Copyright © 1995 by Paul Vincent Spade

This document may be copied and duplicated at will, in whole or in part, including printed paper copies, for any non-commercial purpose, provided only that the above copyright notice accompany any copies made.
# Table of Contents

Part One: Notes .................................................................................................. 8

Porphyry the Phoenician, *Isagoge* ................................................................. 9

Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*............. 15

Peter Abelard, From the “Glosses on Porphyry” in His *Logica ingredientibus* ............................................................................................ 17

   John of Salisbury ...................................................................................... 17

   Outline of Part of the Passage from the *Logica ingredientibus* .......... 17

   Notes on the Passage from the *Logica ingredientibus* ..................... 21

John Duns Scotus, Six Questions on Individuation from His *Ordinatio*, ii, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–6 ................................................................. 27

   Notes to Question 1 .................................................................................. 27

   Note to Question 2 .................................................................................. 27

   Note to Question 3 .................................................................................. 28

   Notes to Question 4 .................................................................................. 28

   Notes to Questions 5 and 6 ....................................................................... 29

William of Ockham, Five Questions on Universals from his *Ordinatio*, d. 2, q. 4–8 ................................................................. 31

   Notes to Question 4 .................................................................................. 31

   Notes to Question 5 .................................................................................. 33

   Notes to Question 6 .................................................................................. 33

   Notes to Question 7 .................................................................................. 34

   Notes to Question 8 .................................................................................. 36

Part Two: Texts ................................................................................................ 39

Porphyry the Phoenician, From his *Exposition of Aristotle’s Categories by Question and Answer* (on Aristotle, *Categories*, 1, 1a1-2) ................................................................. 41

Boethius, From His Second Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, iii, 11 ........................................................................................................ 43

   Porphyry’s Text ....................................................................................... 43

   Boethius’ Commentary .......................................................................... 43
Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Aristotle’s *De interpretatione*, ii, 7 (on De int. 7, 17a38–b3) .............................................. 45

Aristotle’s Text ........................................................................................................ 45
Boethius’ Commentary ......................................................................................... 45

Boethius, Two Texts from His *Theological Tractates* ........................................ 49

From *Contra Eutychen*, i.1–71 ........................................................................ 49
From *De trinitate*, i.7–ii.58 ........................................................................... 51

Fridugisus of Tours, *On the Being of Nothing and Shadows* ......................... 55

On the Being of Nothing .................................................................................. 55
On the Being of Shadows ................................................................................ 57

Odo of Tournai, From his *On Original Sin* ..................................................... 61

On Genera and Species and Individuals ............................................................. 61
That in Every Case the Individual is to Be Distinguished from the Species .......... 62
That the Nature’s Guilt Is in the Person’s Guilt ................................................ 62
How Human Nature Does Not Sin by Itself, But Through a Person .............. 63
That Human Nature Cannot Be Transmitted to Other Persons
Without Guilt ...................................................................................................... 63

Peter Abelard, Miscellaneous Passages from His *Dialectica* and
*Logica ‘ingredientibus’* .................................................................................. 65

From *Dialectica*, p. 541.24–37 ......................................................................... 65
From the *Logica ‘ingredientibus’*, the “Glosses on the *Categories*”,
p. 112.5–6 ......................................................................................................... 66
From the *Logica ‘ingredientibus’*, the “Glosses on the *Categories*”,
p. 113.26–29 ..................................................................................................... 67
From the *Logica ‘ingredientibus’*, the “Glosses on the *De interpretatione*”, p. 315.26–37 ................................................................. 67

Passages from the School of Chartres ............................................................... 69
Gilbert, *De trinitate*, i, 5, 24, *ed. cit.*, p. 144 .................................................. 70
Five Passages from Avicenna, on Common Nature ......................................... 73
*Logica*, iii, fol. 12ra .......................................................................................... 73
Ibid. ................................................................................................................................. 73
86va .................................................................................................................................. 74
Ibid., Van Riet, ed., ii, p. 231.74–81; 1508 ed., fol. 86vb .............................................. 74
Ibid., Van Riet ed., ii, pp. 233.36–234.44; 1508 ed., fol. 87ra .......................... 74
Walter Burley, On Universals .................................................................................. 75
Porphyry’s Text ........................................................................................................... 75
Burley’s Commentary ............................................................................................... 76
Explanation of Porphyry’s questions ........................................................................ 76
The usefulness of the Isagoge .................................................................................. 77
Doubts about universals ............................................................................................ 78
Discussion of Doubt I ................................................................................................. 79
Discussion of Doubt II ................................................................................................. 80
Discussion of Doubt III ................................................................................................. 81
The Theory that Universals Are the Same as Their Individuals .......................... 81
The Theory that Universals are Distinct from Their Individuals ......................... 86
Objections .................................................................................................................. 90
Replies to the Objections ......................................................................................... 93
Discussion of Doubt V ................................................................................................. 99
Plato’s Theory ............................................................................................................. 99
Augustine’s Theory ..................................................................................................... 102
Continuation of the Discussion of Doubt I: The Fictum-Theory ......................... 111
Walter Burley, Treatise on Matter and Form (= “On the Two First
Principles”) .................................................................................................................. 115
Walter Chatton, Reportatio, i, d. 3, q. 2: “Whether any concept is
common and univocal to God and creature?” ....................................................... 121
William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, Part i, Chs. 14–17 .................. 143
Chapter 14 .................................................................................................................. 143
Chapter 15 .................................................................................................................. 145
Chapter 16 .................................................................................................................. 149
Chapter 17 .................................................................................................................. 151
William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation,
Prologue, §§ 3–10 (Commentary on 16a3–6) .......................................................... 157
Section 3: What is a passion of the soul or concept? .................................. 157
Section 4: Is a ‘passion’ a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding? .................................................................................................. 158
Section 5: Is the ‘passion’ a species of the thing? .................................. 158
Section 6: Is the ‘passion’ the very act of understanding? ..................... 159
Section 7: Are passions of the soul specters or ficta? .......................... 165
Section 8: Are passions of the soul the external things as conceived? .... 168
Section 9: Are passions of the soul qualities existing subjectively in the soul? ........................................................................................................ 169
  Objections ............................................................................................ 169
  Replies to the objections ....................................................................... 171
Section 10: Are passions of the soul ficta? ............................................ 174
  Replies to the objections in Section 7 .................................................. 174
William of Ockham, Quodlibet 4, Question 35, and Quodlibet 5, Questions 12–13 ........................................................................................................ 177
  Quodlibet 4, Question 35: Whether first and second intentions are really distinguished ................................................................. 177
    Article 1 .......................................................................................... 177
    First intention .................................................................................. 177
    Second intention .......................................................................... 178
    Article 2 .......................................................................................... 179
    Ockham’s reply ............................................................................. 180
  Quodlibet 5, Question 12: Whether the universal is singular ................ 180
    Article 1 .......................................................................................... 181
    Article 2 .......................................................................................... 182
  Quodlibet 5, Question 13: Whether every universal is a quality of the mind .......................................................................................... 182
    Objection 1 .................................................................................... 183
    Objection 2 .................................................................................... 183
    Objection 3 .................................................................................... 183
    Objection 4 .................................................................................... 183
    Objection 5 .................................................................................... 183
    To Objection 1 ............................................................................... 184
To Objection 2 .................................................................................... 184
To Objection 3 .................................................................................... 184
To Objection 4 .................................................................................... 185
To Objection 5 .................................................................................... 185
Index of Names .............................................................................................. 187
Part One: Notes

The following notes supplement those accompanying the translations in my *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals*, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). References to *Five Texts* will be either by (1) page, paragraph and line numbers, followed by a brief identifying quotation, or else (2) by page and note number. If a paragraph spans two pages, I restart the count of line numbers with the new page. References to a “note” accompanied by the word ‘above’ or ‘below’ refer to notes in this supplementary volume, not to notes in *Five Texts*. The notes below should be used in conjunction with the Bibliography in *Five Texts*. 
Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge

Bibliography


Notes

1. (1.1.2 property) Do not understand this as “property” in the sense current nowadays, namely as any metaphysical feature of a thing. The correct way of interpreting it here is described later in the Isagoge.

2. (1.1.6 introduction) εἰς ἀγαφήν. Hence the title of the work.

3. (1.2.5 investigation) This passage (“For example … investigation”) is the basis for Boethius’ famous discussion of universals in his Second Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (Five Texts, pp. 20–25). But please note the following terminological facts. In the Contra Eutychen (Loeb ed., III.42-45), Boethius says that Greek φἰστοσάλ is to be translated by ‘substand’ (Latin ‘substare’), whereas Greek φὑσιστοσάλ is to be translated by ‘subsist’ (Latin ‘subsistere’). In his Latin translation of the present passage, however, Boethius translates forms of φὑσίασάλ as ‘subsist’, not as ‘substand’. It is perhaps not clear whether this represents a doctrinal decision or only a terminological looseness on Boethius’ part. In my own translation, I have avoided ‘substand’ as a verb, and translated forms of
as ‘to be real’ or some variation on that (such as ‘has its reality’). For όσια I have used the traditional translation ‘substance’, despite Boethius’ translating it as ‘essentia’. (Contra Eutychen, Loeb ed., III.60. See the translation below, pp. 49–51, text I.)

4. **(1.2.7 genus and species)** Literally: these things. But it is clear that Porphyry means genus and species, the *topics* of the three questions he had listed. He has just stated that he is not going to try to *answer* those three questions.

5. **(1.2.7 other matters before us)** That is, difference, property and accident.

6. **(1.2.7–8 in a more logical fashion)** λογικότερον. The sense is obscure. Boethius translated the word as *probabiliter* = probably, which seems pretty free. Warren has simply “in logic” (p. 28). Perhaps the word just means “logical” as contrasted with the more “metaphysical” questions Porphyry has said he will pass over.

7. **(1.3.7 genera)** = races. See p. 1, n. 2.

8. **(2.8.3–4 with respect to what the thing is)** ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν. In Latin this is called *in quid* predication and, in English, sometimes “essential” predication. (See for instance Warren, p. 30.) See also the discussion in n. 10 below.

9. **(2.8.6 ‘this’)** Porphyry’s use of the neuter article here (τῷ τοῖς, Busse ed., p. 2.18) indicates that he is thinking of the words themselves, not of the corresponding objects.

10. **(3.12.6 what manner of thing it is)** ἐν τῷ ποίῳ τί ἐστιν. In Latin this is called *in quale* predication, and in English, sometimes “qualitative” predication. (See for instance Warren, p. 32.) Nevertheless, the connection between this and the Aristotelian category of quality is only indirect. To a first approximation, we may describe the situation as follows. In general, if X is predicated (truly) of A, then the predication is “with respect to *what* the thing A is” (see n. 8 above) if it groups A into a natural kind X to which A naturally belongs. The predication is “with respect to *what manner* of thing A is”, however, if, for some Y/X, X describes what manner of Y the thing A is, where Y is predicated of A with respect to *what A is*. In short, the second kind of predication always presupposes a prior classification into natural kinds. **NOTE:** In the case of property and accident especially, I have tried to translate concrete forms of the neuter adjective by adjectives, not by the corresponding abstract nouns. Thus risible (not risibility) is a property of man, and black (not blackness) an accident of the crow. This makes the English sometimes a bit awkward, but to do it the other way seemed to me unjustified by the Greek.

11. **(3.13.7 disposition)** ποις ἐχον. The term refers to one of the Stoic categories. ‘Disposition’ here does not of course mean “mood”, in the psychological sense.
12. **(4.17.1–2 both must …both)** Warren (p. 34) translates this “we must define one in terms of the other”. So too Herrán and La Croce (p. 176.8-10): “se hace preciso saber si en la definición de cada uno de ellos será necesario valerse de la definición del otro.” This seems to be the right idea, but the Greek plainly says something stronger: one must use both.

13. **(4.19.2 number)** In virtue of the next sentence, one must understand that species in sense (d) is predicated only of things differing only in number.

14. **(5.30.3 Aristotle says)** Apparently Porphyry has the same passage in mind as in para. (29): *Metaphysics* III. 3, 998b22.

15. **(5.31.2 infinite)** Perhaps because, according to the Aristotelian view, the world has no beginning or end in time. Thus the generation and corruption of individuals proceeds without end. In that case, the infinity mentioned here is a “potential” infinity, not an “actual” infinity of things all existing at one time. On the other hand, it is probably wrong to read ‘infinite’ here in too mathematical a sense. (This is a common error in reading pre-Cantorian texts that mention infinity.) ‘Infinite’, after all, can sometimes be correctly translated as just “indefinite”. If that is the case here, then the point is that the number of most general genera (the categories) is fixed and definite, and so is the number of species subordinate to those genera. That much is a matter of ontological “law”. But the number of *individus* that happen to fall under a lowest species — the number of human beings, for instance, actually contained under the species “man” — is not definite and fixed by ontological law; it could be *any* number. In that sense, then, the number is “infinite”.

16. **([6.31.1 Philebus, 16c–18d, Politicus, 262a–c])** Warren (p. 40 n. 37) reports that others refer also to *Sophist* 266a-b.

17. **(6.32.6 the species)** These words are my gloss. Porphyry himself actually said only ‘the one common man’.

18. **(6.33.7 hinnibility)** See n. 31 below.

19. **(6.36.2 if Socrates is his only son)** The condition suggests that Porphyry intends the three terms (‘Socrates’, ‘this white [thing]’, and ‘the one who is approaching, the son of Sophroniscus’) to refer to the same thing. In that case, ‘this white’ refers to the white *thing*, Socrates, and not to this *whiteness*, his individualized color. I have translated accordingly.

20. **(7.39.2 from another)** Or from itself, in virtue of the rest of the paragraph.


22. **(8.42.10 disposition)** See p. 10, n. 11 above.
23. (8.45.6 intension and remission) In the later Middle Ages, there were a number of treatises written “On the Intension and Remission of Forms”.

24. (9.46.2 sensate) Latin ‘sensibile’, i.e., having sensation. There is really no good English translation for this. ‘Sensate’ sounds like the passive participle, and so suggests ‘sensed’. ‘Sensible’, the literal translation, has the wrong connotations, as in “sensible shoes”. ‘Sensitive’ suggests delicacy.

25. (9.46.4 “mortal and immortal,” … “rational and irrational”) Note that divisive differences are here given as coordinate pairs of opposite differences.

26. (9, n. 12) Some commentators identified these “gods” with angels. Note that, according to the “Porphyrian tree” given in para. (22), the gods here are bodies — that is, they are corporeal. See Warren, p. 45 n. 43, who translates some of the commentators’ remarks on this passage.

27. (9.50.2 differing in species) The implications of this phrase are powerful. For instance, if species $S$ is defined by genus $G$ plus difference $D$, then $D$ must be predicated not only of $S$ (and of things in $S$), but of other things as well. Those other things must be outside genus $G$, since if they were in $G$, then insofar as both $G$ and $D$ would be predicatable of them, they would be in $S$ after all. This result seems especially hard to accept if one considers the first differences that divide a most general genus or category. For example, in the Porphyrian tree described in para. (22), body comes immediately after substance. The difference that is added to substance to yield body is presumably “corporeal”. In virtue of the result just described, therefore, it follows that ‘corporeal’ is also predicated of non-substances. But it is hard to see what non-substances those might be, without resorting to equivocation. (It will not do to say that certain non-substances — that is, accidents — are “corporeal” in the sense that they are accidents of corporeal things. For in the same sense, one might just as well call accidents “substances” on the grounds that they are accidents of substances, with the result that substance would be said of several things differing in category. Indeed, it would be said of everything whatever.) The difficulties here can perhaps be resolved, but in any case it is not clear how strongly Porphyry is committed to them. For later on (12.66.3–4), he says that rational and irrational cannot exist without animal. There would seem to be no reason for this unless they are here regarded as wholly contained under animal.

28. (10.54.4 what the thing was to be) διὸ τὸ τί ἡν ἐννοεῖ συνεπάγματος. The difficult Aristotelian phrase τὸ τί ἡν ἐννοεῖ is frequently translated ‘essence’ (although not in my translation of the Isagoge.)

29. (10.54.5 property) See p. 9, n. 1, above.

30. (10.56.1 belongs accidentally) συμβεβηκεν. It is possible to translate this more neutrally as “happens” or “occurs” or “is found”. (Warren, p. 48, uses ‘occurs’.) But this would obscure the terminological link between the present
section, on property, and the next one, on accident. See paras. (119)–(123) on the relation between property and accident.

31. (10.56.11 hinnibility) See also 6.33.7, and the entry in the glossary. So too, mediaeval Latin authors sometimes give “rudibility” — the ability to bray — as a property of the ass. All three properties — risibility, hinnibility, rudibility — are supposed to be features that are accidental, not essential, but nevertheless somehow “follow” from the nature or essence of the thing. The point perhaps works best in the case of risibility. In order to laugh, one must first be an animal, so that one will have the required vocal apparatus. But one must also be rational, in order to see the point of the joke. Hence only rational animals can laugh. The converse is also supposed to hold, although that would appear to be more problematic. The status of the gods seems also a problem. If they can laugh (they are rational animals too, after all), then risibility does not belong only to man. On the other hand, it is hard to see why mortality should be a prerequisite for laughing. Not all humor is “gallows humor”, after all.

32. (12.66.3–4 For if animal is destroyed, rational and irrational are destroyed along with it.) See p. 12, n. 27, above.

33. (12.68.3 animals) This is problematic. Earlier in the Isagoge (4.23.5–6, 9.47.1–5), Porphyry had said that rational animal was a genus of man, a genus divided into man and god by the difference mortal. Thus, either there is more than one genus for man, contrary to what is said here, or else, if Porphyry here means to be talking about the immediate genus (the lowest genus containing the species), then he has simply misidentified that immediate genus in his example.

34. (13.76.1–2) See the definitions of most general genus and of most specific species, at 5.28.1–7.

35. (16, n. 15) Species of course is predicated of individuals, not of genus. See 6.33.4–9. See also p. 10, n. 10, above.

36. (16.101 case) If man, then rational, but not conversely. On the other hand, if man, then risible, and conversely too.

37. (18.117.3 remitted or intended) See p. 12, n. 23, above.
Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*

1. (20.1.2 subsist) See p. 9 above, n. 3 to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*. 
Peter Abelard, From the “Glosses on Porphyry” in His Logica ‘ingredientibus’

John of Salisbury


Here are two remarks about the translation of John of Salisbury there. References are by page and line numbers. ‘F. b.’ means “from the bottom” — that is, lines from the bottom of the page.

p. 167.14 f. b.: word sounds: The Latin is ‘voces’.

p. 167.12 f. b.: word concepts: The Latin is ‘sermones’. The term is not well translated. A *vox* (plural *voces*) is any utterance, any noise produced by the vocal apparatus of an animal and that can be spelled or written down. (The last clause excludes things like sneezes and gurgles.) A *sermo* (plural *sermones*) is a significant *vox* — that is, a *vox* that expresses a concept. Abelard agrees with Roscelin that universals are actual, audible utterances. But he goes beyond Roscelin in providing an account of their significative function in terms of concepts. Hence Abelard’s discussion is in terms of *sermones*, not in terms of mere *voces*.

Outline of Part of the Passage from the Logica ‘ingredientibus’

In the complicated middle section of Abelard’s text in Spade, Five Texts, it is sometimes hard to tell which refutations go with which arguments,
and in general to keep track of what is going on. So here is an outline of the relevant portion of the text. I have not bothered to outline paras. (1)–(14), where Abelard is just getting started. For this outline only, I have given references only by paragraph and (if necessary) line numbers. (The count of line numbers in this outline only does not restart if a paragraph spans a page break.)

I. **Question:** Are only utterances (voces) universal, or are there universal things as well (15.6)?

   A. **Arguments from authority** (16–21).
      1. **A preliminary:** Aristotle’s definition of a universal: what is “naturally apt to be predicated of several” (16.2).
      3. But Aristotle (in other passages) and Boethius ascribe it to *names* (20–21).

   B. Whatever the authorities say, can universality in fact be attributed to *things* (22.2)?
         a) William of Champeaux’s first theory (23–40)
            (1) Statement of the theory (23–27).
            (2) Abelard’s reply (28–40).
               (a) First objection (29).
                  (i) First reply to objection 1 (30).
                     (a) Refutation of first reply (31–33).
                     (ii) Second reply to objection 1 (34).
                        (a) Refutation of second reply (35–36).
               (b) Second objection (37).
               (c) Third objection (38).
               (d) Fourth objection (39).
               (e) **Conclusion:** William of Champeaux’s first theory is untenable (40).
b) William of Champeaux’s second theory and its variants (41–62). The problem Abelard raises for this theory is implicitly a question: “How is this theory a realist one, as it claims to be? What thing on this view is the universal — that is, what is it that is *predicated of many*, according to the Aristotelian definition (see (16.2))?” Abelard mentions two attempted answers to this question, besides William’s own view:

(1) Statement of William’s second theory (41–44).


(3) Variation 2: Similar to Walter of Mortagne’s theory (47).

(4) Refutation of Variation 1 (48–55).

(a) First argument (48).

(b) Second argument (49).

(c) Third argument (50).

(d) Fourth argument (51–53).

(i) Statement of the fourth argument (51).

(ii) Reply to the fourth argument (52).

(iii) Refutation of the reply (53).

(e) Fifth argument (54).

(f) Sixth argument (55).

(5) Refutation of Variation 2 (56–59).

(a) First argument (56).

(b) Second argument (57).

(c) Third argument (58).

(d) Fourth argument (59).
(6) Refutation of William of Champeaux’s own view (60–62).

(a) Argument (60).

(b) Reply (61).

(c) Refutation of the reply (62).

This ends the discussion of the “realist” positions, and so of the view that there are universal things as well as universal utterances. In what follows, I have not given as detailed an outline as above, since it is no longer a matter of keeping track of lists of arguments.

II. Abelard’s own theory (63–175): only utterances are properly called universals.

A. Explanation of how the definition of a universal applies to utterances (63–75).

III. Question for further analysis: What are universal utterances predicated of, and what do they signify? (77–124)

A. Partial resolution in terms of a common reason or cause and a common concept (86–87).

1. Three further questions (88–124):

a) About the “common cause” (89–92).

b) About the “common understanding” (= concepts) (93–123).

(1) Understandings (concepts) in general. Their formation and ontological status (94–101). This is in effect Abelard’s theory of abstraction.

(2) Understandings or concepts of universals vs. understandings or concepts of particulars (102–123).

c) Which of a) or b) is behind the community of universal names? Answer: Both (124).

IV. More on abstraction (125–142).

V. Answers to Porphyry’s original questions, and loose ends (143–175).
Notes on the Passage from the *Logica ‘ingredientibus’*

1. (27.11.2–4 Note … elsewhere) The Latin is “Nota, cum ait: ‘mox’, id est praesenti tractatu, id eum quodammodo innuere, ut alibi solvendas has quaestiones lector expectet.” I am not confident of the syntax of the ‘id … innuere’ clause. Presumably it is oratio obliqua with ‘ait’, and the subject of ‘innuere’ is either ‘eum’ [= Porphyry] or else ‘id’ [= what Porphyry is saying?]. Whichever pronoun is the subject, what is the role of the other pronoun? In any case, the overall sense is clear enough.

2. (27.12.7 is) Abelard is belaboring the point because apparently people found it surprising that Porphyry, after raising his famous three questions, then refused to answer them. Surely it can’t be that the great Porphyry had no view on these matters. Abelard here assures us that in fact Porphyry did have a view on these questions, that he was able to answer them. It is just that the answers are long and complicated, and require a “longer investigation” than yours, gentle reader of the *Isagoge*, is going to be.

3. (28.15.2–6 Because … things) The Latin is “Et quoniam genera et species universalia esse constat, in quibus omnium generaliter universalium naturam tangit, nos hic communiter universalium per singularium proprietates distinguamus et utrum hae solis vocibus seu etiam rebus <conveniant>, perquiramus.” The sentence has lots of problems. For example, what is the subject of ‘tangit’? I have conjectured ‘Porphyry’ in my translation, but I am not entirely happy about it. The construction ‘distinguamus per’ is also troublesome. The word ‘conveniant’ in pointed brackets is Geyer’s (= the editor’s) emendation. Peter O. King, in his *Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals*, (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982; Dissertation Abstracts International, #8220415) rejects the emendation as unnecessary (p. 3* of his translation). I have kept it as certainly conveying the right sense, even if not strictly required by the syntax.

4. (29.20.1 Aristotle says) In the passage cited, Aristotle in fact says this about species too.

5. (32.34.3 both) That is, that *animal* really is both rational and irrational.

6. (32.37.6 basically) The Latin is ‘pentus’. The sense of the argument depends on getting the right flavor for this word. It means “inwardly”, “deeply”, “thoroughly”, “at the core”. Richard McKeon’s translation (in his *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, vol. 1, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957, p. 226) “at bottom” is not bad.
7. (32.37.8 basically the same) That is, the things from any given category in Socrates are basically the same as the things from that same category in Plato, and conversely.

8. (36.53.5 mortal animal) I am not very confident of the argument in this paragraph, and so I am not very happy with my translation. I would be much happier if ‘straightforwardly’ (prorsus) were instead something like ‘exactly’. But I have to translate the text as it is, not as I would like it to be.

9. (36.56.4 agree with them) The point would have been clearer if Abelard had used the singular here instead of the plural. The theory he is discussing now says that each individual thing is a universal and is predicated of several things, not because those several things are essentially it, but because it “agrees” with them.

10. (36.58.10 himself) I’m sorry. I don’t know what the Latin means here, and I don’t think anyone else does either. I suspect the argument is so compressed as to be lost beyond recovery.

11. (37.59.5 plain) That is, Socrates cannot agree with Plato with respect to someone else besides Socrates.

12. (38.68.3 occurs) The syntax is a little dubious in this ‘for example’ clause.

13. (38.68. added) The Latin is clumsy, but the point is simple. It just means that ‘Socrates runs’ or ‘Socrates walks’ amounts to no more than ‘Socrates is running’ or ‘Socrates is walking’.

14. (39.74.4 only the statement makes up arguments) Obviously this doesn’t mean that any one statement alone makes up arguments, but rather that all the things that do make up arguments are statements.

15. (40.77.3 predicated) That is, there is no universal thing of which the universal term can be predicated. The theory that there was just the first theory, rejected on pp. 30–33, paras. (28)–(40).

16. (40.77.4 establish … understanding) constituere intellectum. That is, there doesn’t appear to be any thing a universal term makes you think of. Abelard has already argued that there aren’t any universal things.

17. (40.80.4–7 For … understand) This is more complicated than it has to be. All Boethius is saying is that, if someone just says ‘man’, you quite properly wonder which one (or ones) he is talking about. And, unless he tells you, there is no reasonable way for you to figure it out.

18. (40.81.3 prevents) I conjecture ‘impedimentum’ for the edition’s ‘impedimento’ (Geyer ed., p. 18 line 25), which I am unable to construe plausibly.

19. (41.87.5 conceives) Of course, the word does not conceive anything. Abelard is really talking about what the person who uses the word conceives by means of it.

20. (42.91.4 in that they are men) Notice that Abelard here in effect gives us a kind of definition of his technical term ‘status’. The status of x is being x (where ‘x’ is replaced by a common term). Abelard is here heading off the objection that, if
things do not agree in any thing, then they agree in nothing, which is just to say they do not agree at all. Not so, he says.

21. (42, n. 30) What did the person who originally imposed the term ‘man’ conceive the common likeness of? Earlier (p. 47, para. (87)), Abelard said it was the common likeness of individual men. It would appear then from the present sentence that they are “the things themselves established in the nature of man”. So is Abelard here saying we can also call individual men the “status” of man? Each of them individually? That is totally out of character with everything he has been saying up to now.

22. (43.96.5 a kind of imaginary and made-up thing) res imaginaria quaedam ... et ficta. ‘Res ficta’ becomes something of a technical term for Abelard.

23. (43.98.5–6 Is the squareness and the tallness) The edition has a singular here (Geyer ed., p. 21 line 10), even though the plural would be better with the compound subject.

24. (43.99.1–3 Perhaps … appears) What is the point of this paragraph? The question is not what the paragraph is saying about mirrors, but why it is saying it.

25. (43.100.6 the truth of the substance itself) Here this means only something like the “reality” of the substance.

26. (43.101.1–2 where sensation occurs there is no understanding) The idea is that sensation and understanding are two quite different mental processes, grasping their objects in two quite different ways. While the mind is engaged in the one process, it cannot also be engaged in the other. Abelard thinks otherwise.

27. (44.102.4) To say it is “confused” is not to say there is anything wrong with it. ‘Confused’ in this kind of context just means “fused together”.

28. (44.106.3–4 if he does not proceed on this basis in stating the truth of the matter) This is a highly conjectural translation. The Latin is ‘si et hoc in veritate non astruat’. I suspect some problem with the verb ‘astruat’, but I have no other reading to conjecture. In any event, the overall point is clear enough: The fact that Boethius makes this remark in the context of an argument he does not accept means there is no problem if he in fact does not accept it.

29. (45.108.2–3 limping, maimed or wounded by Hercules’s spear) Note that, like me, both Peter King (Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals, [Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982; Dissertation Abstracts International, #8220415] p. 17*) and Richard McKeon (Selections from Medieval Philosophers, vol. 1, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957, p. 241) translate this passage as though it were the lion that were limping, maimed, or wounded by Hercules’ spear. But the Latin plainly has feminine forms here, and the only plausible feminine noun in the vicinity is ‘pictura’ (= picture, painting). Thus, the sense is literally that the picture is painted as “limping, maimed or wounded by Hercules’s spear”. I don’t think this really makes much difference, but it is worth noting in case some delicate point of interpretation rests on it.
30. (46.120.1–2 Some … “species”) This of course is a pretty bastardized version of Plato. Except for the first part of the *Timaeus*, the actual writings of Plato were not in general circulation until the Renaissance. Abelard knows about Plato only secondhand.

31. (47.122.6 by a transfer of meaning) It is not itself “predicated of several things”, as the definition of a universal requires. But it is *indicated* by what is “predicated of several things” — that is, the *term*.

32. (47.122.9 not subjected to sense) This doesn’t just mean “when it is not actually being sensed”, but rather “when it is not in sensibles”.

33. (47.126.4 The first two understandings) The Latin has a masculine plural numeral here and in line 6, with no obvious antecedent noun to agree with. In virtue of para. (127), I have supplied ‘understandings’.

34. (48.131.1 differently) Geyer’s edition (p. 25 line 37) has ‘*diversim*’. But I suspect this should be ‘*divisim*’ (= dividedly). Either is acceptable, but the latter is a little smoother, and is used in line 4 of the paragraph. (See Geyer ed., p. 26 line 1.)

35. (48.133.2 divided in one sense and *conjoined* in another) Notice that Abelard does not say “dividedly” or “conjointly” here. He is using the participles, not the adverbs.


37. (50.139.3 will be an old man) Socrates is just an example. Of course Abelard knew that the historical Socrates was already long dead.

38. (50.140.5 speak about the creator as if about creatures) That is, we take terms applying to creatures and apply them also to God.

39. (51.145.1–4 To this … given above) In other words, Abelard’s answer to the question is: “Both”.

40. (51.146.5 not) In effect Abelard is here considering the possibility that the question was originally intended in the sense in which he answering it. See p. 51, n. 37.

41. (52.148.4 like the soul, justice) The question presumably is not taking ‘corporeal’ and ‘incorporeal’ in this sense. We are not asking whether universals are “incorporeal” things in the same way the soul or justice is.

42. (52, n. 41) The sense of the paragraph seems to be to mix the two senses of ‘corporeal’ and ‘incorporeal’ given in para. (148). Since I see that subsistents are divided into corporeal ones and incorporeal ones in one sense of these terms (man, whiteness, on the one hand, and the soul, justice, on the other), which of these two terms are we to apply *in a totally different sense* to the things signified by universal terms? This doesn’t seem like a very plausible way of reading the question.
43. **(53.156.5 removed)** I can only make sense of this if Abelard is here talking about the *res ficta*, the “made up” thing we think of when we hear a universal term.

44. **(53, n. 42)** In para. (155), Abelard has just said that *all* genera and species inhere in sensible things. What is going on?

45. **(54.163.5 a thing in a genus)** Plainly, a species does *not* consist of a genus and a difference in the sense that a species-*term* consists of a genus-*term* and a difference-*term*. The term ‘man’ does not consist of the terms ‘animal’ and ‘rational’. But an individual thing in the species *man* does consist of an individual thing in the genus *animal* and an individual thing falling under the difference *rational*. (Presumably these are not three *distinct* things, but Abelard does not go into details here.)

46. **(55.170.3 nevertheless common)** In other words, if someone maintains that there is a sense of ‘one’ for which Boethius’ statement does not hold.

47. **(56.173.3 sophistically)** That is, he shows it by means of an argument he himself does not accept. And in fact, Boethius does reject this argument later on in his text, pp. 23–24, paras. (24)–(29).
John Duns Scotus, Six Questions on Individuation from His *Ordinatio*, ii, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–6

Notes to Question 1

1. *(61.21.1 minor)* Scotus’ editors (399, n. 1) observe that almost all the manuscripts read ‘major’ here. But the sense surely requires ‘minor’, and the editors emend accordingly.

2. *(64.34.10 entity)* ‘Entity’ here has a gerundial rather than a participial force. That is, an “entity” in this sense is not just something that is, but rather what something that is *does*. The word might sometimes be translated ‘way of being’.

Note to Question 2

1. *(69.47.3 Quodlibet V, q. 8, [166M])* Here is what Henry of Ghent says: “Therefore, [the cause of individuation] has to be something [either] negative or else positive [and] relational. Not positive [and] relational, because that relation would necessarily be founded in the thing itself as [already] made, and so as determined in *suppositum*. Therefore, it has to be some negative condition. Therefore, it must be said that in specific created forms … the reason for individuation … is a negation, by which the form itself, … insofar as it is the terminal-point of the making, is made altogether undivided in *suppositum*, and individual and singular by the privation of every divisibility, *per se* and by accident, and divided from everything else …. Now this negation is not simple, but twofold. For, from the inside, it removes every plurificability and diversity, and from the outside, [it removes] every identity …. And this twofold negation determines the notion of the form entirely formally. By this determination [added] onto the essence of the form, the absolute *suppositum* is constituted …. So, therefore, both individuation and the
constitution of a *suppositum* come about completely, as by a formal reason, only by a negation’s determination with respect to the form.”

**Note to Question 3**

1. *(73.61.3 hierarchy of essences)* That is, the Porphyrian tree.

**Notes to Question 4**

1. *(74.67.1–7 “The variety … are several.”)* Scotus is quoting only loosely.

2. *(75, n. 21)* See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *In Sent.*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 *in corp. et ad 3; Summa theologiae*, I, q. 50, a. 2 *in corp.*, and III, q. 77, a. 2 *in corp.; Summa contra gentiles*, II, 50, arg. 1, and IV, 65. See also Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* I, q. 11 *in corp.; Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5 *in corp. (p. 322), and VI, q. 16 *in corp* (p. 322).

3. *(78.81.5 from what was given above)* That is, given by the opinion under attack.


5. *(83, n. 32)* See Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3 (pp. 12–21). For references to Aquinas and Giles, and for further references to Godfrey, see the following notes, below.

6. *(83.99.4 being in matter)* See Godfrey of Fontaines, as in (118). Also Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet II*, q. 11 *in corp.* (fol. 2va): “Indeterminate dimensions precede the substantial form in matter, because every natural agent presupposes a quantity of matter. Since this quantity is determined by a substantial form, therefore the indeterminate quantity precedes the substantial form, the determined [quantity] follows [it].”

7. *(83.99.9 the generated and the corrupted)* See Thomas Aquinas, *In Sent.*, II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4 *in corp.*, and Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet XI*, q. 3 *in corp.* (p. 13). See also Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 9 *in corp.* (fol. 70rb): “Now it remains to satisfy what the question asked, namely, about indeterminate dimensions, as about the quantity of matter, how it remains the same in a corrupted and generated thing. Avicenna solves this in his *Sufficientia*, saying that an accident either follows on the composite according to itself, or it follows on it by reason of
the form, or [it follows on] it by reason of the matter. Now an accident that follows on a subject by reason of the matter remains the same, because the matter in a corrupted and generated thing can remain the same in number (according to him) in a corrupted and generated thing. Thus, he says that ‘A scar and the blackness of an Ethiopian would remain the same in the Ethiopian alive or dead’. But whatever is the case for other accidents, there is no doubt about the quantity of matter (to which there is no motion, and which is never separated from matter) that it remains the same in number.”

8. (84.101.2 Godfrey, VI. 16, 259) “Any form whatever, considered in itself and absolutely, is only specifically distinguished from another [form].”

9. (84.101.2 VII. 5, 332) “Things that differ by form considered by itself differ according to species. But things that differ by form according to the being it has in the external thing and in matter … do not differ in species but in number.”

10. (84.103.4 categorial position) That is, the category of position (situs).

11. (85.106.22–23 some people) Those who hold the view in (71).

12. (89.117.1 it is claimed) See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XI, q. 3 in corp. (p. 13).

13. (89.118.2 the theory) That is, the theory stated in (71).

14. (90.119.1 premise) That is, that a particular agent does not reach to the substance of the matter, but rather precisely reaches to it insofar as it is quantified.

Notes to Questions 5 and 6

1. (94.133.2 what-it-was-to-be) This is a peculiarly Aristotelian code-word for the essence of a thing.

2. (94.134.2 heavens) In the astronomical sense, not the theological sense.

3. (96, n. 51) The resurrection of the dead at the end of the world is of course a different matter altogether; it is not a “natural” process.

4. (96.142.2 opposite, affirmative side of the question) Scotus himself takes the negative side.

5. (97.148.1 VII. 5, 319) “For just as the common genus cannot be divided into several [things] differing in species except by the addition of something pertaining to the notion of the species …, so too it seems that the common species cannot be divided into several individuals unless each individual adds something over and above the nature of the species, which — as far as it itself is concerned — is one in all individuals…. But it does not seem that it can be understood to add something
pertaining to the essence and nature of the individual, because the species indicates that whole [nature], which is the whole being of the individuals. Therefore, if something is added, it seems to be something pertaining to an accidental nature…. For in a categorial line there is [no — this addition seems needed for the sense] division in the most specific species, insofar as it includes the ultimate difference under which nothing more determinate can be taken through which [the most specific species] would be determined in the individual (as happens in the species with respect to the genus). Otherwise, there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, as Plato says, one must stop at singulars, in the sense, namely, that one cannot posit in them anything formal pertaining to the essence and quiddity beyond what is included in the notion and quiddity of the species. Therefore, if something is added by which the nature, common in itself in this way, is determined and contracted, it has to be something pertaining to an accidental nature, as was said.”

6. (97.148.1 324–325) “But since a material substance is undivided in itself into several [things] of the same kind or species …, therefore, just as it is quantified by an adventing accident, so it is divided into several [things] of the same kind through an accident, namely, through quantity.”

7. (97.149.2 atomic) Recall that ‘atomic’ is just Greek for “indivisible”.

8. (101.166.1–2 the statement of the theory [(154)].) Scutas’ editors (473, n. 4) give the reference to (154). But in fact no “example” is given there.

9. (101.167.3 a certain theory) See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, 4, 65.

10. (105.182 what-something-is) quod-quid-est.

11. (109.197.1 [(150)–(151)]) Scotus is replying to both arguments at once here.

12. (113, n. 64) Earlier in the sentence matter is said to do the distinguishing (= is “distinctive”), which would suggest that the active voice ‘distinguishes’ is to be preferred here. On the other hand, the lack of a direct object for ‘distinguishes’ makes the sentence awkward. I have adopted the passive-voice variant, but I am not completely confident about it.
William of Ockham, Five Questions on Universals from his *Ordinatio*, d. 2, qq. 4–8

Notes to Question 4

1. *(116, n. 3)* The real sciences are physics (= philosophy of nature), metaphysics, and mathematics, along with various “subalternate” sciences derived from these. Rational science, on the other hand, is logic.

2. *(117.21.2 attribute)* passio.

3. *(121.49.1 Even)* There is some question about how to construe the ‘etiam’ in this sentence. The most natural translation of the Latin would read: “They assert the opposite of even this”, which does not seem to fit the context very well.

4. *(121.52.5–6 communal man)* Literally, this is just “common man”. But I have avoided translating it that way (here and throughout), because ‘common man’ suggests the famous “man on the street”, which is not the idea here at all.

5. *(122, n. 4)* We *count* discrete quantity, whereas we *measure* continuous quantity. This is a standard distinction that goes back to Aristotle’s *Categories*, Ch. 6.

6. *(124. 65.1–7 When some … exist)* The point is clearer than the rather labored quantifiers might make it appear. If x does not essentially depend on y or z, and, according to the normal course of nature, it is possible for x to exist without y and also possible for x to exist without z, then it is also possible, at least by the power of God, for x to exist without y and without z. (Whether this is plausible or not is of course another matter.)

7. *(124.67.1 newly created)* creari de novo. The phrase refers to a “new” creation, in the sense that it would be a creation *after* the original six-day creation reported in Genesis. It was a common doctrine that human souls are newly created in this way; they do not pre-exist in some celestial warehouse before they are implanted in bodies.

8. *(125.71.2 material form)* That is, a form *in* matter.
9. (126.75.4 coexists with) Some manuscripts have ‘corresponds to’ here. That is perhaps the smoother reading.

10. (126.79.3 added) This suggests that the “singular thing” in this argument is a contracting individual difference.

11. (128.92.2 divine Word) The second person of the Trinity, the one that became incarnate in Jesus.

12. (129.95.3 XII) This is my mistake. It should be XIII.

13. (134.121.7 authorities) For instance, Boethius, In Porphyrium II, lib. 2, c. 8 (Brandt ed., 196.16–197.12).

14. (134.121.8 some modern authors) For instance, Thomas Aquinas, In Sent. I, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

15. (137.135.5–6 nothing can be heard with bodily ears but a spoken word) That’s not quite true, of course. One can hear “the stamping of feet and the breaking of trees”, as one mediaeval author somewhat strikingly put it. But the point is that nothing relevant to hearing lies can be heard with the ears except an utterance.


