seem that there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter in “This is intel-
ligible; therefore, this is”. For the predicate in the antecedent is not a sepa-
rating or diminishing one, because in that case it would follow: “This is in-
telligible; therefore, this is not”. Yet that inference is not valid.

(243) Again, it seems that in the case of transcendental [terms] the in-
ference holds from tertium adjacens to secundum adjacens. For it follows:
“This is a being; therefore, this is.” For being and to be are entirely the
same.284

(244) To the first [of these doubts], it must be said that “This is intel-
ligible; therefore, this is” does not follow. For the predicate of the antecedent
is indifferent with respect to actual being and actual non-being. And when it
is said “It is not a predicate separating from being”, I say that a predicate or
determination can be called “separating”, either because it posits the opposite
of its determinable or else because it permits the opposite of its determinable
along with it.285 In the first sense, ‘dead’ is a separating determination with
respect to being. For it follows: “This is dead; therefore, this is not.”286 In the
second sense, to be intelligible is a separating determination with respect to
being because, together with [the being of what it is predicated of] it permits
the non-being of what it is predicated of. For ‘This is intelligible’ and ‘This is
not’287 go together.

(245) Thus, I say there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter when
one goes from something taken with a separating determination in the first
sense or the second sense to the same thing taken simply. Or [alternatively,]
it can be said that not only is there a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter
when one goes from a determinable taken with a separating determination to
the same thing taken simply, but there is also a fallacy secundum quid et sim-
pliciter when one goes from a determinable taken with an indifferent deter-

284 ‘being and to be are entirely the same’ = ens et esse idem sunt ommino. That is,
the words ‘being’ (in the antecedent) and ‘is’ (in the consequent) mean exactly the same
thing.
285 That is, along with permitting the determinable.
286 ‘This is not’ = ‘This does not exist’.
287 See the preceding note.
mination to a determinable [taken] simply, or to the opposite of the determinable taken simply.\textsuperscript{288} And that happens in the present case.

\textbf{(246)} To the second [doubt], I say that ‘being’ can be taken in three senses. In one sense, [it can be taken] as the most transcendental [term], and as common to every intelligible. In this sense, [being] is the adequate object of the intellect. And in this sense, it does not follow: “This is a being; therefore, this is.” In the second sense, it is taken for a being such that it is not prohibited to be. In this sense, every possible being is a being. In this sense too it does not follow: “This is a being; therefore, this is.” In the third sense, [‘being’] is taken for an actually existing being. In this sense, it is a participle derived from the verb ‘is’. And in this third sense, it quite well follows: “This is a being; therefore, this is.” ‘Being’ said in the first sense is called “being in the understanding”, because it is the object of the understanding. And in that sense, being is “objectively”\textsuperscript{289} in the understanding. ‘Being’ said in the second sense is called “being in its causes”, or the “being that is in its cause”.\textsuperscript{290} But ‘being’ said in the third sense is called “being in itself”.

\textbf{(247)} Therefore, I say that, taking ‘being’ in the first or second sense, it does not follow: “This is a being; therefore, this is.” Neither is to be a being in [one of] these [two] senses entirely the same as to be, \textit{secundum adjacens}. But taking ‘being’ [as] said in the third sense, it quite well follows: “This is a being; therefore, this is.”

\textbf{(248)} I say the same thing about ‘true’ and ‘false’. For I say it does not follow: “This proposition is true; therefore, this proposition is.” Neither does it follow: “This proposition is true; therefore, the truth of this proposition is”, just as it does not follow: “This is intelligible; therefore, the intelligibility of this is.” For ‘Antichrist is producible’ was true from eternity, and yet neither this proposition nor its truth was\textsuperscript{291} from eternity.

\textsuperscript{288} ‘or to the opposite of the determinable taken simply’ = \textit{et ad suum oppositum ad determinabile acceptum simpliciter}. The Latin makes no sense that I can discern. My translation is based on conjecture.

\textsuperscript{289} That is, in the manner of a “thought object”. The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ somehow switched meaning between mediaeval times and our own. “Objective being” was the kind of being a thought object has — that is, “intentional being” or what we might (very loosely) call “subjective being”. On the other hand “subjective being” was the kind of being a real subject of accidents enjoyed — that is, what we would call “objective being”.

\textsuperscript{290} The second sense had to do with logically possible being. There is an implicit theory here linking logical possibility with causality, but Burley does not say enough for us to be able to say what it is.

\textsuperscript{291} ‘was’. That is, existed. Propositions are creatures for the Middle Ages.