17. (138, n. 12) Propositions are “complexes” in the sense that they are put together out of subject and predicate. At least categorical propositions are; molecular propositions are even more complex, of course.

18. (141.152.4–5 the view that claims light is not apprehended through itself [but only through color]) See Henry of Ghent, Summa, a. 24, q. 6 (142V — not 192V as stated in the edition of Ockham, 141 n. 1): “For just as the eye grasps color and light together, and color only under the aspect of light, even though it judges more about the vision of color than [it does about that] of light because the coarseness of color casts a shadow over the aspect of light, so [too] the intellect grasps the aspect of the first good and of a creature’s good together in a confused being, even though it judges only about a creature’s good, or [at least it judges about a creature’s good] more than [it does] about the creator’s good, because the magnitude of the created good overshadows in us the aspect of the uncreated good.”

19. (142.156.7 contrary to true logic) Suppose x, y and z are the only individual men there are. Then Ockham’s point is that, according to “true logic”, ‘x is risible’ ‘y is risible’ and ‘z is risible’ together suffice for the “inductive” inference to the universal conclusion ‘Every man is risible’. But this would not be so if, in addition, it were required that ‘The universal man M is risible’ also be true. Then the induction would require four premises, not just three.

20. (143.161.4 informing them) That is, making them take on a form. The connection between this primitive sense of the term and the more familiar
epistemological sense comes by way of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, whereby the knower literally takes on the form of the known.

21. (144.166.1–2 certain people, who think they know logic) See Walter Burley, *De suppositionibus*, in Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise *De suppositionibus* and Its Influence on William of Ockham,” *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), pp. 15–63. Burley was capable of giving as good as he got. See his *In Aristot. Physicam*, I, t. 5 (Venice, 1589, col. 16): “Nevertheless, these arguments would not have to be included here, if it were not because certain [people], who assert that they above all mortals know logic, reply to the argument by claiming that in saying ‘I promise you a cow’, I promise you one singular thing outside the soul.”

22. (146.175.3 categorial line) That is, a branch of the Porphyrian tree. The rest of the paragraph indicates that Ockham is thinking of the tree for the category *substance*.

23. (147, n. 18) One might be tempted reword the statement ‘Socrates and Plato are specifically identical’ to say ‘Socrates is specifically identical with Plato’. But the text here suggests that Ockham thinks this is not a good way to put it. Nevertheless, Ockham himself says in (183) that this man is generically the same as *this horse*.

Notes to Question 5

1. (149, n. 20) See *In Sent.*, II, d. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Biblioteca communale, MS 172, fol. 69v). Scotus’ real theory is discussed in Question 6 of Ockham’s text.

2. (150.11.7 those do not exist) Actually, Ockham has not said that the contracting differences do not exist, but only that (by hypothesis) they are separated from the humanities. The point stands, however: they do not enter into the picture.

3. (151, n. 21) The Latin text seems to me dubious here.

4. (151.15.6 first question [q. 4]) Question 4 is the first question on universals.

Notes to Question 6

1. (163.59.1 remains) For instance, Plato. It is only Socrates who is assumed to have been destroyed, after all. The common nature that remains will be the nature that is in Plato.
2. (163, n. 33) Obviously Ockham is using the term ‘contradiction’ very loosely here.

3. (164.66.3) The Latin edition (185.5) reads the feminine ‘aliqua’ here, where the neuter ‘aliquo’ would be expected.

4. (164.68.11 to be deprived) privari vel esse privata.

5. (164.70.2 formal understanding) That is, roughly, the one is not analytically contained in the other.

6. (166.77.5 divine relation in the Trinity) That is, one of the relations between or among the persons of the Trinity. Traditionally these relations are: paternity (Father to Son), filiation (Son to Father), spiration (Father and Son to Holy Spirit) and procession (Holy Spirit to Father and Son).

7. (171.102.2 [numerical] unity) As it stands in the Latin, the argument seems incomplete. I have added the word ‘numerical’ in an attempt to fill it out. The justification for the addition is that, according to Scotus as well as Ockham, everything outside the soul is singular.

8. (173.115.3 in that sense … is false) That is, if the subject term ‘nature of a stone’ in this case too is in simple supposition and supposita for a concept of the mind.

9. (173.115.14 particularly quantified) That is, quantified with the “particular” (existential) quantifier ‘some’.


11. (174, n. 40) For one treatment of these examples, see Ockham, Summa logicae, I, Ch. 71.

12. (175, n. 42) See also Ockham, Summa logicae, III–IV, Chs. 2–4.

13. (175.123.7 subjectively) That is, as in a subject. ‘Subjective’ in this period did not mean ‘mind-dependent’.

14. (179.150.1–4 I grant … forms) It is hard to see how this reply addresses the objection. On the other hand, the objection was not very well put in the first place.

Notes to Question 7

according as it is in things, [and] another according as it is in the soul .... But with respect to the second [kind], there is a certain nature that is not actually a universal, but rather potentially, because it potentially has [the ability] for such a nature to become universal through the action of an intellect.” See also Giles of Rome, in the question “Whether universals are in particulars” (Girardo Bruni, *Una inedita “Quaestio de universalibus” di Egidio Romano*, [“Collezione di testi filosofici inediti e rari.”] vol. 2; Naples: A. Morano, 1935, p. 20): “But the same [thing] is not also a universal except in potency. Therefore, the universal does not have to have universal being before it is understood, except in potency.” Also Peter Auriol, *In II Sent.*, d. 9, a. 3 (Rome: A. Zanetti, 1605, II, 109b): “Therefore, if you ask [about] the specific unity of humanity, what is it formally in, I say that .... that unity is in the external thing in potency and inchoatively.”


3. *(191, n. 53)* See the anonymous author in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS lat. 17813: “And because genera and species … cannot be without individuals, because they are nothing other than individuals, but considered in another way. For the same thing is an individual and a species and a genus, considered in different ways. For example, the same thing is Socrates and man and animal.” (Quoted in B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale*, 6 vols., [Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1890–1893], at vol. 5, p. 296.) See also Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias*, (Antwerp, 1566), II, d. 3, q. 2, n. 14 (137ra): “Those [entities] that are the same, as such, have the same principles. But a universal nature and an individual or singular one are the same according to reality, but differ according to reason, because what the species says indeterminately, the individual says determinately.”

4. *(194, n. 56)* The *Book of Six Principles* was often attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers, but is now generally thought not to be by him.

5. *(196, n. 58)* The only possible antecedents for ‘quae’ would be ‘essence’ and ‘thing’, and neither of those makes good sense in the context. I take the antecedent of ‘qui’ to be ‘sermo’.

6. *(200.64.1 Harclay, Gál ed., 218–219)* The text reads: “To the second argument, when it is argued that Socrates is Plato as confusedly conceived, I say that it does not follow. Rather it is a fallacy of accident [arising] from a variation in the middle [term]. For when I say, “Animal is nothing but Socrates when he is conceived confusedly,” and you argue, “But Plato is an animal; therefore, he is Socrates confusedly conceived,” the middle [term] is varied. For when ‘Plato is an animal’ is said in the minor [premise], the discussion is about another animal than [it was] in the major [premise]. For there is nothing common to them. Hence, just as ‘animal’ signifies Socrates confusedly understood, so ‘animal’ signifies Plato confusedly understood. But [that is] not the same [thing] on the part of reality, but rather [something] else.”
7. (201.69.8 according to them) Henry of Harclay, *loc. cit.*: “Every thing posited outside the soul is by that very fact singular.”

8. (201.72.7–8 fallacy ... *simpliciter*) The fallacy proceeds by confusing what is said without qualification or absolutely with what is said only under a qualification. The example of the Ethiopian (202.72.1–2) is Aristotle’s.

9. (204.84.3 the third view reported above) That is, Henry of Harclay’s view.

10. (206.86.1–2 according to you) The editors (250 n. 1) refer to the statement of Henry’s view earlier in Ockham’s text. But the claim is not made explicitly there.

11. (206.92.4 according to you) That is, according to Henry of Harclay.

12. (209, 67) Henry of Harclay, *Quaestiones disputatae*, (Vatican, Borghese MS 171, fols. 1r–32v), at q. 1, fol. 2ra: “I say to this that to the community of a concept there does not necessarily correspond a community in the thing. Rather, from altogether the same simple thing there is taken a common and confused or non-differing concept and [also] a distinctive and more particular concept.”

**Notes to Question 8**

1. (215, n. 72) See James of Viterbo, *Quodlibet*, I, q. 1 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS lat. 15350, fols. 291vb–292va): “On this, you should know that a concept, according as it is taken in intellectual [matters], is a certain actuality or perfection of the intellect according to which [the intellect] is called, and is, [in the process of] understanding. And this [is so] whether it is really the same as the act of understanding, as it seems to some [people], or is something formed or constituted through the act of understanding, as is maintained by others .... But there are [yet] others who say that the concept is the object itself, as cognized. (/fol. 292va/) But it seems to me at present that it is more reasonably said that ‘concept’ and ‘act of understanding’ indicate the same absolute thing .... On this, you should know that a concept of the soul can be taken in two ways. In one sense, according as it perfects the intellect absolutely. In this sense, every concept of the intellect is simple, because such a concept is a certain accidental form pertaining to the category of quality (as, in [his] commentary on the *On Interpretation*, Simplicius mentions Porphyry’s statement), although according to another sense it pertains also to the category of action or passion.” See also Durand of Saint Pourçain, *In Sententias*, (Antwerp, 1566), I, d. 19, q. 5 (65vb–66va); and Peter Auriol, *Commentariorum in I Sententiarum pars prima (= Scriptum)*,(Rome: Vatican Press, 1596), I, d. 23, q. unica (525–541).
2. (216.10.1 according to everyone) For example, Scotus (?), *Theoremata*, theor. 8, n. 1: “I call a concept that which terminates an act of understanding.” (W 3. 273.) The authorship of this work has been questioned.

3. (216, n. 74) See Giles of Rome, *In Sententias*, (Venice, 1521), I, d. 19, q. 1 (110v).

4. (217.16.2 passion) That is, the opposite of an action, being on the receiving end of an action.

5. (218, n. 79) See William of Alnwick, *In Sententias*, (Assisi, Biblioteca communale, MS 172), I, q. 10 (fols. 48v, 49r): “In a second sense, there is the universal that is the nature and quiddity itself, insofar as [it is] considered by the intellect according to its indifference to all [its] supposita. And [this] is the completed universal, which is one in many and is said of many. … But the universal in the second sense, namely, considered according to [its] indifference, is only objectively in the possible intellect. It is in nothing [at all] subjectively, and [it is] not in any representation. For it is everywhere and always.” See also Peter Auriol, *Scriptum*, I, d. 9, a. 1 (319f.); Henry of Harclay, *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. 3, in Gál, “Henricus de Harclay,” § 101). Ockham held this view, and then changed his mind about it. See Gál, “Gualteri de Chatton”.

6. (221.39.7 mind) *animus*, here and in several other places in the discussion of Augustine.

7. (221.41.4 ‘Whiteness dazzles sight’) For this example, see Aristotle, *Topics*, 3, 5 (11930–31).
Part Two: Texts

The following translations are to be used in conjunction with those in my *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals*. They are arranged in approximately chronological order.
Porphyry the Phoenician, From his *Exposition of Aristotle’s Categories by Question and Answer* (on Aristotle, *Categories*, 1, 1a1-2)

Translated from *Porphyrii Isagoge et In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, Adolphus Busse, ed., (“Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,” vol. IV.1; Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1887), p. 62 lines 17–33.²

Question: How is ‘common’ taken [in Aristotle’s definition]? But first, tell [me] in how many ways ‘common’ is said.

Answer: I maintain that [it is said] in many ways. For (1) that is called “common” which is divided into parts, like a loaf [of bread], and wine if it is one of [the things that] are divided.³ Things are “common” [in this sense] by being divided into parts according to each of the participants.⁴ (2) That is

---

¹ In *Categories*, 1, 1a1-2 (the opening words of the work), Aristotle defines “equivocals” or “homonyms” as having a name in common, but the definition of the name they do not have in common. The passage below asks about the word ‘common’ in this definition.


³ are divided: The Greek has the active participle διαιρούντων here, although the passive seems perhaps to be better. The apparatus to the edition shows no variants. The sense of the whole clause is obscure. Strange (p. 41) takes the ‘it’ to refer back to the ‘that’ at the beginning of clause (1), and translates: “if it is a single thing that comes to belong to those who divide it up”. This requires construing the simple genitive as “that comes to belong to”, which seems a little strange. But Strange’s reading does have the advantage of keeping the active participle.

⁴ according ... participants: καθ’ ἐκαστοῦ τῶν μετεχόντων, following Busse’s conjecture at p. 61.21. The edition has τῶν δύνατων = ‘of the beings’, which seems senseless here.
called “common” which is not divided into parts but is received\(^5\) by many for [their] use, like a horse or a slave [that is] common to many brothers. (3) That is called “common” which is in someone’s possession beforehand and, after being used, is returned to common [ownership]. The [public] bath and the theater are such a thing. Again in another sense, (4) that is called “common” which, as a whole, comes undividedly into the use of many simultaneously. For in this way, through the voice of the crier, the use [of the theater] is common to those in it, although the voice is not divided up in the least among each of those present.\(^6\)

**Question:** So in which sense is ‘common’ taken [in Aristotle’s definition]?

**Answer:** I say [it is] according to the last [sense], according to which there comes to be a use common to many simultaneously, although the same whole remains undivided. For the word ‘Ajax’ is used both for the son of Oileus and for [the son] of Telamon,\(^7\) taken as a whole and remaining undivided between the two [of them].

---

\(^5\) received: \(παραλαμβάνω\). The word means “received from another”, and is used in cases of inheritance (among other usages).

\(^6\) The word \(θέαρον\) = ‘theater’ means not only a place where drama was performed, but also an “assembly”, where a “crier” made proclamations and kept order.

\(^7\) These are called, respectively, Ajax the Less and Ajax the Greater. They are characters from the *Iliad.*
Boethius, From His Second Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, iii, 11


**[Porphyry’s Text]**

Such things are called individuals because each of them consists of characteristics\(^1\) the collection of which will never be the same for anything else. For the characteristics of Socrates will never be in any other particular. But the characteristics of man — I mean of the [man] that is general — will be the same in several things, or rather in all particular men insofar as they are men.\(^2\)

**[Boethius’ Commentary]**

Because he appealed to the “individual” above, he [here] tries to exhibit the notion behind this name. For only those things are divided\(^3\) that are common to several. For each thing is divided by those things to which it is common and the nature and likeness of which it contains. Now the things into which the common is divided participate in the common nature, and the common characteristic of the thing belongs\(^4\)

---

\(^1\) characteristics: *proprietatibus*.


\(^3\) The term ‘individual’ etymologically suggests something that is “undivided”. The point here, therefore, is to contrast the individual with things that are divided.

\(^4\) belong: convenit + dative, literally: “comes together (with)”. This is the only occurrence of such a construction in this passage. Elsewhere in the passage, forms of ‘convenio’ are construed with ‘in’ + accusative, and there I have translated it ‘come together (in)’. The reader should be sensitive to occurrences of this word, because one of the difficulties in interpreting the passage is in deciding
to the things to which it is common. The characteristic of individuals, however, is common to none.

For the characteristic of Socrates — if, [for instance.] he was bald, snub-nosed, pot-bellied, and [had] other bodily features or well established practices or mannerisms of speech — did not come together in anyone else. For these characteristics, which came upon him from accidents and joined together his form and shape, came together in no one else.

Now what has characteristics that come together in no other has characteristics that will be able to be common to none. But what has a characteristic that is common to none has nothing that participates in its characteristic. Now what is such that nothing participates in its characteristic cannot be divided into those things that do not participate [in it].

Therefore, those things that have a characteristic that does not come together in [anything] else are rightly called “individuals”. The characteristic of man, however — that is, the specific [characteristic] — comes together in Socrates and Plato and the rest. [But] their characteristics, coming from accidents, on no account come together in anything else.

whether the “characteristics” Boethius has in mind are unique combinations or collections of accidental features, or whether they might be single accidents that just happen to belong to only one individual. If one stresses the force of the ‘con-’ prefix (= “together”) in forms of ‘convenio’, particularly when construed with the accusative, then the former interpretation might seem more likely. Thus the reader should be aware of where those forms occur.
Boethius, From his Second Commentary on Aristotle’s
*De interpretatione*, ii, 7 (on De int. 7, 17a38–b3)


[Aristotle’s Text]

Now some things are universals, of course, but others [come] one by one.¹ I call “universal” what is apt to be predicated of several [things], but [I call] “singular” what is not. For instance, man is a universal, but Plato belongs among what are singulars. Now it is necessary [in our statements] to state that something does or does not belong (A) sometimes to something included among what are universals, but (B) sometimes [to something included] among what are singulars.²

[Boethius’ Commentary]

Every proposition takes the characteristics³ of its signification from the subjects [that are] understood. But, because the understandings of things must be likenesses,⁴ let us extend the force of propositions to things as well. And so, when we want to affirm or deny something, this is referred to the quality of the [act of] understanding and of the mind’s conception. For what we conceive by the imagination or intellect, that we either affirm or deny by putting it in an affirmation or a negation.

---

¹ one by one: singillatim. The word is an adverb related to ‘singular’.

² In other words, sometimes our statements have universals as their subjects, and sometimes they have singulars.

³ characteristics: The Latin here is *proprietates*, not to be confused with *propria*. The latter is one of the five Porphyrian “predicables”. The term *proprietas* means “peculiarity”, “characteristic feature”, and is broader than the Porphyrian notion of “proprium”. The latter applies only to species, but as we shall see later in this text, there are “proprietates” of individuals as well.

⁴ That is, concepts are likenesses or “pictures” of their objects. This is a standard Boethian doctrine.
Propositions take their force and characteristic in the first place from [the mind’s] comprehension\(^5\) of them. But, in the second place, they take [their force and characteristic] from the things out of which the understandings themselves must arise. Thus it comes about that a proposition participates in quantity and quality. [It participates] in quality in the utterance of the affirmation and negation that someone pronounces and utters on the basis of his own judgment. But [it participates] in quantity on the basis of the subject things the intellect grasps.\(^6\)

So we see that there are other qualities in things, such that they cannot belong to [anything] else but to one singular and particular substance, whichever it is. For the quality of a singular, for instance of Plato or Socrates, is distinct from the [quality] that, communicated to many, presents itself as a whole to each one of them and to all [of them together], as humanity itself does.\(^7\) For there is a certain quality such that it is, as a whole, in each one and, as a whole, in all [of them together]. Whenever we observe something like that with the mind, we are not led in [our] mind’s thinking by the name [‘man’] to any one person, but to all those people whatever who participate in the definition of humanity.

Thus it happens that this [kind of quality] is common to all. But the former kind is incommunicable to all, but rather proper to one. If I might make up a name, I would call that certain singular quality, incommunicable to any other subsistence, by its contrived name, in order to make the form of what is being claimed clearer. All right then, let the incommunicable characteristic of Plato be called “Platonity”. For let us be able to call this quality “Platonity”, by a contrived word, in the [same] way that we call the quality of man “humanity”.

Therefore, this “Platonity” belongs to one man only, and not to just any one, but only to Plato. Humanity, on the other hand, belongs to Plato and the rest, whoever are included in the word [‘humanity’].

Thus it comes about that, since Platonity belongs to the one Plato, the soul that hears the word ‘Plato’ refers to one person and to one particular substance. But when it hears ‘man’, it refers the intellect to several, to whomever it knows to be contained under humanity. And so, because humanity both is common to all men [taken together] and also is, as a whole, in each [of them] — for all men equally contain humanity, just as one man does, for if that were not so, the specific definition of man

---

\(^5\) comprehension: *intelligentia*.

\(^6\) In mediaeval logic, the “quality” of a proposition was either its affirmative or negative character. Affirmations and negations, then, were said to differ in “quality”. On the other hand, the “quantity” of a proposition referred to whether it was universal (‘Every man is mortal’, ‘No man is an island’), particular (‘Some man is a Greek’, ‘Some man is not a Greek’), indefinite (‘Man is running’, ‘Man is not running’) or singular (‘Socrates is running’, ‘Socrates is not running’).

\(^7\) The example of “humanity” indicates that the notion of “quality” is not here being taken in the strict sense, for entities in the Aristotelian accidental *category* of quality. Humanity belongs to the category of substance, and is essential (not accidental) to the things that have it.
would not fit the substance of a particular man — since, therefore, these things are so, for that reason man is said [to be] a kind of universal, but Platonity itself, and Plato, [are said to be] particular.

Assuming these things, therefore, since the universal quality can be predicated of all [taken together], and also of each one, [therefore] when we say ‘man’, it is ambiguous, and one can doubt whether one was talking about [man] in the specific [sense], or about some particular, for the following reason: The name ‘man’ can be said of all [men taken together] and [also] of each one, whoever are contained under the one species of humanity. Thus, it is indefinite whether the ‘man’ that we said was said about all [men], or about some one individual man, a particular substance.

Therefore, if we try to separate the ambiguity in the understanding [of this term], the quality of humanity must be distinguished, and either extended into a plurality or else gathered together into numerical unity. For when we say ‘man’, it is indefinite whether we are saying all [men] or one. But if ‘every’ is added, so that the predication be ‘every man’, or ‘some’ [is added, so that the predication be ‘some man’], then there occurs, [respectively,] a distribution and a determination of universality, and the name that is universal — that is, ‘man’ — we utter universally by saying ‘every man’, or particularly by saying ‘some man’. For the name ‘every’ is significative of universality.

Hence, if ‘every’, which signifies a universal, is joined to ‘man’, which is the very same universal, the universal thing that is man is universally predicated, insofar as the definition of the quantity is added to it. But if ‘some man’ is said, then the universal that is man is uttered particularly, because particularity is added through the ‘some’ that is adjoined to it, and the universal thing is said [to be] uttered particularly.

But because the predication ‘some man’ is particular and, again, the predication of ‘Plato’ is particular — for ‘some man’ is said of one [man], and ‘Plato’ is [also] said of one [man] — they are not both said to be particular in the same way. For ‘Plato’ indicates one definite substance and characteristic that cannot go together with [anything] else. On the other hand, the ‘some man’ that is said determines the universal name — [‘man’] itself — with particularity. But if the ‘some’ were lacking, the ‘man’ that we say, [which is] universal and thus ambiguous, would remain. But the ‘Plato’ that we say will never be able to be a universal. For even if sometimes the name ‘Plato’ is imposed on several [men], yet it will not for that reason be a universal name.

8 that we said: Boethius had no quotation marks in the written Latin of his day. The point of the phrase ‘that we said’ is to signal the reader that it is not man in general that is under discussion, or any one man, but rather the word ‘man’. Similarly for the phrases ‘that is said’ and ‘that we say’, below. The English sentences sound a little awkward with these phrases, but in the end that is all that is going on.

9 In mediaeval grammatical theory, the category of “names” included pronouns and adjectives, as well as nouns.
And so humanity, gathered together from the natures of singular men, is reduced in a certain way to one [act of] comprehension\(^\text{10}\) and [one] nature. But the name ‘Plato’ that we say might seem perhaps to be verbally common to many, [and] yet the characteristic of Plato, which was the characteristic or nature\(^\text{11}\) of the Plato who was the pupil of Socrates, would belong to no one [else] even if he were called by the same name. This is because humanity is natural, whereas a proper name [is a matter] of stipulation.

I am not claiming now that the name ['Plato'] cannot be predicated of several [men], but [that] the characteristic of Plato [cannot]. For that characteristic is naturally not said of several [men], as [the characteristic] of man is. And so Platonity itself is an incommunicable quality, as has been said, whereas the universal quality that is both in several [men] and also in each one [of them] is communicable….

\(^{10}\)comprehension: *intelligentia* again. See above, p. 46, n. 5.

\(^{11}\)characteristic or nature: Reading ‘*proprietas aut natura*’ instead of ‘*proprietatis aut naturae*’, following the editor’s conjecture. See p. 139.11 of the Latin edition.
Boethius, Two Texts from His *Theological Tractates*

---


---

**I**

**From *Contra Eutychen*, i.1–71**

Hence, if “person” is [found] only in substances, and [only] in rational ones [at that], and [if] every nature is a substance and is not found in universals but rather in individuals, [then] the definition of “person” has been found: *an individual substance of a rational nature*. Now by this definition we have determined what the Greeks call ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἁγίως.

For the name ‘person’ seems to have been taken from elsewhere, namely from the masks\(^1\) that represent the men portrayed in comedies and tragedies. Now ‘person’ is derived from ‘personare’, with a circumflex on the penultimate [syllable].\(^2\) If the antepenult has an acute [accent],\(^3\) [the word] will appear quite clearly [to be] derived from *sonus* [— that is, from ‘sound’]. It

---

1. ‘Persona’ means both “mask” and “person”, as is clear in the following explanation.

2. Latin does not have a circumflex. Boethius simply means: with the accent on the penultimate — personáre. (To make the point, I explicitly wrote in an accent there, although Latin would do no such thing.)

3. Again, Latin does not distinguish kinds of accent. All Boethius means is: if the accent is put on the antepenult, as for instance in the first person singular *persono*. (Again, writing an accent in explicitly.) This makes it clear that the second syllable is short (if it were long, then the rules of Latin accentuation would require the accent to go there), and so that the word comes etymologically from *sonus* with a short ‘o’.

---
[comes] from ‘sound’ because necessarily a greater sound rolls around [in it] because of [its] concavity. The Greeks also call these masks πρόσωπα because they are put on the face and conceal the expression from the eyes [of the viewers]: παρὰ τοῦ προφθαρτας τοῦς ὄμοις τίθεσθαι. But, because the stage-players, when they put on [their] masks, represented the individual men portrayed in the tragedy or in the comedy, as has been said — that is, Hecuba or Medea or Simon or Chremes — therefore other men too, who would be certainly recognized by their form, the Latins called ‘person’ and the Greeks πρόσωπα.

But [the Greeks], much the more clearly, called the individual subsistence of a rational nature by the name ὑπόστασις, while we [Latins], through our poverty of meaningful words, have kept to a metaphorical nomenclature and call ‘person’ what they call ὑπόστασις. But Greece, richer in words, calls the individual subsistence ὑπόστασις.

To use the Greek language in matters that were [first] treated in Greek, and [then] transferred in Latin translation: ἀι ὁσίατε ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου ἐλαξινοὶ δύνανται ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις καὶ κατὰ μέρος μόνοις ὑφίστανται. That is, essences can indeed be in universals, but they “substand” only in individuals and particulars. For the understanding of universal things is taken from particulars. Hence, since these subsistences are indeed in universals, but take on substance in particulars, [the Greeks] rightfully called ὑπόστασις the subsistences substanding particularly. For to one who looks carefully and with subtlety, subsistence and substance will not seem to be the same.

For what the Greeks call οὐσίωσις or οὐσιωσθαι, that we call “subsistence” or “to subsist”. But what they call ὑπόστασις or ὑφίστασθαι that we translate as “substance” or “to substand”. For that “subsists” which does not need accidents in order to be able to be. But that “substands” which furnishes a certain subject to other accidents, so that they may be. For it “stands under” them, as long as it is a subject for accidents. Hence genera and species only subsist. For accidents do not befall genera or species. But individuals not only subsist, they also substand. For neither do they need accidents in order to be.

For they are already informed by their properties and specific differences, and provide to accidents the opportunity to be — that is to say, as long as they are subjects.

Hence, εἶναι and οὐσιωσθαι are understood as ‘to be’ and ‘to subsist’, while ὑφίστασθαι [is understood] as ‘to substand’. For, as Marcus Tullius [Cicero] says in jest,5 Greece is not in want of words, and has names to correspond one for one with ‘essence’, ‘subsistence’, ‘substance’ [and]

---

4 πρόσωπα: Literally, “before the eyes”, as Boethius goes on to explain.

5 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, II, 15, 35.
‘person’, calling essence οὐσία, subsistence οὐσίωσις, substance ύπόστασις, [and] person πρόσωπον.

Now the Greeks call individual substances ύποστάσεις because they are under the rest and are underpinnings and subjects for certain (so to speak) “accidents”. Hence we too call “substances” — as it were, “underpinnings” — what they call ύποστάσεις. And since they call the same substances πρόσωπα, we too can call [them] “persons”. Therefore, οὐσία is the same as essence, οὐσίωσις the same as subsistence, ύπόστασις the same as substance, [and] πρόσωπον the same as person.

II

From De trinitate, i.7–ii.58

The judgment of this [Christian religion] about the unity of the Trinity is: “The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore, Father, Son, Holy Spirit are one, not three gods.” The reason for this conjoining is lack of difference. For difference follows on those who either augment or diminish [the persons of the Trinity], such as the Arians who, varying the Trinity through degrees of merits, tear [it] apart and split [it] into a plurality.

For the principle of plurality is otherness. Neither can it be understood what plurality is without otherness. Now of three things, or however many, there exists a diversity in genus, in species, and in number. For in however many ways ‘the same’ is said, in that many ways ‘diverse’ is said too. Now ‘the same’ is said in three ways: (a) either by genus, as a man is the same as a horse, because there is the same genus for them, to wit, animal; (b) or by species, as Cato is the same as Cicero, because he is the same species, to wit, man; (c) or by number, as Tully and Cicero, because he is one in number. Hence ‘diverse’ is also said either by genus or by species or by number. Now it is the variety of accidents that makes for difference in number. For three men are distinguished not by genus or species, but by their accidents. If by the mind we separate all their accidents from them, nevertheless place is diverse for each of them, and we can in no way suppose that it is one. For two bodies will not occupy one

---

6 The etymology of ύπόστασις is from “to stand under”, as is the etymology of ‘substance’.

7 lack of difference: indifferentia. The term will have a distinguished future in the twelfth century.
place, which is an accident. And therefore they are several in number, because they are made several by their accidents.

Let us then begin, and investigate each point insofar as it can be understood and grasped. For as, it seems, [was] most well said,\(^8\) it is the learned man’s job to try to adopt a belief about each thing that conforms to the way it is.

Now there are three parts of speculative \[science\]: (a) **Natural** \[science, which is\] non-abstract, \(\alpha ν\pi\varepsilon\zeta\omicron\rho\varepsilon\tau\varsigma\) [and] in motion.\(^9\) For it considers bodies’ forms together with matter, \[forms\] that cannot be actually separated from bodies. These bodies are in motion. For example, when earth is borne downwards and fire upwards, the form conjoined to the matter has the motion too. (b) **Mathematics**, \[which is\] non-abstract \textit{without} motion. For it examines bodies’ forms without matter, and therefore without motion. Since these forms are in matter, they cannot be separated from \[bodies\].\(^{11}\) (c) **Theological** \[science, which is\] without motion, abstract and separable. For God’s substance lacks both matter and motion.

Therefore, with \[topics\] in natural \[science\], one will have to proceed in a rational manner, with mathematics in a disciplined manner, with divine \[topics\] in an intellectual manner,\(^{12}\) and not be drawn away to the products of imagination but rather gaze upon the very form that is truly a form and not an image, and that is being itself and that from which being comes.

For every being is from form. For a “statue” is not so called because of the bronze that is its matter, but because of the form by which the likeness of an animal is impressed on the bronze. [And] the “bronze” itself is so called not because of earth, which is its matter, but because of the configuration of bronze. “Earth” itself is also so called not because of \(\alpha \pi\omicron\iota\nu\upsilon\theta\lambda\eta\nu\),\(^{13}\) but

\(^8\) Cicero, \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, v.7.19.

\(^9\) That is, inseparable.

\(^{10}\) That is, its \textit{objects} are non-abstract, inseparable (from matter) and in motion. So too for (b) and (c) below.

\(^{11}\) The idea is that, like physics (= natural science), mathematics deals with forms in matter and in motion. But it does not take account of the matter or the motion.

\(^{12}\) rational, disciplined, intellectual: \textit{rationabiliter, disciplinaliter, intellectualiter}. Commentators have had a grand time explaining what Boethius meant here, particularly about mathematics. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, \textit{The Division and Method of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius}, Armand Maurer, tr., 4th rev. ed., (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), q. 6, a. 1.

\(^{13}\) \(\alpha \pi\omicron\iota\nu\upsilon\theta\lambda\eta\nu\): unqualified matter.
because of dryness and heaviness, which are forms. Thus nothing is said to be because of matter, but because of its proper form.

But the divine substance is a form without matter, and therefore one. And it is what it is. For other things are not what they are. For each thing has its being from the [things] of which it is [made up] (that is, from its parts) and is “this and that” (that is, its parts joined together), but not “this” or “that” taken singly. For example, since earthly man consists of soul and body, he is “body and soul”, not either the body or the soul alone. Therefore, he is not what he is. But what is not “this and that”, but is only “this”, is truly what it is. And it is most beautiful, and strongest, because it depends on nothing.

Therefore, that is truly one in which there is no number, in which there is nothing besides what it is. Neither can it be a subject. For it is a form, and forms cannot be subjects. When another form, like humanity, is a subject for accidents, it does not take on accidents insofar as it is, but insofar as matter is subjected to it. For, as long as matter, subject to humanity, takes on any accident, humanity itself appears to take it on. But a form that is without matter cannot be a subject, and cannot be in matter. For it would not be a form but an “image”. From the forms that are outside matter come the forms that are in matter and make a body. We misuse the others, which are in bodies, when we call them “forms” while they are images. For they are made like those that are not constituted in matter.

Therefore, in him there is no diversity, no plurality [arising] from diversity, no multitude from accidents, and so no number.

---

14 what they are: id quod sunt. One would have expected the plural pronoun ‘ea quae sunt’.
Fridugisus of Tours, *On the Being of Nothing and Shadows*


### On the Being of Nothing

Fridugisus the deacon, to all the faithful of God and of our most fair lord Charles,² gathered together at his sacred palace.

I diligently turned it over [in my mind] and considered the matter, and at last it seemed right to me to undertake the question about nothing, which has been bandied about by a great many people for a long time, but which they have abandoned without [seriously] discussing or examining it, as if it were impossible to explain. Breaking the powerful bonds in which it seemed to be tangled up, I have resolved [the question] and untied [the knot]. Dispersing the cloud, I have brought [the matter] back into the light, and have taken care that it be entrusted to the memory of posterity for all ages to come.

Now the question is as follows: Is nothing something or not?


² Fridugisus’ letter was sent to Charlemagne, who must have been very surprised to get it.
If one answers “It seems to me to be nothing”, his very denial, as he supposes it, compels him to say that something is nothing, since he says “It seems to me to be nothing”, which is as if he were to say, “It seems to me that nothing is something”. But if it seems to be something, it cannot appear not to be in any way at all. Hence, the only remaining alternative is that it seems to be something.

But if this is the answer given, “It seems to me to be nothing and not something”, this answer is to be countered first by reasoning, to the extent that human reason allows, and then by authority — not just any [authority], but only by divine [authority], which alone is [truly] an authority and [which] alone reaches unshakable certitude.

Let us proceed therefore by reason. Every finite name signifies something. For instance, ‘man’, ‘stone’, ‘wood’. As soon as these [words] are said, at the same time we understand the things they signify. Thus, the name ‘man’, uttered without any differentiating [word], designates the universality of men. ‘Stone’ and ‘wood’ include their generality in the same way. So, if ‘nothing’ is a name at all, as the grammarians claim [it is], it is a finite name. But every finite name signifies something. Now it is impossible that this finite something is not anything. It is impossible, therefore, that nothing, which is finite, is not anything. And in this way it can be proved that it exists.

Again, ‘nothing’ is a significative word. But every signifying is related to what it signifies. [Hence,] on these grounds too it is proved that nothing is unable not to be anything [at all].

Again, another [argument]. Every signifying is a signifying of that which is. But ‘nothing’ signifies something. Therefore, ‘nothing’-’s signifying is of that which is — that is, of an existing thing.

Now because we have provided only a few points from reason to demonstrate that nothing is not only something but even something great, although nevertheless countless such examples could be brought into the discussion, we wish to turn [now] to divine authority, which is the safeguard and fixed foundation of reason.

For indeed the whole divinely instructed Church, which arose from the side of Christ, was raised on the food of his most sacred flesh and the drink of his precious blood, [and] was educated from the cradle in the mysteries of secret things, confesses that it holds with unshakable faith that the divine power produced earth, water, air and fire, along with light and the angels and man’s soul, out of “nothing”.

The edge of the mind, therefore, must be lifted up to the authority of so great a summit, which no reason [can] shake, no arguments [can] refute, no powers can oppose.

---

3 The second clause in this formulation is intended to prevent the kind of objection raised to the first answer, in the preceding paragraph. In other words, I take both of these answers to be on the negative side of the question. I therefore agree with Corvino (p. 281, n. 8), and disagree with Gennaro (pp. 124–125, note m), on the proper way to read the first answer.
For this is [the authority] that declares that the things first and foremost among creatures are produced out of nothing. Therefore, nothing is a great and distinguished something. It cannot be assessed how great is that from which so many and so distinguished things come, since not one of the things generated from it can be assessed for what it is worth or be defined.

For who has measured the nature of the elements in detail? Who has grasped the being and nature of light, of angelic nature, or of the soul?

Therefore, if we are unable to comprehend by human reason these things I [just] mentioned, how shall we [ever] reach [the knowledge of] how great and what kind of thing it is from which they draw their origin and their genus?

I could have added a great many other things. But we think that, from the points [above], enough has [already] penetrated into the breasts of whoever can be taught.

On the Being of Shadows

Since I have appropriately put an end [to the previous discussion] after saying the [few] brief things [above], I have next turned [my] attention to [other] matters that must be explained, [matters] that have not undeservedly seemed to inquisitive readers [to be] worth asking about.

There is the opinion, then, among some people that shadows do not exist, and that it is impossible that they exist. How easily this [opinion] can be refuted, the prudent reader will recognize from the authority of Sacred Scripture, once it has been brought into the discussion.

So let us see what the story in the book of Genesis thinks about this.

It says, “And the shadows were over the face of the deep” (Gen. 1:2).

If they did not exist, by what inference is it said that they “were” [over the face of the deep]? He who says that shadows “are”, by affirming a thing, posits [it]; but he who [says they] “are not”, by denying the thing, takes [it] away. For example, when we say “Man is” we affirm a thing — namely, man. When we say “Man is not”, by denying the thing — namely, man — we take [it] away. For a substantial verb\(^4\) has it in its nature that, whatever subject it is joined to without a negation, it makes known the being of that subject. Therefore, in saying ‘were’ in the quotation “the shadows were over the face of the deep”, a thing is affirmed that no negation separates or divides from being.

\(^4\) A “substantial verb” is a form of the verb ‘to be’ when not used as a copula — that is, when it means “to exist”. Other verbs, which can be resolved into a copula plus a participle (e. g., runs = is + running), are called “adjectival verbs”. The exact metaphysical importance of this distinction is of course subject to discussion. But the terminology itself was standard.
Again, ‘shadows’ is the subject, [and] ‘were’ makes [it] known. For it makes [it] known by declaring that shadows in some way are.

Observe how invincible authority, accompanied by reason, together with reason acknowledging authority, declare the same thing, namely, that shadows exist.

But, although the above points, given for the sake of example, are enough to demonstrate what we claimed, nevertheless in order that there remain no opportunity for enemies to contradict [us], let us bring out into the open a few [other] passages from Scripture, gathering [them] from among the many [possible], [so that,] shaken by the fear of them, [such people] will not dare to hurl their ridiculous words against them any more.

When the Lord punished Egypt with terrible plagues because of [its] oppressing the people of Israel, he enveloped it with shadows so thick they could be felt. Not only did they deprive men’s sight of [its] objects, but because of their density, they could even be touched by the hands. Now whatever can be touched and felt must be. Whatever must be, it is impossible for it not to be. And so it is impossible for shadows not to be because it is necessary for [them] to be, as is proved from the fact that it\(^5\) can be felt.

Moreover, the fact is not to be ignored that when the Lord made the division into light and shadows, he called the light “day” and the shadows “night” (Gen. 1:5). For if the name ‘day’ signifies something, the name ‘night’ cannot help but signify something. Now ‘day’ signifies the light, and light is a great something. For the day both is and is something great. What then? Do shadows signify nothing when the name ‘night’ is imposed on them by the same maker who imposed the title ‘day’ on the light?\(^6\) Is divine authority to be shaken [in this way]? No indeed! It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for divine authority to be moved from its station.

The creator stamped names on the things he made, so that each thing would be known when it is called by its name. Neither did he form any thing without its [corresponding] word, nor did he establish any word unless that for which it was established existed. If it were the case [that God had established a word with no corresponding thing, the word] would seem entirely superfluous. And it is wicked to say God has done that. But if it is wicked to say God has established something superfluous, [then] the name God imposed on the shadows cannot appear in any way to be superfluous. But if it is not superfluous, [then] it is in accordance with [some] method. And if it [is] in accordance with a method, it [is] also necessary, since it is needed in order to distinguish the thing signified by it. And so it is certain that God has

\(^5\)The text has the singular here, presumably referring to ‘whatever can be touched and felt’ two sentences earlier. One would have expected a plural, agreeing with ‘shadows’.

\(^6\)There seems to be some confusion here about what is signifying what. The point would be clearer, and the parallel with the fact that ‘day’ signifies the light would be stronger, if the text read: “Are shadows nothing when the name ‘night’ is imposed on them by the same creator . . .”. 
established things and names, which are necessary for one another, in accordance with a method.

And the holy prophet David, filled with the Holy Spirit and knowing that ‘shadows’ does not mean something empty and like a wind, plainly expresses [the fact that] they are something. Thus he says, “He sent shadows” (Psalms 104:28). If they do not exist, how are they sent? What is can be sent, and can be sent to where it is not. But what is not cannot be sent anywhere, since it is nowhere. Therefore, the shadows are said to have been sent because they were.

Again, the passage: “He put the shadows as his hiding place” (Psalms 17:12). Of course he put what existed, and he put [it] a certain way, so that he put the shadows, which were his hiding place.\(^7\)

Again, another [passage]: “Like his shadows” (Psalms 138:12). Here it is indicated that they are in [his] possession, and therefore it is made plain that they exist.

For everything that is possessed exists. But the shadows are in [his] possession. Therefore, they exist.

Although these passages are enough, as many and as great as they are, and offer a secure fortress against all attacks, so that with an easy rebuff they can turn missiles back on those who threw them, nevertheless certain passages from the steadfastness of the Gospel should be required [too].

Therefore, let us set down the words of the Savior himself. “The children of the kingdom,” he says, “will be cast forth into the shadows outside” (Matt. 8:12). Now observe that he calls the shadows “outside”. For ‘out’ (extra), from which ‘outside’ (exterius) is derived, signifies a place. Therefore, when he says “outside”, he is indicating that shadows have locations. There would not be shadows “outside” unless there were also [others] “inside”. Now whatever is outside must be in a place; what does not exist is nowhere. Therefore, the shadows outside not only exist but also have locations.

Also, in the Lord’s passion the evangelist declares that shadows were made from the sixth hour of the day until the ninth hour. Since they were made, how can they be said not to exist? What has been made cannot be caused not to have been made; rather what does not always exist, and is never made, never exists. But shadows are made. Hence it cannot be brought about that they do not exist.\(^8\)

Again, another [passage]: “If the light that is in you is shadows, how great those shadows will be!” (Matt. 6:23). I believe no one doubts that quantity is attributed to bodies, which are divided [from one another] by quantity. And quantity is accidental to bodies. But accidents are either in a subject or predicated of a subject. Therefore, in

---

\(^7\) The general point of the paragraph is clear enough, but I find the exact sense a little shaky.

\(^8\) Presumably this is not supposed to mean that things that are made cannot be destroyed, but only that what is made exists, and nothing can change that fact.
the quotation ‘how great those shadows will be’, quantity is shown to be in a subject.\textsuperscript{9} Hence it is inferred, by a persuasive argument, that shadows not only exist, they are also corporeal.

And so I have taken the trouble to write to Your Dignity and Prudence these few points collected from reason and authority together, so that, adhering fast and immovably to them, no false opinion will be able to seduce you to stray from the path of truth.

But if perhaps something in disagreement with this reasoning of ours should be said by anyone, you will, by having recourse to this [letter] as if to a rule, be able to overthrow foolish contrivances on the basis of its statements.

The end.

\textsuperscript{9} As it stands, this is of course a blatant \textit{non sequitur}. But the words ‘or at least predicated of a subject’ could be added to the sentence without spoiling the point of the paragraph.
Behold, here it is plainly pointed out that we have men as fathers of our flesh and God as father of our spirits, so that the flesh alone comes from man, but a new spirit is given by God in a new flesh. Following the [Scriptural passages cited earlier], a very difficult question arises. For if I have the body alone from Adam, and the soul not from Adam but from God, then since sin is only in the soul and not in the body, how am I said to have sinned in Adam? Adam sinned, and the sin was in his soul alone, and not in the body. But my soul, where the sin is, I do not have from him. How [then] am I said to have sinned in him? When he sinned in [the body], my body was then in that [body], [and] I was rightly said to have sinned in him — if the sin was in the body. But now that sin is in the soul alone, how am I said to have sinned when he sinned, if my soul was not in him at all?

**On Genera and Species and Individuals**

To this question the orthodox give the following reply, and say that individuals are related to species otherwise than species are to genera. For species have more by substance than genera [do]. Neither does a genus suffice for a species’ substance, because by substance a species has a difference in addition to the genus, and the species is more by substance than the genus [is]. For man is more than animal, because man is rational and animal is not rational. On the other hand, individuals by substance have nothing more than species. Neither are they by substance other — [for instance,] Plato other than man. Now it is not something substantial that brings it about that there are several individuals under one species, but rather accidents. Therefore, it is

---

1 Inserting ‘corpore’ after ‘in’ in the edition.
possible for a solitary individual to be under a species, although a solitary species cannot be under a genus. For instance, taking away all individual men besides Peter, the species man has Peter alone as an individual. He is an individual because of the collection of his accidents, just as man is a species because it can be common to many individuals. For “phoenix”, although it does not have but one individual, is a species because it can be common to many. Phoenix is one thing, this phoenix is another. Phoenix is a specific nature which can be common. But this phoenix is a nature that is only individual. Neither can it be other than singular. Phoenix is bounded by genus and differences; this phoenix is distinguished by the peculiarity of its accidents. An individual cannot be said except of one. A species, even if it is said of only one, is universal; the individual, however, is only singular.

Reason grasps the species from genus and differences; sense knows the individual from the peculiarities of its accidents. The interior reasoning of the reason reaches to the universals, but exterior sensuous cognition to individuals. We sense individuals bodily; we perceive universals by reason. And when the species is said of a solitary individual, only then is it valid to attribute an accident both to the individual and to the species, although principally and in the first place accidents are in individuals.

That in Every Case the Individual is to Be Distinguished from the Species

Therefore, when man was first made, and the human soul was made first in one individual and then divided in another, the nature of that human soul was whole and entire in two persons. I say “entire” because it was never outside them, “whole” because nothing of the human soul was lacking to any person. Listen and distinguish [these] three things. There was the human soul, there was Adam’s soul, and there was Eve’s soul. The three are diverse. Adam’s soul is an individual, or if you prefer, a singular or a person, and is said of nothing. Likewise, Eve’s soul is an individual, or person, or a singular, and is said of nothing. The human soul is a specific nature, not individual but common, which is said of two persons and is divided in them. Distinguish these three things, and do not use only your sense in distinguishing them, but your reason [too]. For it is not by sense, but only by reason, that an individual is distinguished from a species….

That the Nature’s Guilt Is in the Person’s Guilt

Lo, each person sinned at the instigation of the serpent. Each one sinned, I say, while there were as yet none who had the substance [of those two] anywhere else but in them, and it was not yet anywhere else but there. If,

2 Reading ‘sive’ for the edition’s ‘sine’.
therefore, the person sinned, he did not sin without his substance. Therefore, the substance of the person is vitiated by sin, and the sin infects the substance, which is nowhere outside the sinning person. Now the substance is one and the same for either person, [and is] common to them and specific. Therefore, in the sinning persons the specific nature, which is nowhere but in them, is infected with sin. Therefore, in Adam’s soul and in Eve’s soul, which personally sinned, the whole nature of the human soul is infected with sin. That nature is a common substance and specific to each. For it has not yet come about that it is outside them. For if it had been divided in others, the whole would not have been infected on account of them alone, because if these had sinned, perhaps others would not have sinned, in whom the nature of the human soul would have been saved. But now where could the human soul be clean, which was everywhere a sinner?

How Human Nature Does Not Sin by Itself, But Through a Person

But perhaps someone will say: If the common nature, namely, the human soul, sinned in its persons, who can deny that the species sinned? But it is absurd to say this of the species itself, and to ascribe to universals what pertains only to persons. Moreover, universals are always what they are, and however you vary the individuals, the universals stand immutably. And although the mutability of individuals may truly be said of the universals, it is not truly in them. But we do not say that the species sinned by itself, but only through its persons….

That Human Nature Cannot Be Transmitted to Other Persons Without Guilt

And since the whole human soul is in Adam subject to sin, it cannot be transferred without sin to\(^3\) other persons. Neither can a human soul [now] be made without the vice of sin. It draws with it everywhere the vice, grown together with it, which it has within itself from the beginning….

\(^3\) Reading ‘ad’ for the edition’s ‘ab’.
I

From Dialectica, p. 541.24–37

Now, however, <when> it is said that the division of a genus is made through differences,¹ and differences are said to be put in the place of species,² it helps to ask carefully whether by the differences-names we mean the very forms of the species,³ or whether we rather understand these difference-words — which are said by some people to be taken in the role of species-names and to be used for designating species — in such a way that ‘rational’ is equivalent

¹ This refers to the traditional Aristotelian way to define a substance, by genus plus difference. For example, man is traditionally defined as a rational animal. Animal is the genus, and rational is the “difference”. It is what “differentiates” a man from other things within the same genus animal. The genus animal may then be said to be “divided” by its “differences” rational and irrational into man, on the one hand, and brute (or whatever you call it — there was no special term for this), on the other.

² The point of this will come out in the following lines.

³ In William’s of Champeaux’s terminology, this might be expressed: whether difference-words signify only the advening forms that constitute a species, and not the underlying material essence — that is, not the genus.
to ‘rational animal’, and ‘besouled’\(^4\) is equivalent to ‘besouled body’, so that in difference-words there is contained not only the signification of the form\(^5\) but also of the matter.\(^6\) Indeed, the latter view seemed [to be the one] to have the most influence on our master W.\(^7\) For, I recall, he wanted there to occur such an abuse of words that, when the difference-name would be inserted in place of a species in the division of a genus,\(^8\) [that difference name] would not be taken from the difference itself but \(<\text{would be}\>\) inserted as a substantival name of a species.\(^9\) Otherwise the division of a subject\(^10\) could be said to be into accidents,\(^11\) according to the view of him\(^12\) who wanted differences to inhere in the genus as accidents.

II

From the Logica ‘ingredientibus’, the “Glosses on the Categories”, p. 112.5–6

Now Boethius, in explaining the purpose of this book, calls these ten names the ‘first words’ signifying the primary genera of things.

\(^{4}\) That is, “animate”.

\(^{5}\) Understand: advening forms, as in William’s first theory.

\(^{6}\) Understand: the material essence.

\(^{7}\) That’s what the manuscript says: just “W”. Everyone presumes that this refers to William of Champeaux.

\(^{8}\) For example, if you say that animal is “divided” into “the rational ones” (men) and “the irrational ones” (brutes), instead of saying that it is divided by the differences rational and irrational into man and brute. Either way is a perfectly legitimate way to talk.

\(^{9}\) That is, if ‘rational’ means “the rational ones”, that is, the rational animals, as in the previous note, then in effect it just means “man”, the species.

\(^{10}\) That is, the genus.

\(^{11}\) And, William apparently reasoned, substance cannot be divided into accidents.

\(^{12}\) Apparently William of Champeaux.
Now because ‘signifying the primary genera of things’ is implicit in the statement of the purpose [of the book], he decides that these [primary] words must be understood to be the ten most general genera, namely, those that signify the natures of things as primary, that is, naturally prior in status to the others, as has already been said.

... Hence Plato calls [the images] incorporeal — that is, intangible by the bodily senses. Some people maintain they are in the first instance designated by words, which [opinion] Aristotle rejects entirely. For words were not set up because of the likenesses of things, or because of the likeness of the [act of] understanding, but rather because of the things themselves and the [acts of] understanding them, so that [the words] would effect a teaching about the natures of things, not about such figments, and would establish understandings of the things, not of the figments but only through the figments, when we establish them for the things that are absent, like certain intermediary signs of the things. Hence the words, by means of these [figments] we use like intermediary signs, establish understandings of things, not of [the figments] themselves, when the words turn the hearer’s mind to the likeness of the thing, so that in that [likeness] he attends not to it, but to the thing for which it is put.
Passages from the School of Chartres


I

Gilbert of Poitiers, *De trinitate*,¹ i, 1, 21 and 27–29, ed. cit., pp. 76–77.²

(21) Again, ‘the same’ is said by species. For instance, Cato is the same as Cicero because there is the same species for Cato and Cicero, namely, man. For diverse subsistences, which are one species, make them substantially alike. By one of these subsistences Cato [is a man], and by another Cicero is a man.

(27) Many subsistents are also called “one” and “the same”, not by a singularity of one nature, but rather by the union of many [natures] which comes about by reason of their likeness. For by this [kind of union] several men [are said to be] “one” or “the same” man, and several animals “one” or “the same” animal.

(28) He who thinks about something diverse from a “this one” must not only compare what is opposite [to it] by essence but also [what is opposite to it] by unlikeness, and oppose [them] by means of [the latter] comparison — for instance, horse to man and stone to animal. These [things] are said [to be]

---

¹ That is, his commentary on Boethius’ *De trinitate*.

² Gilbert is commenting on the second paragraph of passage ii in “Boethius, Two Texts from His Theological Tractates”, p. 51 above.)
“diverse” by species or genus. Others like them, which the con-formity of diverse natures unites, are called “one” by genus or species.

(29) In this unity, which the uniting produces, there is always a number not only of subsistents but also of subsistences. For just as things [are] not diverse unless [they are diverse] by number [at least], so [too] only things that are diverse according to number can be con-formed. For Cato would not be a man in the manner Cicero is unless their subsistences, by which each one is a something, were also diverse in number. The numerical diversity of their subsistences makes [the men] be diverse in number.

II

Gilbert, *De trinitate*, i, 5, 24, ed. cit., p. 144.4

(24) Often, however, singulars [that are] diverse in number are [nevertheless] con-formed with respect to some of the things by which they are. And so not only the things that are, but also the things by which they are con-formed, are one “dividual”.5 Therefore, none of the things by which the things that are are con-formed is an “individual”. For if likeness makes a “dividual”, unlikeness makes an “individual”.

III


(12) Certainly Socrates, Plato and Cicero are men by the same humanity. And yet since Socrates is a man and Plato is a man and Cicero is a man, there is no doubt that there are three men. And no wonder, because although they are men by the same humanity, nevertheless a plurality of men slips in among them because of the variety of their accidents….

(13) But because we just said that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are men out of the same humanity, nevertheless because certain famous doctors have

3 I have hyphenated the word in order to bring out the sense Gilbert intends: “having a form together with”.

4 Gilbert is commenting on Boethius’ discussion of the Aristotelian category of relation.

5 “dividual”: *dividuum* — that is, not an *individuum* = “individual”. Get it?

6 Clarenbald is commenting on the first paragraph of passage 11 in “Boethius, Two Texts from His Theological Tractates”, p. 51 above.)
spread it about that single men are men by singular humanities, even though it
does not contribute much to the explanation of the present tract, we have
considered it worth the trouble to show that it is one and the same humanity by
which single men are men. This will be clear as follows: Every most specific
species is the whole substantial being of all its individuals. No one disagrees
with this truth except one who, by an impudent obstinacy, contradicts the
authorities [both] of the doctors of logic and of logical arguments. Now
humanity is the same species as man is. Those who attribute singular
humanities to single men agree with us in this. If, therefore, the species man is
not but one, so too the species humanity is not but one.

(14) But here someone will object as follows: Although man is not but
one species, nevertheless there are many men under that species. Therefore,
since [a] man and [a] humanity are the same species, there are many
humanities under the species man. To this objection we reply as follows: For
ages, it has never been heard that individuals confer substantial being on some
thing. The substantial [things] rather are genus, species, difference, and
definition. But if humanity is a most specific species, then no instance of it in
the categorial order can be a species.

(15) Therefore, no singular humanity confers being men on Socrates,
Plato, or Cicero. There is no [singular humanity].

---

7 That is, Boethius’ De trinitate.

8 The objection gets its plausibility from the lack of an indefinite article in Latin, and
trades on an ambiguity between a man and man as a species.

9 “being men” = homines esse. Note that this is the same grammatical construction
Abelard uses for his status.
Five Passages from Avicenna, on Common Nature

From the Latin text in Avicenna, *Opera*, Dominic Gundissalinus, tr., (Venice: Bonetus Locatellus for Octavianus Scotus, 1508), and — for the last three passages — from the Latin text in *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, S. Van Riet, ed., 2 vols., (Louvain: E. Peeters, and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977, 1980). For these last three passages, I have also given the folio reference to the 1508 edition.

I

10 *Logica*, iii, fol. 12ra

Animal is in itself a certain something, and it is the same whether it is sensible or is understood in the soul. But in itself it is neither universal nor is it singular. For if it were universal in itself, so that animality from the fact that it is animality would be universal, it would be necessary that no animal be singular. Rather, every animal would be universal. If, on the other hand, animal from the fact that it is animal were singular, it would be impossible for there to be more than one singular, namely, the very singular to which animality is due. And it would be impossible for another singular to be an animal.

II


Now animal in itself is a certain something, understood in the mind that it be animal. And according as it is understood to be animal, it is nothing but animal only. If, on the other hand, beyond this it is understood to be universal or singular, or anything else, then beyond this, namely, that which is animal, there is understood a certain something that happens to animality.
III

Metaphysica, v, 1, Van Riet, ed., ii, p. 228.31–36; 1508 ed., fol. 86va

Horsehood, to be sure, has a definition that does not demand universality. Rather it is that to which universality happens. Hence horsehood itself is nothing but horsehood only. For in itself it is neither many nor one, neither is it existent in these sensibles nor in the soul, neither is it any of these things potentially or actually in such a way that this is contained under the definition of horsehood. Rather [in itself it consists] of what is horsehood only.

IV

Ibid., Van Riet, ed., ii, p. 231.74–81; 1508 ed., fol. 86vb

Hence, if someone should ask whether the humanity that is in Plato, insofar as it is humanity, is other than that which is in Socrates, and we say no, as we must, we will not have to agree with him when he says, “Therefore, this one and that one are the same in number”, because the negation was absolute and we understood in it that that humanity, insofar as it is humanity, is humanity only. But insofar as it is other than the humanity that is in Socrates, that is something extraneous. On the other hand, he did not ask about humanity except insofar as it is humanity.

V

Ibid., Van Riet ed., ii, pp. 233.36–234.44; 1508 ed., fol. 87ra

Now animal can be considered by itself, although it is together with what is other than it. For its essence is together with what is other than itself. Therefore, its essence belongs to it by itself, but its being together with what is other than it is something that happens to it, or something that accompanies its nature, like this animality, or humanity. Therefore, this consideration, [“insofar as it is animal”,] precedes in being both the animal that is this individual because of its accidents, and also the universal that is in these sensibles and is intelligible, as the simple precedes the composite, and as a part the whole. For from this being there is neither genus nor species nor individual, neither one nor many. Rather from this being there is animal only, and man only.
[PORPHYRY’S TEXT]

[1] …ABSTAINING FROM THE HIGHER QUESTIONS, BUT INTERPRETING THE SIMPLER ONES STRAIGHTFORWARDLY. NOW I SHALL BEG OFF SAYING [ANYTHING] ABOUT THE [QUESTION] WHETHER GENERA AND SPECIES SUBsist OR ARE PLACED IN SOLE, BARE AND PURE\(^2\) UNDERSTANDINGS, OR WHETHER, SUBsisting, THEY ARE CORPOREAL OR INCORPOREAL, AND WHETHER THEY ARE SEPARATED FROM SENSIBLES OR PLACED IN THOSE VERY SENSIBLES AND STAND IN CONNECTION WITH THEM. FOR THAT BELONGS TO A VERY EXALTED BUSINESS, AND REQUIRES A GREATER INVESTIGATION. BUT I SHALL NOW TRY TO SHOW YOU HOW THE ANCIENTS, AND THE PERIPATETICS AMONG THEM MOST OF ALL, PLAUSIBLY TREATED THESE [THINGS]\(^3\) AND THE [OTHERS] BEFORE US.\(^4\)

\(^1\) I have also consulted the manuscript copy in Vienna, Dominikanerkloster 14/14, fols. 40–46, which omits the beginning of the text as translated below, and begins with para. [16]. Although Burley’s “On Universals” is still a long way from being critically edited, I have in some cases adopted the readings in the manuscript. All such cases are identified in the notes. Burley’s references are sometimes quite free; I have identified them where I could, but some of them I have been unable to locate. Square brackets mark my own insertions for the sake of clarity; they do not indicate an emendation unless otherwise noted. I would like to thank Mr. Charles Bolyard for help with this text.

\(^2\) and pure: Reading ‘purisque’ for ‘plurisque’ in the ed. 3\(^{rd}\)62. In the Indiana University copy, the word has been corrected by hand.

\(^3\) these things: That is, genus and species, the topics of the three questions above. Porphyry has just stated that he is not going to try to answer those three questions.

\(^4\) That is, difference, property and accident, the remaining three predicables. The text comes from Porphyry, Isagoge, in Adolf Busse, ed., Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, (“Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,” vol. 4, pt. 1; Berlin: George Reimer, 1887), p.
The questions irrelevant to this science, which he eliminates from his consideration, are four. (1) First, whether universals are (1a) subsistents outside the soul or (1b) in the understanding only.

Then the second question follows. It has three parts: For assuming (1b) that universals are in the understanding only, then there is the question whether universals are (2a) in sole understandings, or (2b) in bare understandings, or (2c) in pure understandings.

He understands by these three [terms] three operations of the understanding. For by ‘sole understanding’ he understands an operation of the understanding to which there corresponds nothing in reality. Thus, the operation of the understanding by which a chimera is understood is called a “sole understanding”. And he understands by ‘bare understanding’ an operation of the understanding by which matter is apprehended when form is not apprehended. By ‘pure understanding’ [he understands] an operation of the understanding by which a form is apprehended when matter is not apprehended. Assuming that universals have [their] being through the sole operation of the understanding,5 there is a question (2a) whether they are in the sole operation of the understanding in such a way that nothing corresponds to them in reality, or (2b) [whether] they are in the operation of the understanding after the fashion of matter apprehended without form, or (2c) [whether] they are in the operation of the understanding like a form apprehended without matter — that is, whether it is apprehended like matter or like form.

Yet some [people] do not understand by ‘understanding’ the operations of the understanding, but rather the substance of the understanding. In that case, by ‘sole understanding’ they understand the divine understanding, which [is the] sole [thing that] is called an understanding primarily and principally. It is “sole”, because it is unique. There neither is nor can be any other equal to it. By ‘pure understanding’ they understand an angelic understanding, which is pure, without [any] union with a body as if it were the form of a body. By ‘bare understanding’ they understand the human

---

5 sole operation of the understanding: *solam operationem intellectus* (ed. 3° 19–20). But since ‘sole’ has just been defined in a technical sense, perhaps the phrase is a mistake for ‘operation of the understanding only’ (*per operationem intellectus tantum*). See the statement of question (1), in paragraph [2] above.
understanding, which in the beginning is like a blank and bare slate\(^6\) on which nothing is drawn, according to the Philosopher, *On the Soul*, III.\(^7\) Hence the human understanding, taken by itself, is bare and denuded of every material form and of every species of a material thing.

[6] Assuming (1a) that universals are existents outside the soul, there are two questions:

[7] (3) The first [question], and [this] is the third in order: If universals are outside the soul, whether universals are corporeal or incorporeal. That is, whether they are extended, like a body, or unextended.

[8] (4) The other question, and it is the fourth in order, is: Assuming that universals are incorporeal, whether universals are separated from singulars or sensibles, or placed in the sensibles themselves.

[9] The author says he wants to abstain from these questions that arise, because they do not pertain to the logician but rather to the metaphysician. And he says that in this work he wants to pursue the plausible statements of the ancients about these universals, insofar as they are relevant to the logician. And he says he wants to pursue the Peripatetics’ statements in this work more than [those] of other ancients.

[The usefulness of the *Isagoge*]

[10] Here a doubt arises, how the knowledge of the five universals\(^8\) is useful for the above four [tasks],\(^9\) namely, (a) for the science handed down in the book *Categories*, (b) for assigning definitions, and (c) for making divisions and (d) demonstrations.

[11] [To (a)] You should know that the science of the five universals is useful for knowing the ten categories. For in every category there are genera and species and differences. Therefore, the knowledge of those three is useful for the knowledge of the ten categories.

[12] Likewise, all [the things] in the nine categories other than substance are accidents. And among accidents, one kind is common and another is proper. Therefore, for knowing the nine categories that are accidents, the knowledge both of common and of proper accident is useful. So it is clear that the knowledge of those five universals is useful for the science that is in the ten categories.

\(^6\) blank and bare slate: *tabula rasa et nuda*.

\(^7\) Probably Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 429a18–25, although Aristotle does not explicitly use the phrase there.

\(^8\) That is, the five “predicables” discussed in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*.

\(^9\) four tasks: Tasks discussed earlier in Burley’s commentary on Porphyry.
[13] [To (b)] It is useful for assigning definitions. For only species is defined. And every definition consists of genus and difference. Accident or property should not be included in a definition in the absolute sense. Therefore, the knowledge of these five universals is useful for assigning definitions. For the knowledge of the species is useful, since it alone is defined. The knowledge of the genus and difference is useful, since genus and difference are included in the definition. The knowledge of property and accident is useful, not insofar as they are included in a definition but rather insofar as they are eliminated from a definition.

[14] [To (c)] The knowledge of the five universals is also useful for making divisions. For sometimes the division of a genus into species is made by essential differences, and sometimes by accidental differences. An accidental difference is of two kinds: One kind is common, another is proper. Therefore, for making both essential and accidental divisions, the knowledge of those five universals is useful.

[15] [To (d)] It is also very useful for the art of demonstrating. For by a demonstration a property is concluded of the species of which it is a property through the definition of the species, as through a middle term. And the definition consists of genus and difference. Therefore, the knowledge of those four (namely, genus, species, property and difference) is useful for the art of demonstrating. And because common accident does not enter into demonstration, therefore the knowledge of accident is useful for the art of demonstrating, insofar as it is eliminated from a demonstration.

[Doubts about universals] 11

[16] There are doubts concerning universals, and not a few of them either. 12

10 they are included: Reading ‘ponantur’ for ‘ponatur’ in the ed. 3965.

11 The text in the MS begins here (40').

12 The discussion in the remainder of the treatise will be clearer if you notice the structure of the five questions listed here (numbers in square brackets are paragraph numbers to the translation):

(I) Do universals exist in reality or not? [22]
   (Ia) Yes. [22]
   (II) Separate from singulars or in them? [25]
      (IIa) In them. [26]
      (III) Distinct from individuals or the same? [33]
         (IIIa) The same. [33]
         (IIIb) Distinct. [51]
      (IIb) Separate. [111]
      (IV) In the understanding or outside?
         (IVA) In the understanding.
         (IVB) Outside.
      (V) In God or existing in themselves? [111]
         (VA) Existing in themselves. (Plato’s theory.) [111]
         (VB) In God. (Augustine’s theory.) [130]
   (Ib) No. (The fictum-theory.) [170]
(I) The first is: Whether universals exist in reality or not.

(II) Secondly, assuming that they do exist in reality, the second doubt is: Whether they have a being separate from singulars or exist in their singulars.

(III) The third doubt: Whether entirely the same thing is in singulars, or diverse [things].

(IV) Assuming that they are separated from singulars, there is a fourth doubt: Whether they are in the understanding or outside the understanding.

(V) Assuming that they are outside the understanding, there is a fifth doubt: Whether they exist in God, as [those maintain who] posit ideas in the divine mind representing the species of created things, or do they exist by themselves outside the divine mind.

**[Discussion of Doubt I]**

In solving the first doubt — namely, whether universals exist in reality or not — almost everyone grants the statement that science is about universals. Now about the subject of a science, one should know that it is, since there is no science about a non-being, as is said in *Posterior Analytics*, I. Therefore, universals have to have being in reality.

Again, universals — that is, genera and species — are in a category, since in every category there is a most general genus and a most specific species and

The discussion is complicated, however, by the following factors:

(a) Question (III) is asked in the form “Whether entirely the same thing is in singulars, or diverse things?” That is, is there one humanity common to Socrates and Plato, or does Socrates have his own humanity and Plato a distinct humanity of his own? But, although the question is asked in this form, it is discussed in a different form: Is the universal distinct from its individuals or the same as them? The connection between these two formulations seems to be as follows: If one humanity is common to Socrates and Plato, then presumably that one humanity cannot be the same as those two numerically distinct individuals. (Note that the converse connection is weaker. If Socrates and Plato each has his own distinct humanity, it need not follow that Socrates is identical with his humanity and Plato with his.)

(b) Question (IV), although announced in the list of questions here, is never explicitly discussed at all.

13 Reading ‘sicut’ with the MS 40°7 for ‘ut’ in the ed. 3°b19.

14 See paragraph [17] above.

15 that it is, since: Reading ‘quia est, quoniam’ with the MS (40’11) for ‘quid est’ (ed. 3°b24–25).


17 that is: Reading ‘videlicet’ with the MS 40’12 for ‘ut’ in ed. 3°b27.
intermediate genera that are genera and species with respect to different [things], as is clear from Porphyry.\textsuperscript{18} But everything in a real category is a real being. Therefore, genera and species, taking them not for simple things but for what they denominate, are real too.

\textbf{[24]} But there is another opinion, which maintains that no universal by predication exists in reality, but only\textsuperscript{19} has being according to the understanding. This opinion will be discussed at the end.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{[Discussion of Doubt II]}

\textbf{[25]} There are [various] opinions on the second doubt.\textsuperscript{21} For some say that universals are in singulars, and some say that they are outside singulars.

\textbf{[26]} Those who say that universals are in [their] singulars have authorities in their favor:

\textbf{[27]} (1) First, because Aristotle says in the \textit{Categories} that second substances are in first [substances].\textsuperscript{22} But second substances are universals and first substances are singulars. Therefore, universals are in their singulars.

\textbf{[28]} (2) And Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, I, says that universals are everywhere and always.\textsuperscript{23} The Lincolnite\textsuperscript{24} explains the first part [of this] as follows: Universals are everywhere, that is, universals are in each of their places. For the places of universals are singulars, as he says. Hence a universal is everywhere, that is, a universal is in each of its singulars. So it is clear that a universal has being in its singulars.

\textbf{[29]} There are two [arguments from] reason in favor of affirming this opinion:

\textbf{[30]} (1) The first is that a quiddity is not separated from that of which it is the quiddity. For a quiddity is the same as that of which it is the quiddity, as is clear from


\textsuperscript{19}Following the MS 40\textsuperscript{vii}7 and omitting the extra ‘\textit{quod}’ found in the ed. 3\textsuperscript{vb}35.

\textsuperscript{20}See below, paragraphs [170]–[188].

\textsuperscript{21}See paragraph [18] above.

\textsuperscript{22}No he doesn’t. On the contrary, Aristotle there says secondary substances are “predicated of” first substances but not “present in” them. See \textit{Categories} 5, 3\textsuperscript{v}7–21.

\textsuperscript{23}Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, I, 31, 87\textsuperscript{b}32–33.

Metaphysics, VII. And [what is] the same cannot be separated from itself. But the universal is the quiddity of a singular. Therefore, etc.

[31] The minor [premise] of this reasoning is argued: For the universal is predicated in quid of its singular, as is clear through Porphyry, who defines the species as follows, “Species is what is predicated,” etc. And whatever is predicated in quid of something is its quiddity. Therefore, etc.

[32] (2) Again, the part is not separated from the whole of which it is a part. But [what is] per se superior is a part of [what is] per se inferior to it, as is clear from Metaphysics, VII. But a universal is per se superior to [its] singular. Therefore, the universal is a part of its singular. Consequently, a universal is not separated from its singulars.

[Discussion of Doubt III]

[The Theory that Universals Are the Same as Their Individuals]

[33] Assuming this, some people say to the third doubt that the universal is the same thing as its singular, and differs [from it] only according to concept. For the same thing while it is under singular and material conditions is a singular, and while it is abstracted by the understanding from [its] singular conditions is a universal. And so while it is understood under a common concept, it is a universal. This is what Boethius says on Porphyry, that [the thing] is a singular while it is sensed, but a universal while it is understood.

[34] Hence, [these people] say that man and animal are entirely the same things, yet they differ by reason or concept. For the concept of Socrates insofar as he is

---

25 Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 6, 1031a15–1032a11 (that is, the whole chapter).

26 Reading ‘separari’ with the MS 4028 for ‘separarari’ in the ed. 3vb53, an obvious printing error.


28 The reference is probably to Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 10, 1034b20–1036a25.

29 That is, that universals are in their singulars.

30 the third: Reading ‘tertiam’ with the MS 4033, instead of ‘istam’ with the ed. 3vb63. The reading in the edition would imply that we were still talking about the second doubt.

31 See paragraph [19] above.

Socrates is one [concept], and the concept of Socrates insofar as he is a man is another, and the concept of Socrates insofar as he is an animal is [yet] another.

[35] But it is argued against this opinion:

170

[36] (1) The singular is not defined, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics*, VII. But a species is defined. Therefore, the species is another thing than the singular.

175

[37] If it is said that the singular is not defined under a singular concept but rather under a universal concept, and the same [thing] is defined under one concept and not defined under another concept, [then] to the contrary: A definition is convertible with the defined, as is clear from *Topics*, I, and *Posterior Analytics*, II. But the definition of man is not converted with any singular man. For Socrates and mortal rational animal are not converted, because if they were convertibles, then ‘Every mortal rational animal is Socrates’ would be true. For a convertible is predicated of [its] convertibles. But this [proposition] is false. Therefore, no singular or individual man is defined by the definition ‘mortal and rational animal’.

180

[38] Suppose it is said: “I grant that no singular is defined under its own concept. Yet the singular is quite well defined under a common concept.” Then, to the contrary: If this were true, then Socrates under a common concept is converted with the definition ‘mortal rational animal’. Consequently, ‘Every mortal rational animal is Socrates under a common concept’ would be true, because [in it] a convertible is predicated of [its] convertible. But it is false, because it follows: “Every mortal rational animal is Socrates under a common concept; Plato is a mortal rational animal; therefore, Plato is Socrates under a common concept.”

185

[39] Suppose it is said that the singular is not defined, but a name common to all singulars of the same species is defined, and the same name is convertible with [what is] defined. But, to the contrary: Every name and every concept is an accident. But, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics*, VII, no accident has a simple definition. Rather, only substance is defined by a definition simply so called.


34 Ed. 4a9. The MS 40'42 has “Topics, I and VI”. See Aristotle, *Topics*, I, 8, 103b7–10, and also VI, I, 139a31–32.

35 Perhaps this is a very diffuse reference to Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, II, 13, 96b20–97a39.

36 because [in it] … animal: Reading ‘quia praedicatur convertible de convertibili. Haec autem est falsa, quia sequitur: ‘Omne animal rationale mortale est Sortes sub conceptu communi. Plato (MS 40'1) est animal rationale et mortale.’ with the MS 40'50–1. The ed. omits the passage, 4b20.

37 Reading ‘Plato est Sortes’ with the MS 40'1 for ‘Sortes esset Plato’ in the ed. 4b20–21.

Therefore, I take a substance — say, the substance of man — that is defined by a definition simply so called. Now that substance cannot be a singular substance, like Socrates and Plato. For no singular substance is convertible with the definition ‘mortal and rational animal’, as was proven [above],\(^{39}\) [and] therefore a singular substance is not defined [by that definition].

Again,\(^{40}\) no accident is predicated \textit{in quid} of substance, as is clear in the book \textit{Categories}.\(^{41}\) But what is defined by the definition ‘mortal rational animal’ is predicated of Socrates and Plato \textit{in quid}. Therefore, what is defined by the definition ‘mortal and rational animal’ is not an accident. Consequently, it is neither a name nor a concept.

Likewise, suppose it is said, alternatively, that the definition and the \textit{name} of the defined are converted, but the defined itself and its definition are not converted. Hence the singular is defined, and a name common to all singulars of the same species is converted with the definition. To the contrary: One utterance is not converted with another utterance. Hence, when it is said that the name of the defined is converted with the definition, and that the defined itself is not converted with it — that is to make impossible statements.

(2) Again, what is converted with the definition [is that] of which an attribute is demonstrated in the strongest [kind of] demonstration. For in the strongest [kind of] demonstration, the extremes and the middle [term] are convertible, as is clear from \textit{Posterior Analytics}, I.\(^{42}\) But the attribute in the strongest [kind of] demonstration is not demonstrated of any singular. For, according to the Philosopher, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, I,\(^{43}\) it is a mistake to affirm\(^{44}\) that the attribute of the species inheres primarily in any singular. Therefore, since the attribute is demonstrated of some thing, and it is not demonstrated of any singular, there has to be some thing (where “thing” is

\(^{39}\) See paragraph [37] above.

\(^{40}\) Again: Reading ‘\textit{Item}’ with the MS 40’8, for ‘\textit{ergo}’ in the ed. 4”32.

\(^{41}\) See, for instance, Aristotle, \textit{Categories}, 2, 1’23–29.

\(^{42}\) the strongest [kind of] demonstration = \textit{demonstratio potissima}. This is an expression often found in the mediaeval literature on demonstration, and refers to a notion genuinely found in Aristotle’s \textit{Posterior Analytics} (see, for instance, I, 14, 79’17–32) but not clearly explained or developed there. For a fairly good discussion, see Damascene Webering, \textit{Theory of Demonstration According to William Ockham}, (“Franciscan Institute Publications”, Philosophy Series No. 10; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1953), pp. 14–20. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, \textit{William Ockham}, 2 vols., (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987; rev. ed., 1989), at vol. 1, pp. 447–449. Note that both these sources focus primarily on Ockham’s interpretation, not Burley’s.


\(^{44}\) affirm: Reading ‘\textit{affirmare}’ with the MS 40’19, for ‘assignare’ with the ed. 4”49.
contrasted with “sign”), other than a singular thing, of which the attribute is demonstrated. And that thing is convertible with the definition.

[43] This reasoning is confirmed, because sciences and demonstrations are about entirely the same subject. For science is acquired through demonstration, by demonstrating the attribute of the subject the science is about. But a real science — like metaphysics and natural physics — is not about names. Therefore, demonstrations in the real sciences are about things. But demonstrations are not made about singular things, as is clear from the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics,45 I.46 Therefore, the things about which demonstrations are made are things other than singulars. Consequently, the singular and the universal are not the same thing.

[44] If it is said that demonstration is about the singular thing under a common concept, [then] to the contrary: The extremes in the strongest [kind of] demonstration are converted with the middle [term]. Therefore, a singular under a common concept is converted with the definition, which was disproved above.47

[45] (3) Again, about the subject of a science, it should be known what it is and that it is, according to the Philosopher, Posterior Analytics, I.48 But natural science is about substance or about mobile body, as about [its] subject. I ask then whether the mobile body that is the subject in natural philosophy is a singular thing or a thing other than a singular. If the latter is granted, the point is established, namely, that the universal the science is about is a thing other than a singular. If it is granted that it is the same as the singular thing, then some singular mobile body is the subject in natural philosophy. And, by the same reasoning, every other [one will be too]. Therefore, every peasant in India49 would be the subject in natural philosophy. Consequently, one could not have natural scientific knowledge unless he knew of every peasant that he exists, which is a big problem. The inference is clear. For it is necessary for one having scientific knowledge of a subject to know what it is and that it is.

---

45 Posterior Analytics: Reading ‘Posteriorum’ with the MS 40’27, for ‘Physicorum’ in the ed. 4°61.


47 See paragraphs [37]–[38] above.

48 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 71a11–16. See Walter Burley in: Robert Grosseteste, In Aristotelis Posteriorum analyticorum libros, Walter Burley, Super libros Posteriourum analyticorum Aristotelis, (Venice: Gregorius de Gregoriis, 1514; photoreprint Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966), fol. 40v4, “There are two kinds of knowledge in advance: that it is, and what is signified by the name. And there are three things known in advance: subject, attribute, and axiom. About the subject it should be known what is signified by the name and that it is …. See also Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum analyticorum libros, Rossi ed., I.1, lines 46–49.

49 India: The MS 40’37 has ‘Ireland’. On either reading, I don’t think the phrase is meant exactly as a compliment to the group mentioned.
[46] (4) Again, definition is the principle of distinctly and perfectly knowing the defined, as is clear from Topics, VI, and Physics, I. I ask, then: Is what is defined by the definition ‘rational and mortal animal’ a singular thing, namely, some individual man, or is it a universal thing? If the latter is granted, the point is established. If the former is granted, then since there is no greater reason in the case of one individual that the one individual man is defined by this definition than [there is in the case of any] other, consequently, one cannot know or have this definition unless he were to know every individual perfectly and rightly.

[47] (5) Again, there is no greater identity between the universal and the individual in external things than between the universal and the individual in the concept. For the universal is predicated just as essentially and in quid of the individual in the case of concepts as in the case of external things. But in the case of concepts, a universal concept and an individual concept, or a superior concept and an inferior concept, are not the same. Therefore, neither in the case of things will the universal and the individual, or the superior and the inferior, be the same.

[48] The major is plain. The minor is proved: For a concept abstracted from two concepts is another concept than either of the ones from which it is abstracted, as is clear. For the concept of a genus is other than the concept of the species from which it is abstracted. So it is clear that in the case of concepts the universal and the singular are not the same, and the superior and the inferior in the case of concepts are not the same. Consequently, neither in the case of things are superior and inferior the same things.

[49] (6) Again, everyone agrees on the fact that the universal is abstracted by the understanding from singulars and from material conditions. For the Commentator, On the Soul, I, says that the understanding makes universality in things. From this it is argued as follows: What is abstracted by the understanding from material conditions and accidents is really under them. For otherwise those who abstract would be lying, which is contrary to the Philosopher, Physics, II. Therefore, a universal abstracted from accidents [and] really existing under them is another thing than a singular. So

50 VI: Following the MS 40"41; the edition 4th has ‘VII’. See perhaps Aristotle, Topics, VI, 1, 139b13–15, and VI, 4, 141b27–28.

51 Rather see perhaps Averroes, In I Physicorum, comm. 5, in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis, 10 vols. in 13, (Venice: Juntas, 1562–1574; photoreprint Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1962), vol. 4 (1562), fol. 8A (on Physics, I, 1, 184b11–12).


53 Aristotle, Physics, II, 2, 193b35.

54 Reading ‘alia’ with the MS 41r11 (although the text is not otherwise especially close to the edition here) for ‘aliqua’ in the ed. 4th9.
in the case of things, the universal and the singular or individual are not the same thing.

[50] Let these statements, therefore, be enough for the present concerning the opinion that maintains the universal is a thing outside the soul completely the same on the part of reality with the singular thing.

[The Theory that Universals are Distinct from Their Individuals]

[51] There is another opinion, which maintains that a universal has subjective being in its singulars, and that a universal is as a whole in each of its singulars. These [people] say that one kind of universal has being in the soul only, another kind has being outside the soul only, and [yet] another kind of universal has being both in the soul and outside the soul.

[52] For example, one kind of universal — like science, art, prudence, and the like — only has singulars existing in the soul. In that case the universal is in the soul [only]. Another kind of universal only has singulars existing outside the soul, as stone has, [and] wood, and the like. In that case, the universal is only outside the soul. And [yet] another kind is a universal that has certain [singulars] in the soul and certain ones outside the soul.

[53] For example, the common [entity] quality and the common [entity] state have certain singulars in the soul and certain ones outside the soul. For one kind of quality — like grammar [and] music — is in the soul, and another kind of quality is outside the soul — like whiteness, blackness, and the like. Likewise, one kind of state is in the soul, like the moral and theological virtues, and another kind of state is outside the soul, like bodily states such as strength [and] health. They say, therefore, that universals of this [last] kind have some singulars in the soul and some outside the soul.

[54] Those who maintain this say that the universal, both the kind that is in the soul and the kind that is outside the soul, is some thing distinct from the singular thing from which it is extracted, which is contrary to the opinion described immediately above.

[55] They prove this through the fact that two contradictories are not verified of altogether the same thing. This is clear from Metaphysics, IV, where the Philosopher says that the first principle or the truest and best known concept is that, for anything, there is [either] an affirmation or a negation, but for nothing [is there] both

55 state: habitus — like quality, one of the Aristotelian categories.

56 They prove this: Reading ‘Quod probant’ with the MS 41’27 for ‘Quod probatur’ in the ed. 4º65.
of them.\footnote{57} And in \textit{Topics}, VII,\footnote{58} he says that in order to know whether [things] are the same or diverse, one must see whether [this or] that is affirmed of the one and denied of the other, and in that case they are not the same but rather diverse. If nothing is affirmed of the one that is denied of any other, then they are the same. And in the \textit{Categories},\footnote{59} the Philosopher proves that being blind and blindness are not the same. For being blind is truly affirmed of something of which blindness is not affirmed. For of some man it is truly said that he is blind, and it is not said that he is blindness.

\footnote{56} From all these [texts], the truth of the basis for this opinion is apparent, and [that basis] is this, namely, that of what is entirely the same on the side of reality, the same [thing] is not truly [both] affirmed and denied.

\footnote{57} On this foundation, it is proved that a singular and a universal are not the same, because of the many contradictories that are verified of them. Thus, I construct the following line of reasoning, based on that foundation: Of [what is] entirely the same, the same [thing] is not [truly both] affirmed and denied. But something is truly affirmed of a universal that is truly denied of each of its singulars, and something is affirmed of a singular that is denied of [its] universal. Therefore, the singular and the universal are not the same.

\footnote{58} The major is clear from the truest and most known complex principle [mentioned above].\footnote{60} The minor is proved in many ways.

\footnote{59} (1) First, as follows: Every universal is in many. No singular is in many, as is clear from the book \textit{On Interpretation}.\footnote{61} Therefore, something is truly affirmed of a universal that is denied of each of its singulars.

\footnote{60} (2) Second, as follows: The universal is defined. But no singular is defined, as is clear from \textit{Metaphysics}, VII.\footnote{62} Therefore, etc.

\footnote{61} (3) Again, the universal and the genus are divided by contrary differences, like animal by rational and irrational. But no singular is divided by such differences. Therefore, etc.

\footnote{57} For the first half of this, see Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, IV, 7, 1011b23–24; for the second half, see IV, 3, 1005b19–20.

\footnote{58} \textit{Topics}, VII: The correct reading here is uncertain. Ed. 4\textsuperscript{th}70 has ‘\textit{Physics VII}’, but the MS 41r30 has ‘\textit{Topics IV}’. Neither passage contains any appropriate passage. On the other hand, the first two chapters of \textit{Topics}, VII, contain a discussion of ‘the same’, and \textit{Topics}, VII, 1, 152a33–34, says approximately what Burley claims.

\footnote{59} Aristotle, \textit{Categories}, 10, 12a35–b1.

\footnote{60} See paragraph [55] above.

\footnote{61} Aristotle, \textit{De interpretatione}, 7, 17a38–b1.

Suppose it is said to these arguments that the same [thing] is not affirmed and denied of the same [thing] under the same concept. But the same [thing] can be affirmed and denied of the same [thing] under one concept and another. Hence, Socrates under a common concept is defined, but under a proper concept he is not defined.

To the contrary: When it is said that the same [thing] is affirmed and denied of [what is] entirely the same [thing, but under different concepts, I deny that]. For example, ‘Socrates under a common concept is defined’, [and] ‘Socrates under a proper concept is not defined’. In these propositions the same predicate is not affirmed and denied of the same subject. For in ‘Socrates is defined under a common concept’, this whole, namely, ‘Socrates under a common concept’ is the subject. And in ‘Socrates under a proper concept is not defined’, this whole, namely, ‘Socrates under a proper concept’ is the subject. And so the aggregate [expressions] — the subjects of the propositions — are not entirely the same.

For example, [the same point can be made] in other cases, as in the following propositions: ‘Socrates the grammarian is known by you’, ‘Socrates who is coming is not known by you’. Here the same [thing] is not affirmed and denied of [what is] entirely the same, and therefore they can be true together. For I can know that Socrates is a grammarian, yet without knowing that he is coming.

If it is said perhaps that these determinations ‘under a common concept’ and ‘under a proper concept’ belong on the side of the predicate, [then] to the contrary: It follows from this that in these [propositions] — namely, ‘Socrates under a common concept is defined’ and ‘Socrates under a proper concept is not defined’ — the same predicate is not affirmed and denied of the same [thing]. For ‘to be defined under a common concept’ and ‘to be defined under a proper concept’ are not the same terms, and the same thing is not assigned by these terms.

This is confirmed as follows: If a universal and a singular, like the species man and Socrates, are entirely the same on the side of reality, then there is just as much identity between the species man and Socrates on the side of reality as there is between Socrates and Socrates. But ‘Socrates is defined’ and ‘Socrates is not defined’ are incompatible, because they are two contradictories. For the same predicate is affirmed and denied of entirely the same subject. Therefore, ‘The species is defined’ and ‘Socrates is not defined’ will be incompatible too. For there is the same cause of the inconsistency in either case, namely, the identity between the things predicated and the identity between the things for which [the subjects] supposit.

---

63 And: Reading ‘et’ with the MS 41″1, for ‘est’ in the ed. 4″33.

64 For … proper concept: The ed. 4″46–47 has ‘quia definiti sub conceptu communi et non definiri sub conceptu proprio’. The MS 41a 8 has ‘quia definitur sub conceptu communi et sub conceptu proprio’. I have mainly followed the wording of the ed., but have omitted the extra ‘non’ following the MS.
Again, the reasoning about identity under different concepts does not solve the argument constructed about the division of genus into species by contrary differences. For it is certain that no one singular thing, [either] under a common concept or under a proper concept, is divided by [the differences] rational and irrational, because in that case the singular thing would be [both] rational and irrational.

If it is said that the division of animal by [the differences] rational and irrational is not a division of a thing into things, but rather is a division of a general concept into specific concepts, [then] it follows that it is a division of an accident into accidents. This is contrary to Boethius in the book On Division. He says that the division of a genus into species by differences is division per se, and the division of a subject into [its] accidents is division by accident.

(4) Again, just as in the genera of accidents there are genera and species and differences that belong by themselves to some genus, so all the more in the genus of substance there are genera and species and differences, through which differences the genera descend into their species. But nothing is by itself in the genus of substance except a substance. Therefore, animal, which is a subalternate genus in the genus substance, is a substance, and the species into which it descends and the differences by which it descends into its species belong to substance.

(5) Again, [it is argued] that the individual and the universal are not the same things. For if they were, [then] since the most general genus in the genus substance is substance, as this opinion maintains, it follows that the most general genus in the category substance would be some singular thing, like Socrates or Plato. And for whatever reason one individual or singular would be the same thing as the most general genus, for the same reason every other singular in the genus substance would be the most general genus in the genus substance. This seems a problem, both because, (a) in accordance with this, there would be several most general genera in the genus substance. For there would be as many most general genera as there would be individuals in the genus substance. Also, because (b) Socrates would by himself be superior to an ass.

(6) Again, according to this opinion there would be no aspect common to two individuals of the same species. For every thing outside the soul is singular. And no singular thing is common to two individuals of the same species. Therefore, no thing, etc. But this is false, as is proved in two ways.

---


66 category: Reading ‘praedicamento’ for ‘praedicato’ in the ed., 4vb7. The MS 41r31 has ‘genere’.

67 That is, the opinion that the individual and the universal are the same things, the opinion being argued against here.
[72] (a) First, as follows: [Even] if there were no intellect, two stones would still agree more than one stone [would] with an ass. But every agreement is [an agreement] in something one. For every agreement is a unity founded on a multitude, because whatever [things] agree agree in something one. Therefore, there is some common thing outside the soul in which two stones agree, and in which a stone and an ass do not agree.

[73] [This] is confirmed as follows: Whatever [things] are really compared are compared in something one, as greater and less, or as equal. For if a and b are compared to one another as greater and less, they are not compared in what belongs only to a or in what belongs only to b, but rather in something that belongs to both. For example, if a is more white than b, [then] a and b are not compared in the whiteness of a itself, or in the whiteness of b itself. For ‘a is more white by the whiteness of a itself than b [is white] by the whiteness of a itself’ is false. Likewise, ‘b is less white by the whiteness of b itself than a’ [is white] by the whiteness of b itself’ is false. Therefore, that in which they are compared has to belong to both. But no singular belongs to both. Therefore, there is some universal thing in which they are really compared to one another.

[74] (b) Second, it is proved that there is some thing common to two individuals of the same species, which [thing] is not singular. For otherwise, two individuals of different species would not differ any more than two individuals of the same species [do], because nothing that is in the one singular of the one species would be in the other singular of the same species. For no singular thing is the same in two such [individuals], and there is no other [kind of] thing outside the soul, according to this opinion. Rather one individual of the one species differs from another individual of the same species through something that is in it and not in the other. And so Socrates differs from Plato through something that is in him [but not in Plato]. But something cannot differ from something else through [anything] more than through something that is in it [and not in the other]. So Socrates does not differ more from a stone than [he does] from Plato.

[75] Because of these reasons and infinitely many others, it is maintained that a universal is in each of its singulars, whether it is a universal being in the soul or whether it is a universal being outside the soul.

[Objections]

[76] There are some apparent reasons against this opinion.

[77] (1) First, according to this [opinion][69] it follows that the same [thing] is in heaven and in hell. For man, which is in Socrates, is in each individual. Therefore, it is

---

[68] b itself than a: Following the MS 41°49. The ed. 4°34 reverses the ‘a’ and ‘b’ here.

[69] [opinion]: Following the MS 42°9, which has ‘secundum eam’, where the antecedent of ‘eam’ is ‘opinionem’ in the preceding sentence. The ed. 4°52 has ‘contra istam rationem’. Either can be construed, but I think the MS’s reading makes better sense.
in the individual which is in hell and in the one which is in heaven. And so the same man will have the greatest joy and the greatest pain.

[78] If it is said that it is not a problem for contraries to be in the same [thing] according to species, in the sense that the universal man is one according to species and not according to number, [then] to the contrary: What is the same as something in such a way that [it is] in no way diverse [from it] and there is no diversity between them, that is numerically one with it. But there is no diversity between the [universal] man existing in heaven and the [universal] man existing in hell. Therefore, the [universal] man who is in hell and the [universal] man who is in heaven are numerically the same man.

[79] Again, it would follow that numerically the same man would simultaneously be moved and be at rest. For when something is moved, everything in it is moved, and when something is at rest, everything in it is at rest. Therefore, when Socrates is moved, the specific nature that is in Plato is not moved, assuming that Socrates is moved and Plato is at rest. In that case, it follows that the specific nature of man, which is numerically one in Socrates and Plato, is simultaneously moved and at rest.

[80] If it is said that the nature is not numerically one, [then] to the contrary: (1a) Same and different are the first differences of being, as is clear in the fourth and tenth\textsuperscript{70} books of the \textit{Metaphysics}.

Therefore, if the specific nature of man is not one\textsuperscript{71} numerically in Socrates and Plato, it follows that it will be numerically diverse in them. And so there will be as many specific natures, according to specific nature,\textsuperscript{72} as there are individuals, which is a problem. And so it follows that Socrates and Plato are not in numerically the same species, because Socrates is in the species that is in Socrates, and Plato is in the species that is in Plato.

[81] (2) Again, the specific nature that is in Socrates, according to you, is a substance. Therefore, either it is a corporeal substance or an incorporeal one. But it is not an incorporeal substance, because if it were, [then] Socrates would be contained under incorporeal substance. For whatever the species is contained under, the individual of the same species is contained under the same [thing]. But this is false, namely, that Socrates is contained under incorporeal substance. It remains, therefore, that the specific nature of man is a corporeal substance. If [it is] a corporeal substance, either [it is] animate or inanimate. Not inanimate, certainly. Therefore, animate. Therefore, either [it is] a sensitive substance or an insensitive one. Not insensitive, as

\textsuperscript{70} The MS 42\textsuperscript{22} omits ‘and tenth’. See n. 72 below.

\textsuperscript{71} See perhaps Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, IV, 2, 1004\textsuperscript{a}2–22. This passage is perhaps referred back to at \textit{Metaphysics}, X, 3, 1054\textsuperscript{a}30–31.

\textsuperscript{72} of the \textit{Metaphysics} … one: Following the MS 42\textsuperscript{22}. The ed. 4\textsuperscript{vb}72 omits these words.

\textsuperscript{73} according to specific nature: Following the ed. 5\textsuperscript{ra}2 ‘\textit{secundum naturam specificam}’. The MS 42\textsuperscript{23} omits the word ‘\textit{specificam}’. In either case, the role of the clause is unclear.
was said. Therefore, it is an animate sensitive substance. Consequently, it is an animal. Therefore, either [it is] rational or irrational. Not irrational. Therefore, rational. Consequently, the specific nature of man is a man. And every man either is Socrates or is Plato, and so on for singular [men]. Consequently, the specific nature of man does not differ from the individual nature, which was the point.

[82] (3) Again, it follows from this opinion that there are two suns, namely, the universal sun and the individual sun.

[83] (4) It follows also that in Socrates there is a man other than Socrates, namely, the universal man. Proof: Let Socrates be a and the universal man b. Then a and b agree, because a and b are two men, [and] therefore a and b agree in the human nature common to them. That nature common to them is other than a and other than b. For, according to you, a common nature is another thing than those to which it is common. Therefore, let that third nature be c. And then a, b, [and] c are three men. Therefore, they really agree in the common nature of man. And let that be d. Thus, there will be an infinite regress in the categories predicated in quid. There will also be an infinite [number of] men, as is clear through the deduction [just] constructed.

[84] (5) Again, according to this opinion God could not annihilate Socrates unless he annihilated every man, which seems a problem. The inference is proved: For annihilation is the destruction of something with respect to everything that is in it. If, therefore, God annihilated Socrates, he would have to destroy the common nature that is in Socrates, namely, the specific nature of man. But when the species is destroyed, every individual of the same species is destroyed. Therefore, God could not destroy Socrates unless he destroyed every man. That is unheard of.

[85] Suppose it is said that the annihilation of something is [its] destruction with respect to all its parts. But the species is not a part of the individual. Therefore, when the individual is annihilated, the species does not have to be annihilated.

[86] (5a) To the contrary: Whatever is the case for the species and the individual, according to this opinion, there is the genus. But the genus is a part of the species. Therefore, it follows that [God] cannot annihilate the species man unless the genus animal, and even the most general genus substance, is destroyed. But when the genus is destroyed, all the species of that genus are destroyed. Therefore, God could not destroy the species man unless he destroyed every species belonging to the genus substance, which is a problem. The inference is clear. For when the most general genus is destroyed, all the inferiors of that genus are destroyed.

---

74 He has not said this, but the point is plain anyway.

75 common: Reading ‘communi’ with the MS 42°39, for ‘cum’ in the ed. 5°24. The latter makes the passage read ‘agree with them in human nature’.
[Replies to the Objections]

[87] Because these arguments do not conclude anything that goes against the truth of [this] opinion in itself, [therefore] we must reply to (1), the first argument.\(^76\) When it is said that numerically the same [thing] would be in heaven and on earth and in hell, it must be said that ‘numerically the same’ is taken in two senses, namely, broadly and strictly.

[88] [What is] numerically the same, taken broadly, is that which, together with [something] else, can make a number or constitute a number, in such a way that of this and of the other it is true to say that they are two. In this sense I grant that the nature of man is numerically one. For it and the specific nature of an ass are two natures.

[89] But [what is] numerically one, taken strictly, is only that which is distinguished as against [what is] specifically one and generically one. The Philosopher speaks about the numerically one in this way in \textit{Metaphysics}, V and VII.\(^77\)

[90] There is the same division about [what is] numerically the same.\(^78\) For [what is] numerically the same in one sense is what, together with [something] else, makes a number. In another sense it is what is distinguished as against [what is] specifically the same and generically the same, as is clear from \textit{Topics}, I.\(^79\)

[91] Therefore, I say that taking ‘numerically the same’ in the broad sense, for all that constitutes a number together with [something] else, there is no problem with numerically the same [thing’s] being simultaneously in heaven and in hell, and [its] being simultaneously moved and at rest. And [I say] that [‘numerically the same’] said in this sense is superior to ‘numerically the same’ taken strictly, and to ‘specifically one’ and ‘generically one’. Also, it is common to every being, and has the same generality\(^80\) as ‘being’.

[92] And when it is said [in objection (1)], “Numerically the same [man] would have the greatest joy and the greatest sadness,”\(^81\) I say that [this] does not follow as [it

---

\(^{76}\) See paragraphs [77]–[80] above.

\(^{77}\) \textit{Metaphysics}, V and VII: Following the ed. 5\(^{\text{iv}}\)59. The MS 42\(^{\text{v}}\)14 has ‘\textit{Metaphysics}, V and IV’. See Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, V, 6, 1016\(^{b}\)31–35. I have found no plausible passage in either \textit{Metaphysics} IV or \textit{Metaphysics} VII.

\(^{78}\) The text here seems to suppose that the division just given was of two senses of ‘numerically one’, so that now Burley goes on to give the same two senses for ‘numerically the same’. In fact, however, the previous division was introduced as a division of ‘numerically the same’, and it is not until we get to the second half of the division that the term ‘numerically one’ appears.

\(^{79}\) Aristotle, \textit{Topics}, I, 7, 103\(^{\text{v}}\)6–14.

\(^{80}\) generality: Reading ‘\textit{communitatis}’ with the MS 42\(^{\text{v}}\)20, for ‘\textit{communiter}’ with the ed. 5\(^{\text{iv}}\)68.

\(^{81}\) See the end of paragraph [77] above.
did in the argument] about [what is] numerically the same in heaven and on earth. For
acts and operations like this belong to singulars, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics*, I.\(^82\) Thus, just as running is by itself only in singulars, so [too for] being joyful and being sad.

[93] Nevertheless, it can be said that operations like this belong to universals by accident, as the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics*, I,\(^83\) that man heals or is healed by accident, and this man heals or is healed by himself. In this sense, it could be granted that, taking ‘numerically one’ in a broad sense, [what is] numerically one is [both] supremely sad and joyful by accident, because for the universal to be joyful or to be said is nothing else but for its individual to be joyful or to be said by itself.

[94] Hence, just as there is no problem about contraries’ being in the same [thing] according to species, so there is no problem about contraries’ being in the same [thing] according to number, speaking in the broad sense, at least by accident. Indeed it follows that if contraries are in [what is] specifically the same, therefore contraries are also in [what is] numerically the same, speaking about [what is] numerically the same in the broad sense. The inference is clear, because it argues from an inferior to its superior, as was said.

[95] But taking ‘numerically one’ strictly, according as it is distinguished as against [what is] specifically one and generically one, in that sense [what is] numerically one is distinguished as against everything common. And in that sense [what is] numerically one and the same is the same as the individual, with the concept of which it is inconsistent for it to be represented\(^84\) in several, like Socrates or Plato.

[96] In this sense, no universal is numerically one. Taking ‘numerically one’ in this sense, it is impossible for [what is] numerically one to be in heaven and in hell [simultaneously], or that it be simultaneously moved and at rest, and so on.

[97] ‘Numerically one’, said in this sense, is inferior to ‘generically one’ and ‘specifically one’, as the Philosopher says in *Topics*, I,\(^85\) and *Metaphysics*, V,\(^86\) where he says that whatever [things] are specifically one are [also] numerically one, but not conversely.

---


\(^83\) *Ibid.*

\(^84\) represented: Not in the sense of “picturing”, but in the sense of “being duplicated”, as a universal is represented in its particulars.

\(^85\) Aristotle, *Topics*, I, 7, 103\(^b\)6–14.

\(^86\) V: Following the MS 42\(^b\)39, for ‘VII’ in the ed. 5\(^b\)23. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, V, 6, 1016\(^b\)31–35.
When it is said [in (1a)] that the specific nature either is numerically one in Socrates (taking ‘numerically one’ strictly) or else [it is numerically] diverse, it must be said that [it is] neither the one nor the other. For although same and diverse [are] applied to anything whatever, [but] only in the aspect according to which they are the first differences of being (for everything that is is [either] the same [as] or diverse from Socrates), nevertheless, same and diverse by a specific nature or [same and diverse as] contracted through some determinate subject are not the immediate differences of being. [For example,] although ‘same as Socrates’ and ‘diverse from Socrates’ divide being, nevertheless ‘same as Socrates’ and ‘diverse as from Socrates’ do not divide being immediately. For not every being is the same as Socrates or a diverse ass from Socrates.

Or take the example of Browny [the ass]. For, even though everything that is is [either] the same as Browny or diverse from Browny, nevertheless not everything that is is the same ass Browny or a diverse ass from Browny.

The same thing must be said about the numerically same and diverse. For even though the specific nature of man is the same as Socrates or diverse from Socrates, nevertheless it is not numerically the same [as] or numerically diverse from Socrates, taking ‘numerically the same’ strictly.

To (2), the other [argument], when it is asked whether the specific nature of man that is in Socrates is corporeal substance or incorporeal [substance], I reply by distinguishing the [proposition] ‘The species of man is corporeal substance’, insofar as the predicate can have (a) general or (b) special simple supposition. This only applies in the case of a common term containing [both] species and individuals under it. For (a) when such a term has general simple supposition, it then supposits for the genus itself, namely, for its primary signficate, which is the genus. But (b) when it has special simple supposition, it then supposits for the species contained under that genus.

---

87 See paragraph [80] above.

88 For: Reading ‘quia’ with the MS 42v42, for ‘unde’ in ed. 5th27. I suspect the Latin is corrupt for this sentence. The text in the ed. 5th27–31 reads: “Unde quamvis idem vel diversum cuicumque comparata in ratione tantum ad quam sunt primae differentiae entis; omne enim quod est est idem Sorti vel diversum a Sorte, tamen idem vel diversum natura specifica seu contracta per aliquod determinatum subjectum non sunt immediate differentiae entis.” The MS 42v42–45 is substantially the same: “quia quamvis idem et diversum cuicumque comparata in ratione termini ad quam sunt primae differentiae entis, quia omne quod est vel est idem Sorti vel diversum a Sorte, tamen idem et diversum in natura specifica seu contracta per aliquod determinatum subjectum non sunt immediate differentiae entis.” My translation is extremely tentative. Fortunately, the examples make the overall point clear enough.

89 See paragraph [81] above.

90 On general and special simple supposition, see Walter Burleigh (= Burley), De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, with a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior, Philotheus Boehner, ed., (“Franciscan Institute Publications,” Text Series, no. 9; St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 11.29–12.23.
Therefore, I say that ‘The species of man is corporeal substance’ is false according as the predicate has general supposition. For that is the way Porphyry is speaking when he says that substance is a genus in such a way that it is not a species.\footnote{Porphyry, \textit{Isagoge}, Busse ed., p. 4.21–5.1. See Spade, \textit{Five Texts}, p. 4 (§§ 22–23).} For in that sense ‘substance’ supposits for the common [category] substance, and not for any content inferior to that. But if [‘substance’] has special simple supposition, it then supposits for its species, and in that sense ‘The species of man is corporeal substance’ is true, and so on descending down to the lowest genus.

\footnote{particular sign: That is, the sign of particularity, the existential quantifier ‘some’.
}

\footnote{and so on for the other [categories]: Reading ‘\textit{et sic de aliis}’ with the MS 43\textsuperscript{31}, for ‘\textit{et sic de aliis ejus speciebus}’ in the ed. 5\textsuperscript{v}.9. Substance, quantity, etc., are categories, which is to say that they are the most general genera; they are not the species of anything.
}

\footnote{The addition is implied by the context. See the preceding paragraph, and also the next sentence of the text. As it stands, the inference is fallacious in the same way as ‘Some animal is an ox; therefore, some man is an ox’ is fallacious. The invalidity Burley is here concerned to point out is presumably not of this trivial kind. Both the ed. 5\textsuperscript{v}10 and the MS 43\textsuperscript{32} stop the inference with the words ‘some substance is a species’.
}

\[102\] Hence, I grant ‘The species of man is animal’, [but only] according as the predicate has special simple supposition. For each of the following is false: ‘The species of man is some corporeal substance’, ‘The species of man is some animal’, because a particular sign\footnote{The addition is implied by the context. See the preceding paragraph, and also the next sentence of the text. As it stands, the inference is fallacious in the same way as ‘Some animal is an ox; therefore, some man is an ox’ is fallacious. The invalidity Burley is here concerned to point out is presumably not of this trivial kind. Both the ed. 5\textsuperscript{v}10 and the MS 43\textsuperscript{32} stop the inference with the words ‘some substance is a species’.
} added to a common term that is \textit{per se} in a genus makes it stand personally for individuals and [for] species that have personal supposition. For according to this kind of supposition, the genus standing personally is verified of them.

\[103\] Hence, ‘Some substance is a species’ is false, and yet the subject supposits both for species and for individuals, since it is common to both. For since the subject supposits personally, it does not supposit for species unless species are taken according to the supposition according to which [the subject] is verified of them. And it is not verified of them unless the species supposits personally. For ‘Man is some substance’ is not true except according as the subject supposits personally. Therefore, ‘Some substance is a species’ is false, despite the fact that the subject supposits personally for species that supposit personally. For each of the following is false: ‘Man is a species’, ‘Ox is a species’, when the subject supposits personally.

\[104\] Suppose it is said that ‘Some being is a species’ is true, taking the subject personally. From this it follows that some substance is a species or some quantity [is a species], and so on for the other [categories].\footnote{The addition is implied by the context. See the preceding paragraph, and also the next sentence of the text. As it stands, the inference is fallacious in the same way as ‘Some animal is an ox; therefore, some man is an ox’ is fallacious. The invalidity Burley is here concerned to point out is presumably not of this trivial kind. Both the ed. 5\textsuperscript{v}10 and the MS 43\textsuperscript{32} stop the inference with the words ‘some substance is a species’.
}

\[105\] It must be said that the following inference is not valid: “Some being is a species; therefore, some substance is a species, [or some quantity is a species, etc.]”.\footnote{The addition is implied by the context. See the preceding paragraph, and also the next sentence of the text. As it stands, the inference is fallacious in the same way as ‘Some animal is an ox; therefore, some man is an ox’ is fallacious. The invalidity Burley is here concerned to point out is presumably not of this trivial kind. Both the ed. 5\textsuperscript{v}10 and the MS 43\textsuperscript{32} stop the inference with the words ‘some substance is a species’.
} But it does correctly follow: “Some being is a species; therefore, some substance, or substance, is a species, [or] some quantity, or quantity, is a species, [etc.],” where, [for each category,] the name of the genus in the first occurrence supposits personally, and
in the second occurrence simply — and this indifferently according to general or special simple supposition.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{[106]} Hence, you should know that it belongs to the notion of a transcendental [term] that, when it suppositis personally, it supposits for all its inferiors, under whatever [kind of] supposition it is possible that they be taken,\textsuperscript{96} whether materially or simply or personally. But this is not so for a term [that is] \emph{per se} in a genus. For such a term, suppositing personally or taken with a sign that makes it stand personally, only supposits personally for individuals. Therefore, under a transcendental term suppositing personally and disjunctively, it is not right to descend under a disjunction\textsuperscript{97} to its inferior supposita [taken] personally only. Rather the descent should be made from it to its inferior supposita [taken] both personally and simply\textsuperscript{98} under a disjunction, as was said.

\textbf{[107]} To (3), the other argument,\textsuperscript{99} it must be said that it does not follow from [this] opinion that there are two suns. On this [point], you must know that just as a universal sign\textsuperscript{100} added to a common term having individuals under it distributes that [term] for the individuals, so [too] a numeral added to a common term — namely, to a genus or species — numbers it for individuals and makes it supposit for individuals. Therefore, it is the same [thing] to say ‘There are two suns’ and to say ‘There are two individual suns’. Thus, just as the universal sun and the particular sun are not two individual suns, so [too] there are not two suns. Nevertheless, there are two \textit{things}, because a transcendental term — like the term ‘thing’, which is a transcendental term — is numerical\textsuperscript{101} among all [its] inferiors, whether they are individual or common, [and] so is distributable for each of its inferiors, whether it be individual or common.

\textsuperscript{95}general \ldots supposition: Reading ‘\textit{supositionem simplicem generalem vel specialem}’ with the MS 43’34, for ‘\textit{supositionem simplicem vel personalem}’ in the ed. 5’14–15.

\textsuperscript{96}they be taken: Reading ‘\textit{accipliantur}’ for ‘\textit{acciipiatur}’. The rest of the paragraph suggests that the subject of the verb here must be ‘inferiors’, not ‘transcendental term’. Nevertheless, both the ed. 5’18 and the MS 43’36 have ‘\textit{acciipiatur}’.

\textsuperscript{97}under a disjunction: Reading ‘\textit{sub disjunctione}’ with the MS 43’39, for ‘\textit{subdisjunctive}’ in the ed. 5’23.

\textsuperscript{98}What happened to material supposition? It is explicitly included in the first sentence of the paragraph, but no mention is made of it here (ed. 5’26, MS 43’41) or in the example in the preceding paragraph.

\textsuperscript{99}See paragraph [82] above.

\textsuperscript{100}universal sign: The universal quantifier ‘every’.

\textsuperscript{101}numerical: \textit{numeralis} (ed. 5’37–38, MS 43’3). I am not familiar with this usage, but the sense can be gathered from the context. The point is to contrast the case of transcendental terms like ‘thing’ or ‘being’ with other terms, like ‘animal’. One can say that Socrates is an animal, and man is an animal too. But Socrates and man (the common nature) are not \textit{two} animals; they cannot be counted.
To (5), the other argument, it is to be said that it does not follow from this opinion that God could not annihilate Socrates unless he annihilated every man. And when it is said that if God annihilated Socrates, then he would annihilate the species of man, I say that [this] does not follow, as was said. For the species is not a part of the individual, as is clear from the Philosopher, *Physics*, II, *Metaphysics*, V. He says that there are particular causes of particular effects and universal causes of universal effects. Therefore, Socrates, who is a particular effect, is put together only out of particular causes, namely, out of this matter and this form.

When it is argued to the contrary — when it is said that at least there would follow the problem that God could not annihilate the species of man unless he annihilated the whole genus of substance — it must be said that that does not follow. For annihilation is the destruction of the thing as far as everything that is proper to it is concerned, not as far as everything common to it and to other things is concerned. Therefore, a species can be annihilated without the annihilation of the genus. For the genus is not a proper part of the species, but rather common to it and to others. Hence, if God destroys [the universal] intellective soul and [the universal] human body too, then he would annihilate [the species] man, because soul and human body are proper parts of man.

To (4), the immediately preceding argument, the one that proves an infinite regress if it is claimed that the universal is a thing other than singulars, it must be said that if ‘a’ is a sign for an individual — say, Socrates — and ‘b’ [a sign for] the species of man, then ‘a and b are two men’ is false, as was said earlier about the sun. Neither is it true that a and b agree in a third human nature [distinct] from them. Indeed, the one of them is contained under the other (namely, a under b) as an individual under a species. But a and b do not agree in a third most specific species [that is] common to them, since the one of them is the most specific species of the other.

together when counting animals. On the other hand, Socrates is a being, and man is a being too. And in this case it does follow that they are two beings; they can be counted together when counting beings.

102 See paragraph [84] above.

103 *Physics*, II, *Metaphysics*, V: Thus the ed. 5va45–46. The MS 43v8 has “*Posterior Analytics*, II, and *Metaphysics*, IV”. The ed. seems to have the correct reading, although the claim to be found in those places is not that “the species is not a part of the individual”, but rather approximately the claim found in the following sentence of Burley’s text, that “there are particular causes of particular effects and universal causes of universal effects”. See *Physics*, II, 3, 195b6–9 & 16–20, and *Metaphysics*, V, 2, 1014a10–12 & 20–23.

104 See paragraph [86] above.

105 See paragraph [83] above.

106 See paragraph [107] above.
[Discussion of Doubt V]

[Plato’s Theory]

[111] There is yet another opinion, which maintains that universals are outside the soul [and] separated in being from singulants. This was Plato’s opinion, according to [what] Aristotle attributes to him. There are two motives for this opinion, as Aristotle reports in Metaphysics, VII. One was to have scientific knowledge of sensible things, and the other motive was [to account] for the generation of [things] that come about by putrefaction, like many [kinds of] worms.

[112] The first motive is based on the fact that there is scientific knowledge of natural or sensible things, and there is no scientific knowledge about individuals that have being in sensible matter. Therefore, besides sensible individuals, one must posit universals separated from sensible matter. Natural science is about them.

[113] Now the reason there is no scientific knowledge of sensibles is that, when the sensibles withdraw from the sense, it is not known whether they [continue to] exist or do not [continue to] exist. Therefore, since they are transmutable and variable, there can be no certain knowledge about them.

[114] The second motive is based on the fact that nothing is generated except from [something] like it in species. But [things] generated by putrefaction do not have [anything] similar to them in species existing in the nature from which they are generated. For a fly [generated from putrefied matter] does not have another substantial fly like himself [in that matter], from which he is generated. Therefore, in the case of things generated by putrefaction, one must posit [something] similar in species [and] separated from matter, from which they are generated. And that [entity], separated from sensible matter, is claimed by Plato to be the universal.

[115] So it is clear that there are two motives for maintaining that universals are separated from sensibles, namely: one [to account] for scientific knowledge, and the other [to account] for generation.

[116] The Philosopher argues against this opinion in Metaphysics, III and VII. He assumes that everything whatever that exists by itself and separately is a singular or individual. From this, it is argued as follows: The universal existing by itself and separately from individuals is an individual. Consequently, the universal sun and the particular or singular sun are two individual suns. And there will be two suns and even two worlds — namely the universal world and the particular world — each of which exists by itself. Consequently, each is singular and individual.

107 I have not been able to locate a likely reference. Certainly there is nothing in Metaphysics, VII, like the second motive mentioned below. But it is not silly. The theory seems to be that, since worms generated by putrefaction — and so not by parents — do not get their substantial forms from parents, they must get them from some other external source; Platonic forms provide such a source.

108 I have not found any particularly appropriate text in either place.
Likewise, it follows that two bodies are in the same place, namely, the
universal body$^{109}$ and the particular or singular body.

If it said that universal body is not in a place, [then] to the contrary: From
this there follows the problem that some body is without a place.

Again, that one does not have to posit separated universals in order to
have scientific knowledge is proved as follows: For that of which scientific knowledge
is had has a definition. But a separated universal does not have a definition, since it is
singular and no singular is defined, as is proved in *Metaphysics*, VII.$^{110}$ Therefore, if a
separated universal is posited, there is no scientific knowledge of it.

Again, the separated universal is less known to us than are sensible
singulars. But scientific knowledge of the more known is not had through the less
known. Therefore, one does not have to posit a separated universal, since it is un-
known to us, in order to have scientific knowledge about singulars [that are] known to
us.

Hence Aristotle, in opposing Plato in *On the Soul*, I,$^{111}$ says that the
universal is nothing, or else it is posterior. That is, the universal separated from
sensible singulars, as Plato claimed, is either nothing in reality or else, assuming that it
is in reality, it is posterior with respect to cognition. For it is less known to us, and
posterior to sensible singulars.

Again, the corporeal and the incorporeal are not in the same species. For
the universal man, since he is incorporeal, will not be in the same species with a
particular man — for example, with Socrates. Consequently, scientific knowledge of
particular sensible men will not be had through the fact that scientific knowledge is
had of the universal man. So one does not have to posit a separated universal in order
to have scientific knowledge of singulars.

The Philosopher destroys the other motive for positing universals
separated from singulars, through the fact that the agent that induces the form
transmutes and disposes the matter for the induction of the form. Therefore, what does
not transmute the matter does not induce the form. But in [things] generated by
putrefaction, the separated universal does not transmute the matter. Therefore, it does
not induce the form. Therefore, in the generation of a fly, the universal fly is not the
generator of the particular fly.

Thus, the proposition ‘The same agent transmutes the matter and induces
the form’ is universally known in the case of the induction of a material form, by
which [induction] such a form is drawn out from the potency of matter, and conse-

---

$^{109}$ universal body: Reading ‘*corpus universale*’ with MS 43’44, for ‘*corpus in universale*’ in ed. 5’b29.


$^{111}$ Aristotle, *De anima*, I, 1, 402a8–9.
quently [is drawn out] by an agent transmuting the matter. (This is the case, for
example, with the intellective soul. For it is not drawn out from its [own] potency).
Consequently, [the agent that induces the form] is different from a separated agent, as
is clear in *On Animals*, VI.\footnote{VI: Following the MS 44\textsuperscript{19}, for ‘XVI’ in the ed. 5\textsuperscript{b}65. The *Historia animalium* does not have sixteen books. Nevertheless, I have been unable to find any likely reference in Book VI — or anywhere else, for that matter.}

\footnote{112}{VI: Following the MS 44‘19, for ‘XVI’ in the ed. 5\textsuperscript{b}65. The *Historia animalium* does not have sixteen books. Nevertheless, I have been unable to find any likely reference in Book VI — or anywhere else, for that matter.}

[125] Hence, you should know, according to Aristotle, in the book *On the Generation of Animals*,\footnote{Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, I, 1, 715\textsuperscript{a}18–716\textsuperscript{b}2.}{\textsuperscript{113}} that some [animals] are generated by propagation, and they are generated from seed. Some are generated from putrefaction, and they are not generated from seed, but rather from a similar power caused in matter by the sun.

Thus, in the putrid matter from which a fly is generated there is caused by the sun some power, similar to the power of seed, which acts in the generation of a fly like seed in the case of [things] generated by propagation. Aristotle calls this power a “divine power”, according to [what] the Commentator says on *Metaphysics*, II.\footnote{II: Thus the ed. 6\textsuperscript{a}1. The MS 44‘24 has ‘IV’. I have not found this said in either place. See Averroes, *In Metaphysicorum*, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), *ad locos*.}{\textsuperscript{114}}

[126] Further, [things] generated by propagation are of two kinds. For some are generated by [what is] similar in most specific species, as man from man, and [some] from [what is] similar in closest genus. (There is no name given to that.) Hence, the proposition on which Plato was based is not universally true, namely, that everything that is generated is generated from [what is] like it in species. For heat is generated from a motion that is not similar to it in species. And fire [is generated] from the striking or collision of solid bodies against one another. And a worm is generated from the action of the sun.

[127] It is true, according to Aristotle in the book *On the Generation of Animals*,\footnote{See perhaps Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, I, 1, 715\textsuperscript{a}18–\textsuperscript{b}16.}{\textsuperscript{115}} that in general [what is] generated from seed and [what is] generated without seed differ according to species, no matter how much they are alike in [their] acts. For example, suppose that some rat is generated without seed — say, from earth. Such a rat afterwards generates, by his seed, another rat. No matter how much these rats would be alike in their acts, nevertheless they differ according to species. For the one is generated with seed and the other without seed.

[128] Nevertheless, Avicenna maintained the opposite of this. He holds that the same [things] according to species could be generated from seed and [could also be generated] without seed. Thus, he maintained, [at least] as the Commentator attributed

\begin{enumerate}
\item [\textsuperscript{112}] VI: Following the MS 44‘19, for ‘XVI’ in the ed. 5\textsuperscript{b}65. The *Historia animalium* does not have sixteen books. Nevertheless, I have been unable to find any likely reference in Book VI — or anywhere else, for that matter.
\item [\textsuperscript{113}] Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, I, 1, 715\textsuperscript{a}18–716\textsuperscript{b}2.
\item [\textsuperscript{114}] II: Thus the ed. 6\textsuperscript{a}1. The MS 44‘24 has ‘IV’. I have not found this said in either place. See Averroes, *In Metaphysicorum*, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), *ad locos*.
\item [\textsuperscript{115}] See perhaps Aristotle, *De generatione animalium*, I, 1, 715\textsuperscript{a}18–\textsuperscript{b}16.
\end{enumerate}
[it] to him, that man can be generated without seed, from an extreme commingling of the elements.

[129] Again, you must know that one kind of generation is univocal. That [kind of] generation is [the generation] of the similar by [what is] similar [to it] in species. Another kind is equivocal generation, which is the generation of something from [what is] dissimilar to it in species. This dichotomy is maintained both by philosophers and by theologians.

[Augustine’s Theory]

Now that we have seen Plato’s opinion about ideas, we must look at the opinion of Saint Augustine and other theologians about ideas.

It should be known that the divine essence represents from eternity all the [things] that are to be made. Thus God, before he made things, knew them. Otherwise he would be ignorant of what he was about to do. Therefore, Augustine maintains in his book On Eighty-Three Questions, that from eternity there were exemplars representing things to be made, and those exemplars he calls “ideas”.

Thus, he says that from eternity there were ideas in the divine essence, after the examples of which things were going to be made. About those ideas, he says three things that appear difficult, namely, that the ideas in the divine mind are (1) eternal and (2) immutable and are (3) diverse. For, as he says, man was established by one reason, and horse was established by another reason.

But there is a big doubt about this. For I ask: Is an idea the divine essence or another thing? If it is the same [as the divine essence], then there will not be several ideas. For in God there is not any plurality. If the idea is another thing than the divine essence, problems follow: (a) that there was [something] other than God from eternity, namely, the idea of man. And it follows (b) that [something] other than God is immutable, which is a problem. For everything other than God is transmutable by the divine power, and can revert to nothing. Likewise, (c) from the fact that God is supremely simple, everything that is in God is the same as the divine essence.

---

116 Averroes, In II Metaphysicorum, comm. 15, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), fol. 35D. See also, In VIII Physicorum, comm. 46, Juntina ed., vol. 4 (1562), fol. 387H.

117 That is, a highly organized physical body. The view here is that an animal body that is highly developed enough will be “all ready” for the implanting of an intelligent soul in it, resulting in a human being, and that this can sometimes happen without the intervention of human parents.


119 reason: ratio. Here, a “divine reason” or divine idea. This was a standard idiom.
Therefore, it cannot be maintained that an idea is another thing than the divine essence.

On these doubts and many others, there is one way of talking, [namely,] that some [things] are really the same and [yet] diverse with respect to what they connote. By this means, one replies to difficulties about the [divine] attributes. For they say that in God to know is the same as to will, or to know about is the same as to will. Nevertheless, God knows about the evil of sin and does not love or will the evil of sin. In this way, contradictories are attributed to [what is] really the same, by reason of what they connote. And so [too] for ideas, namely, the idea of man and the idea of horse are really the same, since they are the same in the divine essence, and yet are diverse with respect to what they connote.

But to the contrary: The idea of man either is a thing signified by the utterance ['man'] or else it is the utterance signifying the thing signified by the utterance. If, [in either case,] \(a\) is the thing signified by ‘the divine knowing’, and \(b\) is the thing signified by ‘the divine loving’, then \(a\) and \(b\) are entirely the same thing, because in God knowing and loving are the same. If, therefore, \(a\) and \(b\) are entirely the same thing, it cannot be said that \(a\) connotes something unless \(b\) connotes the same [thing]. For this diversity of connotations cannot be on the side of the things connoted. And if it is said that it is on the side of the utterances, then this kind of diverse connotation makes no difference to the case at hand. For there is no difficulty about the identity or diversity of the utterances, but only about the identity or diversity of the thing.

Keeping to the question and to [this] famous opinion [about it], we can say that that is said to be connoted which is included in the total significate of a name and is signified in an oblique case or in the nominative. What is signified in the nominative is said to be signified principally. For example, the utterance ‘divine essence representing man’, as far as the part of the utterance that is in the nominative is concerned, signifies the divine essence. Yet through the other part of the utterance, which is in an oblique case, it signifies the thing represented by the divine essence.

**120** **utterance:** *vocem* (ed. 6\textsuperscript{ra} 54, MS 44\textsuperscript{v} 15). The word is surprising here. Certainly, Burley is not talking about spoken words. By ‘utterance’, he seems to mean the actual divine thought, so that the distinction made here is between the idea as the divine act of thinking and the idea as the *object* of that act. If thinking is regarded as a kind of “mental language” (as was common in Burley’s day), then perhaps ‘vox’ here simply means “word” — that is, *term* — of mental language. It is still surprising, however; ‘vox’ almost always refers to *speech*. (We get ‘voice’ from it, after all.) The usual term for the mental or divine “word” is ‘*verbum*’. The word recurs throughout the paragraph (ed. 6\textsuperscript{ra} 54–65). The MS 44\textsuperscript{v} 15–22 has a text that is only loosely parallel to the ed., although the overall sense is the same. It too uses forms of ‘*vox*’ throughout.

**121** **keeping to:** Reading ‘*sustinendo*’ with the MS 44\textsuperscript{v} 22, for ‘*sustinente*’ in the ed. 6\textsuperscript{v} 65.

**122** **is said:** Reading ‘*dicitur*’ with MS 44\textsuperscript{v} 23. The ed. 6\textsuperscript{v} 66 omits the word.

**123** **and:** Reading ‘*er*’ with the MS 44\textsuperscript{v} 23, for ‘*vel*’ in the ed. 6\textsuperscript{v} 67.
namely, man. Therefore, the principal significate is signified in the nominative, and the
connotatum is signified in an oblique case. Therefore, when it is said that the idea or
name of a [divine] attribute connotes, the connotation is [indeed] on the side of the
defined utterance [even] when it is on the side of the things signified by the utterance.

[137] Thus, when it is said [that “the term] ‘idea’ connotes [something] other
than the divine essence”, it is understood here that the name ‘idea’ includes more
[things] in its total significate than [does] the name ‘divine essence’. And then the
question arises about the thing signified by the utterance, insofar as it is signified by it.
When it is asked whether the idea is the same as the divine [essence] or not, I say that
the idea, with respect to the principal significate in it, is the same. But with respect to
the connotatum, it is not the divine essence but [something] else.

[138] Thus, Blessed Augustine grants that there are several ideas, with respect
to [their] connotata — that is, with respect to [their] ideata. For there are several
[things] ideated or connoted by the divine essence. But there are not several ideas with
respect to what is principally conveyed by the name ‘idea’, because that is the divine
essence only.

[139] But there is a doubt. For Blessed Augustine says that the ideas are
immutable reasons,125 and he is speaking [there] in personal supposition about the
same [things] of which he says ‘eternal essence’. But the connotata and ideata are not
eternal. Therefore, a plurality must be attributed to other [things] than to the ideata. So,
from eternity there was a plurality in the divine essence.

[140] It must be said that the ideata were objectively eternal in the divine
essence. That is, from eternity they were represented and understood by God. Thus,
one should not grant absolutely that man, or a quantity of man,126 was from eternity.
For in this [proposition] the verb predicates as an “adjacent second”,127 For the deter-
mination ‘from eternity’ is not a predicate but rather a determination of the verb. Thus,
for nothing other than God should there be granted a predication of the verb [‘is’] in
the past tense, or the present, together with the determination ‘from eternity’ or
‘eternally’, according as [the verb] predicates as an “adjacent second”. Yet, according
as [the verb ‘is’] predicates as an “adjacent third”, many affirmative propositions with

124 ‘Man’ is in the accusative case in the Latin.

125 The point here seems to be the fact that Augustine speaks in the plural.

126 quantity of man: quantitas hominis. This could refer to a man’s size. But I suspect that it
just means “a certain number of men”.

127 adjacent second: secundum adjacens. This is a standard piece of terminology. The verb ‘is’
(and its various tenses), when it serves as the copula in a subject–predicate proposition of the form $S$ is
$P$, is said to be an “adjacent third” (tertium adjacens). But when it serves as the predicate in a
proposition of the form $S$ is, it is said to be an “adjacent second”. The latter case is sometimes analyzed
as $S$ is a being, thus reducing propositions secundum adjacens to propositions tertium adjacens.
the determination ‘from eternity’ can correctly be granted of [something] other than 

God.

[141] For instance, ‘Man was from eternity’ is not to be granted. Neither was 
the proposition ‘Man is’ true from eternity. For in these [propositions] the verb ‘is’ 
predicates as an adjacent second. Yet in another way, propositions in which the verb 
‘is’ predicates affirmatively as an adjacent third are to be granted with the determina-
tion ‘from eternity’. Thus ‘Man, or a quantity of man, was understood by God from 
eternity and was creatable by God from eternity’ is true.

[142] And so it is for ideas. For what is connoted by ‘the idea of man’ was rep-
resented from eternity by the divine essence. Hence, Augustine says that the ideas are 
eternal reasons. The author’s meaning is that an idea, with respect to [its] connotata, is 
eterally represented according as it was from eternity objectively in the divine 
essence. That is plain enough. For it is certain that God is an agent and cause through 
his [his] cognition, and therefore all that God creates now and anew\textsuperscript{128} he earlier and from 
eternity knew was going to be created. So a thing that is now made by God was 
understood from eternity by the divine intellect.

[143] From these [considerations] it can be made clear that certain [people] are 
mistaken. They say that all the things understood by God from eternity are the same as 
the divine essence. For it is manifest that Antichrist, who will be created, is not God 
himself. For if numerically the same [thing] that is Antichrist, who will be created, 
were numerically the same as the divine essence, it would follow that Antichrist was 
already created, and he would be the same as the divine essence, which is false.

[144] Thus, one can argue as follows: Nothing that is the divine essence will be 
created. Antichrist will be created. Therefore, Antichrist is not the divine essence. The 
premises are true. Therefore, etc.

[145] Suppose it is said that (a) everything that is in the divine essence is the 
same as the divine essence. But a thing that will be made was never in the divine 
essence. Therefore, such a thing was never the divine essence.

[146] (b) Again, if Antichrist, who will be created, is not the same as the divine 
essence, therefore he is other than the divine essence. But the same and other are dif-
fences of being. Therefore, if Antichrist, who will be created, was other than God, it 
follows that Antichrist, who will be created, is a being.

[147] (c) [This] is confirmed as follows: ‘Other’ conveys a relation, but only 
between things.

\textsuperscript{128} anew: \textit{de novo}. Creation \textit{de novo} is creation now, after the original six days of creation. For 
instance, the creation of individual human souls during the development of the fetus is a creation \textit{de novo}. Human souls, it was generally agreed at this time, did not pre–exist in some celestial warehouse 
from which they would then be taken and implanted in suitably prepared matter. No, they were created 
on the occasion.
[148] To (a),\(^{129}\) it is to be said that for something to be in the divine essence happens in two ways: either (i) essentially, or (ii) objectively or representatively. I say then that everything that is in the divine essence essentially is the same as the divine essence. And the proposition [in objection (a)] should be understood in this sense. Nevertheless, not everything that is in the divine essence objectively or representatively is the same as the divine essence.

[149] If it is said that God understands nothing outside himself, according to the Commentator, *Metaphysics*, XII,\(^{130}\) [and] therefore whatever God understands is the same as God, [then] it must be said that God understands nothing outside himself primarily. Rather he understands himself first, and in understanding himself understands all other [things].

[150] Likewise, God understands nothing outside himself through a reception from external things, as our intellect understands by receiving species from external things. But God, in understanding himself, understands all other [things], because the divine essence is a sufficient representative of all other [things].

[151] The common slogan from the Commentator, namely, that in the case of [things] separated from matter, what understands\(^{131}\) is the same as the understood,\(^{132}\) should be understood in this sense, [namely,] understanding by ‘understood’ that through which the separated intellect understands.\(^{133}\) In [things] separated from matter, the intelligible is the same as that through which [the intellect] understands.

[152] Thus, according to the Commentator, no substance separated from matter understands through a received species, but only through its essence.\(^{134}\) Rather this is proper to an intellect conjoined to matter, namely, to understand through a species received from the understood thing.

[153] To (b),\(^{135}\) I grant that a thing that is going to be created is other than God, taking ‘other’ insofar as it is a difference of the transcendental ‘being’, as was noted.\(^{136}\) And [‘being’, in this sense, is] maximally transcendental, because ‘being’, so

\(^{129}\) See paragraph [145] above.

\(^{130}\) Averroes, *In XII Metaphysicorum*, comm. 51, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), fols. 335D–337C.

\(^{131}\) what understands: Reading ‘*intelligens*’ with the MS 45\(^{27}\), for ‘*intelligible*’ in the ed. 6\(^{v}\).\(^{7}\)

\(^{132}\) See, for example, Averroes, *In XII Metaphysicorum*, comm. 39, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), fol. 322D–E. Also, *ibid.*, comm. 51, fols. 335D–337C.

\(^{133}\) understands: Reading ‘*intelligit*’ with MS 45\(^{27}\), for ‘*intelligitur*’ in ed. 6\(^{v}\).\(^{9}\)

\(^{134}\) Averroes, *In XII Metaphysicorum*, comm. 51, Juntina ed., vol. 8 (1562), fols. 335D–337C.

\(^{135}\) See paragraph [146] above.

\(^{136}\) See paragraph [146] above.
said, is convertible with the common [term] ‘intelligible’. Therefore, just as the thing that is going to be created was from eternity intelligible, so from eternity it was a being, taking ‘being’ insofar as it is a name. Nevertheless, it should not be granted that the thing that is going to be created was from eternity, because in this [proposition] ‘being’ is predicated as a participle, because the verb ‘was’ is predicated in it as an adjacent second.

[154] To (c), when it is said that otherness is a relation, and a relation [is only between things], I say that [otherness] is a transcendental relation. For in every category there is found an otherness between the things in that category and in another. Such a relation can quite well be between a non-being and a being. Hence the understanding is related to the understood, as is clear from Metaphysics, V, and yet [there is sometimes] something understood [that] is not a being.

[155] There is another [way] of dividing [questions] about ideas, which is really the same as the one described earlier. It is that ‘idea’ can be taken either for what it signifies or for what it denominates. In the first sense, there are several ideas, because the name ‘idea’ not only signifies the divine essence but also the divine essence representing the ideatum. Hence ‘idea of man’ signifies the same as the expression ‘divine essence representing man’, and ‘idea of a horse’ signifies the divine essence representing a horse. And it is certain that not only the divine essence belongs to the signicate of the whole expression, but also the ideatum — namely, man or horse. So it is clear that the idea of man signifies one thing, and the idea of horse signifies another.

[156] But if ‘idea’ is taken for what it denominates, then only the divine essence is an idea. For ‘The divine essence is the idea of man’ is true, and is a denominative predication, like ‘The divine essence is representing man’.

[157] But then there is a doubt in which way of taking ‘idea’ is it to be granted [both] that the ideas are eternal and that there are several ideas. For taking ‘idea’ for what it denominates, there is no plurality there, and taking ‘idea’ for what it signifies, there is no eternity there. For the ideatum belongs to the signicate of the idea, and the ideatum is not eternal.

[158] It must be said that expert statements must be taken in the sense in which they are made, and not in the sense they make. I say that, literally, it is false that the ideas are several and eternal. But the author’s meaning is true, and it is that the ideata are several, and that they are objectively represented or drawn out by the divine essence from eternity. And that is true.

137 See paragraph [147] above.

138 category: Reading ‘praedicamenti’ with the MS 45r38, for ‘praesenti’ in the ed. 6va23.

[159] Or let it be said that the plurality is referred to one [thing], and the eternity is referred to [something] else, according to Augustine’s meaning. For the plurality is referred to things, and the eternity[140] [is referred] to what [the term ‘idea’] denominates, namely, to the divine essence. So [too] the division, (that a term can be taken for what it signifies and for what it denominates) can be applied to the matter, namely, about eternity and in eternity.[141]

[160] For the Doctors maintain three kinds of measure for the duration of things: (a) time, which is claimed to be the measure of mutable and corruptible [things]; (b) everlastingness,[142] according to the duration or measure of angels. And there is maintained (c) another [kind of] measure, which is called eternity, [and] which is posited, according to imagination, to be the measure of God. Nevertheless, this common claim about the different kinds of duration cannot be understood in the sense that there are three simple measures of duration. Indeed, every measure of duration is time. For duration cannot be understood without earlier and later. But only time is the measure of earlier and later in duration. Thus, an angel does not have a measure of [its] duration that is another thing than the essence of the angel. For by the same reasoning, that other thing would have [yet] another measure, and there would be an infinite regress. Neither[143] does God have some measure of his duration, which [measure] is another thing from God himself.

[161] Thus, [‘everlastingness’ or] ‘eternity’ can be taken principally for what it conveys, and that is what it denominates, like the essence of an angel or of God, or else it can be taken for what it signifies. In the first sense, everlastingness is the same as the essence of an angel, and eternity is the same as the divine essence. In the second sense, [everlastingness] is the same as what the expression ‘angelic essence coexisting with time’ signifies, and eternity is the same as [what the expression] ‘God’s essence coexisting with eternal time, true or imaginative’ [signifies]. Thus, that is eternal which coexists with eternal time, if there were to have been time from [all] eternity.

[162] So, therefore, I say that, taking ‘everlastingness’ or ‘eternity’ for what it signifies, in that sense each is other than time, because it conveys more — namely, the essence of the angel or of God. But taking ‘everlastingness’ or ‘eternity’ for what it

---

140 eternity: Reading ‘aeternitas’ with MS 45v4, for ‘idea’ in ed. 65v53.

141 The end of this sentence is gibberish, as far as I can make out. I suspect some textual problems here. In ed. 66v54–57, the Latin is: “Ita divisio, scilicet, quod terminus potest accipi pro eo quod significat et pro eo quod denominat potest applicari materiae, scilicet, de aeternitate et in aeternitate.” The MS 45v5–7 has: “Ista dicendo, scilicet, quod terminus potest accipi pro eo quod denominat vel pro eo quod significat potest applicare (then two illegible words), scilicet, aeterntiati et in aeternitati (sic).” The textual problems continue for the next three paragraphs.

142 everlastingness: aevum.

143 Neither: Reading ‘Nec’ with the MS 45v14, for ‘Nam’ in the ed. 66v70.
denominates, in that sense everlastingness is nothing but the essence of the angel, and eternity is nothing but the essence of God.

[163] If it is said that the name ‘eternity’ cannot be denominative, since it is abstract by an ultimate abstraction, it is to be said that [something] can be called “denominative” [in the sense of] (a) what is denominative in itself, and that is not abstract by an ultimate abstraction, or else (b) it can be called “denominative” in its equivalent. ‘Eternity’ is like the latter, because it is the same as ‘coexisting with the whole of eternal time, if [time] should be [eternal]’. But now my phrase ‘coexisting with the whole of eternal time’ is also in a certain way denominative. In this way, therefore, it appears that the measure of the duration of an angel is not some thing besides the nature or essence of the angel and besides the time with which the angel coexists. Neither is eternity another thing than God and than the infinite time, if there should be [such a thing], with which God coexists.

[164] You should know that the [notion of] a concrete term is divided [as follows]: One kind is concrete by a concretion of the subject, another kind by a concretion of the suppositum. Everything that is what conveys a form and [along with that] the subject of the form, whether it signifies adjectivally or substantivally, is concrete by a concretion of the subject. For example: adjectivally, like ‘white’, ‘black’, and the like. Substantivally, like ‘master’, ‘servant’, and the like — and in general, all the names of offices and of positions of dignity or subservience.

[165] A concrete [term] by a concretion of the suppositum is what conveys a thing existing by itself. In this sense, ‘man’, ‘ass’, and the like, are said to be concretes by a concretion of the suppositum. Such [concrete terms] are called concrete subjectively. Of this kind, there are some that indicate a substantial form inhering in the suppositum with which they are concerned, like ‘man’ and ‘ass’. There are others that indicate a form inhering in [something] other than that with which they are concerned, like the words ‘human’, ‘forged’ and the like. For these indicate a form inhering in [something] else extrinsic to that of which they are predicated. For a house is called “human” not from [any] humanity that is in the house but rather from the humanity that is in the man, and a [produced] work is called “forged” not from [any] art of forging that is in the work but rather from the art of forging that is in the smithy.

---

144 Both the ed. 6vb12 and the MS 45v23 add ‘vel quasi’ here, which seems unintelligible in the context.

145 Abstract by an ultimate abstraction: This notion is explained in the following paragraphs.

146 Namely, in sense (a) above.

147 Everything: Following the MS 45v32. The ed. 6vb27 adds an unconstruable ‘esse’ at the beginning of the sentence.

148 Forged: Reading ‘fabrile’ with MS 45v39, for ‘fabulae’ in ed. 6vb40. ‘Forged’ here does not mean forged in the sense of “faked”, but rather in the sense of being produced by a forge or furnace.
In the same way, it can be said about the [notion of an] abstract [term] that one kind is abstract by an abstraction of an accidental form from a suppositum in which it finally inheres, like ‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’, etc. Another kind is abstract by an abstraction of a substantial form from the subject\(^{149}\) in which it really inheres or [which] it denominates in any way whatever. In this sense ‘humanity’ is said to be abstracted from ‘man’, or from a suppositum in which [humanity] really inheres. It is also called abstract with respect to ‘human’, which is denominated from humanity.

Thus, with respect to ‘human’, ‘man’ is called a kind of abstract [term]. For although ‘man’ is concrete with respect to ‘humanity’, nevertheless it is abstract with respect to ‘human’, which is more concrete than ‘man’, because it concerns and conveys more [things]. For it signifies human nature and conveys and denominates another, extrinsic thing — say, a work or a possession of a man.

Thus, it is to be known that when something includes or signifies a greater composition, to that extent it is called more concrete. On account of this, what signifies the simplest concept of some form is called “abstract by an ultimate abstraction”, and what signifies a maximally composite concept is said to be “a most remote concrete” — namely, [most remote] from matter.

Hence ‘humanity’ is abstract by an ultimate abstraction, because there is no [concept] before the intellect simpler in [the case of] human nature than is the name ‘humanity’. And ‘human’ is concrete by an ultimate concretion, because there can be no concept before the intellect signified by the name ‘man’ more composite than what is signified by the name ‘human’. But ‘man’ is in a certain way, concrete and in a certain way abstract. For it is concrete with respect to ‘humanity’ and abstract with respect to ‘human’. But ‘humanity’ is not concrete with respect to anything, and ‘human’ is not abstract with respect to anything. For a [term] abstract by an ultimate abstraction signifies whatever form [it does] with precision from every other thing whatever. This is why Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, V, “Equinity is equinity only.”\(^{150}\) That is, the name ‘equinity’\(^{151}\) indicates such and such a form with precision from every other thing whatever. But this is not so for a concrete [term]. For every concrete [term] indicates something besides the form conveyed by the common name.

\(^{149}\) from the subject: Reading ‘a subjecto’ with the MS 45\(^4\)44. The ed. 6\(^{vb}\)49 omits these words.

\(^{150}\) ‘Equinity is equinity only’: Reading ‘equinitas est equinitas tantum’ with the MS 46\(^8\)8, for ‘entitas est entitas tantum’ in the ed. 7\(^a\)4–5. See Avicenna, Metaphysics, V, 1, in his Opera, (Venice: Bonetus Locatellus for Octavianus Scotus, 1508; photoreprint Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1961), fol. 86\(^v\)a. The critical edition in Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima seu scientia divina, S. Van Riet, ed., 2 vols., (vol. 1 [I–IV], Louvain: E. Peeters, & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977; vol. 2 [V–X], Louvain: E. Peeters, & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), contains marginal folio references to the standard edition of Venice 1508.

\(^{151}\) equinity: Again, reading ‘equinitas’ with the MS 46\(^9\)9, for ‘entitas’ in the ed. 7\(^a\)4–5.
[Continuation of the Discussion of Doubt I: The Fictum-Theory]

[170] Now that we have seen the opinions that maintain that universals have being in reality, one more opinion can be maintained, [namely,] that universals are not existents in reality, either in the soul or outside the soul. Rather they only have objective being in the intellect. Hence this opinion maintains two things: The first is that universals have objective being in the intellect. The second is that they do not have the being of existence. Neither do they have [any] other kind of being than the objective [being] of the intellect.

[171] By ‘objective being’ I understand being cognized, and “the objective being of the intellect” is the same as being intelligible. Thus, some things have being in effect\textsuperscript{152} and also object-being.\textsuperscript{153} For example, things that exist in reality and are also known by the intellect, like things existing outside the soul that, together with the fact that they are outside the soul, are known by the intellect. Other things have only object-being in the intellect, as a chimera [and] a golden mountain have only object-being in the intellect. And [yet] other things appearing to sense and not\textsuperscript{154} existing in reality have only object-being in the sense and in a superior power.

[172] This is clear in the case of the number of candles and the sun. For if an eye is stretched up or pressed down beyond its normal position, one candle will appear as two candles, and one sun will appear as two suns. Such duality is not anything in nature, but only in sensory appearance or in the apparent cognition of the sense.

[173] Likewise, if an undamaged stick is put one-half in water, it will appear to sight that the stick is broken. But this break only has being in appearance, or in the apparent cognition of sight. And as is the case for vision,\textsuperscript{155} so is the case [too] for the other senses.

[174] Such an appearance occurs also in the interior sensible powers and even in the intellect, because whatever is known by an inferior power is known by a superior power. For whatever is known by an exterior [sense-] power is known by the common sense,\textsuperscript{156} and not conversely, and so on climbing right up to the intellect.

\textsuperscript{152} in effect: \textit{in effectu}. This is a standard phrase, meaning “in actuality”, “as a result of its causes”.

\textsuperscript{153} object-being: The Latin here is ‘esse objectum’, not ‘esse objectivum’ as one finds in other discussions of the topic. The sense is “being a [thought-] object”, or “being a [mental-] object”.

\textsuperscript{154} not: Reading ‘\textit{non}’ with the MS 46’21. The ed. 7\textsuperscript{a}24 omits the word.

\textsuperscript{155} And … vision: Reading ‘et sicut est de visu’ with the MS 46’27, for ‘et sic est diversa’ with the ed. 7\textsuperscript{a}34.

\textsuperscript{156} common sense: Not common practical wisdom, but the \textit{“sensus communis”} in the sense of Aristotle’s \textit{De anima}, III, 2.
Therefore, I say that a universal has only object-being in the intellect. This is proved as follows: For the universal is known by the intellect, as is clear. For the intellect can have a knowledge of ass or lion in general without having a knowledge of any particular ass or singular lion. So it is clear that the universal has object-being only in the intellect.

That the universal does not have [any] other [kind of] being outside the [mental] object is clear. For it does not have the being of existence in the soul or outside the soul, as the above arguments prove against both opinions, the one of which maintains that universals are concepts in the soul and the other maintains that universals are things existing outside the soul. Thus it follows that the universal has only object-being in the soul.

This is what Boethius says on Porphyry, that universals are understood as existing things, and are not such things.

Against this opinion it is argued as follows:

(1) When the singular is posited, the universal is posited. For it follows: “Socrates is; therefore, man is,” and not conversely. [Thus] this inference is good: “The singular exists; therefore, the universal exists.” The antecedent is true. Therefore, the consequent [is] too. Consequently, the universal has the being of existence and not only objective being.

(2) Again, when the superior is destroyed, the inferior is destroyed. Therefore, if universals do not exist, singulars do not exist. The consequent is false. Therefore, etc.

---

157: That is, one who holds the fictum-theory. Burley’s own theory appears to be more realist than this. See also the following note.

158: This is puzzling. In fact, the theory that universals are concepts has never been explicitly addressed in the above discussion, even though it plainly belongs under Doubt (IV). (See paragraph [20] above.) On the other hand, the arguments given above in favor of the two forms of realism considered under Doubt (III) may, I suppose, be considered as arguments against the theory of universals as concepts. As for arguments against realism, we may count the six (unanswered) arguments in paragraphs [36]–[49], above, against the theory that the universal is the same as its singulars (so that the universal is not the same thing in each of its singulars), and the five arguments given in paragraphs [77]–[86] against the theory that the universal is not the same as its singulars (and so is the same thing in each of its singulars). Burley answered the five latter arguments, which lends credence to the view that he is not speaking for himself in the present paragraph.

159: has only: Reading ‘solum habet’ with the MS 46’38, for ‘non solum habet’ in the ed. 7°51.


161: this: Reading ‘istam’ with the MS 46’41, for ‘aliam’ in the ed. 7°54.
(3) Again, what does not have [any] other kind of being than as an object in the soul has being as a figment. For figments of the intellect, like a chimera, have object-being. Therefore, if the universal does not have [any] other kind of being than object-being in the soul, it follows that universals are figments, which is false.

(4) Again, science is about universals, as it clear from Posterior Analytics, I. But about the subject of a science it must be assumed that it is. Therefore, the universal has true being.

To (1), it is said that from an inferior to its superior is a good inference according as the superior has personal supposition, and not according as it has simple supposition. Thus it correctly follows: “Socrates is; therefore, some man exists.” But it does not follow: “Socrates is; therefore, man is,” according to this way [of viewing universals]. Neither does it follow: “The singular is; therefore, the universal is.”

In the same way, I say [to objection (2)] that when a superior is destroyed taken personally, the inferior is destroyed. For it follows: “No man is; therefore, Socrates is not.” But when the superior is destroyed simply [taken], the inferior is not destroyed on that account.

To (3), the other [argument], it is said that what has object-being in the soul [both] according to itself and [also] according to all its singulars has only being as a figment, as is clear in the case of a chimera. For both chimera in general and this chimera only have being in the soul as an object. But what in itself only has object-being in the soul, such as man, and [yet has] singulars existing outside the soul, does not have being as a figment.

But there is a doubt about those cases that neither in themselves nor in their singulars have being [outside the soul]. How can they have object-being in the soul? For nothing is in the intellect except what was previously under a sense [-power]. And every intellective cognition has [its] origin from sense, as is clear from Posterior Analytics, I.

You must know that a chimera and such ficta have a concept in the soul, which [concept] is a true being in the soul, because it is a quality of the soul. But the concept is not efficiently caused by that of which it is a concept. Rather it is caused by

---

162 See, for example, Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73b26–33.

163 See paragraph [179] above.

164 Both the ed. 7v1–2 and the MS 4652 add ‘omnis’ (= ‘every’) here. This is surely a mistake, since quantifiers like this force the following term into personal supposition, not simple.

165 See paragraph [180] above.

166 See paragraph [181] above.

167 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 18, 81a38–40.
the parts of such a fictum, and by the soul that puts the concepts of the parts together with one another. For instance, the intellect has the concept of a mountain, and it has the concept of gold. These concepts are caused by a mountain and by gold. With those concepts existing in the intellect, the intellect puts those concepts together with one another and makes one composite concept that represents a golden mountain, which is a certain fictive being.

[188] It is the same way for a chimera. For the intellect has a concept of a man’s head and of a lion’s body and of other things, and from those concepts it makes a composite concept that represents a chimera.\(^\text{168}\)


Note that in reality there are only two principles² of a substance, namely matter and form.

Matter is that which is in potency, having no form of itself but rather being in potency to all forms and the subject of all [of them]. Properly speaking, [it is] not anything belonging to the essence of the composite, but [is] the subject of the essence. Without it the essence cannot subsist. Thus matter is necessary as an “occasion” for the composite.

Form, on the other hand, is the whole essence of the composite, as Aristotle says, *Metaphysics*, VII. Thus, if the essence of a man could subsist without matter, it would be infinitely more noble than the essence that is now found in matter.

---

¹ Augustín Uña Juárez, *La filosofía del siglo XIV: Contexto cultural de Walter Burley*, (“Biblioteca ‘La Ciudad de Dios’”; Madrid: San Lorenzo de El Escorial, 1978), p. 61, cites this work as *De duobus primis principiis*. The work is printed together with Burley’s *De relativis in Tractatus de materia et forma magistri Walteri Burlei doctoris planissimi, Aliud perbreve compendium de relativis eiusdem doctoris utile tamen admodum novellis logici* (Oxford, 1518) under the title *Tractatus de materia et forma*. Herman Shapiro cites it under this title in his “A Note on Walter Burley’s Exaggerated Realism,” *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960), pp. 205–214. In a colophon in this 1518 edition, we read “Impositus est finis tractatui doctoris planissimi de duobus principiis, scilicet, materia et forma, et de relativis …”. I have for the most part followed the edition in Herman Shapiro, “More on the ‘Exaggeration’ of Burley’s Realism,” *Manuscripta* 6 (1962), pp. 94–98. That edition is based not on the 1518 edition but instead on MS Vat. lat. 2146, fols. 247rv–248rv. I have not seen the Vatican manuscript, but have compared Shapiro’s edition with the 1518 text, and have sometimes adopted the latter’s readings in my translation. All such departures from Shapiro’s text are recorded in the notes. I have also noted certain other relevant variants found in the 1518 edition.

² principles: The Oxford edition has ‘first principles’. Compare the title of the work as cited by Uña Juárez (see n. 1 above).
An individual has non-being from the nature of matter, but it has being from the nature of form. Therefore, all forms separated from prime matter are incorporeal or incorruptible.\textsuperscript{3}

The [kind of] form that is found only in matter has a twofold being. For the form’s essence is\textsuperscript{4} other than the essence of matter, and naturally prior both to matter and to the composite, as Aristotle says at the beginning of \textit{Metaphysics}, VII. So it has some naturally prior being in itself, besides the being that is left in it insofar as it is the act of matter and the perfection of the composite.

Therefore, insofar as it is something in itself, it has a twofold being: \textbf{(1a)}

One, insofar as it is an essence in itself other than the essence of matter, without any comparison to matter. In this sense, it is properly called an “essence”, and this [kind of] being is called “essential being”.

\textbf{(1b)} The other [kind of being] it has in comparison with matter, insofar as it is multipliable through matter. For by nature the form is multipliable through matter prior to [its] being actually multiplied.\textsuperscript{5} This [kind of] being is called “habitual being”.\textsuperscript{6} It is due to the nature insofar as the nature is multipliable through many [individuals].

---

\textsuperscript{3} incorporeal or incorruptible: The Oxford edition has only ‘incorruptible’, but adds the remark: “because their being does not depend on matter”. The remark is inserted into the sentence in a syntactically awkward way, suggesting that it was originally a marginal or interlinear gloss that subsequently found its way into the text in the printed version.

\textsuperscript{4} form’s essence is: Reading ‘formae’ with the Oxford text instead of Shapiro’s ‘forma’. Shapiro’s reading yields: “the form is an essence”, which is acceptable too. I have followed the Oxford text as preferable here on the assumption that the phrase is meant to be contrasted with ‘essence of matter’ later in the sentence.

\textsuperscript{5} multiplied: The Oxford edition has ‘multiple’ (multiplicem), which is an acceptable reading too.

\textsuperscript{6} habitual being: \textit{esse habituale}. The contrast is between “habitual being” and “actual being” (see below in the text). The relation between the two is like the relation between, say, habitual and actual knowledge. I may be said to have habitual knowledge of Latin, for instance, even while I am asleep and not actually or occurrently exercising that knowledge. And even when I do actually exercise that knowledge, we may still distinguish between my habitual knowledge and that actual or occurrent knowledge. So too, a form has a “habitual being” that can be distinguished from any actual being it has in this or that individual. The terminology of habitual and actual being is meant to be only metaphorical, however, and not literal. For habits were regarded as falling under the category of quality, which is clearly not involved in the notion of “habitual being”. For this reason too, one should be careful not to take the term ‘habitual’ with any overtones of “wontedness”, as though something with habitual being had been a being for so long it finally just “got into the habit” of being. For some interesting remarks on the earlier history of the notion of \textit{esse habituale}, see H. A. G. Braakhuis, “The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation of Those of Roger Bacon,” \textit{Vivarium} 15 (1977), pp. 111–142.
On the other hand, insofar as the form is in matter, it has two other [kinds of] being. *(2a)* For it is the act of the matter, and so is properly called a “form”. For ‘form’ is [so-] called from ‘informing’. *(2b)* But it has another [kind of] being that following immediately on this. For from the fact that it is the act of matter, it is consequently the perfection of the whole composite. In accordance with this [kind of] being it is called a “quiddity”.

Either of these two [latter kinds of] being is called “actual being” or “the act of being”. According to this [kind of] being, the form is substance in act, and [is] the principle of the individual.

So it is clear that the principles of individual things are singular and not universal, because [they are] singular form and singular matter, as the Commentator says on *Metaphysics*, VII, the chapter on universals.

Now the form fully has these four [kinds of] being outside the soul. So the universal, under the [kind of] being a universal has, is outside the soul. Yet this being is not actual, but only habitual. Thus, as far as the act of existing is concerned, there is nothing outside the soul except the singular. For according to the act of existing, the form is found only in matter. Nevertheless, the universal is outside the soul, according to habit. [It is] to this [external] universal [that] there corresponds the universal species in the soul. For [the species] represents to the intellect the universal nature existing outside the soul, not as it is [something] actually multiplied in singulars but as it is multipliable. The species, on the other hand, because it is abstracted by the intellect from matter and from material conditions, has universal being in act.

Thus the universal has the act of existing under that kind of being only from the soul. This is what the Commentator says, that “the agent intellect, by subtracting, makes a universal according to act” — add: of existence — “and not according to habit. What Aristotle says, at the end of the Posterior Analytics and at the beginning of the old *Metaphysics*, is to be understood in this sense, that out of many memories there arises an experience of one

---

7. *act of existing: actus existendi*. Apparently, this is meant to the be same as the “act of being” (*actus essendi*) or “actual being” (*esse actuale*) two paragraphs above in the text.

8. *universal being in act: esse universale in actu*, in contrast to the merely habitual kind of being the external universal has. *Esse in actu* is yet another equivalent for *actus essendi*, *esse actuale*, and *actus existendi*.

universal that reposes in the soul. For the soul makes there be many universals — that is, [it] alone [makes] universals to be in act, namely, in the soul.\textsuperscript{10}

Since the intention received by sense is individual and in matter under material conditions under which it was unable to be received by the intellect, it was necessary\textsuperscript{11} for it to be abstracted from such conditions by the agent intellect, and so to become universal in act, and intelligible. Thus, this abstraction is\textsuperscript{12} necessary more on account of the soul than on account of the universal itself.

Hence, the Philosopher, in De anima, I, when he says that the universal “is either nothing or else is posterior”, and the Commentator on Metaphysics, XI, when he says that no universal has being outside the soul, understand [these claims to hold] for the being that is the act or existing, and not for habitual\textsuperscript{13} being. For in this sense the universal is posterior to singulars, since it is abstracted from them. And [they] also [understand them to hold] according to the act of existing. For if the primary singulars are destroyed, universals are destroyed [too]. But according to habitual being, [universals] are incorruptible. For even if there should be no man in human nature, [nevertheless] there is a certain nature that is prone to be multiplied through several individuals, even though it be actually found in none. So it fully has the being of a universal, and for that kind\textsuperscript{14} of being the proposition ‘Man is, even if no man exists’ is to be conceded.

If someone objects that this opinion holds that the universal in reality is something beyond\textsuperscript{15} the understanding and outside singulars, and so posits separated Ideas, as Plato maintained, it is to be said [in reply] that Plato held that universal forms have an act of existing outside singulars, and are a “this something”, and beings in act, as the entity of other [things]. But, although a universal has habitual being in itself, besides the fact that it is in a singular, the proposition ‘Man is, even if no man exists’ is to be conceded.

\textsuperscript{10} For ... soul: I am not confident of my translation of this sentence. The Latin (in both the Oxford edition and in Shapiro’s text) reads: “quia illa anima facit universalia esse multa, scilicet solum universalia esse in actu scilicet in anima”. The translation above was the best I could do with this.

\textsuperscript{11} necessary: Reading ‘necessarium’ with the Oxford edition instead of ‘necessaria’ with Shapiro’s text, which makes no sense.

\textsuperscript{12} is: Reading ‘est’ with the Oxford edition. Shapiro’s text omits the word.

\textsuperscript{13} habitual: Reading ‘habituali’ with the Oxford edition rather than ‘habituale’ with Shapiro’s text.

\textsuperscript{14} that kind: Reading ‘tali’ with the Oxford edition rather than ‘tale’ with Shapiro’s text.

\textsuperscript{15} beyond: Reading ‘praeter’ (= ‘preter’) with the Oxford edition. Shapiro’s text has ‘per-ter’, an obvious printing error.
nevertheless as far as act is concerned, it is found only in singulars, since the form cannot actually subsist without matter.

If someone still objects that this is the definition of a universal, that it be one in many, and not beyond many, as Aristotle says in *Posterior Analytics*, I, it is to be said [in reply] that the being [universals have] does not give actual existence but only habitual. So the sense [of the passage] is [that] the universal is one, prone to be in many and of many. Thus, according to universal being it is habitually in many. Under this being it does not include any determinate individuals, but rather all present, past and future ones indifferently. In this sense, science is about the universal. But insofar as it is actually multiplied, it determinately includes present individuals. Under that kind of being it is corruptible, and about that there is imagination, not science, as Aristotle says in the old *Metaphysics*, where he argues against Plato.

---

16 cannot: Reading ‘*non potest*’ with the Oxford edition, rather than Shapiro’s ‘*non posuit*’, which makes no sense.
Walter Chatton, *Reportatio*, i, d. 3, q. 2: “Whether any concept is common and univocal to God and creature?”


It seems not. For God and creature agree less than do two concepts of being — that is, than the concept of being repeated twice. Yet the latter agree so little that there can be no universal concept common to them. Therefore, etc. The minor is clear, because if the two [concepts of being] had some third [concept] common [to them, then] for the same reason that third [concept], together with the two preceding ones, would have a fourth [concept common to them], and the fourth one a fifth, and so on to infinity. This seems false, because in that case scientific conclusions would go on to infinity.

Again, if [it were] the case [that there is a concept common and universal to God and creature], therefore [God and creature] could [both] agree and differ. But nothing differs from something through that by which it agrees with it. Otherwise, there would be no way of investigating the difference between being a genus and a difference, and God could then be in a genus without composition.¹

¹This compressed argument is in effect based on divine simplicity. If there were a common and universal concept applicable to both God and creature, then God and the creature would both (a) agree in one respect, since the concept would be applicable to both of them, and (b) differ in another respect, since after all God and creature are quite distinct. The two “respects”, (a) and (b), could not be the same. Hence there would have to be some kind of composition or complexity in God. Since God is simple, we can conclude by *reductio* that there is no such common and universal concept. The last sentence of the paragraph supports the claim that (a) and (b) cannot be the same respect. For example, man and dog are alike in being animals, but differ insofar as man is rational whereas dogs are not. “Animal” is here the common genus, while “rational” and “irrational” are differences. Now if exactly the same feature could account for both the similarity and the difference between man and dog, there would in the end be no way to draw the distinction between genus and difference here. So too, it was sometimes said that God is not in a genus (and so is entirely outside the Aristotelian categories), because if he were, then he would have to be in some species of that genus, and so be composed of genus and difference. This reasoning would fail if exactly the same feature could account for both the similarity and the differences among things.
To the contrary, in the first principles\(^2\) ‘Of anything at all, [either] being or non-being [is predicated]’, [and] ‘Every being is [either] created or uncreated’, the distribution [of the subject terms\(^3\)] occurs for God as much as for other things. Therefore, the subject of these propositions in the mind is equally common to God and creature. Therefore, etc.

Here first, we must investigate the nature of a concept. Second, I will raise [various] doubts [that appear to go] against me.

On the nature of a concept, there is one opinion\(^4\) that a universal concept is not some intention [of the mind], but a kind of fictum that does not have any subjective being, [either] in the mind or outside, but only an objective and cognized being.

This is proved. (1) For we take a confused and general intention [of the mind]. What is understood by it? Either (a) an external thing. But that is not so, because something common is understood, and no external thing is common to many. Neither (b) is a singular thing understood, because the intention is common. Nor (c) [is the intention] itself [understood], surely. Therefore, something else — and I call that the “concept”. But that is nothing but a fictive being. Therefore, etc.

(2) This is confirmed because, according to everyone generally, what terminates the [mental] act is called the “concept”. But what terminates a confused act is not a thing that has subjective being anywhere, but only objective [being]. [This is] proved as before. Therefore, etc.

And so, in the end, they posit such a fictum. And that is the universal concept, predicatable of several.

This is proved: (i) First, because being is divided in [its] primary division into being in the soul and being outside the soul. ‘Being in the soul’ is not taken there for what has subjective being in the soul, because that falls under the other branch. For being outside the soul is [what is] divided into the ten categories, and the beings [that are] subjectively in the soul belong to the category of quality. Therefore, [‘being in the soul’] is taken for a purely objective being of nature.\(^5\) And that was the point.

\(^2\) I conjecture ‘principiis’ for the edition’s ‘principaliter’.

\(^3\) The notion of “subject” here is not taken in the grammatical sense. The term described as being distributed in the first proposition is ‘anything at all’ (\(= \textit{quolibet}\)), which is not the grammatical subject (it is the object of a preposition) but rather a kind of “logical” subject — it is what the proposition is “about”.


\(^5\) I do not understand the role of the ‘of nature’ here.
(ii) Second, because a chimera and [other] such impossible [things] are only objectively in the soul. Therefore, [so are] these fictive concepts.

(iii) Again, the propositions in a syllogism are beings, and they are in the soul. And [they are] not [in the soul] subjectively. Therefore, [they are there] objectively only.

(iv) Again, artifacts are in the mind of the artisan, and not subjectively; therefore, objectively only.

(v) Fifth, because according to the common view relations of reason are in the soul. And [they are] certainly not [there] subjectively.

(vi) Again, otherwise no concept [would be] universal.

(vii) Again, otherwise there would be no distinction between first and second intentions.

(viii) Again, otherwise, if the fictum is not granted, nothing the same would be predicated of several [things] in a universal proposition.

(ix) Again, otherwise genus would not differ from species. For the same singulars would correspond to them, unless two distinct ficta are posited.

This is proved, lastly, through authorities.⁶

Not only he⁷ but [also] many others⁸ posit an objective kind of being like this, a middle between the cognition and the external thing, a kind of

⁶ In a parallel passage from his later Lectura, I, d. 3, a. 2 (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS lat. 15886, fol. 134⁶) Chatton continues (still with Ockham plainly in mind): “Now at the end of the question, they add that whoever does not like this view can say that a universal concept is a certain quality existing subjectively in the soul itself, namely, [either] the [act of] intellection itself or else a kind of quality produced by the intellection. Thus, just as words signify by [a conventional] institution — some [of them], like categoremata, [signify] by themselves, and others signify only as syncategoremata [do] — so [too] for these signs that signify naturally. In accordance with this view, they solve the opposing arguments. But which of the described views is the truer, they say they are leaving [that] to the judgment of others.

“Against this second view, I argue first: Even though those of the second view add [this] last qualification at the end of certain statements of theirs about fictive being, nevertheless the sequence of his questions about the concept in his first book on the Sentences is written entirely for the sake of showing that a common concept is such an objective fictive being. No question about the common concept is discussed or treated concerning the other [view]. This is also clear to [anyone who] looks at his Prologue to the first book [of his on the Sentences], and [also] distinction 1, and distinctions 2 and 3. [It is] also [clear to anyone who] looks at the way he sets up the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit, and wherever he treats the cognition of God or creatures in common concepts. Nevertheless, whether that is [his] opinion (reading ‘opinio’ for the edition’s ‘opinia’) or not, I prove that such a fictive being is not to be posited.”

⁷ That is, Ockham.

“diminished” [being]. Some even posit it in the case of intuitive cognition, as was treated in the Prologue.

There is another view. For I do not understand what a universal or particular concept is other than the very act of cognition. And so I argue further in favor of this view, and against the fictum.

First, as follows: The view about ficta is held in order to have some one thing in subject or predicate position in a universal proposition. [But] that is not needed.

Proof: What is equally as undivided in itself and divided from everything else as the act of cognition is is no less one than the act [is], and is no more universal for that reason. But the fictum is like that — if it is granted [at all]. This is clear from the following, whether you are talking about a universal in being or [a universal in] representing: For the act suffices for representing any things whatever just as much as such a fictum does. I also prove [the point in the case of a universal] in being: For from what do we conclude that some act of understanding is one singular act? Surely, because it can be destroyed while another one remains and is disregarded. So it is [too] in the case of ficta — if they are granted — that one can cease to be while another one remains. Therefore, they are distinguished among themselves as much as the acts [are].


10 Peter Auriol, Scriptum, I, Prooem., § 2, a. 3 (vol. 1, pp. 196–207).


12 what: Reading the edition’s ‘quod’ in the sense of ‘quid’. This sense is not at all uncommon in the period.

13 in … position: quod subiciatur vel praedicetur, literally: that is subjected or predicated.

14 The editor emends this to ‘more’, but I think the emendation is unnecessary.

15 and is disregarded: et circumscripto. The phrase seems wrong here. Normally in contexts like these it means ‘disregarded’, ‘set aside’, or even ‘excluded’, and would be used to describe the act that has been destroyed (or at least disregarded), not the act that remains.
The assumption is clear. For I ask about the fictum: Does it essentially depend for its being on this act [of intellection]? In that case, it ceases [to be] when this intellection ceases. Yet another [act of] intellection remains, and consequently [so does] such a fictum, corresponding to it. I prove [this] by the argument: “What is understood by this remaining intellection, when the earlier one has ceased, etc.” Therefore, there are two ficta, just as [there are] two intellec tions.

If it does not essentially depend on this intellection, [then] for the same reason neither [does it depend] on any other [intellection] of the same kind. Therefore, it can exist without there being any such intellection. And [so] objective being and understood being will remain without [there being] any [act of] understanding, which is a plain contradiction.

Again, conversely, an act of understanding does not depend on a fictive and objective being any more than on really and subjectively existing things. But by the power of God an act of understanding can be brought about without [any] subjectively existing external things. Therefore, [it can be brought about] without a fictum.

Or [put it] like this: Nothing that does not include an evident contradiction is to be denied of the power of God. But there appears [to be] no contradiction for an [act of] intellection to remain without such a fictum and without subjectively existing external things. And yet it is a contradiction for an [act of] intellection to be posited unless something is understood — namely, the term itself. Therefore, etc.

Again, let us take the article of faith, namely that God is three and one, and let us resolve its subject-term in the mind into its description, as follows:

---

16 assumption: that one fictum ceases [to be] while another one remains. The two ficta discussed here, like the two acts of intellection in the preceding paragraph, are apparently understood to be exact duplicates of one another.

17 The sentence suggests that this is a well known argument form. But I do not know what it is, other than what you see here.

18 As it stands, this seems a blatant fallacy: \( x \) does not depend on \( y \), and \( x \) does not depend on \( z \); therefore, \( x \) does not depend on either \( y \) or \( z \), in the sense that one can have \( x \) without having either \( y \) or \( z \). By this kind of reasoning, I can read with both eyes shut, since I can read without my right eye open, and I can also read without my left eye open. Does the word ‘essentially’ in the text somehow save the inference here?

19 [act of] understanding: intellec tion. I have been translating this ‘intellection’ hitherto, but here I translate it ‘understanding’ in order to bring out the terminological link with ‘understood being’ earlier in the sentence, and so to bring out the “plain contradiction”.

20 ‘Term’ here does not mean a piece of language, but rather the terminus of the relation of intellection or understanding — in short, the intentional object.
‘Infinite being is three and one’. Either the subject of this [proposition] immediately signifies an external thing — and [in that case], the point\textsuperscript{21} is granted, because [the subject-term in the mind] is composed of common intellecions. If [the subject-term signifies] a fictum, therefore this proposition denotes that a fictum is three and one.

You will say that [this] does not follow, because the fictum does not supposit for itself but rather for God, and [for] an external thing. To the contrary: I take the proposition in the mind that includes the intellecions caused in the same order in which I pronounce the corresponding words. I ask about [this] combination of [acts of] understanding: What does it immediately signify? If [it immediately signifies] a fictum, therefore it immediately signifies that a fictum is three and one — even though [it] \textit{mediately} [signifies that] God [is three and one]. In that case, it would not signify a truth except through the fact that it more immediately signifies [what is] false and impossible. If [it signifies] an external thing, I have [my] point, because then it seems to no purpose to posit the fictum.

Again, in the case at hand “to be understood” is “to be signified”, because an intellecction is a natural sign of its object. Thus if by means of this proposition a fictive being is immediately understood to be three and one, therefore this [fictive being] is immediately signified by [the proposition].

Again, the act of believing caused by means of the [above] article of faith either (a) has a complex as its immediate object. I proved the opposite [of this] in the first question of the Prologue. Or [the immediate object is] (b) an external thing, and [in that case] the point is granted. Or [it is] (c) a fictum. And I certainly do not believe in that!\textsuperscript{22}

Again, we adore nothing if [it is] not cognized. But we do not adore a fictum. Therefore, given this article [of faith], we cognize [something] other than a fictum, which is [my] point.

Again, the immediate object of the [beatific] vision is either (a) such a fictum. And in that case our blessedness would have for its immediate object such [a fictum], and not God himself. This is false, because just as God is immediately loved in an act of enjoyment, so [too] he is immediately seen in an act of vision. If [the immediate object is] (b) a real being, that is [my] point. For the same thing that is the immediate object cognized by the [beatific] vision is [also] the immediate object of faith, which the [beatific] vision replaces.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{21} That is, the point of the entire question, namely that there is a concept that is common and universal to God and creatures.

\textsuperscript{22} That is, ficta are not what faith is about.
[This] is confirmed. For the intellect defines the same thing that is seen by sense, and the same thing too is [what is] immediately signified by the definition.

Again, otherwise in a universal proposition there would be distribution for an infinity of ficta more than for things.

Their reasons [in favor of positing ficta] are not conclusive. For, as will be clear in the answers to [those reasons], they count equally against all men, and even against themselves. For they prove that a singular cognition has a fictive being for its object just as much [as a universal cognition does]. And [so does an act of] love, because we can love the cognized in general. They also prove an infinite regress of ficta.

Therefore, I maintain the opposite, that the concept itself is neither an act of understanding terminating another act, nor some species, nor an act of imagining (I would be more likely to grant this, since phantasms are related to the intellect as sensibles [are] to the sense), nor something — whether fictive or real — produced by the [act of] intellection. For without [any] contradiction the act [of understanding] could be brought about by God without any of these [things]. Yet in that case [something] would necessarily be understood in a universal cognition just as much as now. Therefore, etc.

Therefore, to (1) the first reason [in favor of positing ficta], when you ask: "What is understood by a general or specific [mental] intention? Either [it is] something or nothing. If nothing, therefore you simultaneously understand and [yet] understand nothing, etc." This [reasoning] proves just as well that besides your fictum one must posit another fictum, and besides that a third, and so on to infinity. Proof: The fictum represents or signifies either something or nothing. If nothing, therefore it simultaneously represents and [yet] represents nothing. If [it represents] something, either (a) [that is] a universal. But there is no such external thing. Therefore, it is something inside [the mind], having only objective being, and I will argue about that one just as [I did] about the

---

23 The point is that the difficulties that led Ockham and others to the fictum-theory remain difficulties even on that theory. In other words, the theory does not help.

24 In a parallel passage from his Lectura, I, d. 3, a. 2 (MS cit., fol. 135vb), Chatton says: “Therefore, on this point we must say otherwise, that besides the [act of] intellection, and besides the external thing itself cognized by that intellection, there is no intermediary fictive being there, which immediately terminates the act [of intellection] for the external thing. Neither is there any being of a thing distinct from the existence of the [act of] cognition and from the real existence of the external thing. Rather there is only the intellection or species or [intellectual] habit itself. For this suffices on the part of the intellect in order for it to be true to say that the intellect has a cognition of man."

25 The argument was not given in this form above.
first one. If (b) [the fictum represents] a singular, that is [my] point, because I will say the same thing about the [act of] intellection.\textsuperscript{26}

Again, [this first reason in favor of ficta] proves just as much that in a general volition you either love something or nothing by it, and so on for all the steps of your argument.\textsuperscript{27}

Again,\textsuperscript{28} as they themselves grant\textsuperscript{29} — and rightly so — a cognition of a singular can be had when [that singular] does not exist. What is understood by that [act of] intellection? Either [it is] something or nothing, etc., as you say. [The argument is a parallel one], because it is certain that an existing singular is not then understood by [the intellection].\textsuperscript{30}

There is the same argument too in the case of an utterance, like ‘man’ or ‘animal’. For I ask: What does it signify? Either something or nothing, etc., as before. Also, in the same way, for the roaring of bulls. What does it signify? Either nothing or something, etc., as before.\textsuperscript{31}

Whatever is the case about your argument, what do you mean by a thing’s being understood? If [you mean] nothing but that an [act of] intellection is in the mind, by which [intellection] a thing is extrinsically denominated and said to be understood, so that nothing more is required there, [then] I agree with you. But in that case one plainly does not have to posit any fictum. If you mean that something is there that terminates the act [of intellection] — namely, a fictum or a real being — [and that] without that terminating [something] no intellection can be had, [then] that is [merely] false imagining. For an [act of]

\textsuperscript{26}That is, alternative (b) can be adopted without resorting to ficta at all.

\textsuperscript{27}and … argument: The edition has ‘\textit{etc. Per omnia tu arguis}’, which I do not understand. I conjecture a ‘\textit{quae}’ after ‘\textit{omnia}’, and construe the whole without beginning a new sentence. Incidentally, it is not clear why this reasoning should count as an \textit{objection} to the fictum-theory. It only means that one would have to allow ficta to play a role in acts of willing just as they do in acts of intellection.

\textsuperscript{28}Reading ‘\textit{item}’ for the edition’s ‘\textit{itam}’, an obvious typographical error.


\textsuperscript{30}In short, there would have to be not only universal ficta but also singular ones. Ockham denied this.

\textsuperscript{31}The roaring of bulls is a parallel case only if it is taken as significant. Presumably, it is supposed to signify anger, or something like that.
intellection is an absolute quality, and does not need a term\textsuperscript{32} other than what was granted on the first alternative.\textsuperscript{33}

This is confirmed by you. For the fictum you posit depends on things no less than does the intellection itself. Therefore, if the intellection cannot be without a terminating thing, neither [can] the fictum.

Or [put it] like this: Therefore, if the intellection necessarily requires a term, so does the fictum, and [there will be] an infinite regress. Or else [the fictum will require not another fictum, but rather] a thing. In that case the intellection will be able just as well to signify the thing immediately, and to represent [it].

You will say, “A rose is understood”. Let us posit that there is no [rose] in the realm of nature. How [then] does the subject-[term] supposit there, or for what? One will not be able to find anything to give in reply, except a fictum. Therefore, etc. [To this] I say that we do not have to appeal to a logical property of speech in the same way in every case. Let us agree [then] on the nominal definition of the terms and of the proposition, and the way to get rid of the difficulty will be apparent at once. I say that by ‘A rose is understood’ there is nothing signified except that this [act of] intellection, or such a one,\textsuperscript{34} informs the mind.

And how does ‘rose’ supposit in ‘This intellection is in the mind’? Surely, in no way at all.\textsuperscript{35} In the same way, neither [does it supposit] in the first [proposition]. Rather [that first proposition] is a metaphorical and improper locution [taking place] through an extrinsic denomination by which the rose is denominated by the intellection.

For example: What kind of supposition does ‘stone’ have in the [proposition] ‘A stone is in potency’?\textsuperscript{36} I say that [it has] the kind [it has] in ‘There is matter’ or ‘There is [what] makes such and such’. For the first [proposition] signifies only that there is a material or efficient cause. Therefore, ‘stone’ does not have [any] other kind of supposition in the one [proposition] than in the

\textsuperscript{32} Again, ‘term’ here does not mean a piece of language, but rather the intentional object.

\textsuperscript{33} alternative: intellectu. That is, the first thing you might “mean” (intelligis) by a thing’s being understood, earlier in the paragraph.

\textsuperscript{34} or … one: That is, another, exactly similar act of intellection, a different “token” of the same “type”, as they used to say.

\textsuperscript{35} The term does not supposit in that proposition because it does not even occur there.

\textsuperscript{36} As is clear from the discussion three paragraphs below, this can mean either that the matter exists from which a stone can be made, or else that an efficient cause exists that is capable of producing the stone.
other. Yet I do not want to deny that ‘A stone does not have [any] inconsistency with being’\textsuperscript{37} is true.

Again, according to the common school [of thought], there is a fallacy \textit{secundum quid et simpliciter}\textsuperscript{38} in ‘Homer is in thought\textsuperscript{39}; therefore, Homer is’. For the premises signify nothing but that there is a thought by which Homer is extrinsically denominated, whether he exists or not. Therefore, the consequent [of this inference] does not follow. [It is] the same way in the case at hand for an [act of] intellection and the thing that is understood.

To (2) the other [reason in favor of ficta],\textsuperscript{40} when you say, “The concept is what terminates the act [of intellection, I reply]: But to terminate a reflex act is nothing but to be cognized in an utterance.\textsuperscript{41} So I say that a thing, and not a fictum, terminates [the act of intellection]. A thing terminates the intellection — that is, on this sense of saying ‘a thing is understood’, it is denominated extrinsically by the intellection in the mind.

To (i) the first [argument] listed above, about the division of being into being in the soul and [being] outside the soul, I say that this division is like [the division] of being into act and potency, as when I say “One kind of stone is in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} inconsistency with being: \textit{repugnantiam essendi}. In other words, there is nothing self-contradictory or impossible about stones. The point is that Chatton’s method of parsing away the term ‘stone’ in the previous propositions should not be taken to imply that stones can only be a kind of logical “fiction”.
\item \textsuperscript{38} That is, a fallacy arising from confusing what is true only in a certain respect with what is true without qualification or absolutely.
\item \textsuperscript{39} thought: \textit{opinione}.
\item \textsuperscript{40} In his \textit{Lectura}, (\textit{MS cit.}, fol. 136\textsuperscript{b}), Chatton says: “To the second argument given there, when it is said that a concept terminates the intellection, it must be said [in reply] that the argument proves just as well that that fictive being is terminated by another one, and that by [yet] another, and so on to infinity. For it represents an external thing.

“Likewise, for the same reason, both an utterance and an image, and even the [beatific] vision, if it were caused without the presence of the represented thing, would be terminated by such fictive beings. But [conjecturing Sed for the edition’s scilicet] they are terminated now in the same way [as they would be] then. Therefore, they are now terminated by such [fictive beings]. They do not grant that.

“It must be said, therefore, that an intellection is a kind of absolute quality that does not require such a terminating-point accompanying it in being [and] differing [conjecturing differentem for the edition’s differens, which could only be construed with ‘quality’] from any real being. Therefore, it must be said that the intellection itself is the concept. For through it there is conceived the thing that is conceived. Neither is there any such accompanying fictive being.”

\item \textsuperscript{41} I do not understand this sentence. Why the limitation to \textit{reflex} acts — that is, to acts that take other acts as their objects? And why the unexpected phrase ‘cognized in an \textit{utterance}?’ Spoken language is out of context here. (It was last mentioned along with the “roaring of bulls”, above.)
\end{itemize}
potency, and another kind in act”. That distinction amounts to “A stone either exists by its own existence, or else it is denominated extrinsically from the existence of a material or efficient cause by which the stone can be produced or which can produce the stone”. Likewise here: ‘One kind of stone is in the soul and another kind is outside the soul’ — that is, ‘Either the stone is denominated extrinsically from the existence of the intellection in the soul, or else it exists outside the soul by its own existence’.

Again, they have to reply as well that besides the fictum one must posit another [fictum] and another, to infinity. For the stone is not “in the soul” only through the fact that the intellection is in the soul, according to this [theory], but also from the fact that the fictum is in the soul. I ask, how is the stone “in the soul” by means of the fictum? Either [it is] because [the fictum] immediately signifies and represents singular stones — and [in that case] I will say this just as well about the intellection — or else [it immediately signifies and represents] something else. [But that can be] nothing but a fictum, as you argue, etc.

Again, [the argument] is equally conclusive in the case of love, because to be loved is to be in the soul just as to be cognized [is to be in the soul], as before.

Again, the same argument [applies] to the case of cognition of singulars. For just as being is divided into being outside the soul and [being] in the soul, so too Socrates is divided in the same way. Likewise, the stone is divided in the same way into a being in potency and [a being] in act. Surely its cause, from which it is denominated to be in potency, is not in potency but rather in act. Therefore, [by the same argument,] one must posit that there is a fictum of the stone in the cause.

To (ii) the second [argument], about the chimera, I say that to understand a chimera and such impossible [things] is nothing else than for there to be an intellection in the mind by virtue of which [the mind] can judge that such and such would be the nature of a chimera if there were a chimera in the realm of nature.

Again, the argument runs just as well in the case of the will, because I can want to have a chimera, just as much as I [can] understand [a chimera].

Again, it runs just as well in the case of a singular fictum and a singular chimera as [it does] in the case of a universal one.

To (iii) the other [argument], it has often been said that the act of knowing does not have a complex for an object. Neither is a syllogism or a

---

42 Reading ‘et’ for the edition’s ‘er’, an obvious typographical error.

43 That is, the object of knowledge is a thing, not a proposition or fact or state of affairs.
proposition composed of ficta but rather of the intellections themselves. Also, the argument runs just as well for the cognition of singulars as [it does for the cognition] of universals. Also, propositions and syllogisms and the like⁴⁴ are subjectively in the mind, not objectively — except when they are understood by reflex acts.⁴⁵ For syllogisms are composed of true intellections inhering subjectively in the mind.

To (iv) the other [argument], about artifacts: [The argument] runs just as well for the will as for the intellect. For I can want to produce a house, just as [I can] also understand a house. Therefore, you should posit a willed fictum just as much as a cognized [fictum]. I say, therefore, that for artifacts to be in the mind is nothing else than that the cognition of the things to be made informs the mind.

I will speak to (v) the fifth [argument], about the relation of reason, in the discussion of intentions or intellections. This [argument] too works just as well for willing. For I can want something in relation to⁴⁶ [something] else, just as [I can] understand it [in relation to something else].

What therefore do you mean by “relation of reason”? If [you mean] a kind of intellection that relates one [thing] to itself or to another — then fine. In that case, I say that the relation of reason is subjectively in the soul. [But] if you mean that there exists outside the mind a relation that nevertheless does not exist outside the mind,⁴⁷ [then] I say that insofar as this is to contrive [something] false, such [a relation] is neither subjectively in the soul nor outside the soul. But the intellection by which you contrive this, whether it signifies negatively or affirmatively, is indeed subjectively in the soul.

⁴⁴ and the like: The edition reads ‘et etiam huiusmodi’ (= and even the like). I suggest deleting the ‘etiam’.

⁴⁵ There may an equivocation here. Usually, ‘objective being’ is taken as a kind of intentional being that does not fall into any of the Aristotelian categories. In this sense, it is opposed to “subjective being”. This is the sense the phrase has in the argument to which this paragraph is a reply. Here, however, when Chatton says that propositions and syllogisms may be “objectively” in the mind when they are understood by reflex acts, he seems to mean only that they then serve as the objects of other acts of knowing. In both cases, “objective being” is the kind of being objects of knowledge have. In Chatton’s sense, however, this kind of being is not opposed to subjective being, as the rest of the paragraph makes clear.

⁴⁶ in relation to: in ordine ad.

⁴⁷ Chatton’s point is that the whole idea of a “relation of reason” is that it exists only in the mind. Relations that exist outside the mind are not “relations of reason” but rather “real” relations, or relations “on the side of reality”. The objection Chatton is replying to seems to want to have it both ways: the relation of reason is only a relation of reason, and so exists only in the mind. Yet it is supposed to have some kind of (fictive) being in addition to its subjective being in the soul. For Chatton, this is just contradictory, as his striking formulation here makes clear.
To (vi) the other [argument], that “in that case no concept is universal and univocal”, I say that [the argument] proves [its point] as much for the fictive concept as for others. For two ficta agree; therefore, there is some concept common to them, and that [common concept] is nothing but a fictum. And those three agree once again, and so on to infinity.

[I will discuss] (vii) the other [argument] elsewhere, about the difference between first and second intention. But whether a first intention is called an external thing or the intellection of an external thing is called a first intention, I say here that a concept is a true intellection.

To (viii) the eighth [argument]: This goes just as much against you [as it does against me]. For the fictum is no more something one than the intellection itself [is], because if the fictum depends essentially on the intellection, [then] just as intellections are numerically distinguished, so that there is one [intellection] and another, so too the ficta are distinguished analogously. And so you will have [something] the same that can be the predicate or subject in a universal proposition by positing only the act [of intellection] just as much [as you would] by positing a fictum besides the act.

I say therefore that, in one proposition, altogether the same thing is predicated of some subject [that is] distributed for all external singulars. And to stand universally is to stand for singulars. But in diverse propositions, numerically the same thing is not predicated, but rather a similar one. For propositions follow and precede one another successively in the mind, or can follow [one another], just as [they do] correspondingly in speech. And one [proposition] can end before another one begins. Thus in a syllogism the subject of the major is numerically other than the predicate of the minor [is] numerically. Yet a similar concept is the middle term, and that is enough.

Therefore, [the argument] runs equally for the unity of the act [of intellection] as for the unity of the fictum, and [the fictum] ought not to be posited for this reason.

To (ix) the other [argument, that] “in that case genus and species would not differ or be predicated of diverse things”: That does not follow. For the one of them is predicated of [things] differing in species, the other one not.

As for the authorities, I grant that the soul can contrive many things, like a golden mountain, a chimera, and the like. But this is nothing else than having the intellection of a golden mountain or of a chimera — that is, an intellection by virtue of which I could judge that such and such would be its nature if it existed, as was said above. You manage this by [appealing to] complexes. [But] I can [do it] better, because I posit a simple concept that is always equivalent to a complex. For a complex would signify other things [too], by

48 That is, you allow for our making such judgments.
reason of its parts. A simple concept [would] not.\textsuperscript{49} Neither is there any “terminating” there except the having of the intellection in the soul.\textsuperscript{50} If a species or [mental] habit or something else occurs there along with [the intellection], it does not do so under the aspect of a term [of a relation of intellection], but only in order to cause the act by which the external thing itself is immediately understood.

You will say, “The intellection itself is a thing outside the soul, because it is in a real category, etc.” If, in the end, you want to call every true quality an “external thing”, I cannot stop [you].

But [some] doubts remain here. First, about what kind of concept\textsuperscript{51} [this is], and what is understood by it. This was treated above, in the discussion of enjoyment.\textsuperscript{52} I say that there are two ways by which this can be expressed. One is as follows: by saying that one thing is understood [by a concept] and another one not, insofar as there is an intellection in the mind by virtue of which [intellection] you judge that the thing is such and such, or ought to be [such and such] if it existed, and that its nature is such and such. Therefore, when it is asked what is understood by a common intention [of the mind], either you mean to be speaking (a) in this sense, namely that there is a cognition in the mind by virtue of which you can judge that the thing is such and such, and what kind of nature it has. Or else [you mean to be speaking] (b) in another sense, namely: What is the thing that is denominated to be cognized by the cognition in the mind? (I mean, what is that thing if it were to exist?)

If you are asking [your question] in (b) the second sense, then I say that singular things [are understood by a common intellection of the mind], so that only a singular thing is what is understood by a universal cognition, and the

\textsuperscript{49}For Ockham’s fictum-theory, to have a concept of a golden mountain is to have (a) a single act of intellection that takes (b) the concept or fictum of a golden mountain as its intentional object. This concept or fictum is a composite or “complex” one, made up the concept of gold and the concept of mountains. Chatton’s point is that such a complex concept would signify \textit{all} gold things (in virtue of the one component concept) as well as \textit{all} mountains (in virtue of the other component). This indeed does follow according to semantic principles that Ockham himself accepts. On the other hand, Chatton says, if one does not appeal to ficta but only to the single act of intellection as the concept, this problem does not arise.

\textsuperscript{50}That is, the act of understanding a golden mountain is not a “relational” act that requires some other entity — real or fictive — as a term in the relation.

\textsuperscript{51}what … concept: \textit{qualitate conceptus}, literally “quality of the concept”. But I do not see that anything more than the looser translation is warranted here.

\textsuperscript{52}In his \textit{De doctrina christiana}, Augustine had distinguished between things that are to be \textit{used} and things that are to be \textit{enjoyed}. The topic was discussed in Book I, distinction 1 of Peter Lombard’s \textit{Sentences}. Chatton’s commentary on that part of the \textit{Sentences} has not yet been edited.
specific concept of man is the intellection only of Socrates and Plato and the
other singulars.

If [you are asking your question] in (a) the first sense, then the specific
concept of man is the intellection of man, and not the intellection of Socrates.
For it is the cognition and intellection in the mind by virtue of which you can
d judge about Socrates that he is a man, and not that he is Socrates. And the
intellection of animal (not of Socrates or of man) is that by virtue of which you
can judge about Socrates that he is an animal, not that he is a man or that he is
Socrates. And so on for other common concepts.

But if you ask in (b) the second sense whether Socrates is the thing that
is understood, I say yes, because in fact Socrates and man and animal in this
concrete\(^53\) [case] are not distinguished in reality, and neither are the things
corresponding to the abstract [forms] of these concrete [terms].\(^54\)

The second way of expressing the kind of concept [this is], and its
nature, and what is understood by it, is as follows: When it is asked what is
understood by the intellection of man — or in other words, in the form in
which [the question] is often discussed, “Whether this specific concept is an
intellection of man or of Socrates?” — if you are asking whether it is \textit{in fact} an
intellection of Socrates, I say yes. If you are asking whether it is \textit{per se} an
intellection of Socrates, I say no. For if humanity were distinguished in reality
from Socrateity, the intellection of humanity would not have Socrateity as an
object, but rather humanity, which would be [only] a \textit{part} of Socrateity. In fact,
however, it has Socrateity as an object. Whoever explains the [Subtle] Doctor
in [any] other sense, so that [humanity and Socrateity] are not altogether the
same, and to know the one is not the same as to know the other, is not
proceeding according to his meaning.\(^55\)

\(^{53}\) concrete: Accepting the editor’s conjecture of ‘\textit{concreto}’ for the manuscript’s ‘\textit{cognito}’.

\(^{54}\) That is, Socrateity, humanity and animality, corresponding to the abstract terms
‘Socrateity’, ‘humanity’ and ‘animality’ formed from the concrete terms ‘Socrates’, ‘man’ and
‘animal’, respectively.

\(^{55}\) Chatton is referring to Duns Scotus. See later in his \textit{Reportatio}, I, d. 25, q. 1 (Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale, MS lat. 15887, fols. 57\textsuperscript{vb}–58\textsuperscript{ra}):
‘To the third [argument]: Who posits a
community in reality? I do not know who. Yet the doctors understand one way and express
[themselves] another. For sometimes, to be sure, they state that there is humanity in reality, or that
there is a common nature in reality. These words can be forced to mean that the same nature in
reality is common to all the individuals. But that is to force them into a worse [sense]. … For no one
meant that. … Some seem to say that paternity [in the Trinity] is not the [divine] person [of the
Father]. … But the opposite is to be maintained: that there is no distinction [on the side of reality] in
the same [divine] person. Thus [the distinction between paternity and the person of the Father] is
[only] a distinction between concepts of the same thing. Hence the Solemn Doctor [= Henry of
Ghent] did not dare to maintain an intentional distinction in that case, and neither [did] the Subtle
[Doctor — that is, Duns Scotus — dare to maintain] a formal distinction [there]. For although some
people conceived such a formal distinction [between paternity and the Father] on the basis of some
To the contrary: What is that thing that is *per se* and primarily understood by the specific concept of man? If [it is] (a) Socrates, he says the opposite. If [it is] another [thing], therefore either [it is] (b) a thing outside the soul, and in that case [there is] something common outside the soul. Or [it is] (c) in the soul, and in that case [it is] a fictum, which you have disproved. Or [put it] like this: If Socrates, [that is] the point. If not Socrates, then the third man.58

I reply: What do you mean by having Socrates as a *per se* object? I say that having Socrates, or something else, as a primary and *per se* object is that, when the [mental act] is posited, [then] whatever [other] possible or impossible assumption is made — say, assuming that humanity is removed from Socrateity as a part from [its] whole — it would still have it as an object. In this way of speaking, this specific concept has humanity, and not Socrateity, as an object. But the concept of Socrates would have Socrates’ whole essence as [its] primary object. Thus, the intention that is the specific concept is not equally [a concept] of humanity and of Socrateity.

But in that case on what basis is the one concept universal and specific, and not the other one? I say that [it is because] the one as a matter of fact signifies every individual whatever, while the other one [does] not.

But why [then] does it seem universal?59 I say that [it is] not because the specific concept of humanity *per se* requires that a humanity be [both]

of his words, he himself drew up certain logical questions [while he was] at Paris, in which he taught the opposite. Rather he maintained only that this is not *per se* that [namely, that paternity is not *per se* the Father]. So I say along with him that, without any plurality, divinity is not *per se* paternity, or conversely. What does that amount to saying? That if, through an impossibility, there were a distinction in the same [divine] person such as there is between the concepts, then divinity would not be paternity, or conversely.”

56 That is, Ockham?

57 That is, Chatton. The paragraph contains an objection to Chatton’s view. At first (“he says the opposite”) he speaks in the third person about what the objector says — presumably Ockham, who defended the fictum-theory. But by the end of the paragraph (“you have disproved”) he is speaking in the objector’s own voice and addressing himself in the second person.

58 The entire paragraph is pretty cryptic, but the last two sentences especially so. Perhaps the sense is this: If Socrates is *per se* and primarily understood by the concept “man”, then the objector (Ockham) has his point — that is, he has maneuvered Chatton into an untenable position. If it is not Socrates that is *per se* and primarily understood by the concept “man”, then it is either a fictum — which is Ockham’s own view, but Chatton rejects that alternative — or else it is a real common nature, so that one would be committed to a realistic theory of universals with all the problems that go along with that — and in particular, to the “third man”.

59 That is, why does the concept of humanity seem to be universal, if it signifies only individuals? Note that Chatton does not really answer this question.
Socrateity and Platoni ty. For the concept does not require that a humanity be humanities. So it not only does not demand this, [it demands] rather the opposite, namely that it not be several humanities.

To the contrary: The definition of man is indifferent with respect to one and to many. Therefore, it does not require that a humanity not be several. I say [in reply] that the specific concept per se requires that none of its individuals be several humanities, because in that case it would not be a humanity but rather humanities. Therefore, it does not abstract in this sense from the one and the many, but rather in the sense that the specific concept does not per se demand that there be only one [thing] in reality, or [that there be] several, of which it is said. (But the opposite holds for the concept of deity.)

The second doubt is: How can [a concept] be made the subject of several [predicates], and how [can] it supposit in a proposition? Here some people deny the distinction between simple and material supposition in the case of a proposition [made up] of concepts in the mind — although not in the case of a proposition in speech. For the subject in a conceived proposition, according to them, either supposits for an external thing, and in that case [it supposits] personally, or else for the concept itself, and in that case [it supposits] simply.

But I say that there is yet a third [kind of supposition in the mind], so that a concept in the mind can supposit materially, as when I say ‘This concept is a quality’. I say too that [a term] can have both simple and personal supposition for an external thing. For when the specific concept of man supposits for external individuals in just the way it would supposit [for them] if humanity were distinguished from each individual, then each sign of [humanity] supposits simply, whether in concept or in speech. It seems that this

---

60 Latin has no indefinite article, so that the change from talking about ‘humanity’ to talking about ‘a humanity’ corresponds to no difference whatever in the Latin. I have inserted the article only because I think it helps to clarify the sense here. For Chatton, there is no universal humanity; there is only the humanity of Socrates and the humanity of Plato, etc.

61 Chatton’s editor refers here to Ockham’s *Scriptum* d. 2, q. 4, pp. 134.3–135.17. But on the contrary, Ockham does not there (or anywhere else that I know of) deny the distinction between simple and material supposition in mental propositions. Indeed, he explicitly affirms there that all three kinds of supposition (personal, simple and material) occur in mental sentences just as they do in spoken ones. It is not clear, therefore, whom or what Chatton has in mind here.

62 For Ockham, this would be a case of personal supposition, not material. On Ockham’s account, the concept “man” in the mental sentence ‘Man has three letters’ (where the subject refers to the written term) stands in material supposition. Material supposition in mental propositions is an odd case for Ockham’s theory, and some modern scholars have confessed they are unable to make good sense of it. But Ockham does have it. Chatton’s real quarrel with Ockham here seems to be based on an entirely different notion of the role of simple supposition. Chatton appears to accept the more “traditional” view that a term in simple supposition refers to a nature, whereas for Ockham it refers to a concept it does not signify.
is so because, given this, I can preserve common statements that they cannot preserve by denying simple supposition for external things. For ‘Humanity in Socrates is a real specific nature’ is generally granted as true. And [it is] certainly not [true if ‘humanity’ supposits] for the concept. Therefore, [it is true only when ‘humanity’ supposits] for an external thing. Yet the subject of this proposition in the mind does not supposit personally, because [it does] not [supposit] for any individual. Therefore, [it supposits] simply.

I confirm this: These people grant ‘Man is per se primarily risible’, and not ‘Socrates is per se primarily risible’. ‘Man’ here does not stand for the concept or for individuals, because you deny this of any individual.63 Therefore, I say that [a term] can have another [kind of] supposition for [external] things than personal [supposition], as in ‘Humanity is a real specific nature’, and another [kind of supposition] for a concept than simple [supposition], namely, material, as in ‘The concept of man is a quality’. I do not care whether [the subject has simple supposition] in ‘Man is a species’.64

The third doubt is how a universal concept is predicated of many. They posit the fictum in order to preserve what they say, that to be predicated is to be understood and to be an object.65 But I say that to be predicated is to have subjective being. Neither is the reason [they give] a valid one. For the fictum either essentially depends on the intellection, and in that case is varied with the variation of the intellection (which certainly is varied and multiplied). Or else it does not depend on it, and in that case it would be or could be something cognized [even] if it is not cognized, which is a contradiction.

Therefore, I say that to be predicated universally is to be a predicate in a universal proposition, and to be made a subject universally is to be made a subject with distribution. To predicate and to make [something] a subject is nothing else than to cause intellections arranged in the mind in the same order in which they are ordered in the proposition in speech, just as to predicate in speech is to order and arrange the utterances in this way in the spoken proposi-

---

63 That is, no one individual is per se primarily risible. On the notion of being “primarily” such and such, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 4. (The Oxford translation renders this notion “commensurate and universal”.)

64 Chatton’s editor refers to Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 8., p. 283.7–22. But the claim is not made there.

65 In other words, either the fictum depends on the intellection, so that it varies along with the intellection. Chatton has discussed the problems with that alternative above. Or else the fictum does not depend on the intellection, in which case the fictum would still be there even if the intellection ceased. But, according to Chatton’s account, the whole idea of a fictum is that it is something cognized, a thought object. Thus, on this second alternative, the fictum would remain as something cognized, even when there is no cognition of it. And that is contradictory.
tion. This is the reason why an angel does not compose or divide or proceed discursively, because its concepts are not ordered like this. [And this is the reason likewise why [an angel] is able not to proceed discursively. Neither do the doctors mean to teach that an angel cannot proceed discursively, but [only] that it [does] not [do so] necessarily.

The fourth doubt: Does a superior concept belong to the understanding of an inferior one? Here they work hard, using another sense of the word, and say no. For if they want to have [the claim that the superior does not belong to the understanding of the inferior, in the sense] that one intellection is not another one, and that an external thing is not an intellection, [that] is certain, and there is no difficulty in that. Nevertheless, there can be three other good meanings [of the claim that the superior belongs to the understanding of the inferior]: First, the superior belongs to the understanding of the inferior — that is, it is a part of its definition. Second: that is, it is impossible to have the inferior concept without your being able, in virtue of the same thing by which you have [that concept], to have the superior one. For, in general, every intellection by virtue of which you can know Socrates to be man is also one by virtue of which you can know him to be an animal and a body and a substance, and so [too] for others. The third meaning is that the thing signified by the superior concept is either the thing signified by the inferior one or else a part of it. This is what we name and call a superior concept’s belonging to the understanding of an inferior one. If you deny these senses, you deny the truth.

The fifth doubt is about syncategorematic concepts. Here they say that many of them are conventional, and presuppose the voluntary institution of words just as grammatical concepts [do], and they do not come from reality. But to me it appears the opposite, that the concept of per se is no more based on voluntary institution than the concept of man [is]. I argue this as

---

66 compose or divide: A code phrase meaning “put together (words or concepts) to form a proposition”. An affirmative proposition is said to “compose” or “put together” its subject and predicate; a negative one is said to “divide” them from one another.

67 That is, is it analytically contained?

68 That is, another sense of the phrase ‘belong to the understanding of’.

69 Chatton’s editor refers to Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 7, p. 258.3–18. More like is the immediately following passage, ibid., pp. 258.15–259.25, although Ockham hardly gives an unequivocal “no” to Chatton’s question there.

70 is: Conjecturing ‘est’ for the edition’s ‘et’.

71 Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 8, pp. 285.11–286.22.

72 That is, the concept of being such and such per se. ‘Per se’ is a syncategorematic expression.
follows: Setting aside every voluntary institution, the proposition ‘Man is per
se man’ in the mind is verified just as much as [is] the [proposition] ‘Man is
man’. Therefore, since the truth of the second [proposition] comes from the fact
that these concepts signify only an external thing, therefore, so does [the truth]
of the first. Neither is [the case] similar for grammatical concepts, because to be
in the genitive case, and the like, are conditions of words. But the conditions of
concepts no more depend on the will than [does] the roaring of bulls. ‘Man is
man’ is a per se [proposition] for precisely this reason, that such and such is the
nature of the external thing and such and such is the nature of the concepts that
are natural signs of things. For although it is a voluntary matter that a definition
be in the mind, nevertheless that it per se signifies [such and such] a thing if it
posed in the mind is not a voluntary matter.

The sixth doubt is how a definition, and likewise an attribute,73 is
common and primarily belongs to the specific nature. They explain74: They are
convertibly predicated of one another. But surely the whole doubt still remains:
Why [are they predicated] convertibly? But I say [they are predicated]
convertibly because the nature of the external things and of these concepts is
such that whatever the one is verified of, so is the other. Hence, because
humanity is such a nature that it does not per se determine itself to be Socrates
or to be Plato, therefore the definition and the specific attribute primarily
belong to man and not primarily to Socrates or to Plato.

The seventh doubt is how the specific and the individual concept are
related to one another. I say that they are of different kinds, and the one is
common while the other is proper. For the ultimate proper concept of Socrates
is of a different kind than both the specific concept and the ultimate and proper
concept of Plato. For the concept of Socrates twice repeated agrees more than
[do] the concept of Socrates and [the concept] of Plato.

To the question,75 I say yes. For “being”, “good”, and such transcen-
dentals are distributed in a universal proposition for both [God and creature].

To the first main argument, I grant the infinite regress in such reflex
acts.

73 attribute: passio.

74 Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 4, pp. 127.5–134.2.

75 That is, the question at the beginning of this text.
To the second one, I say that [it is] by the same thing in reality [that] God [both] agrees with and differs from a creature, and so [too] for any two other things whatever. But [it is] not by the same concept, because it is impossible that the same concept be common to him and to something else and yet be proper to him.
Chapter 14

Since such a general knowledge of terms\(^1\) is not enough for a logician, but rather he must know about terms in a more special way [too], therefore after the general divisions of terms have been treated, we must follow up [by treating] certain of the contents under some of those divisions.

Now first we must treat terms of second intention, [and] second terms of first intention. It has been said [already]\(^2\) that terms of second intention are ones like ‘universal’, ‘genus’, ‘species’, etc. Therefore, we must now speak about [the terms] that are posited [as] the five universals.\(^3\) But first, we have to speak about the common [term] ‘universal’, which is predicated of every universal, and about ‘singular’, which is opposed to it.

Now first, you have to know that ‘singular’ is taken in two senses. In one sense, the name ‘singular’ signifies everything that is one and not several. In this sense, those who hold that a universal is a certain mental quality predicatable of several [things], yet not for itself but for those several [things], have to say that every universal is truly and really a singular. For, just as any utterance, no matter how common [it is] through institution, is truly and really singular and numerically one, because it is one and not several, so [too] an intention of the soul, signifying several external things, is truly and really singular and nu-

---

\(^1\) such … terms: That is, the general account given in the preceding chapters of the *Summa logicae.*

\(^2\) Ockham, *Summa logicae,* I, 11–12.

\(^3\) That is, the five treated in Porphyry’s *Isagoge.*
merically one, because it is one and not several things, even though it signifies several things.

In another sense the name ‘singular’ is taken for everything that is one and not several, and is not apt to be a sign of several [things]. Taking ‘singular’ in this way, no universal is a singular, because every universal is apt to be a sign of several [things] and apt to be predicated of several [things].

Hence, calling “universal” something that is not numerically one (which is the sense many [people] attribute to “universal”), I say that nothing is a universal, unless perhaps you abuse the word by saying that a “people” is a universal, because it is not one but many. But that is childish.

Therefore, it must be said that every universal is one singular thing, and is therefore not universal except by signification, [that is,] because it is a sign of several [things]. This is what Avicenna says, *Metaphysics*, V: “One form before the intellect is related to a multitude, and in this respect is a universal, because it is an intention in the intellect the comparison of which is not changed to [just] anything you pick.” And it follows: “This form, even though in comparison to individuals it is universal, nevertheless in comparison to the singular soul in which it is impressed, it is individual. For it is one from among the forms that are in the intellect.”

He means to say that a universal is a singular intention of the soul itself, apt to be predicated of several [things], so that insofar as it is apt to be predicated of several [things], not for itself but for those several [things], it is called universal. But insofar as it is one form, existing really in the intellect, it is called singular.

So ‘singular’ said in the first sense is predicated of a universal, but not said in the second sense. In [the same] manner, we say that the sun is a universal cause, and yet it is truly a particular and singular thing, and consequently is truly a singular and particular cause. For the sun is called a universal cause because it is the cause of several [things], namely, of all these generable and corruptible [things here] below. But it called a particular cause because it is one cause and not several causes. So [too] an intention of the soul is called universal because it is a sign predicable of several [things]. And it is also called singular because it is one thing and not several things.

Nevertheless, you should know that there are two kinds of universal.

One kind is a universal naturally, namely, one that is naturally a sign predicable of several [things], in the way (analogously) in which smoke naturally signifies

---

4 See Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense*, II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 8 (VI, 360f.).


6 That is, it follows in Avicenna’s text.
fire, and the groans of the sick [signify] pain, and a laugh signifies inner
delight. Such a universal is nothing but an intention of the soul, so that no
substance outside the soul, or any accident outside the soul, is such a universal.
I will be speaking about this kind of universal in the following chapters.

There is another [kind of] universal, through a voluntary institution. In
this way a spoken utterance, which is truly numerically one quality, is
universal, because, namely, it is a sign voluntarily instituted to signifying
several [things]. Hence, just as an utterance is called “common”, so it can be
called “universal”. But it does not have this from the nature of the thing, but
rather only from the choice of those who institute [it].

Chapter 15

Since it is not enough [just] to recite these [claims] if they are not
proven by plain reason, therefore I shall set out some reasons in favor of what
was said above, and will confirm [my claim] by authorities.7

For it can be evidently proven that no universal is any substance
existing outside the soul. First, as follows: No universal is a singular,
numerically one substance. For if it were said that it is, it would follow that
Socrates would be a universal. For there is no greater reason why a universal
should be one singular substance rather than [any] other.

Therefore, no singular substance is any universal. Rather, every sub-
stance is numerically one and singular, because every substance is either (a)
one thing and not several, or else it is (b) several things.

If it is (a) one and not several, it is numerically one. For that is what
everyone calls [being] numerically one. But if some substance is (b) several
things, either it is (i) several singular things or else (ii) several universal things.

If (i) is granted, it follows that some substance would be several singular
substance, and consequently, by the same reasoning, some substance would be
several men. In that case, even though the universal would be distinguished
from one particular, nevertheless it would not be distinguished from particulars.

But if (ii) some substance were several universal things, [then] I take
one of these universal things and ask: Is it (1) several things or (2) one and not
several? If (2) is granted, it follows that it is singular. If (1) is granted, [then] I
ask: Is it several singular things or several universal things? And so either there
will be an infinite regress, or else it will be established that no substance is

---

7 The following arguments are roughly the same as those found in Henry of Harclay
(Gedeon Gál, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de significato conceptus universalis,” Franciscan
Studies 31 [1971], pp. 178–234) and in Richard of Campsall’s Contra ponentes naturam, in Edward
universal in such a way that [it is] not singular. As a result, the only remaining alternative is that no substance is universal.

Again, if some universal were one substance existing in singular substances [and] distinct from them, it would follow that it could exist without them. For every thing naturally prior to another can, [at least] by divine power, exist without that [other]. But the consequent is absurd.

Again, if this view were true,\(^8\) no individual could be created if any individual preexisted. For it would not take its whole being from nothing if the universal that is in it was in something else earlier. For the same reason, it would also follow that God could not annihilate one individual substance unless he were to destroy the other individuals. For if he were to annihilate some individual, he would destroy all that belongs to the essence of the individual. Consequently, he would destroy the universal that is in it and in other [individuals]. Consequently, the others would not remain, since they could not remain without their part, as the universal is claimed to be.

Again, such a universal could not be posited as something completely outside the essence of the individual. Therefore, it would belong to the essence of the individual. Consequently, the individual would be put together out of universals, and so the individual would not be any more singular than [it is] universal.

Again, it would follow that something belonging to the essence of Christ would be wretched and damned, because the common nature really existing in Christ and in a damned [person] would be damned, because [it is damned] in Judas. But this is absurd.

Many other reasons could be added, which I pass over for the sake of brevity.

[Now] I confirm the same conclusion through authorities.

First, from Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII,\(^9\) where with an aim to treat the question whether the universal is a substance, he demonstrates that no universal is a substance. Thus, he says: “It is impossible for a substance to be anything that is said universally.”

Again, *Metaphysics*, X,\(^10\) he says: “And so, if none of the universals can be a substance, as was said in our discussions of substance and being,\(^11\) [and] neither [can] this itself\(^12\) [be] a substance as a one beyond the many.”

---

\(^8\) Namely, that a universal is a substance existing in but distinct from singular substances.

\(^9\) Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7, 13 (1038\(^b\)8–9).


\(^11\) *Ibid.* 7, 13 (1038\(^b\)8–9).
From these [passages] it is clear that, according to Aristotle’s meaning, no universal is a substance, even though it supposit for substances.

Again, the Commentator, *Metaphysics*, VII, comment 44\textsuperscript{13}: “In an individual there is no substance except the matter and the particular form from which it is put together.”

Again, in the same place, comment 45\textsuperscript{14}: “Let us say, therefore, that it is impossible for [any] one of what are called universals to be the substance of any thing, even though it reveals the substances of things.”

Again, in the same place, comment 47\textsuperscript{15}: “It is impossible for these to be parts of substances that exist through themselves.”

Again, *Metaphysics*, VIII, comment 2\textsuperscript{16}: “The universal is not a substance or a genus.”

Again, *Metaphysics*, X, comment 6\textsuperscript{17}: “Since universals are not substances, it is plain that common being is not a substance existing outside the soul.”

From the authorities cited above, and from several others, it can be gathered that no universal is a substance, however it is considered. Hence, the consideration of the intellect does not make something be a substance or not be a substance, even though the signification of a term makes the name ‘substance’ be predicated, or not predicated, of it ([but] not for itself). For example, if the term ‘dog’ in the proposition ‘A dog is an animal’ stands for the animal that can bark, [then the proposition] is true, [but] if it [stands] for the star in the heavens,\textsuperscript{18} it is false.\textsuperscript{19} Nevertheless, it is impossible for the same thing to be a substance on account of one consideration and not a substance on account of another.

Therefore, it is to be simply granted that no universal is a substance, however it is considered. Rather every universal is an intention of the soul,

\textsuperscript{12} That is, being.

\textsuperscript{13} Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.* 7, t. 44 (VIII, 92\textsuperscript{vb}).

\textsuperscript{14} *Ibid.* t. 45 (93\textsuperscript{ra}).

\textsuperscript{15} *Ibid.* t. 47 (93\textsuperscript{va}). There ‘that exist’ refers to ‘parts’ and not, as here, to ‘substances’.

\textsuperscript{16} *Ibid.* 8, t. 2 (99\textsuperscript{ra}).

\textsuperscript{17} *Ibid.* 10, t. 6 (120\textsuperscript{rb}).

\textsuperscript{18} star … heavens: The star Canis major, the “dog star”.

\textsuperscript{19} The example does not give an instance of the point, but rather presents an analogue to it.
which according to one likely opinion does not differ from the act of understanding. Hence, they say that the intellection by which I understand a man is a natural sign of men, just as natural [a sign] as a groan is a [natural] sign of sickness or sadness or pain. It is such a sign that it can stand for men in mental propositions, just as an utterance can stand for things in spoken propositions.

For Avicenna [states] quite expressly that the universal is an intention of the soul, *Metaphysics*, V, where he says: “I say therefore that ‘universal’ is said in three senses. For (a) ‘universal’ is said according to the fact that it is predicated in act of many [things], like ‘man’. And (b) an intention that can be predicated of many [things] is called a universal.” And there follows: “Also, an intention that nothing prevents being thought to be predicated of many is called a universal.”

From these and many other [passages], it is clear that a universal is an intention of the soul apt to be predicated of many.

This can be confirmed by reason too. For every universal, according to everyone, is predicable of many. But only an intention of the soul or a voluntarily instituted sign, and not any substance, is apt to be predicated. Therefore, only an intention of the soul or a voluntarily instituted sign is a universal. But I am not now using ‘universal’ for a voluntarily instituted sign, but rather for what is naturally a universal.

For it is clear that a substance is not apt to be predicated, because if it were, it would follow that a proposition would be put together out of particular substances. Consequently, the subject might be in Rome and the predicate in England, which is absurd.

Again, there is no proposition except in the mind, in speech, or in writing. Therefore, its parts are only in the mind, in speech, or in writing. But particular substances are not like this. Therefore, it is clear that no proposition can be put together out of substances. But a proposition is composed out of universals. Therefore, universals are not in any way substances.

---

20 As stated in *Summa logicae*, I, 12. See the following note.

21 Ockham himself says this in *Summa logicae*, I, 12.29–39: “But what is it in the soul that is such a sign? It must be said that with respect to this article [of the question], there are different opinions. Some say that it is nothing but a certain [something] contrived by the soul. Others [say] that it is a certain quality subjectively existing in the soul, [and] distinct from the act of understanding. Others say that it is the act of understanding. Reason is on the side of these last, because ‘What can be done through fewer [things] is done in vain through more.’ But all [the things] that are saved by positing something distinct from the act of understanding can be saved without that distinct [something], insofar as suppositing for [something] else and signifying [something] else can belong to an act of understanding just as much as to [any] other sign. Therefore, besides the act of understanding, one does not have to posit anything else.”

Chapter 16

Although it is plain to many [people] that the universal is not some substance outside the soul, existing individuals [and] really distinct from them, nevertheless it seems to some [people] that the universal is in some way outside the soul in individuals, not to be sure really distinct from them, but only formally distinct from them. Hence they say that in Socrates there is human nature, which is contracted to Socrates by an individual difference that is not really but formally distinguished from the nature. Thus they are not two things, and yet the one is not formally the other.

But this opinion seems altogether unlikely to me. First, because in creatures no distinction of any kind can ever be outside the soul except where there are distinct things. Therefore, if between this nature and this difference there is any kind of distinction, they have to be really distinct things. The assumption I prove in syllogistic form, as follows: This nature is not formally distinct from this nature; this individual difference is formally from this nature. Therefore, this individual difference is not this nature.

Again, the same thing is not [both] common and proper. But, according to them, the individual difference is proper, whereas the universal is common. Therefore, no universal is the same thing as an individual difference.

Again, opposites cannot belong to the same created thing. But “common” and “proper” are opposites. Therefore, the same thing is not [both] common and proper. Yet that would follow if the individual difference and the common nature were the same thing.

Again, if the common nature were really the same as the individual difference, therefore there would really be as many common natures as there are individual differences. Consequently, none of them would be common, but rather each would be proper to the difference with which it is really the same.

Again, each thing, either by itself or through something intrinsic to it, is distinguished from whatever it is distinguished from. But Socrates’ humanity is other than Plato’s. Therefore, they are distinguished by themselves. Therefore, [they are] not [distinguished] through added differences.

Again, according to Aristotle’s view, whatever [entities] differ specifically differ [also] numerically. But the nature of a man and the nature of an ass are specifically distinguished by themselves. Therefore, by themselves they are numerically distinguished. Therefore, each of them by itself is numerically one.

---


Again, what cannot through any power belong to several, is not through any power [made] predicable of several. But such a nature, if it is really the same as the individual difference, cannot through any power belong to several, because in no way can it pertain to another individual. Therefore, through no power can it be [made] predicable of several. Consequently, through no power can it be [made] a universal.

Again, I take this individual difference and the nature it contracts, and ask: Is there a greater distinction between them than [there is] between two individuals, or [is there] a lesser one? Not a greater [distinction], because they are not really different, whereas individuals are really different. Neither [is there] a lesser [distinction], because in that case they would be of the same kind, just as two individuals are of the same kind. Consequently, if the one is of itself numerically one, the other will also be of itself numerically one.

Again, I ask: Is the nature the individual difference or not? If it is, [then] I argue syllogistically as follows: This individual difference is proper and not common. This individual difference is the nature. Therefore, the nature is proper and not common. [And] that is the point.

Likewise, I argue syllogistically as follows: This individual difference is not formally distinct from the individual difference. This individual difference is the nature. Therefore, the nature is not formally distinct from the individual difference.

But if it is given that this individual difference is not the nature, I have my point. For it follows: The individual difference is not the nature; therefore, the individual difference is not really the nature. For from the opposite of the consequent there follows the opposite of the antecedent, arguing as follows: The individual difference is really the nature; therefore, the individual difference is the nature. The inference is clear, because there is a good inference from a determinable, taken with a determination [that is] not destructive or diminishing, to the determinable taken by itself. Now ‘really’ is not a destructive or diminishing determination. Therefore, it follows: The individual difference is really the nature; therefore, the individual difference is the nature.

It has to be said, therefore, that in creatures there is no such formal distinction. Rather, whatever [entities] are distinct among creatures are really distinct, and are distinct things if each of them is a true thing. Hence, just as in the case of creatures such ways of arguing as the following should never be denied: “This is a; this is b; therefore, b is a,” or the following: “This is not a; this is b; therefore, b is not a,” so it should never be denied in the case of creatures that whenever contradictories are verified of some [entities], they are distinct — unless some determination or some syncategorema is the cause of such verification, which should not be maintained in the present case.

Therefore, we ought to say with the philosophers that in a particular substance there is nothing substantial at all except the particular form and the
particular matter or something put together out of them. Therefore, it is not to be imagined that in Socrates there is a humanity or a human nature distinct from Socrates in any way, to which an individual difference that contracts that nature is added. Rather anything substantial imaginable that exists in Socrates is either a particular matter or a particular form or something put together out of them. Therefore, every essence and quiddity, and whatever belongs to a substance, if it is really outside the soul, is simply and absolutely either matter or form or put together out of them, or else an immaterial, abstract substance, according to the teaching of the Peripatetics.

Chapter 17

Because the solution of doubts is the manifestation of truth, therefore some objections should be set out against what has been said, in order that they be solved. For it seems to many [people] of no little authority that the universal is somehow outside the soul and belongs to the essence of particulars. To prove this they bring forth some reasons and authorities.

(1) Hence, they say\(^{25}\) that when some [entities] really agree and [also] really differ, they agree through one [entity] and differ through another. But Socrates and Plato really agree and really differ. Therefore, they agree and differ in distinct [entities]. But they agree in humanity, and also in matter and form. Therefore, they include some [entities] besides these, by which they are distinguished. These they call “individual differences”.

(2) Again, Socrates and Plato agree more than [do] Socrates and an ass. Therefore, Socrates and Plato agree in something in which Socrates and an ass do not agree. But they do not agree in anything numerically one. Therefore, that in which they agree is not numerically one. Therefore, it is something common.

(3) Again, *Metaphysics*, X\(^{26}\): In every genus there is something first that is the measure of all the other [entities] in that genus. But no singular is the measure of all others, because [it is] not [even the measure] of all individuals of the same species. Therefore, there is something besides the individual.

(4) Again, everything superior belongs to the essence of [its] inferior. Therefore, the universal belongs to the essence of a substance. But non-substance does not belong to the essence of substance. Therefore, some universal is a substance.

(5) Again, if no universal were a substance, therefore all universals would be accidents. Consequently, all categories would be accidents, and so the

---


category of substance would be an accident. Consequently, some accident would be by itself superior to substance. Indeed, it would follow that the same [entity] would be superior to itself. For those universals could not be put anywhere except in the genus of quality, if they are accidents. Consequently, the category of quality would be common to all universals. Therefore, it would be common to the universal that is the category of quality.

Innumerable other reasons and authorities are brought forth in favor of this opinion, which I omit at present for the sake of brevity, [although] I will say [something] about them in various places below. 27

I reply to these:

To (1), I grant that Socrates and Plato really agree and really differ. For they really agree specifically, and really differ numerically. And they specifically agree and numerically differ through the same [entity], just as the others 28 have to say that the individual difference really agrees with

the nature and formally differs [from it] through the same [entity].

If you say that the same [entity] is not the cause of agreement and difference, it is to be said that it is true that the same [entity] is not the cause of an agreement and a difference opposed to that agreement. [But] that is not [what happens] in the case at hand. For there is no opposition at all between specific agreement and numerical difference. Therefore, it is to be granted that Socrates, through the same [entity], agrees specifically with Plato and differs numerically from him.

The second argument, (2), does not work either. For it does not follow: “Socrates and Plato agree more than [do] Socrates and an ass; therefore, they agree more in something.” Rather, it is enough that they agree more in themselves. Thus, I say that Socrates through his intellective soul agrees more with Plato than [he does] with an ass, and by himself as a whole he agrees more with Plato than [he does] with an ass. Hence, literally it should not be granted that Socrates and Plato agree by something that belongs to their essence. Rather, it should be granted that they agree by some [entities], 29 because [they agree] by their forms and by themselves — even though if, by a contradiction, there were one nature in them, they would agree in that, just as if, by a contradiction, God were foolish, he would rule the word badly.

To (3), the other [argument], it is to be said that, even though one individual is not the measure of all individuals of the same genus or of the same

27 See Ockham, Summa logicae, II, 2.

28 That is, the Scotists.

29 The point is that they agree not in something, in the singular, but in some entities, in the plural.
most specific species, nevertheless the same individual can be the measure of 
individuals of another species, or of many individuals of the same species. And 
that is enough for Aristotle’s meaning.

To (4), the other [argument], it is to be said that, speaking literally and 
according to proper speech, it should be granted that no universal belongs to 
the essence of any substance whatever. For every universal is an intention of 
the soul, or else [is] some voluntarily instituted sign. But no such [entity] 
belongs to the essence of a substance. Therefore, no genus or species or 
universal belongs to the essence of any substance whatever. Rather, more 
properly speaking, it should be said that the universal expresses or explicates 
the nature of a substance — that is, the nature that is a substance.

This is what the Commentator says, *Metaphysics*, VII,\(^{30}\) that “it is 
impossible for any of what are called universals to be the substance of any 
thing, even though they reveal the substances of things.” Thus, all the 
authorities who say that universals belong to the essence of substances, or that 
they are in substances or are the parts of substances, should be understood [in 
the sense] that the authors mean only that such universals reveal, express, 
explicate, and convey the substances of things.

Suppose you say: Common names — such as, say, ‘man’, ‘animal’, and 
the like — signify some substantial things. And they do not signify singular 
substances, because in that case ‘man’ would signify all men, which seems 
false. Therefore, such names signify some substances besides singular sub-
stances.

It must be said [to this] that such names signify precisely singular 
things. Hence, the name ‘man’ signifies no thing except one that is a singular 
man. Therefore, it never supposit for a substance except when it supposit for 
a particular man. Therefore, one has to grant that the name ‘man’ equally 
primarily signifies all particular men. Yet it does not follow because of this that 
the name ‘man’ is an equivocal utterance. This is because, even though it sig-
nifies several [things] equally primarily, nevertheless it signifies them by a 
single imposition, and it is subordinated in signifying those several [things] to 
only one concept and not to several. Because of this it is univocally predicated 
of them.

To (5), the last [argument], those who maintain that intentions of the 
soul are qualities of the mind have to say that all universals are accidents. Yet 
not all universals are signs of accidents. Rather, some are signs of substances 
only. Those that are only signs of substances constitute the category of 
substance, [whereas] the others constitute the other categories. Therefore, it is 
to be granted that the category of substance is an accident, even though it 
reveals substances and not accidents. Therefore, it must be granted that some

\(^{30}\) Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph. 7*, t. 45 (VIII, 93\(^{39}\)).
accident — namely, one that is a sign only of substances — is by itself superior to substance. This is no more a problem than saying that some utterance is a name of many substances.

But is the same [thing] superior to itself? It can be said that [it is] not, because in order for something to be superior to [something] else, a distinction between them is required. So it can be said that not all universals are by themselves inferior to the common [term] ‘quality’, even though all universals are qualities. For the common [term] ‘quality’ is a quality, but it not inferior to that [term] — rather, it is that [term].

Suppose it is said: The same [thing] is not predicated of diverse categories; therefore, quality is not common to diverse categories.

It must be said [to this] that, whether the same [thing] is predicated of diverse categories when they stand significatively or not, nevertheless when the categories stand and supposit not significatively, it is not incongruous for the same [thing] to be predicated of diverse categories. Hence, if in ‘Substance is a quality’, the subject stands materially or simply for the intention, [the proposition] is true. In the same way ‘Quantity is a quality’ is true, if ‘quantity’ does not stand significatively. So the same [thing] is predicated of diverse categories. For example, the two [propositions] ‘Substance is an utterance’ [and] ‘Quantity is an utterance’ are true if the subjects supposit materially and not significatively.

Suppose you say: Spiritual quality is in more than any category [is], insofar as it is predicated of several [categories]. For it is predicated of all categories, and no category is predicated of all categories.

It must be said that spiritual quality is not predicated of all categories taken significatively, but only taken for signs. For this reason it does not follow that it is in more than any category [is]. For superiority and inferiority among [things] is taken from the fact that the one taken significatively is predicated of more than the other taken significatively [is predicated]. Hence, the difficulty here is like the one about the name ‘word’. For this name is one of the contents under ‘name’. For the name ‘word’ is a name, and not every name is the name ‘word’. Nevertheless, the name ‘word’ is in a certain way superior to all names, and to the name ‘name’. For every name is a word, but not every word is a name.

And so it seems that the same [thing] is superior and inferior with respect to the same [thing]. This can be solved by saying that the argument would be conclusive if in all the propositions from which the conclusion is proved the terms supposited uniformly. Now, however, it is otherwise in the present case. Yet if that is called “inferior” of which, suppositing in some way, [something] else is predicated and [is predicated] of more [besides], even though if it supposited otherwise [that something else] would not be predicated of it taken universally, [then] it can be granted that the same [thing] is superior and
inferior with respect to the same [thing]. But in that case ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ are not opposites but [only] disparate.
William of Ockham, Commentary on Aristotle’s
On Interpretation, Prologue, §§ 3–10
(Commentary on 16a3–6)

[Section 3]

[What is a passion of the soul or concept?]

Second, we have to see what this “passion” is. It must be said that ‘passion’ is taken here otherwise than in the book Categories. How it is taken there was said in that place.¹ But in the present context ‘passion of the soul’ is taken for something [that is] predicable of something and is not an utterance or an inscription. It is called by some [people] an “intention of the soul”, and by some people it is called a “concept”. Now it is not the logician’s but rather the metaphysician’s business to consider what this “passion” is, whether it is some thing outside the soul, or something really existing in the soul, or some fictive being existing only objectively in the soul. Nevertheless, I want to describe some opinions that can be maintained about this difficulty.²

---

¹ Ockham, Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, 14, § 7 (277ff.).

² Scotus also discusses this topic, in his Ordinatio, I, d. 27, qq. 1–3, n. 48 (Vatican ed., VI, p. 84): “Now in an intelligence there seem to be only: (a) the actual intellection, or (b) the object terminating that intellection, or (c) according to others, the species generated in the intelligence from the species in memory, which ‘species in the intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or (d) according to others, something formed through the act of understanding, or fifth (e), according to others, the intellection itself, as a passion — caused, as it were, by itself as action. According to these five [alternatives], there can be five opinions about the ‘[mental] word’.”
[Section 4]

[Is a “passion” a quality of the soul distinct from the act of understanding?]

Therefore, an opinion like the following could be maintained, namely that the “passion of the soul” of which the Philosopher is speaking here is a quality of the soul, really distinct from the act of understanding, and terminating that act of understanding as its object. This quality only has being when there is an act of understanding. And this quality is a true likeness of the external thing, for which reason it represents the external thing and supposits for it by its nature, just as an utterance supposits for things by institution.

But whether this opinion is true or false, there are some difficulties against it. One difficulty is this: The Philosopher seems to posit in the soul only powers and habits and passions (or acts), as is gathered from *Ethics*, II. Therefore, since such a quality is not a habit or a power or an act, as is plain according to this opinion, it does not seem to be a true quality of the mind.

Likewise, it seems that this quality is not an object of the intellect. For passions of the soul are posited in order to correspond to utterances, so that, namely, something is understood when an utterance is pronounced and its concept signified. But when I say ‘animal’, and someone else hears and knows the signification of this utterance, he does not seem to understand any such quality, because he seems to understand animal in general. But such a quality cannot be animal in general, because that quality, if it is posited, is distinguished from animal just as whiteness or heat is, since it is a spiritual accident in the soul and heat is a corporeal accident in a body. And a spiritual accident seems to be distinguished more from animal than a corporeal accident is.

[Section 5]

[Is the “passion” a species of the thing?]}

There could be another opinion, that the passion of the soul of which the Philosopher is speaking here is something that can be made a subject or a

---


4 See Roger Marston, *Quaediones disputatae de emanatione aeterna*, q. 6, in Roger Marston, *Quaediones disputatae*, (“Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi,” vol. 7; Quaracchi, 1932), p.118: “Therefore, just as a sensible thing generates its species in the eye, [and] this species is my reason for seeing since through it I see the external thing, so too, from something’s species in the memory, if I want to recall [the thing] actually, there is generated at the peak of the intelligence a certain species like the one that is in memory, and then I actually know. For from the fact that from not actually understanding I have come to be actually understanding, some change must have taken place in something absolute in my intellect. And that absolute
predicate, from which a proposition in the mind is put together that corresponds
to a proposition in speech. This “passion” is the species of the thing and
naturally represents the thing. Therefore, it can naturally supposit for the thing
in a proposition.

But this opinion seems to me more unreasonable than the first one. First,
such a species is not to be posited, because it is superfluous, as will be clear
elsewhere. Second, as was said against the earlier opinion, there is nothing in
the soul really distinct from the soul except habits or acts, according to the
Philosopher. Third, such passions would remain in the soul [even] when the
soul is not thinking of anything, and there would be propositions in the soul
when it was not actually thinking anything.

[Section 6]

[Is the “passion” the very act of understanding?]

There could be another opinion, that the passion of the soul is the very
act of understanding. Because this opinion seems to me the most likely of all
the opinions that maintain that these passions are subjectively and really in the
soul as true qualities of it, therefore with respect to this opinion I shall first set
out the more likely way of maintaining [it], if it ought to be maintained.
Second, I shall set out true or [merely] apparent problems [that count] against
it, and I shall reply to them in the way I think one who holds [this opinion]
ought to reply to them.

I say, therefore, that one who wants to hold the above opinion can
suppose that the intellect, when it apprehends a singular thing, elicits a
cognition in itself which is [a cognition] of only that singular. [This] is called a

[something] is the species generated from the treasury of memory [and] expressed in the peak of the
intelligence.” Scotus also discusses a view like this, loc. cit., n. 54 (p. 86). The term ‘species’ in this
context does not of course mean species as opposed to genus, but rather “species” in the
epistemological sense.


6 In § 4, above.


8 Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 27, qqs. 1–3, n. 59 (Vaticana ed., VI, p. 84): “Therefore, it follows
by a process of exclusion that the [mental] word is an actual intellection.” See also William of
Nottingham, In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2 (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, MS 300/514, fols. 77a & 78a):
“From all these [facts] it follows that the mental word is an actual cognition, as Augustine plainly
says in On the Trinity, XV, Chapters 11 and 17 …. Therefore, by a ‘concept’ I understand nothing
else than the perfect and complete intellection of the thing. I believe Augustine called this the
‘formed cognition’.”
passion of the soul, [and] is able from its nature to supposit for that singular thing. Thus, just as by institution the utterance ‘Socrates’ supposits for the thing it signifies — so that one who hears the utterance ‘Socrates runs’ does not conceive from it that the utterance ‘Socrates’ that he hears runs, but rather the thing signified by that utterance runs — so [too] one who saw or understood something to be affirmed about that intellection of the singular thing would not conceive that the intellection is such and such. Rather, he would conceive that the thing of which it is [an intellection] is such and such. Thus, just as an utterance by institution supposits for the thing, so [too] the intellection itself by its nature, without any institution, supposits for the thing of which it is [an intellection].

But besides this intellection of this singular thing, the intellect forms for itself other intellections that are not any more [intellections] of this thing than of another, just as the utterance ‘man’ does not signify Socrates more than Plato, and therefore does not supposit more for Socrates than for Plato. So it would be for such an intellection, that Socrates is not more understood by it than Plato [is], and so on for all other men. So too, there would be some intellection by which this animal would be no more understood than that animal [is], and so on for other [animals]. In short, therefore, the intellections of the soul are themselves called passions of the soul and supposit from their nature for the external things themselves, or for other things in the soul, just as utterances [do] by institution.

But one can argue against this opinion in many ways.

(1) First, as follows: I take the common or confused cognition that corresponds to the utterance ‘man’ or to the utterance ‘animal’, and ask: Is (a) something or (b) nothing understood by this cognition? It cannot be said that (b) nothing [is understood by it], because just as it is impossible for there to be a seeing and [yet] that nothing be seen, or for there to be a love and [yet] that nothing be loved, so it is impossible for there to be a cognition and [yet] that nothing be cognized by that cognition.

If (a) something is cognized by the cognition, [it is] either (i) something in the soul or (ii) something outside the soul. If (ii) some thing outside the soul, [it is] not a universal thing, because there is no such thing, as was shown in the preceding books and will be shown more fully in this book. Therefore, some singular thing is cognized by such a cognition. But not one any more than another. Therefore, either each one [will be cognized by the cognition] or none [of them will be]. But not none [of them]. Therefore, each [of them] is understood. So, when I understood a man or formed the proposition ‘A man is an animal’ in [my] soul, I would understand every man, and so would

---

9 See Ockham, *Expositio in librum Porphyrii*, prooem., § 2 (pp. 10–16); *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, Ch. 4, § 2 (pp. 149–154), and Ch. 8, § 1 (pp. 162–171); also *Expositio in librum Perihermenias*, I, 5, § 3 (pp. 398–400), not translated here.
understand and cognize many men I have never seen and have never thought about. That seems a problem.

But if by such a cognition (i) something existing in the soul is cognized, I ask: What? Nothing but the intellection itself can be given. So the intellection would cognize itself, which seems a problem [too].

[This] is confirmed. By saying in the soul ‘Every man can run’, without any utterance spoken or conceived, either (a) some man is understand or (b) no man or (c) something other than a man. If it is said that (a) some man is understood, it is not one any more than another, and not a man that is any more than a man that can be. For [the term ‘man’] supposits for what can be men just as [it does] for what are men, and what can be men are infinite [in number]. Therefore, an infinity [of men] are understood by such an intellection.

But if (b) no man is understood, it is plain that (c-i) no other thing outside the soul is understood. Therefore, either nothing is understood or (c-ii) something else in the soul is understood. And nothing else really in the soul can be given that is understood, except the intellection itself. Therefore, the intellection itself is understood by itself, which seems a problem.

(2) Moreover I take an act of knowing a proposition, and ask what is understood by such an act. Either (a) [something] simple or (b) [something] composite [is understood]. [It is] not (a) simple, because every proposition is composed of at least a subject and a predicate and a copula. If [it is] (b) composite, I ask what the proposition is composed of. Either (i) precisely of things. And in that case, the proposition would be on the side of reality and not only in the intellect. Or (ii) it is composed of some [entities] in the intellect. Not of acts of understanding, because in that case besides the act of understanding the proposition there would be other acts of which the proposition would be composed. Thus, there would be many acts at once [in the soul]. Therefore, something other than the act of understanding is understood, and nevertheless it is in the intellect. Consequently, that will more truly be the “passion” of which the Philosopher is speaking here than [will] the act of understanding.

Suppose it is said that the act of apprehending or knowing a proposition is not some one simple act, but rather is an act composed of many acts, all of which acts [together] make one proposition.

To the contrary: In that case the propositions ‘Every man is an animal’ and ‘Every animal is a man’ would not be distinguished in the mind. For if the proposition in the mind is nothing but an act of understanding composed of these particular intelli<actions>, then since there cannot in this case be any particular act in the one proposition without its being in the other, and

---

10 Walter Burley held the doctrine of a “real proposition” composed of things. See his Quaestiones in librum Perihermenias, in his In artem veterem, (Venice, 1541), q. 3 (238–260).
difference of word-order does not get in the way as it does in speech, [therefore] there does not appear to be any way to distinguish [them] in the mind.

Likewise, the act of knowing is distinguished from all those acts taken separately or together. For they can all be at once even though there is no act of knowing.

One who wants to maintain this opinion can reply to these [arguments].

To (1), the first [objection], it can be said that by such a confused intellection singular external things are understood. For example, to have a confused intellection of a man is nothing else than to have a cognition by which one man is no more understood than another, and yet by such a cognition a man is more cognized or understood than [is] an ass. This is nothing else than for such a cognition to be more similar, in some way of being similar, to a man than to an ass, and no more [similar] to this man than to that one.

In that respect, it seems it has to be said as a consequence that an infinity [of things] can be cognized by such a confused cognition. This seems no more unthinkable than the fact that by the same love or desire an infinity [of things] can be loved or desired. But the latter does not seem unthinkable. For someone can love all the part of some continuum, which are infinite. Or he can long for all the parts of the continuum to endure in being. Yet by such a longing, nothing is longed for except some part of the continuum — and not one any more than another. They all have to be longed for, and yet they are infinite [in number]. Likewise, one can long for there to be all the men who can be, and yet they are infinite, because an infinite [number of men] can be generated.

So, therefore, it could be said that the same cognition can be [a cognition] of an infinite [number of things]. But it will not be a cognition proper to any of them. Neither can one [of them] be distinguished from another by this cognition. This is because of some specific likeness between this cognition and those individuals, [but] not others.

One can reply to (2), the second [objection], in many ways. (a) In one way, [by saying] that the proposition in the mind is a composite of many acts of understanding. For example, the proposition ‘A man is an animal’\(^\text{11}\) in the mind is nothing else but the act by which all men are confusedly understood and the act by which all animals are confusedly understood, and there is an that corresponds to the copula. (b) Or it can be said that this proposition is one act equivalent to three such acts existing at once in the intellect. And then, according to this way of speaking, the proposition is not anything composite really, but only by equivalence — that is, it is equivalent to such a composition.

\(^{11}\) Latin has no articles, so that in Latin this sentence has only three words.
But in that case it is hard to preserve any way for the propositions ‘Every animal is a white [thing]’ and ‘Every white [thing] is an animal’, and the like, to be distinguished in the mind. For in the mind they are not distinguished because of a different word-order, in the way they can be distinguished in speech. For the conjoining of the [universal] sign\textsuperscript{12} with the one spoken word or with the other plainly makes the [spoken] proposition different. But that cannot be done in the mind. For such acts of understanding in the mind, since they are together and in the same subject (that is, in the intellect), cannot have such a difference of order. Neither can the same act of understanding be put together more with the one than with the other.

To this, it can be said that a proposition can be an act of understanding [that is] equivalent to a whole proposition [that would be] composed of [things] really distinct, if they were to have such an order as they have in speech. And then [mental] propositions will be distinct according as [their] corresponding propositions would be distinguished if their terms or parts were ordered in one way or another.

It could be said otherwise that in a proposition in the mind there corresponds one act of understanding composed of a universal sign and a common term. Therefore, in the proposition in the mind corresponding to the spoken proposition ‘Every animal is a white [thing]’ one act corresponds, as a part of the proposition, to the whole [phrase] ‘every animal’, and another [act] to ‘white [thing]’. But in the proposition in the mind corresponding to the [spoken] proposition ‘Every white [thing] is an animal’, one act corresponds to the whole [phrase] ‘every white [thing]’ and another to the term ‘animal’. So the propositions ‘Every animal is a white [thing]’ and ‘Every white [thing] is an animal’ in the mind will not have the same parts, because the act of understanding corresponding to the whole [phrase] ‘every white [thing]’, is distinguished from the act of understanding corresponding precisely to the term ‘white [thing]’. And the same thing, analogously, would have to be said for other cases.

And according to this opinion, it could be said that every proposition in the mind, which [proposition] is not in any way an utterance or an inscription, is composed of intellections and in no way of things. So, if one were to affirm or deny that Socrates is Plato, the proposition would not be composed of Socrates and Plato, but of the intellections of

\textsuperscript{12} sign: That is, quantifier.
intellection that has naturally the same mode of signifying with respect to the same [thing] as the spoken word has by institution. Just as the sobs and groans of the sick and many [other] such utterances signify the same [thing] naturally that utterances significative by convention can signify, so [too] intellections of the soul, which the Philosopher here calls “passions of the soul”, can naturally signify the same [thing] that utterances instituted by convention signify. And not only that, but a single intention can naturally signify — and in the same way — what something composed of a categorematic utterance and a syncategorematic [one] signifies. Yet there is a difference in the fact that an utterance signifies not only to the speaker but also to the hearers, whereas intellections of the soul signify only to the understanding soul itself. This is because others cannot apprehend the passions of the soul.

Therefore, to the form of (2), the [second] argument, one can reply that it makes a difference whether one is speaking about the act of knowing a proposition or about the act of apprehending [it]. For the act of apprehending will be more the proposition itself than [it is] of that proposition. So to apprehend a proposition is nothing else than to form the proposition. Then, when it is asked what is understood by such a proposition in the mind — is it simple or composite? — it can be said that it is neither simple nor composite. For example, through the proposition ‘A man is an animal’, there is apprehended, properly speaking, neither [something] simple nor [something] complex. Rather the proposition in the mind is an act of understanding by which every man and also every animal is understood confusedly, and the numerically the same [thing] is a man and an animal. For this [is what] is denoted by [the proposition]. So by such a proposition several [things] are understood, but not a composite.

When it is said [in objection (2)] that every proposition is composed of a subject and a predicate and a copula, it can be said that this is true for spoken and written propositions. But for a conceived proposition, which is only in the mind, it can be said that one [kind] is composed of such a subject and predicate and copula, and another [kind] is equivalent to such a composite. And this is enough for a proposition.

Therefore, according to this way of speaking, it would be more true to say that a proposition is not always understood when it is in the soul. Rather it is that by which things or intentions of the soul — that is, acts of understanding — are understood. For in that case the proposition is the act of understanding.

But if we are speaking about the act of knowing some proposition, then it can be said that that act is another act than the proposition [itself]. Therefore, when some proposition in the mind is known, there are two acts of understanding at once, namely the proposition itself and another act by which the proposition is known. It is never found in Aristotle that he would deny that two acts of the intellect can be in the intellect at once — especially in the case of ordered acts, like a proposition and the act of knowing it.
Therefore, anyone who wanted to could hold this opinion, [namely,] that the passions of the soul of which the Philosopher is speaking are intellections. This is a likely opinion, and agrees with the preceding ones in the general conclusion that passions of the soul are true qualities of the mind.

Whoever wants to hold this opinion, I think he will speak with greater consistency if he says that all propositions, syllogisms, all intentions of the mind whatever, and in general all the [things] that are called beings of reason, are real positive beings and true qualities of the mind that really inform the mind, as whiteness really informs a wall and heat [does] fire. In that case, the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul is no different than if being were divided into qualities of the mind and into other beings.

[Section 7]

[Are passions of the soul specters or ficta?]

Besides these opinions, another opinion could be maintained, that an intention of the soul, or a concept or passion of the soul, is nothing but [what can be] in predicate position or in subject position in a proposition in the mind, to which there corresponds [something that can be] in predicate position or in subject position in speech, and in general that the passions of the soul, or intentions of the soul or concepts, are propositions in the mind, or syllogisms or their parts. But it could be maintained that such [things] are not true qualities of the mind, and are not real beings existing subjectively in the soul, but are only certain [entities] known by the soul, in such a way that their being is nothing other than their being to be cognized. They can be called “specters”, according
to some [people’s] way of speaking, or certain “ficta”, according to other [people’s] way of speaking.

In this sense it can be said that the intellect, when it apprehends a singular, fashions a similar singular [in the mind], and the singular so fabricated does not exist anywhere really, any more than the fort the artisan fashions [in his mind] exists really before he produces it. Yet it is such in fictive being as the other is externally. For this reason it can supposit in a proposition for the thing from which it is fashioned, and it can be called a “passion” insofar as it has no being except through an operation of the soul. It can also be called a “intention of the soul” insofar as it is not something real in the soul in the way in which a habit is something real in the soul. Rather it has only an intentional being, namely, a being cognized, in the soul. For the same reason it can be called a “concept of the mind”, and it terminates the act of understanding when no singular external thing is understood and yet something common to external things is understood. And [the fictum] so formed or fashioned can be called a “universal” because it is equally related to all [the things] from which it is abstracted by such a [process of] formation or fashioning. Propositions are formed from these [ficta], which [are] the propositions [that] are understood and known. Yet in many propositions [the ficta] do not supposit except for external things.

---

13 Hervaeus Natalis, Quattuor quodlibeta, (Venice, 1486), Quodlibit II, q. 8: “Yet I hold [it as] more likely that in the intellect there is formed a certain form that is not the act of understanding…. Third, as follows: What is the case in sensation is the case, in its own way, in the intellect. But in sensation one [has] to grant such a specter (idolum), by which the thing is cognized. And it is not the knowledge of the thing. Therefore, etc…. I say, therefore, as I have said elsewhere, that the [mental] word is not the act of understanding, but is rather a certain form as in a mirror, in which the thing is thought, in such a way that the form itself is also known in a way …. See also Quodlibit III, q. 1: “To the first point, you have to know that something is said to be in the intellect in two senses: In one way, as in a subject, like an act of understanding and a concept of the mind, and intellectual habits. And in this sense they are in the intellect just as any accidents are in the [things] of which they are accidents, as in a subject. In the other sense, something is said to be in the intellect objectively. Now to be in the intellect objectively is the same as to be in the view of the intellect as [what is] thought [is in] the thinker, in the sense in which the whole of what he sees is said to be in the view of someone.” See also Hervaeus Natalis, De intentionibus secundis, (Paris, 1489), q. 2.

14 See Henry of Harclay, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 3, (in Gedeon Gál, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de significato conceptus universalis,” Franciscan Studies 31 [1971], pp. 178–234, at p. 211): “In reality outside the soul, there is nothing but the singular. Community is not in reality outside the intellect.” Also (ibid., p. 225): “You say, ‘Therefore, the universal is a figment, which is contrary to theLincolnite’…. I say that there are two kinds of figment: the philosophical figment and the poetical [figment]. The poetical figment is false in reality…. But the philosopher fashions [figments] in another way. For by the necessity of teaching, he fashions in the intellect a simple [thing] that neither is nor can be. To this fictum he attributes, without any falsehood, what would inhere in that thing if it existed in reality. For example, the geometer, for the sake of teaching, fashions in [the mind’s] consideration a line without width, and perhaps the astronomer [fashions] epicycles and eccentrics, without asserting that there are [any] such [things] in reality.”
I do not think there is anything very weighty against this opinion, except 
that (1) it is hard to imagine that something can be understood in a real 
tellection by the intellect and yet neither it nor any part of it nor anything that 
belongs to it can be in reality, and it cannot be either a substance or an accident. 
The fictum would be supposed to be like this. 

(2) Likewise, such a fictum would differ more from any thing than any 
thing [does] from another [thing]. For a real being and a being of reason differ 
more than [do] any two real beings. Therefore, such a fictive being is less 
similar to the thing. Therefore, it is less able to supposit for the thing than the 
tellection [is], which is more like [the thing]. Consequently, it will be less 
common to the external thing than the tellection [is], and will have less of the 
aspect of a universal than the tellection [does]. But such a specter or fictum is 
not maintained for any other purpose than for it to be common to the thing, and 
for a proposition to be composed of it,\(^{15}\) and for it to be common to things. For 
these [functions] are denied of things. Therefore, since these [functions] can 
pertain more truly to the tellection than to such a specter, it seems that it is 
superfluous to posit such a specter or fictum. 

(3) Likewise, however much the aforesaid [functions] are unable for 
other reasons to pertain to the tellection — because it is hard to say what I 
understand by such an tellection\(^{16}\) — nevertheless they all can pertain more 
truly to some quality existing in the soul and terminating the act of 
understanding [than to such a specter or fictum]. For if there is posited some 
quality really existing in the mind, since it is a real and positive being, just as is 
the external substance, it is more truly like the external thing than such a 
specter or fictum [is]. Therefore, it can more properly be said that the external 
thing is understood in such a quality than that the external thing is understood 
in such a specter. Or it can be more truly said that the external thing is 
somewhere understood because such a quality is understood than it can be said 
that the external thing is understood because such a specter or fictum is 
understood. Likewise, for the same [reason] it can more truly be common to ex-
ternal things and [can] more truly supposit for a thing. Therefore, for these rea-
sons, it ought more to be maintained that the passions of the soul of which the 
Philosopher is speaking here are qualities of the mind than that they are such 
specters or ficta. 

---

\(^{15}\) The edition (line 42) has ‘ea’ here, which can only refer to ‘res’ (= ‘thing’). No variants 
are noted. The sense seems to require ‘eo’, referring to ‘idolum’ (= ‘specter’) or ‘fictum’.

\(^{16}\) See § 6, above.
Therefore, I say that the Philosopher calls passions of the soul those entities from which a proposition or syllogism in the mind is composed, or can be composed. But what is that? In general, there can be three opinions.\(^\text{17}\)

One is that the external thing [as] conceived or understood is the passion of the soul, in the way in which some [people]\(^\text{18}\) maintain that besides singular things there are universal things, and that conceived singular things are the subjects in singular propositions and conceived universal things are the parts of universal propositions.\(^\text{365}\)

But this opinion, to the extent that it maintains that there are external things besides singul\[s\] [and] existing in [singul\[ars\]], I regard as completely absurd and destructive of all of Aristotle’s philosophy, and of all knowledge and all truth and reason [too], and that it is the worst error in philosophy and [is] criticized by Aristotle in \textit{Metaphysics}, VII,\(^\text{19}\) and that those who hold are incapable of knowledge.

\(^{17}\) The first of these three opinions has not been discussed before, but the second, and especially the third, have (see §§ 9–10 below). The second opinion is a generic view that includes all three opinions discussed in §§ 4–6 above. The third opinion is just the “fictum”-theory already discussed in § 7.

\(^{18}\) Ockham is thinking of Walter Burley. See Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burley’s \textit{Quaesitio}nes in librum Perihermeianas,” \textit{Franciscan Studies} 34 (1974), pp. 200–295, at q. 1, § 17 (p. 212): “In the third sense ‘passion’ is taken for the thing itself as it is apt to move the intellect. Taking ‘passion’ in this sense, utterances signify passions. For to signify passions in this way is nothing other than to signify the thing as it is proportioned to the intellect. In this sense, every utterance signifies a passion.” See also, Stephen F. Brown, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Perihermeianas},” \textit{Franciscan Studies} 33 (1973), pp. 42–134, at § 1.73 (pp. 84f.): “There is another division of statement, because one kind of statement has a singular subject, and another kind has a universal subject. This division is taken from the division of things. Now some things are universals and some singulars.” See also Burley, \textit{In artem veterem (ed. cit., 75\textsuperscript{vb})}: “Second, it can be noted that outside the soul one kind of thing is universal and another singular. This is clear from the division of things. It can be noted on the same basis, second, that a statement is composed of things outside the soul, which are universals and singulars (and these are outside the soul). Yet the moderns do not like these observations, who neither maintain universals outside the soul nor maintain that a proposition is composed of things outside the soul.” The last sentence seems to be a recognition of Ockham’s resistance to the view.

\(^{19}\) Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics} 7, 13 (1038\textsuperscript{b}10–1039\textsuperscript{a}3).
[Section 9]

[Are passions of the soul qualities existing subjectively in the soul?]

There can be another opinion, which I regard as likely, namely, that passions of the soul are certain qualities of the mind existing subjectively in the mind just as truly and just as really as whiteness exists in a wall or coldness in water. The Commentator seems to be in favor of this opinion, *Metaphysics, VII.* And so, according to the Commentator, universals are qualities of the mind, and do not belong to the substance of external things and are not parts of them. Therefore, according to this opinion, every universal that is not a universal by voluntary institution (as is the case for an utterance or inscription) is truly numerically one thing in itself, and truly singular in itself. Yet it is universal and common by predication and representation in some way. Avicenna seems to say this. If I held this opinion I would say that nothing is imaginable unless it is a real being, or can be, or something that aggregates such [entities] that are or can be real beings.

[Objections]

But against this one can argue in many ways.

(1) First, figments — like a chimera, a goat-stag and the like — are imaginable by the intellect, and yet they are not in reality either according to themselves or according to their parts. For if they were, they would be just as truly in reality as a man and an animal [are], or at least [just as truly as are] a people and an army.

---

20 See William of Alnwick, *In I Sententias*, d. 27, in Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana, MS 291, fol. 60r: “Reply: First I shall show what nature and what entity an intellectual operation is…. With respect to the first point, I intend to show that an intellectual operation is a quality belonging to the first species [of quality]…. I say therefore that an intellectual operation is a certain quality and a certain absolute form that perfects the intellect.” See also Richard of Campsall, *Contra ponentes naturam*, in Edward A. Synan, ed., *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, vol. 2, (“Studies and Texts,” vol. 58; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), § 8, p. 15: “Therefore, it must be said that genus and species and universals like that are not things outside the soul, so that there is some common thing, as is generally imagined, that is common to many. Rather they are universal forms existing in the soul as in a subject. Yet they are singular forms in being, just like other accidents in the soul. A form like this is called universal insofar as such an intention, although it is numerically one in the soul, is common or universal in this way or that because it is essentially several. This is clear in the case of the intellection of man or animal. Although it is numerically one [form] existing in the soul, nevertheless it is common, like a genus or species, because it represents several [things]."

21 Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph. 7*, t. 23 (VIII, 81r–82r).

(2) Likewise, everyone experiences in himself that he contrives castles and golden mountains and the like [in his mind], which have no real being, and cannot have [any].

(3) Likewise, an artisan thinks out the house before he produces it, and it does not have real being then.

(4) Moreover, being is first divided into being in the soul and into being outside the soul. Being outside the soul is divided, second, into the ten categories.\(^{23}\) I ask then: How is being in the soul taken in the first division? Either [it is taken] (a) for some real quality of the mind itself. And in that case it will be contained under the genus quality. Therefore, it would not be divided against being outside the soul, but rather would be something contained under being outside the soul. For it would be contained under quality, and quality under being outside the soul, as it clear from the second division.

Or else being in the soul is taken there (b) for something that is not really in the soul but only as the known [is] in the knower. In that case, I ask: (b-i) Is it in the soul in such a way that is not really and positively outside? In that case the point is established.\(^{24}\) Or (b-ii) is it in the soul as in a knower, and yet is really outside positively and subjectively? In that case it is not distinguished as against being outside the soul, but rather is a being outside the soul.

(4a) This is confirmed by the Commentator, *Metaphysics*, VI, the last comment,\(^ {25}\) where he says the following: “Of this being, that which is in cognition is either a composition or a division\(^ {26}\) without what is a being outside the soul, which is different from this, [and which] in reality is what ‘What?’ signifies, or ‘Of what quality?’ or ‘How much?’, or something continuous with [something] else,\(^ {27}\) and these are the other categories.” From this passage it is clear that the Commentator divides being in the soul, which he calls true and false, from all the ten categories. Consequently, it is not contained under any of the ten categories. Consequently, it is not contained under quality. Hence, beings in the soul are not qualities or substances or quantities, and so on. Therefore, it is plain that such [beings in the soul] are not real beings.

---

\(^{23}\) See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5, 7 (1017\(a\)7–1017\(b\)9).

\(^{24}\) This seems very compressed. Presumably the point is that, if it is in the soul in such a way that it is not also outside, then it does not fall into any of the ten categories (by the second division), so that it must be granted some kind of fictive being.

\(^{25}\) Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.* 6, t. 8 (VIII, 72\(r\)). The Latin is awkward, so do not put too much confidence in the translation.

\(^{26}\) This is a code meaning that it is either an affirmation or a denial. Averroes is thinking of mental propositions.

\(^{27}\) or … else: I do not the sense of this.
One who wants to maintain the above opinion — namely, that whatever is imaginable or conceivable is truly a real thing or [something] that aggregates such things that are or were or can be — can reply to (1), the first of these. When it is said that a chimera and the like are figments and are not real, he can say that ‘A chimera is in reality’ has to be distinguished, insofar as ‘chimera’ can supposit personally, materially or simply. If it supposits personally, [the proposition] is false. If [it supposits] materially or simply, [the proposition] is true. For both the utterance and the intention of the soul are something in reality.

If it is asked whether ‘A chimera is understood’ is true, it can be said that if ‘chimera’ is taken personally, it is false, just as ‘Non-being is understood’ is false if the subject is taken personally. But if the subject is taken materially or simply, [the proposition] is true. One must say the same thing in all cases, like: ‘A goat-stag is understood,’ ‘Non-being is understood’, ‘Non-being is a being’, ‘A vacuum is understood’ ‘A vacuum is thinkable’, ‘A vacuum is a being of reason’, ‘One can imagine an infinite line’, and in many such cases.

If it is said that in all such cases the terms are understood, we have to say that that is true. So propositions like ‘A chimera is understood’, ‘A vacuum is understood’, and the like, are to be granted if the subjects supposits simply or materially, because of those [terms] so suppositing it is verified that they are the terms of [mental] propositions — and not otherwise.

Suppose it is said that if such propositions are true when the subjects supposit simply, [then] therefore the subjects supposit for something intelligible, at least, and not for themselves. Therefore, there is something else that is understood, for which the subject supposits.

It is to be said, as I have said elsewhere, that in many propositions, even though the terms supposit personally, nevertheless they do not supposit for anything. For a term can supposit personally, even though it does not supposit for anything. Rather it is enough that it is denoted to supposit for something. For example, if no man is white, the subject in the proposition ‘A white man is a man’ does not supposit for anything, but it is implied that is supposits for something. And not for itself or for an utterance. Therefore, it supposits personally. This is the case [also] in ‘A chimera is understood’, ‘A vacuum is’, ‘Non-being is a being’, and so on in similar cases.

To (2), the second [objection], it can be said that when someone contrives castles and the like [in the mind], he does not contrive otherwise than because he elicits such and such intellections. For example, someone who is

---

28 Ockham, *Summa logicae*, I, 72 (pp. 214, 218).
speaking contrives many [things in speech], because, say, he utters many lies. Yet there is nothing there except an utterance or utterances. Nevertheless, he is said to “contrive”, because he says something through which it is implied that the case is otherwise than it is. Therefore, just as one who contrives in speech pronounces [what are] truly utterances to which nevertheless nothing such corresponds in reality, and there is nothing truly contrived except the utterances, so [too] one who contrives mentally causes true intellections, or other qualities, according to another opinion, to which nevertheless nothing corresponds. Yet he implies that something corresponds. That is why it is called a “fictum”.

Suppose it is said that in that case every figment would be a true thing, and consequently is would not be a figment, because no thing is a figment, no one more than any other.

To this it can be said that it can be granted literally that every figment is a true thing, just as every lie is a true thing. For if it is a lie in speech, it is truly an utterance or utterances. Likewise, if it is a mental lie, it is truly an intellection or intellections, or other qualities, according to another opinion. Neither does it follow: ‘Therefore, it is not a figment’. For one thing is called a figment more than another, not because it is not truly a positive thing, but when there does not correspond to it anything in reality as is denoted to correspond to it. In this sense the utterance ‘golden mountain’ can be called a figment, because there does not correspond any golden mountain in reality. So it is for all figments in the mind.

If it is said that a chimera is a figment, but a chimera is not a positive thing, [and] therefore, etc., it can be said that ‘A chimera is a figment’ has to be distinguished, insofar as ‘chimera’ can supposit personally (and then [the proposition] is false, just as ‘A chimera is a chimera’ is false), or else it can supposit simply or materially (and then [the proposition] is true). But taken in the same way, the minor [premise] is false.

To (3), the third [objection], it must be said that for the artisan to think out the house before he produces in is not for the artisan to have the house in merely objective being. Rather it is to have the art or science of the house, which is a true quality of the mind, [and] which quality of the mind, namely the art or science, is called the house. So [too], according to the Commentator, *Metaphysics, VII*,29 the art and science of health is called health. Thus he says there, in comment 23: “Health is said in two senses. For it is said of the form that is in the soul and of the habit that is in the body. Both are the same, that is, they have the same name. But health in the second sense is discovered by what is [health] according to the first sense.” And later on: “Health is said in two senses. For it is said of the understanding of health that is in the soul, and [also]

29 Averroes, *In Aristot. Metaph.* 7, t. 23 (81r–82r).
of the health that exists in the body.” And later on: “Health in reality is the
definition of health that is in the soul. And to know that is not the health that is
outside the soul.” From this it is clear that the definition and knowledge itself is
called health. So too, the house in the mind of the artisan can be called a house.
And if it is asked what terminates that intention as an object, it can be said that
the external thing [does], but not one house any more than another, as was said
earlier.\(^{30}\)

To (4), the last [objection], it can be said that when being is divided into
being in the soul and into being outside the soul, being in the soul is taken there
for a being that is really and subjectively in the soul, like an intellection or
some other quality of the mind, in the way in which being is divided by some
[people]\(^{31}\) into things and the signs of things, and yet in reality signs are things.
Further, just as “thing” is divided into the ten categories, and yet signs are
contained under one category, as all utterances are contained under the
category of quality, so [too] beings in the soul are contained under the category
of quality.

Therefore, it can be said that these divisions are not by themselves
subordinated [to one another] in the way in which the following divisions are
ordered: “[Of] substance, one kind [is] corporeal, another incorporeal. [Of]
corporeal substance, one kind [is] animate body, another [is] inanimate body.”
Rather [they are ordered] as follows: “Of beings, some are signs, others
significates. And of significates, some are qualities, just as signs themselves are
qualities, and others are substances,” and so on. So in the present case it should
be said that being is divided into being in the soul and into being outside the
soul. And afterwards, the subdivision should be made as follows: that of beings
outside the soul, some are qualities, just as the beings in the soul are themselves
qualities, and some are substances.

And when it is said [in (4a)] that the Commentator\(^{32}\) says that “being,
which is different from this” — add: being in the soul — “[and which] in
reality is what either [the question] ‘What?’ signifies,” etc., “and these are the
other categories,” this should be glossed as follows: that these are contained

\(^{30}\) The editors (p. 368 n. 11) refer to the reply to the second objection, above, in § 9. But
this appears to be an error. The correct reference appears to be to the reply to the first objection in §
6, above.

\(^{31}\) See Augustine, \textit{De doctrina christiana}, W. J. Mountain, ed., (“Corpus Christianorum
Series Latina,” vols. 50 & 50a; Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), I, 1, n. 2: “From this it is understood what
I call signs: namely, the things used to signify something. Thus, every sign is also some thing. For
what is no thing is nothing at all. But not every thing is also a sign.” See also Peter Lombard,
\textit{Sententiae in IV libris distinctae}, 2 vols., (“Specilegium Bonaventurianum,” vols. 4–5; Grottaferrata

\(^{32}\) Averroes, \textit{In Aristot. Metaph.} 6, t. 8 (72').
under the other categories. Nevertheless it is compatible with this that beings in the soul be contained under one of those categories.

So, therefore, it can be held that passions of the soul and all the predicables can be put in subject position. And in general, all universals and all propositions and syllogisms and their parts, if they are not signs instituted by convention, are real qualities of the mind, spiritual ones however, as their subject is a spirit. This is either because they are intellections, according to one opinion, or [because they are] certain qualities of the soul terminating intellections of the soul as [their] objects. According to this [latter] opinion, it can be held with [some] likelihood that every proposition in the mind that is not composed of signs instituted by convention is composed of real qualities of the mind, or else is some quality of the mind equivalent to such a composition, as was treated above.33

[Section 10]

[Are passions of the soul ficta?]

A third main opinion could be, as was discussed,34 that the passions of the soul about which the Philosopher is speaking here, and [also] propositions and syllogisms and universals are all nothing but certain ficta in the soul having only objective being — that is, being cognized — [and] existing nowhere really. They can be called “ficta” insofar as they are not real beings. In that case, certain beings of reason have to be posited, distinct in every case from all real beings, as against all [the beings] that exist in the categories. In that case all ficta would be such beings of reason, like a chimera, a goat-stag, and the like. Similarly, such beings of reason would be the constructs, such as castles, houses, cities and the like, that are thought out by the artisan before they are produced in real being.

[Replies to the objections in Section 7]

One who wanted to hold this opinion could reply to (1), the first [argument] for the contrary, by saying that it is no problem for something to be understood by the intellect that neither is nor can be in reality. Rather it suffices that it can be fashioned after the likeness of some thing or things existing in reality. For example, a golden mountain cannot be in reality, and yet can be simulated from a seen mountain and [seen] gold.

Yet one has to distinguish among ficta. For some are ficta to which nothing similar in reality can correspond, as is the case for a chimera and the

33 In § 6. Again, the editors of the Latin text give an erroneous reference.

34 In § 7, above.
like. Ones like these are generally called ficta. Other [things] are called ficta, and yet there correspond to them, or can correspond, similar [things] in real being. Ones like these are called universals, in the manner clarified earlier and explained further elsewhere.\(^{35}\)

To (2), the other [argument], it can be said that such a fictum or specter is more distinguished from an external thing than any thing whatever [is] from another. Nevertheless, in intentional being it is more similar to it, to the extent that if it could be really produced as it can be fashioned, there would truly be a [thing] similar to the external thing. For this reason it is more able to supposit for the thing, and to be common, and to be that in which the thing is understood than [is] the intellection or some other quality.

Hence [the reply] to (3), the last [objection] is clear from the same [consideration].

So, therefore, I regard these last opinions as likely ones. But let the learned discuss which one is true and which false. Nevertheless, for me it is completely certain that neither passions of the soul nor universals are any [things] outside the soul and belonging to the essence of singular things, whether they are conceived or not conceived.

Now that these [matters] have been seen, even though an infinity of others could be added, we must return to the exposition of Aristotle’s text.

\(^{35}\) See § 7, above, and Ockham, *Scriptum*, I, d. 2, q. 8 (283–289).
William of Ockham, *Quodlibet* 4, Question 35, and *Quodlibet* 5, Questions 12–13


*Quodlibet* 4, Question 35:

**Whether first and second intentions are really distinguished**

No. For beings of reason are not really distinguished. But both first and second intentions are only beings of reason. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary: First and second intentions are things. And they are not the same thing. Therefore, they are distinct things. Consequently, they are really distinguished.

Here first it has to be seen what a first intention is and what a second intention [is]. Second, [I shall speak] to the question.

[Article 1]

[First intention]

On the first point, I say that both first intention and second [intention] can be taken in two senses, namely, broadly and strictly. In the broad sense, every intentional sign existing in the soul, which does not precisely signify intentions or concepts in the soul, or other signs, is called a first intention. And I say this whether ‘sign’ is taken for what can supposit in a proposition and be a part of a proposition (as categoremata are) or whether ‘sign’ is taken for what cannot supposit or be an extreme of a proposition when it is taken significatively (as are syncategoremata).

In this sense, not only mental categoremata that signify things that are not signs, but even mental syncategoremata and verbs and conjunctions and the like are called first intentions. For example: In this sense, not only are the concept of man, which signifies all singular men (who signify nothing) and can
supposit for them and be a part of a proposition, and the concept of whiteness and the concept of color, etc., called first intentions, but syncategorematic concepts like ‘if’, ‘nevertheless’, ‘not’, ‘while’, and ‘is’, ‘runs’, ‘reads’ and the like are [also] called first intentions. This is because while, taken by themselves, they do not supposit for things, nevertheless when conjoined with other [terms] they make them supposit for things in different ways. For example, ‘every’ makes ‘man’ supposit and be distributed for all men in the proposition ‘Every man runs’. Yet the sign ‘every’ by itself signifies nothing, because [it] does not [signify] either an external thing or an intention of the soul.

But in the strict sense, precisely a mental name [that is] apt to be an extreme of a proposition and to supposit for a thing that is not a sign is called a first intention. For example, the concept of man, animal, substance, body — and in short, all the mental names that naturally signify things that are not signs.

[Second intention]

Likewise, taken in the broad sense, a concept of the soul is called a second intention if it signifies not only intentions of the soul that are natural signs of things (as first intentions are, taken strictly), but also can signify mental signs signifying by convention — say, mental syncategoremata. In this sense, perhaps, we have only a spoken [term] corresponding to a second intention.¹

But taken strictly, a concept is called a second intention if it precisely signifies first intentions that signify naturally, like ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘difference’, and others like that. For, just as the concept of man is predicated of all men, by saying ‘This man is a man’, ‘That man is a man’, and so on, so [too] a common concept that is a second intention is predicated of first intentions that supposit for things, by saying ‘Man is a species’, ‘Ass is a species’, ‘Whiteness is a species’, ‘Animal is a genus’, ‘Body is a genus’, ‘Quality is a genus’, in the way that one ‘name’ is predicated of different names by saying ‘Man is a name’, [and] ‘Whiteness is a name’.² And so a second intention naturally signifies first intentions, and can supposit for them in a proposition, just as

¹ I can make no sense the last part of this paragraph. According to what Ockham usually says, mental syncategoremata certainly do not signify by convention. And the last sentence of the paragraph seems completely unmotivated. The editor of the Latin text (ed. line 49) notes that for ‘only’ (non ... nisi) one manuscript has ‘name’, yielding: “we do not have a spoken name corresponding to a second intention”. This perhaps makes better sense. Two other manuscripts omit the ‘nisi’, resulting in pretty much the same meaning.

² The point of the simile is not clear. Perhaps it is simply that both the cases of second intentions and the case of ‘name’ involve propositions in which the subjects are not in personal supposition.
much as a first intention naturally signifies external things and can supposit for them.

[Article 2]

On the second point, some people say\(^3\) that first and second intentions are certain fictive entities that are only objectively in the mind and [are] nowhere subjectively.

To the contrary\(^4\): When a proposition is verified for things, if two things suffice for its truth, it is superfluous to posit another, third thing. But all propositions like ‘Man is understood’, ‘Man is a subject’ ‘Man is a predicate’, ‘Man is a species’, ‘Animal is a genus’ and the like, on account of which such fictive being is posited, are verified for things. And two things suffice — at least, [two] things truly and really existing suffice — for verifying all [of them]. Therefore, etc. The assumption is clear. For, positing the cognition of man in the intellect, it is impossible for ‘Man is understood’ to be false. Likewise, positing the intention of man in general and the intention of subject in general, and if the mental proposition ‘Man is a subject’ is formed, in which the one intention is predicated of the other, [then] it is necessary for the proposition ‘Man is a subject’ to be true — [even] without any fictum. Therefore, etc.

Moreover, such a fictum will get in the way of the cognition of the thing. Therefore, it is not to be posited on account of [that] cognition. The assumption is clear. For [the fictum] is not the cognition or the external cognized whiteness or both together, but rather a certain third [entity] midway between the cognition and the thing. In that case, when I form the mental proposition ‘God is three and one’, I do not understand God in himself but rather the fictum, which seems absurd.

Moreover, by the same reasoning [that leads to this view], God in understanding other [things] would understand such ficta. And so, from eternity, there was an arrangement of as many fictive beings as there can be.

---


different intelligible beings. These [fictive beings] are so necessary that God could not destroy them, which seems false.

Moreover, such a fictum is not to be posited in order to have a subject and a predicate in a universal proposition, because the act of understanding is enough for that. For the fictive being is just as singular, both in being and in representing, as is the act [of understanding].

This is clear from the fact that a fictum can be destroyed, while the other [entity] — the act — remains. For either the fictum depends essentially on the act or it does not. If it does, then when one act stops, the fictum is destroyed. Yet the fictum remains in another act. Consequently, there are two singular ficta, just as [there are] two acts. If it does not depend on this singular act, [then] neither consequently does it depend essentially on any [other] act of the same kind. And so the fictum will remain in objective being without any act, which is impossible.

Moreover, it is not a contradiction for God for make a universal cognition without such a fictum. For the cognition does not depend essentially on such a fictum. But it is a contradiction for an intellection to be posited in an intellect without anything that is understood. Therefore, [such a fictum] it not to be posited on account of a common intellection.

[Ockham’s reply]

Therefore, I say that both first intention and second intention are truly acts of understanding. For whatever can be saved by means of the fictum can be saved by means of the act, insofar as the act is a likeness of the object, can signify and supposit for external things, can be a subject and a predicate in a proposition, can be a genus, a species, etc., just as a fictum [can].

From this it is clear that first and second intention are really distinguished. For a first intention is an act of understanding that signifies things that are not signs. A second intention is an act of signifying first intentions. Therefore, they are distinguished.

To the main argument, it is clear from what has been said that both first and second intentions are truly real beings. For they are truly qualities existing subjectively in the intellect.

**Quodlibet 5, Question 12**

**Whether the universal is singular**

No. For every universal is predicated of several. A singular is predicated of one only. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary: Everything that is is singular. The universal is. Therefore, it is singular.
Here I first distinguish [the senses of the term] ‘singular’. Second, I will speak to the question.

[Article 1]

On the first point, I say that according to the philosopher\(^5\) ‘singular’, ‘individual’, [and] ‘suppositum’ are convertible names. I say this with respect to logicians, although according to theologians a suppositum is found only among substances, [whereas] the individual and the singular [are found] among accidents [too].

But speaking logically now, ‘singular’, and ‘individual’, are taken in three senses: (a) In one sense, that is called a singular which is numerically one thing and not several things. (b) In another sense, a thing outside the soul, which [thing] is one and not several and is not a sign of anything, is called a singular. (c) In a third sense, a sign proper to one [thing] is called a singular. This [last] is [also] called a “discrete term”.

This division is plain as far as its first two branches are concerned. The third branch is proved [as follows]: For Porphyry\(^6\) says that the individual is predicated of one only. This cannot be understood about a thing existing outside the soul — say, about Socrates — since a thing outside the soul is not in predicate position or in subject position, as is shown in another Quodlibet.\(^7\) Consequently, it is understood about some proper sign that it is predicated of one only, not for itself but for the thing.

Moreover, logicians\(^8\) say that the supposita of a common term are of two kinds: some per se, some by accident. For example: The per se supposita of the common term ‘white’ are this white [thing] and that white [thing]. The supposita by accident are Socrates and Plato. This cannot be understood about the Socrates who is outside the soul, because he is the sign of nothing. Because a thing outside the soul cannot be a suppositum of a common term, either per se or by accident, therefore ‘suppositum’ has to be taken for a term proper to one [thing only], which is called a “suppositum” because the common term is predicated of it, not for itself but for its significate.

---

\(^{5}\) This presumably does not refer here to Aristotle, but to “the typical philosopher”. The editor of the Latin text (ed., line 10) gives no reference.


\(^{7}\) Ockham, Quodlibet III, q. 12.19–59.

\(^{8}\) See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 22 (83a1–20); Ockham, Scriptum, d. 2, q. 3 (95.4–96.18).
In that case, there are two kinds of supposita for a common term: One kind *per se* — namely, demonstrative pronouns taken with the common term. For example, the *per se* supposita of the common term ‘white’ are ‘this white’ [and] ‘that white’. The supposita by accident are proper names — say, the name ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’.

There is a big difference between these [kinds of] supposita. For it is impossible for one contrary to be truly predicated of a *per se* suppositum of another contrary. For example, ‘This white is black’ is impossible. But it can quite well be predicated of a suppositum by accident, even though not while it is a suppositum of it. For example, if Socrates is white, still ‘Socrates is black’ is possible. This is because the same [thing] can be a suppositum by accident of two contraries, although not a suppositum *per se*. Therefore, etc.

[Article 2]

On the second point, I say that the universal is a singular and an individual in sense (a), because it is truly a singular quality of the mind, and is not several qualities. But in sense (b) it is not a singular, because in no way is any thing whatever outside the soul a universal. Likewise, the universal is not a singular in sense (c), because the universal is a natural or voluntary sign [that is] common to several and not only to one.

[The reply] to the main argument is clear from [these] statements.

*Quodlibet 5, Question 13*

**Whether every universal is a quality of the mind**

No. For the substance that is a most general genus is not a quality of the mind. Therefore, not every universal is a quality of the mind. The assumption is clear, because it is predicated univocally and *in quid* of a substance. Therefore, it is not a quality.

To the contrary: The universal is only in the soul. And not objectively, as was shown earlier. Therefore, subjectively. Therefore, it is a quality of the mind.

To this question, I say: Yes. The reason for this is that, as will be clear, the universal is not anything outside the soul. And it is certain that it is

---

9 not while: Reading ‘*non dum*’ for the edition’s ‘*nondum*’ (ed. lines 45–46).

10 Above, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 35.

11 The point is discussed in many places in *Quodlibets* V–VII. See also *Quodlibet V*, q. 12, above; *Summa logicae*, I, 15; *Scriptum*, d. 2, qq. 4–8.
not nothing. Therefore, it is something in the soul. Not just objectively, as was
proved earlier.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, subjectively. Consequently, it is a quality of the
mind.

\textbf{[Objection 1]}\textsuperscript{13}

But to the contrary: Given this, then all categories would be accidents.
Consequently, some accident would be superior to substance.

\textbf{[Objection 2]}

Moreover, the same [thing] is not predicated of diverse categories.
Consequently, quality is not common to all the categories.

\textbf{[Objection 3]}

Moreover, it follows that the same [thing] is superior to itself. For all
universals are in the genus of quality, according to this opinion, as [are] species
and individuals. Consequently, the category of quality is common to all uni-
versals. Consequently, the category of quality is common to itself. And so the
same [thing] is superior to itself.

\textbf{[Objection 4]}

Moreover, given this, one has to grant that the same [thing] signifies
itself and supposit for itself. For in the proposition ‘Every universal is a
being’, ‘being’ supposit personally for all universals. Consequently, it
suppositor for the universal that is ‘being’. So ‘being’ suppositors for itself.

Likewise, [taken] as it suppositor personally, it suppositor only for its
significates and it suppositors for itself. For otherwise the universal proposition
‘Every universal is a being’ would be false, because it would have a false
singular. Therefore, the same [thing] signifies itself.

\textbf{[Objection 5]}

Moreover, it follows that the same [thing] is superior and inferior with
respect to the same [thing]. For the universal ‘being’ is superior to the
categories. And it is inferior, because it is one individual in the genus of qual-
ity. Therefore, etc.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Quodlibet IV,} q. 35.

\textsuperscript{13} For these objections, except for the fourth, see Ockham’s \textit{Summa logicae,} I, 17 lines 25–32, 110–112, & 136.
[To Objection 1]

To the first of these, I grant\(^{14}\) that all universals are accidents. Yet not all [of them] are signs of accidents. Rather some universals are signs of substances only. And those accidents constitute the category of substance, [while] the other accidents constitute the other categories. I grant further that some accident that is only a sign of substances is per se superior to any substance. That is no more of a problem than saying that some utterance is a name of many substances, or signifies many substances.

[To Objection 2]

To the other [objection], I say\(^{15}\) that the same [thing] is not predicated of diverse categories when the categories stand personally and significatively. But when they supposit materially or simply, it is not incongruous for the same [thing] to be predicated of diverse categories. Hence, if in the proposition ‘Substance is a quality’ the subject supposits materially or simply, [the proposition] is true. Likewise ‘Quantity is a quality’. But if [the subjects] supposit materially, then [the propositions] are not true. Hence, just as the two propositions ‘Substance is an utterance’ [and] ‘Quantity is an utterance’ are true if the subjects supposit materially and simply and not significatively, so it is in the present case [too].

[To Objection 3]

To the other [objection], I say\(^{16}\) that the same [thing] is not superior and inferior to itself. For in order for something to be superior to another, a distinction between them is required, [and it is also required] that the superior signify more than the inferior [does]. Therefore, I say that not all universal are per se inferior to the common [term] ‘quality’, even though all universals are qualities. For the universal ‘quality’ is a quality. Yet it is not inferior to ‘quality’ — rather it is that.

Suppose you say\(^{17}\): It follows at least that spiritual quality of the mind is in more than, and superior to, any category. For it is predicated of all categories, and no category is predicated of all categories. Therefore, etc.


\(^{15}\) *Ibid.*, lines 111–120.


I reply\(^\text{18}\): A spiritual quality of the mind is not predicated of all categories taken significatively and personally, but only taken for signs. Therefore, it does not follow that quality is in more than, or superior to, any category. For superiority and inferiority between [things] is taken from the fact that the one taken significatively is predicated of more than the other taken significatively [is]. And this is not so for every spiritual quality that is universal. Nevertheless, some [such quality], like the concept of being, is predicated of more than any category [is].

[To Objection 4]

To the other [objection], I say\(^\text{19}\) that the conclusion is to be granted, that the same [thing] signifies itself, that the same [thing] supposits for itself, that the same [thing] is predicated univocally of itself. For example, in the proposition ‘Every utterance is a being’, the subject supposits for every utterance, and so it supposits for the utterance ‘utterance’, and it signifies it and is predicated univocally of it.

[To Objection 5]

To the other [objection], I say\(^\text{20}\) that there is the same difficulty here as with the name ‘word’ and the name ‘name’. For the name ‘word’ is one of the contents under ‘name’, because the name ‘word’ is a name, and not every name is the name ‘word’. Nevertheless, the name ‘word’ is in a certain way superior to all names, and consequently to the name ‘name’. For the name ‘name’ is a word. But not every word is a name. And so the same [thing], with respect to the same [thing], is [both] inferior and superior.

Therefore, I say for both cases that the argument would be conclusive if in all the propositions from which the conclusion is predicated,\(^\text{21}\) the terms supposited uniformly. But that is not so in the case at hand. For ‘being’, when it is predicated of the categories, supposits personally, not simply or materially. But [taken] as it is an individual [in the category of] quality, it supposits materially and simply.

But we are taking both ‘being’ and ‘quality’ significatively. In that case, ‘being’ is simply superior, because it signifies more. And in that sense it is not inferior to quality and [is] not an individual in [that category]. Nevertheless, if


\(^{\text{21}}\) predicated: Thus in ed. line 104.
that is called “inferior” of which, supposing in some way, there is predicated [something] else that is also predicated of several [other things], even though it would not be predicated of it if supposited otherwise — especially if it is taken universally — in that case it can be granted that the same [thing], with respect to the same [thing], is [both] superior and inferior. But in that case ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ are not opposites but [only] disparate.

[The reply] to the main argument is clear from what has already been stated.
Index of Names

This is the first stab at an index to all the above material. It is woefully inadequate: First, it’s only an “Index of Names” to begin with. And it’s an incomplete one at that. But never mind; it may be of some use anyway.

A
Adams, Marilyn McCord, 83
Aristotle, 11, 18, 21, 28, 31, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42, 45, 67, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 91, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 107, 111, 113, 117, 119, 138, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 157, 158, 159, 168, 170, 175, 181
Augustine, 37, 55, 78, 102, 104, 105, 108, 134, 159, 173
Averroes, 85, 101, 102, 106, 147, 153, 169, 170, 172, 173
Avicenna, 28, 73, 101, 110, 144, 148, 169

B
Boethius, 9, 10, 15, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 66, 69, 70, 71, 76, 81, 89, 112, 181
Bolyard, Charles, 75
Bourke, Vernon J., 102
Braakhuis, H. A. G., 116
Brandt, Samuel, 32, 43, 76, 81, 112
Brown, Stephen F., 33, 143, 157, 168
Bruni, Girardo, 35
Busse, Adolf, 9, 10, 41, 75, 80, 81, 96, 181

C
Charlemagne, 55
Cicero, 50, 51, 52, 69, 70, 71
Clarenbald of Arras, 69, 70
Corvino, Francesco, 55, 56
Cousin, Victor, 24

D
De Rijk, Lambert, 65
Dod, Bernard G., 117
Dominic Gundissalinus, 73
Dressler, Hermigild, 55
Durand of St. Pourçain, 35, 36

F
Fridugisus of Tours, 55

G
Gál, Gedeon, 35, 37, 121, 123, 143, 145, 157, 166, 179
Gennaro, Concettina, 55
Geyer, Berhnard, 21, 22, 23, 24, 65
Gilbert of Poitiers, 35, 69, 70
Giles of Rome, 28, 35, 37
Godfrey of Fontaines, 28, 29

H
Hauréau, B., 35
Henry of Ghent, 27, 32, 135
Herrán, Carlos M., 9, 11
Hervaeus Natalis, 35, 166

J
James of Viterbo, 36
John Duns Scotus, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 37, 43, 73, 76, 110, 135, 144, 149, 151, 157, 159, 181
Joscelin of Soissons, 19

K
King, Peter O., 19, 21, 23
Kretzmann, Norman, 89, 117

L
La Croce, Ernesto, 9, 11

M
Maurer, Armand, 52, 124
McKeon, Richard, 21, 23
Meiser, Carolus, 45
Migne, Jacques-Paul, 55, 61